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Abstract 
The aim of this anthropologically informed qualitative study was to explore the 
primary cultural issues in mental health student nurses’ clinical placements and to 
explore how these issues in placements were dealt with, from the perspectives of 
years two and three mental health student nurses and their undergraduate university 
nursing educators. ‘Critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic 
interviews (Spradley, 1979) were undertaken with a self-selected and purposive 
sample of 36 second and third year mental health nursing branch students, and 7 
undergraduate mental health nursing branch educators across four nursing 
education centres in northern England. Member checking at descriptive and 
analytical levels was carried out, and these checks allowed for further exploration 
with the research participants to take place. Thematic analysis revealed that the 
primary issue to emerge from participants’ ‘critical incident’ accounts of cultural 
issues in clinical placements were problems with differentiating psychopathology 
from culturally validated phenomena. This issue relates to the clinical anthropological 
concept of the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986), 
and was particularly associated with concerns around assessing the clinical 
significance of service users’ religious beliefs, experiences, or practices. The clinical 
implications presented by this dilemma seemed to be exacerbated by a shortfall in 
culture specific knowledge, structural organisational issues, and the professional 
ideological orientation of the placement setting. Whilst the participants mentioned 
some strategies for dealing with the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma, one 
of the key lessons to be drawn from the ‘critical incident’ data is that student nurses 
and their colleagues in clinical placement should be encouraged to view the 
experiences of their service users in context. In the absence of previous empirical 
research on the ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) of mental health 
student nurses, this explorative study clarifies the importance of cultural issues and 
the theoretical base of clinical anthropology and cultural psychiatry to mental health 
nursing.   
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Introduction to the Thesis 
Introduction 
This PhD thesis describes the reported ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 
1992) of undergraduate mental health nurses. The purpose of this anthropologically 
informed (Sobo, 2009) study was to explore the primary cultural issues which 
emerged in pre-registered mental health student nurses’ clinical placements and how 
these issues in clinical placements were dealt with or addressed, from the 
perspectives of years two/three undergraduate mental health student nurses and 
their university nursing educators. In this introductory chapter, the impetus for the 
study, the research purpose and questions, the significance of the study, and the 
overall narrative of the background, methodology, and findings chapters are 
discussed.   
The Impetus for the Study 
The original intention was to explore the meaning of ‘cultural competence’ for 
undergraduate mental health student nurses. My interest in cultural competence and 
its implications for nursing practice was stimulated by work which I had completed for 
a Masters degree in medical anthropology at the Department of Global Studies, 
University of Sussex. The term itself has received much attention and interest in 
health professional (e.g., Sue, et al., 1982; Sue and Sue, 1990; Kim, 1991), nursing 
(e.g., Culley, 2001; 2006; Holland and Hogg, 2010) and policy circles (Department of 
Health, 2005). Its essence was also vaguely defined in the ‘Nursing and Midwifery 
Council Code of Professional Conduct’ (2008), which stated that nurses should  
protect the interests and dignity of service users, irrespective of their gender, race, 
ability, sexuality, economic status, lifestyle, religious, and cultural beliefs. Moreover, 
cultural competence has increasingly been seen as a requisite for quality service 
provision and “good client outcomes” (Yule, 2008, p. 37).   
Thus, it appeared to be an opportune moment to explore the meaning of this much 
debated concept and its implications for clinical practice with undergraduate mental 
health student nurses. However, during the early months of studying for the PhD, it 
became clear that the aims of the study would have to change if I was to continue 
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my interest in examining the role of culture in pre-registered mental health student 
nurses’ clinical placements. After reading a considerable amount of relevant 
literature and speaking to a number of academics in the topic area, the impression I 
had gained was that there was little if any consensus about how cultural competence 
could be defined and operationalized into clinical practice (Kleinman and Benson, 
2006; Bhui and Bhugra, 2007; Bhui, et al., 2007). In fact, ‘cultural competence’ still 
seems to be largely a theoretical concept (Fernando, 2009; Bakhsh, 2010) divorced 
from the lived experience of mental health services.       
Furthermore, despite the critical importance of culture in nearly every aspect of 
mental illness, including its definition and “what constitutes ‘normal’, expected, and 
adaptive behaviour” (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a, p. 1), the empirical base about the role 
of culture in the clinical work of mental health student nurses is extremely limited. To 
my knowledge, no empirical studies specifically have explored how the issue of 
culture is experienced and addressed in pre-registered mental health student nurses’ 
clinical placements. Thus, rather than trying to understand a topic which currently 
may not have any real meaning (i.e., ‘cultural competence’) or impact at the clinical 
level of nursing, the starting point for exploring the role of culture in student nurses 
placement settings was to identify the primary cultural issues and to investigate the 
ways these issues were responded to in clinical practice.                
Research Purpose and Questions   
The aim of this study was to explore the primary cultural issues in pre-registered 
mental health student nurses’ clinical placements and how these issues in clinical 
placements were dealt with, from the perspectives of years two/three undergraduate 
psychiatric student nurses and their university nursing educators. It explored the 
‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) narratives of pre-registered mental health student 
nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), and presents the cultural 
issues which the research participants viewed as important. By focusing on how 
these cultural issues in placement settings were dealt with or addressed, this 
research also presents the perceived needs of pre-registered mental health student 
nurses engaged in ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ and suggests strategies that will 
begin to meet those needs. The generation of ‘critical incident’ data and the thematic 
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analysis centred on providing answers to the following two research questions: 1) 
what are the primary cultural issues in pre-registered mental health student nurses’ 
clinical placements? 2) How are the primary cultural issues in pre-registered mental 
health student nurses’ clinical placements dealt with?   
Significance of Study 
An almost exclusive focus of empirical research to date has been on the 
perspectives of registered nurses engaged in cross-cultural clinical encounters (e.g., 
Murphy and Clark, 1993; Osborne, 1995; Baldonado, et al., 1998; Kim, 1998; 
Spence, 1999; Boi, 2000; Gerrish, 2000; 2001; Cioffi, 2003; Narayanasamy, 2003; 
Ozolins and Hjelm, 2003; Cortis, 2004; Gerrish, Chau, Sobowale and Birks, 2004; 
Cioffi, 2005; 2006; Hultsjo and Hjelm, 2005; Berlin, Johansson and Tornkvist, 2006; 
Vydelingum, 2006; Peckover and Chidlaw, 2007; Pergert, Ekblad, Enskar and Bjork, 
2007; Pergert, 2008; Tuohy, Mccarthy, Cassidy and Graham, 2008; Berlin, 2010). 
Indeed, studies which have explored the clinical interactions of undergraduate 
student nurses in cross-cultural situations (see Gerrish, Husband and MacKenzie, 
1996; Lundberg, Backstrom and Widen, 2005; Jirwe, 2008; Jirwe, Gerrish and 
Emami, 2010) are extremely rare. Moreover, to my knowledge, no studies have 
specifically explored these kinds of clinical encounters in the context of mental health 
student nursing. Whilst some cultural issues can be expected to arise across the 
different undergraduate nursing specialisms, each specialism may present specific 
issues and challenges for students working in that particular area. Therefore, this 
study broadens the understanding of and focuses on pre-registered mental health 
student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) in placement 
settings.        
The hope is that this explorative research will clarify the importance of cultural issues 
and clinical anthropology to mental health theory and practice within undergraduate 
nursing programs. This may then help to set the foundations for informing the clinical 
practice of student nurses in mental health service settings. Furthermore, as student 
nurses work in the context of the multidisciplinary mental health team (Bonham, 
2004), the study findings may not only be of relevance to mental health nursing, but 
also other professional groups. Few if any of the findings are exclusively relevant to 
15 
 
the clinical practice of mental health student nurses. Many of the ‘critical incident’ 
(Fitzgerald, 2000) stories which the research participants shared with me involved 
people from other mental health professions and disciplines. Culturally appropriate 
healthcare is something that should concern all those working in the ‘professional 
sector’ (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) of mental health services.        
This study also moved away from the traditional research focus on nurses’ 
encounters with service users from specific minority ethnic or immigrant 
backgrounds. Rather, the expectation was that the research would reveal some 
broader insights into ‘professional’ understandings of health and illness and the 
clinical interaction (Lambert and Sevak, 1996; Carpenter-Song, Nordquest Schwallie 
and Longhofer, 2007). In this research project, all mental health student nurses’ 
clinical encounters with service users were conceptualised as ‘multicultural clinical 
interactions’ involving the multiple interplay of cultures, medical systems, and frames 
of reference (Tebutt and Wade, 1985; Hoeman, 1989; Fitzgerald, 1992; Fitzgerald, et 
al., 1997a).  
Structure of the Thesis     
Foundations (Setting the Scene)   
Background chapters 1, 2 and 3 focus on the philosophical, theoretical and 
conceptual underpinnings of the research. The first background chapter provides a 
discussion of the constructionist philosophical perspective; the meaning-centred 
medical anthropological approach (Good and Good, 1981); an understanding of the 
important, but contested concepts of culture and family; a definition of clinical 
placement; and a detailed examination of Arthur Kleinman’s (1978; 1980; 1984) 
‘health care systems model’ and Maureen Fitzgerald’s (1992; 2000) related concepts 
of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ and ‘culture general competency’. I make the 
case that pre-registered mental health student nurses’ clinical interactions in 
placement settings involve the interplay of multiple cultures (Fitzgerald, 1992), 
medical systems (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984), and frames of reference (Tebbutt 
and Wade, 1985).      
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In background chapter 2-‘Disease-Illness Perspectives, Explanatory Model (EM) 
Transactions, Conceptions of Self, and Multicultural Clinical Interactions’-I describe 
how key concepts from the meaning-centred medical anthropological paradigm can 
inform the interpretation of pre-registered mental health student nurses’ encounters 
with service users in clinical placement. This involves a discussion of the ‘etic’ and 
‘emic’ perspectives (Skultans and Cox, 2000); the anthropological distinction 
between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 1977); conceptions of ‘self’ (Seeley,   
2006); the concept of ‘explanatory model’ (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978); 
‘cultural theories of illness’ (Helman, 2000; 2007); the problematic clinical concept of 
‘insight’ (Saravanan, et al., 2004; Jacob, 2010); and a critique of the ‘explanatory 
model’ construct.   
The final background chapter (3)-‘Abnormality or Normality: The Normative 
Uncertainty Evaluation Dilemma’ (Good and Good, 1986)-is concerned with the 
major difficulties that mental health practitioners face when having “to determine 
whether particular behaviours or forms of experience are abnormal and therefore a 
symptom of illness or simply different but normal within the patient’s own cultural 
context” (p. 11). This chapter was included at a much later date than the two 
previous background chapters. In particular, I carried out additional research on this 
subject, as it became clear that the issues arising from the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma was a central theme of participants’ narratives. A review of this 
research is contained within separate but overlapping sections of this background 
chapter. These sections include: a definition of religion and spirituality; a discussion 
of the ‘culture’ or ‘psychopathology’ clinical dilemma and the pathologisation of 
religion in mental health service contexts; a description of the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma and the ‘category fallacy’ error (Kleinman, 1977; 1988a); and an 
understanding of the relationship of spiritual/religious issues with matters of 
diagnosis and assessment. The final sections contextualise the ‘normative 
uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma within the rationality and cultural relativism debate 
(Hollis and Lukes, 1982) and the criteria for evaluating ‘abnormality’. However, it is 
noted that the ‘absolutist’/‘universalist’ (rationalist) (Offer and Sabshin, 1966) 
biomedical model dominates the professional sector of mental health services in the 
UK today. These three background chapters set the scene for the chapter on 
methodology and provide important context for the findings chapters. 
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The Methodological Direction 
Chapter 4 gives an in-depth description of the anthropologically informed research 
design (Sobo, 2009) and the qualitative strategy used in the study. Stories are 
integral to culture (Kleinman, 1988b; Mattingly, 1998a; b) and its understanding, and 
they are the mainstay of what anthropologically informed research collects and 
analyses. Participants’ storied accounts of pre-registered mental health student 
nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) was based on ‘critical 
incident’ narratives (Fitzgerald, 2000). ‘Critical incidents’ are a subset of the narrative 
technique (Aranda and Street, 2001; McCance, McKenna and Boore, 2001; 
Schaefer, 2002); and this study drew on Fitzgerald’s (2000) adaptation of Brislin and 
colleagues’ (Brislin, 1981; 1990; 2000; Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie and Yong, 1986; 
Brislin and Yoshida, 1994) definition and meaning of the term.        
The relevancy of the ‘critical incident’ approach to the study’s objectives is then 
considered. In particular, this approach elicits meanings ascribed to specific 
experiences and events by guided reflection (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a); focuses on 
the immediacy of experience (Fitzgerald, 2001); generates ‘thick descriptions’ 
(Geertz, 1973); and may help to uncover the tacit dimensions of clinical practice 
(Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997). Furthermore, the approach has shown real utility in the 
study of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Arthur, 2001; 
2004; Fortune, 2002; Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Whiteford and McAllister, 
2006; McAllister, et al., 2006; Lovering, 2008; Yule, 2008; McAllister and Whiteford, 
2008). The chapter goes on to critically evaluate the various qualitative methods by 
which critical incident data has been generated, and justification is given for applying 
the ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic interview (Spradley, 
1979) to the concerns of the study.    
The latter half of chapter 4 details the access arrangements, ethical protocols, 
recruitment of the participants, the characteristics of participants, data collection 
procedures, member checking and analytical strategies. Pre-registered (years two 
and three) mental health student nurses were self-selected from four nursing 
education centres attached to a university nursing school in the north of England. A 
purposive sample of undergraduate mental health nursing educators also was 
selected from the academic faculty of this University nursing school. Thirty six 
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transcripts of ‘critical incident’ focused ethnographic interviews with the pre-
registered mental health student nurse participants were collected. In addition to 
participating in an interview, a third year student volunteered to write a critical 
incident narrative. Furthermore, the data set included seven transcripts of ‘critical 
incident’ focused ethnographic interviews conducted with the nursing educators.   
In the interview sessions, I asked the student nurse participants to describe a 
particular situation they had experienced or heard about during clinical placement 
where they believed that culture was important to that situation. I also asked the 
student participants to describe how that important cultural issue in that particular 
situation was dealt with.  Similarly, I asked the nursing educator participants to talk in 
depth about a particular situation where culture was an issue for a pre-registered 
mental health student nurse in clinical placement. In addition, the nursing educator 
participants described how that issue was dealt with. By using Spradley’s (1979) 
typology of ethnographic style questions, further questions were used to elicit more 
information (expansion) or for clarification purposes.        
Member checking at descriptive (Seale, 1999) and analytical levels (Sobo, 2009) 
was carried out, and these checks allowed for further understanding to take place. 
Justification is given for choosing the focus group method for the analytical stage of 
member checking. The participants who were able to attend a focus group session 
were then separated into three groups. Participants were asked to evaluate whether 
the themes presented in a summary findings report reflected their own experiences. 
Finally, the process of the thematic analysis is outlined.   
Findings 
Participants’ ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) stories conveyed a sense of ‘thick 
description’ (Geertz, 1973) and are extensively drawn upon in the four findings 
chapters. The first findings chapter (Chapter 5) is about the reported difficulties that 
pre-registered mental health student nurses and their colleagues in clinical 
placement encountered when having to assess the clinical significance of religious 
phenomenology. Assessing the clinical significance of religious beliefs, experiences, 
and behaviours was seen by many of the participants as being particularly 
problematic. In a few cases, the student nurse participants mentioned that the 
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cultural validation of such phenomena made them question the clinical assessment 
that the service user lacked insight. These difficulties are related to Good and 
Good’s (1986) concept of the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma, which is 
defined in the final background chapter (3).      
The first findings chapter also examines some of the perceived reasons for these 
assessment and differential diagnosis (Dein, 2000) difficulties. In particular, there 
was a perception among some of the participants that pre-registered mental health 
student nurses lacked the culture specific knowledge to make informed assessments 
about the clinical significance of religious phenomenology. Formal education about 
the ‘specific’ beliefs and practices of religious groups and informational resources 
with culture specific content were recommended as ways of overcoming knowledge 
deficits. I then identify the problems involved in using culture specific knowledge to 
inform the assessment process, by drawing on the relevant academic literature.  
Not only were participants able to identify the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation 
dilemma as an important issue in pre-registered mental health student nurses’ 
clinical placements, but many of them could see its implications for clinical practice 
and their service users. These implications are the subject of the second findings 
chapter (6). In many cases, the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma resulted 
in clinical assessment errors (Minas, 1990; Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Andary, Stolk 
and Klimidis, 2003; Stolk, 2009).The misinterpretation of culturally validated 
phenomenology as psychopathological phenomena (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, 
Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and 
Williamson, 1997) was the most commonly reported assessment error by the 
participants. These errors are linked to a ‘culture blind’ (Fernando, 2002; 2010) 
approach to clinical assessment and practice. The ‘culture blind’ approach was the 
consequence of poor standards of care, the professional culture of the placement 
setting, and the political economy of care. The decontextualisation of service users’ 
experiences had negative impacts on the experiences of care and the 
appropriateness of psychiatric treatment given.    
As the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma was the primary issue to emerge 
from the thematic analysis, it should not be surprising that the participants focused 
on how this issue was dealt with in clinical placement settings. Chapters 7 and 8 
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therefore, are more orientated to the second research question of this study. In 
chapter 7, I describe how mental health student nurses’ drew on the assessment 
criterion of ‘outcomes’ (Jackson and Fulford, 1997) to inform their decision-making 
about the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma. The criterion of outcomes is 
defined at the beginning of chapter 7. More specifically, the participants’ reports 
focused on three dimensions of the criterion of ‘outcomes’-the ‘impact on 
functioning’, ‘the assessment of risk’, and the ‘emotional valence’ of the service 
user’s experience. The academic literature is drawn on in discussing the utility of the 
criterion of outcomes in differentiating psychopathology from religious/culturally 
sanctioned experiences. Two other assessment strategies were raised by the 
participants and they are discussed in the latter sections of chapter 7. These two 
strategies were categorised in the thematic analysis as ‘relying on intuition’ and 
‘religious coping and psychopathology’.                                                                                                          
Despite the constraints of the professional culture of the placement setting and the 
political economy of care more broadly, some of the participants mentioned that 
attempts were made to assess phenomena in their (perceived) cultural context. 
These assessment strategies and the issues which they raised for the participants is 
the focus of chapter 8. This chapter specifically looks at how some pre-registered 
mental health student nurses drew on their own stocks of cultural knowledge, and 
sought out the advice of culturally informed staff colleagues, (the service user’s) 
family members, or religious group spokespersons when trying to distinguish 
psychopathology from culturally normative phenomena. The medical anthropological 
literature on ‘cultural brokerage’ (Weidman, 1982; 1983; Willigen, 2002; Lo, 2010), 
‘explanatory models’ (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978), and ‘clinical 
recognition’ (Carpenter-Song, 2011) provides the contextual backdrop for the 
discussion of these assessment strategies. Finally, in the conclusion, the key 
findings are summarised and the implications of the study for curriculum 
development and the clinical practice of pre-registered mental health student nurses 
are discussed. Recommendations for further research are also proposed in the study 
conclusion.     
Summary 
21 
 
This introductory chapter gave an overview of the context, significance and structure 
of the study. The basic assumption of this research is that all pre-registered mental 
health student nurses’ clinical interactions with service users in placement settings 
are ‘multicultural’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). I now turn to the first background chapter, which 
provides important details about the philosophical, theoretical and conceptual 
foundations of the study.  
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Chapter 1                                                                                      
Philosophical, Theoretical and Conceptual Foundations 
Introduction 
This background chapter sets out some of the main philosophical, theoretical and 
conceptual foundations of this research study. The cultural constructionist 
philosophical perspective (Gaines, 1991; 1992) and meaning centred theoretical 
paradigm (Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; Good, 1994) that underpins this 
study is explained and justified.  Culture is a key concept in this study; and therefore 
its various meanings and dimensions are outlined, and a ‘mentalist’ 
conceptualisation of culture is adopted (Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1996; 
Fitzgerald, Williamson and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1998). A distinction also is made 
between client attachment and location-based clinical placements (Callaghan, 
Cooper and Gray, 2007). Kleinman’s (1978; 1980; 1984) ‘health care systems’ model 
provided the heuristic model for understanding pre-registered mental health student 
nurses’ clinical encounters with service users. These encounters are conceptualised 
as ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), as the provision of care to 
every service user, regardless of their ethnic identity, involves the interplay of 
multiple cultures (Hoeman, 1989; Hannah, 2011; Good, Hannah and Willen, 2011). 
The concept of multicultural clinical interactions is then discussed in the context of 
culture general competency (Fitzgerald, 2000).  
All people exist in contexts of human relationships (Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 
2002); and so the student nurse is almost never dealing just with the service user. 
Other people such as the service user’s family members may be involved in care, 
help seeking, and decision making (Chrisman, 1977). Previous research has 
indicated the centrality of the family to the everyday discourse of health and social 
services professionals (Whybrow, Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1996; 
Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; 2001; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; 
Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Russell, et al., 2002; Fitzgerald, 2004; Seeley, 
2006; Galanti, 2008). Thus, the cultural meaning of family will be addressed in this 
chapter. Pre-registered mental health student nurses also work in multidisciplinary 
mental health team settings (Bonham, 2004), and so many of their ‘multicultural 
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clinical interactions’ involve co-workers from different professional backgrounds. 
Values are discussed as an important dimension of culture (Winkelman, 1999; 
2005); and in the health sciences (Anderson, 1985; 1987; 1990; Thorne, 1993; 
Seeley, 2004; 2005; 2006; Stolk, 2009) and medical anthropological literature 
(Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Bonder, 
Martin and Miracle, 2001; 2002; 2004; Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Galanti, 
2008), institutional, professional, and personal values are seen as exerting an 
important influence on health practitioners clinical interactions.   
A Cultural Constructionist Philosophical Perspective    
The purpose of this study was to understand the cultural issues and the responses to 
these issues as they emerged in pre-registered mental health student nurses’ clinical 
placements. A cultural constructionist (Gaines, 1991; 1992) philosophical 
perspective was used to construct the meaning of these issues and responses from 
student nurses’ and their nursing educators’ perspectives. A cultural constructionist 
epistemology is subjectivist, as meaning is actively constructed and interpreted 
through an interactive process (Schwandt, 1994; 2000; Davies, 1999; Jenkins and 
Barrett, 2003). Allied to this epistemological perspective is the view that human 
behaviour is purposive, intentional, and directed towards goals (Mishler, 1981). 
Human practices are imbued with culturally based normative expectations that 
embody ideas about what one can reasonably expect in relation to other people’s 
behaviour and actions (Koch, 1994; Bailey, 1997). The ontological position of cultural 
constructionism is relativistic, as social actors are seen to construct ‘reality’ in a 
myriad of different ways (Bailey, 1997; Crotty, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
According to the nursing theorist Tina Koch (1999, p. 25), “‘truth’ is defined as the 
best informed and most sophisticated construction on which there is consensus”. 
Thus, there can be no foundational basis for human experience or knowledge 
generation (Hollis, 1994; Willis, 2007).  
In the cultural constructionist approach, the inter-subjective symbolic forms that 
mediate human experience and knowledge are both historically and culturally 
situated (Geertz, 1973; Good, 1994). Inter-subjective forms also are constructed 
through the medium of shared language, practices and understandings (Schwandt, 
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1994; 2000). It is these inter-subjective symbolic forms that are drawn upon by 
participants in ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). Professional 
values, the organisational context of clinical placement, and student nurses’ own 
personal orientations to culture informed the understanding of cultural issues and 
responses to these issues in clinical placement settings. Another defining feature of 
the cultural constructionist perspective (Gaines, 1991; 1992) is the attempt to gain 
meaning and understanding from situations and actions by interpretations and 
explanations of behaviours, rather than seeking cause and effect relationships 
(Mackenzie, 1994).     
A Meaning-Centred Approach 
This study adopted a meaning-centred medical anthropological theoretical approach 
(Good and Good, 1981; Good, 1994). Such an approach is appropriate, given its 
congruence with the cultural constructionist perspective (Gaines, 1991; 1992) of this 
study. Within the meaning-centred approach there are two underlying assumptions 
about the way meaning is created and presented (Good, 1994). Firstly, meaning is 
established as a network of symbols and language that provides the interpretive 
framework that is used to construct personal, social, and clinical realities (Good and 
Good, 1981). Secondly, networks of meanings are “the metaphors associated with 
disease, the ethnomedical theories, and the basic values and conceptual forms, and 
the care patterns that shape the experience of the illness and the social reactions of 
the sufferer in a given society” (Good and Good, 1981, p. 176). As Good and Good 
(1981) add, all illness episodes should be seen as fundamentally semantic (i.e., 
meaningful) and all clinical interactions should be seen as fundamentally 
hermeneutic. In a meaning-centred approach, the critical psychological mode of 
experiencing is ‘verstehen’ (to understand) rather than ‘wissen’ (to know), or 
‘erklaren’ (to explain) (Gaines, 1982a).    
The practitioner, service user, and any other participants involved in a ‘multicultural 
clinical interaction’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), should be seen as engaged in the 
interpretation of the context of the interaction (as symbolic itself) and of the symbolic 
forms manipulated by other participants in the interaction (Gaines, 1982a). In all 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), meanings are brought to and 
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exchanged by participants through the employment of patterned and idiosyncratic 
symbolic forms (Good and Good, 1981). Symbols are seen as embodiments of 
meaning and are such things as words, acts, events, and gestures (Geertz, 1973). In 
this study I focus only upon student nurses’ understandings, and nursing educators’ 
interpretations of student nurses’ understandings of service users’ semantic illness 
realities (Good and Good, 1981). It was necessary to leave aside from consideration 
the fundamentally semantic nature of service users’ illness episodes to focus fully 
upon the construction of ‘clinical reality’ (Kleinman, 1980) from student nurses’ and 
their nursing educators’ perspectives.    
When student nurses’ multicultural clinical interactions are considered as 
fundamentally hermeneutic (Good and Good, 1981), we are led to a focus on 
meaning and understanding. We need to consider the meanings of service users’ 
presented illness beliefs and behaviours from the perspectives of student nurses. 
Student nurses are also involved in the active interpretation of other meaningful 
symbols that may manifest themselves in ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ 
(Fitzgerald, 1992).These meaningful symbols may relate to such things as 
physiognomy, the significance of service users’ domains of discourse, styles of self-
presentation, service users’ insight into their mental illnesses, speech styles, and 
linguistic competence, gender, and a host of other characteristics.                                                                                                                                                                                  
The Meaning of ‘Culture’ 
In the disciplinary field of anthropology entire books have been devoted to the 
meaning of culture (e.g., Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1953). Despite its ubiquity in 
academic and popular discourses, anthropologists have been unable to agree on a 
single definition, which brings to mind Clifford Geertz’s (1973) classic assertion that 
the concept of culture “obscures a good deal more than it reveals” (p. 4). Typically, 
anthropological definitions of culture have taken a ‘materialist’ (totalist) (Avruch and 
Black, 1991; 1993; Krefting, 1991b) or ‘mentalist’ perspective (Fitzgerald and 
Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1996; Fitzgerald, Williamson and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1998), 
although some scholars have tried to integrate the two perspectives (Hahn, 1995; 
Ember, Ember and Peregrine, 2002). The two perspectives often are distinguished 
by their understandings of how culture functions (Vivelo, 1978; Armstrong and 
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Fitzgerald, 1996). The materialist perspective deals with the ‘products of culture’- the 
observed ‘patterns of behaviour’ and the possessions and symbols of a particular 
group (Keesing and Keesing, 1971; Fitzgerald, 1991). In contrast, in the mentalist 
approach, culture is perceived as a “shared system of rules or a pattern for 
behaviour” (Keesing and Keesing, 1971, p. 20), and a “conceptual code” (Fitzgerald, 
Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997, p. 18) that people use to “order 
their perceptions and experiences and make decisions, and in terms of which they 
act” (Vivelo, 1978, p. 17). Culture as conceptualised in the mentalist perspective is 
closely associated with the concept of ‘consciousness’ and addresses “assumptions 
and presuppositions that individuals and groups hold about the world” (Avruch and 
Black, 1991, p. 27-28).    
Another widely accepted approach to unpacking the meaning of culture has been to 
set out its agreed dimensions (Haviland, 1997; Keesing and Strathern, 1998; Yule, 
2008). A careful study of these dimensions helps in understanding the influence and 
function of culture in pre-registered mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural 
clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). The majority of anthropologists would accept 
that culture is learned (Levine, 1987; Ember and Ember, 1988; 1992; Lynch and 
Hanson, 1992; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995). In other 
words, humans are not born with a particular cultural genetic blueprint; rather, culture 
is learnt through the processes of socialisation and enculturation (Goodenough, 
1981; Litterst, 1985). ‘Enculturation’ refers to the acquisition of cultural knowledge 
that allows an individual to function effectively as a member of society (Chrisman 
and Johnson, 1996). The primary means of cultural transmission occurs through the 
processes of observation, social interaction and discourse (Bonder, Martin and 
Miracle, 2004).     
Culture also is considered to be a set of shared patterns of perceiving, adapting, 
interacting, and behaving towards others and the environment (Domini-Lenhoff and 
Hedrick, 2000; Stewart, 2002). The sharing of culture leads to expectations and 
enables one to predict how others are likely to behave in a given situation or 
interaction (Ajjawi and Rees, 2008). Culture is not a ‘one size fits all concept’ (Harris, 
2004), as although culture is both learned and shared, it is not replicated in the same 
way in each individual person. Each person possesses an individual variation that 
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has been influenced by his or her personal attributes and experiences (Kennedy, 
1997; Dreher and MacNaughton, 2002; Leavitt, 2002). It also is said that culture 
encompasses a person’s beliefs, values and norms (Armstrong and Fitzgerald, 1996; 
Purnell and Paulanka, 1998; Winkelman, 1999; 2005).    
Values refer to learned beliefs that relate to a person’s preference for particular ways 
of behaving and ‘end states of being’ (Rokeach, 1973). Rokeach (1979, p. 2) defined 
the cultural dimension of values as “core conceptions of the desirable within every 
individual and society” and as standards that steer not only behaviour, but also 
“judgement, choice, attitude, evaluation, argument, exhortation, rationalization and 
one might add attribution of causality”. Values therefore, convey a cognitive and 
emotional load (Fitzgerald, et al., 1996) and their violation usually generates 
emotionally charged responses (Sanchez, 1964; Williams, 1968; Porter and 
Samovar, 1994). They can be stated overtly or be inferred from non-verbal behaviour 
(Robinson, 1998), and are affected by the stage of the life course (Winkelman, 1999; 
2005). Values are reflective of a cultural pattern or system and are intertwined with 
worldviews and standards of morality (Winkelman, 1999; 2005). However, they are 
also idiosyncratic, as intracultural variations in the pattern of values are exhibited and 
people continually reconsider these patterns for their degree of personal relevance 
(Bonder, Miracle and Martin, 2002). Religious teachings are a cultural embodiment 
of values and can have important influences upon behaviour by providing ultimate 
justifications and prescriptions about one’s relationship to nature and other people 
(Winkelman, 1999; 2005; Fernando, 2002; 2010). Outside the context of religion, 
one’s culturally informed values are based in and reinforced by one or more social 
institutions (e.g., economic, political and family structures) (Bonder, Martin and 
Miracle, 2001; 2002; 2004). When describing the influence of values, it is preferable 
to talk about value orientations rather than discrete sets of values (Bonder, Miracle 
and Martin, 2001; 2002; 2004).   
In clinical placement, a pre-registered mental health student nurse works “in a social, 
political, and physical context, all of which are influenced by culture” (Fitzgerald, et 
al., 1997a, p. 17); and that itself “exist within a web of assumptions, expectations, 
and evaluations that reflect the competing influences of employees, employee 
groups, clients, managers, owners, regulators, and various related institutions” 
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(Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002, p. 112). Thus, student nurses are always working 
in placement settings that are defined by organisational and professional cultures 
(Good, 1995a; b; Galanti, 2008). These organisational and professional cultures are 
underpinned by certain notions of the ‘self’ (Seeley, 2006), which may sometimes be 
in direct conflict with the values of student nurses and/or service users. Mattingly and 
Fleming (1994) used the term ‘underground practice’ to describe how health care 
professionals  adhere to organisational dicta while at the same time finding ways to 
meet service users’ needs that do not conform to those dicta. In the context of this 
background chapter, what is particularly important to note is that the organisational 
and professional values of the mental health setting interact with the values of health 
care practitioners and help to determine service users’ and/or their family network’s 
experiences of health care (Anderson, 1985).                                                                                             
Finally, it is acknowledged that culture is not static, but is dynamic, fluid, hybrid, and 
ever changing (Culley, 1996; 2000; 2001; 2006; Culley and Demaine, 2006). 
According to Kirmayer (2012, p. 155), “culture involves a flexible, on-going process 
of transmitting and using knowledge that depends on dynamics both within 
communities and at the interface between ethnocultural communities and institutions 
of the larger society, like the health care system, as well as global networks”. In 
cultural environments of hyper-diversity (Hannah, 2011), clinical interactions 
represent multiple forms of identity and difference “in which the link between racial-
ethnic identity and culture is weak or broken (shattered) and, as a result, in which 
broad, identity based indicators of cultural difference prove too blunt an instrument 
for navigating the social heterogeneity within today’s clinical environment” (Good, 
Hannah and Willen, 2011, p. 20-21).    
The conceptualisation of culture used in this study needed to be congruent with the 
cultural constructionist perspective (Gaines, 1991; 1992) of this research project. 
Sandy Lovering’s (2008) adaptation of Spradley (1979), Helman (2007), and 
Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson’s (1997) definitions of culture was used. 
Lovering (2008, p. 15) defined culture as “the learned and shared values, beliefs and 
meanings that forms the lens or perspective through, which an individual 
understands and interprets his or her experiences”. The concept of culture is integral 
to this study for a number of related reasons, all of which will be covered in the 
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background chapters. In sum, for a ‘meaning centred’ medical anthropology (Good 
and Good, 1981), culture defines ‘clinical reality’, ‘abnormality’, and the origins and 
mechanisms (‘explanatory models’) of illness (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978; 
Kleinman, 1980). 
Clinical Placement 
According to Callaghan, Cooper and Gray (2007, p. 18), the purpose of clinical 
placement “is to give students exposure to a range of clinical environments that will 
enable them to develop a broad range of clinical competencies that they can use as 
a qualified mental health nurse”. Typically, half of a student’s training takes place 
within the clinical environment (English National Board for Nursing, Midwifery and 
Health Visiting and Department of Health, 2001). While there are several models of 
clinical placements, client attachment and location-based placements represent the 
two most common types (Callaghan, Cooper and Gray, 2007). In a location-based 
placement, the student nurse is assigned to a specific area of clinical practice for a 
specified amount of time, and for its duration is supervised by an assessor or mentor 
(English National Board for Nursing, Midwifery and Health Visiting and Department 
of Health, 2001). The conventional wisdom is that the location-based placement will 
help the student to develop the competencies and skills to deliver the type of nursing 
care that service users need (Callaghan, Cooper and Gray, 2007). At the beginning 
of the placement, the student is provided with a list of the skills and learning 
outcomes that they are required to achieve by its completion. Callaghan, Cooper and 
Gray listed the advantages of location-based placements as including the following: 
Providing student nurses with a base for clinical learning and good sources of 
learning; giving students the opportunity to apply the skills they have learned formally 
in class; providing students with the opportunity to demonstrate their competencies 
under the guidance of supervision; and to introduce students to the reality of nursing 
practice. The disadvantages of this form of placement were outlined by Callaghan, 
Cooper and Gray as involving the following: Lack of available mentors and 
assessors; lack of staff; placements being unable to cope with the number and 
demand of student nurses; and students not getting the opportunity to work with 
service users’ long term. They also note that their effectiveness in actually providing 
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students with the necessary skills and competencies is largely anecdotal and the 
duration of placements does not fit in with stated learning needs. 
The client attachment approach to clinical placement is a more recent development 
in the clinical education of pre-registered mental health student nurses (Jackson and 
Pogson, 1995). According to Jackson and Pogson, the purpose of the client 
attachment approach is to enable students to develop clinical experience by forming 
long-term attachments with individual service users. Rather than being placed on a 
succession of location-based placements, students demonstrate their clinical 
capabilities by working with a caseload of service users in a range of practice 
settings and with a variety of clinical presentations (Callaghan, Cooper and Gray, 
2007). With the exception of Turner, Callaghan, Eales and Park’s (2004) study at 
City University in London, the evidence for the effectiveness of this model also is 
largely anecdotal.   
The student nurses who were involved in this PhD research had to undergo two 
twelve week blocks of clinical placement in academic years two and three. 
Furthermore, each block of clinical placement was preceded by a 12 week block of 
formal education and theory in a University setting. Although the type of clinical 
settings that the students experienced were varied, the aim was that students should 
have at least one in-patient clinical placement, two placements in community 
settings, and one specialist type placement. The placement experience itself may 
involve the student working in a crisis team, rehabilitation setting, forensic setting 
(e.g., prison), children’s mental health services (CAMS), services dealing with drug 
and alcohol issues, and acute or older people’s inpatient wards.               
‘Multicultural Clinical Interactions’: The Intersection of ‘Popular’, 
‘Folk’ and ‘Professional’ Health Care System Sectors   
Kleinman’s (1978; 1980; 1984) ‘health care systems model’ that conceptualises the 
three sectors in which illness is interpreted, experienced, and reacted to provided the 
heuristic model for understanding the meaning of  cultural issues that arose from 
pre-registered mental health student nurses’ clinical placements. Health care 
systems are distinct cultural systems (Littlewood, 1989; Hahn, 1995) and are socially 
organised responses to illness that integrate the three health sectors of a society 
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(Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984). Each of these three sectors includes distinct beliefs 
about illness and healing, defined roles and interactions between healers and 
patients, and settings or institutions where the healing takes place (Kleinman, 1980). 
Kleinman (1978) defined these three overlapping and interconnected domains as the 
‘popular’, ‘folk’, and ‘professional’ sectors.  
Kleinman (1980) conceptualised the ‘popular’ sector as the lay, non-specialist arena 
(usually involving the family), where health is maintained and the majority of illness is 
recognised and treated. It is estimated that between 70 to 90 per cent of healthcare 
takes place in the ‘popular’ domain (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978). In the 
popular sector, the health beliefs and cultural values held by the person and their 
family influence the help seeking process (Chrisman, 1977). Another sector is 
concerned with the ‘folk’ or non-professional healers, and is based around sacred 
and secular perspectives (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984). According to Helman (2000; 
2007), ‘folk’ healers share the basic cultural values, health beliefs and worldviews of 
their community. Finally, the ‘professional sector’ comprises the legally sanctioned 
healing professions (Kleinman, 1978). In the UK, certified medical doctors of various 
types and specialities and paramedical workers-nurses, midwives, physiotherapists, 
occupational therapists, and other support workers (i.e., health care assistants) 
make up the legally legitimated healing professions (Chrisman, 1986; Helman, 2000; 
2007).These healing professions apply a biomedical or allopathic perspective to 
explain, manage, and treat illness (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984). This cultural belief 
system of biomedicine is elevated above all other forms of health care in the UK 
(Helman, 2000; 2007). Within the professional sector, mental health nursing exists 
as its own subculture with its specialised language, knowledge base, practices, and 
‘normative behaviours’ (Anderson, 1985; 1987; 1990).   
‘Explanatory models’ (EM) (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Kleinman, 1980), 
the subject of the next background chapter, derive from these interconnected, but 
distinct sectors. Kleinman (1978; 1980; 1984) and later, Fitzgerald (1992), argued 
that service user-health care practitioner clinical interactions constitute transactions 
between explanatory models. The ‘explanatory model’ concept (Kleinman, 1980) 
refers to the cultural notions about a specific episode of illness and its treatment. 
They are held both by healers and lay people (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 
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1978). In the meaning centred paradigm (Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; 
Good, 1994), healing is understood as a transaction process that involves ‘popular’, 
‘folk’ and ‘professional’ belief systems or sectors (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984). 
‘Professional’, ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ models of illness are held concurrently in all 
cultures (Helman, 2000; 2007). In any clinical interaction, the mental health student 
nurse and the service user move in and out of these three sectors and thus their 
explanatory models of distress can be influenced by any or all of them (Kleinman, 
Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Fitzgerald, 1992; Helman, 2000; 2007). In some 
circumstances, the explanatory model of a student nurse may be incompatible with 
the explanatory models of the mental health professionals that they work with. 
While mental health practitioners work primarily with biomedically based explanatory 
models that are derived from the ‘professional’ sector, service users’ explanatory 
models tend to draw on the ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ sectors of the healthcare system 
(Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984). However, Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) note 
that practitioners and service users may draw on “knowledge, beliefs, values, and 
practices from multiple domains” (p. 85) as the popular and folk sectors can 
interconnect with the professional (biomedical) sector (Helman, 2000; 2007). 
Therefore beliefs derived from the ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ sectors may be incorporated 
into a practitioner’s clinical practice (Kleinman, 1980). In many cases, this 
incorporation is implicit and there is an unawareness of competing or incompatible 
value systems (Fitzgerald, 1992; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). As the nursing theorist 
Thorne (1993, p. 1936) noted: “It seems evident that we Westerners, like the 
members of all human cultures, are capable of simultaneously holding mutually 
exclusive and logically incompatible beliefs about health and illness”. There is a 
potential for this incompatibility to be heightened for the nurse when there are 
greater differences between their own personal health beliefs and healing traditions, 
on the one hand, and the values of the biomedically informed ‘professional’ 
(Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) medical system (Fitzgerald, 1992; Andrews and Boyle, 
2003), on the other. This may lead to “an incompatibility between these worldviews 
and potential for conflict” (Lovering, 2008, p. 176). In a case detailed by Herberg 
(1995), a general adult nurse giving care to a patient who was contemplating an 
abortion is then asked to give the patient health advice that conflicted with their 
religious beliefs and values. The nurse may ask to be assigned to another patient or 
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makes the decision that the patient’s right to the health information outweighs their 
own personal considerations. In either case, the nurse chooses between conflicting 
norms and values. Thus, the acculturation process of becoming a health professional 
can be a stressful process that may involve conflicted loyalties between different 
value positions that may not always be reconciled (Fitzgerald, 1992).    
In many cases, the self-reported clinical interactions in this PhD research went 
beyond a dyadic encounter between a pre-registered mental health student nurse 
and a service user. Service users are people who exist in the context of human 
relationships (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 2001; Bonder, Martin and 
Miracle, 2002; Russell, et al., 2002; Fitzgerald, 2004; Galanti, 2008; Sobo and 
Loustaunau, 2010). A health practitioner’s clinical interaction may involve other 
people connected to the service user’s care, help seeking and decision making 
processes (Fitzgerald, 2004). The service user’s caretakers, close friends, and family 
members may become involved in discussions around the practitioner’s 
recommendations and treatments (Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002). Considerable 
pressure may be imposed on the service user and/or the practitioner to align with 
one or another of these conflicting agendas (Fitzgerald, 2004). Pre-registered mental 
health student nurses’ clinical placements take place in multidisciplinary team mental 
health settings (Bonham, 2004), and many of the reported clinical interactions in this 
research involved co-workers from different professional backgrounds. All of these 
individuals have their own vantage points and explanatory models (Kleinman, 
Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Kleinman, 1980), and agendas. 
When Kleinman’s (1978; 1980; 1984) health care systems model is applied to pre-
registered mental health student nurses’ clinical interactions, at least three cultural 
systems are involved (Fitzgerald, 1992). These three cultural systems were defined 
by Fitzgerald (1992) as (a) the personal or familial culture of the health practitioner, 
which is primarily influenced by the ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ sectors; (b) the culture of the 
service user, which is primarily influenced by the ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ sectors; and (c) 
the culture of the primary medical system, which is primarily influenced by the 
‘professional’ sector of biomedicine. Each of these cultural systems is associated 
with its characteristic explanatory models. So we can see that in any clinical 
interaction, one or more medical systems are involved, and the participants enter the 
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interaction with “multiple cultural lenses” (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a, p. 19). According 
to Fitzgerald (1992) the participants in a clinical interaction “may, or may not, share 
knowledge of all the systems involved” (p. 3). The greater the shared knowledge, the 
less likely that there will be misunderstandings, “but when participants have little 
knowledge of the other cultures or systems involved, some problems are almost 
assured” (Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 2). As all clinical interactions involve the multiple 
interplay of cultures, medical systems, and frames of reference (Tebutt and Wade, 
1985; Hoeman, 1989), pre-registered mental health student nurses’ clinical 
encounters can be defined as ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992).  
‘Multicultural Clinical Interactions’ and ‘Culture General 
Competency’                                                                                                                                                                               
Clinical anthropology has faced a battle in its attempts to persuade the health 
professions “that cultural data and a culturally sensitive approach are relevant to all 
patients, not just to those whose ethnic background happens to be different from the 
practitioners’” (Chrisman and Johnson, 1996, p. 101). The aforementioned concept 
of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) is concerned with ‘culture 
general competency’ (Cope, et al., 1997) and the idea that the “principles, 
knowledge, skills, etc. associated with intercultural competency1 are treated as 
applicable to all interactions, whether or not there are obvious cultural differences” 
(Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 187). It therefore diverges from the ‘othering’ tendency of 
traditional cultural competency (Fitzgerald, 2000; Canales and Bowers, 2001).  
According to Fitzgerald (2000, p. 187), culture general competency is “about the 
ability to function in the ambiguous, dynamic, open-ended interactions common to 
therapy situations for which no adequate cultural blueprint exists; and do so with a 
reasonable level of comfort”. The culturally general competent practitioner is able to 
interpret these interactions as “‘cultural scenes’ (Spradley and McCurdy, 1972) or 
‘social dramas’ (Turner, 1974) and to do so from multiple perspectives” (Fitzgerald, 
                                                          
1
 According to Fitzgerald (2000), ‘intercultural competency’ developed with the growing awareness 
that practitioners had to be sensitive to the needs of people from cultures that were distinctively 
different from their own. Much of the health sciences literature has advocated this form of cultural 
competency (Kim, 1991; Lustig and Koester, 1996). The focus of intercultural competency has been 
on practitioners working across cultures (Fitzgerald, 2000). It is different, therefore, to ‘culture general 
competency’ (Cope, et al., 1997) that views all clinical interactions as multicultural (Fitzgerald, 1992). 
Willen, Bullon and Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good (2010),  and Seth Donal Hannah (2011) also remind us 
that is untenable to presume a dichotomy between ‘mainstream practitioner’ and ‘other’ service user, 
as in many cases, these roles are reversed.   
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2000, p. 187-188). This approach attempts to achieve something in line with Clifford 
Geertz’s (1973) idea of ‘thick description’ and an understanding of the potential 
implications of culture (as a general concept) for the content and context of 
everyone’s illness and clinical experiences at the micro and macro level (Fitzgerald, 
2000). This understanding is used as a basis for clinical action (Fitzgerald, 2000).  
The culture general competency approach does not assume that the practitioner 
must simulate another cultural identity (Fitzgerald, 1996) and thus, there is 
recognition “that culture influences everyone’s perceptions, interpretations and 
evaluations of the situation” (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 188). If the practitioner is aware of 
the multiple cultural influences on a clinical interaction, misunderstandings or 
‘disconfirmed expectancies’ usually can be avoided (Fitzgerald, 1992; Mullavey-
O’Byrne, 1994a; b; 1999; Mullavey-O’Byrne and Fitzgerald, 1995; Fitzgerald, 
Robison, Clemson and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1997; Mullavey-O’Byrne and West, 2001). 
The practitioner applies flexible and adaptive strategies, which allows them to 
effectively respond to the issues presented in a ‘multicultural clinical interaction’ 
(Fitzgerald, 1992) and therefore, “act in an informed, culturally and psychologically 
sensitive, appropriate, non-judgemental, meaningful way” (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 188). 
Fitzgerald’s (2000) ‘culture general competency’ approach also is reflected in Roland 
Littlewood’s (1998) argument that the ‘new perspective of cross-cultural psychiatry’ is 
relevant to understanding the meaning of emotional experience in all situations and 
not just among cultural and ethnic minorities. A premise of this PhD study was based 
on Lambert and Sevak (1996) and Carpenter-Song, Nordquest Schwallie and 
Longhofer’s (2007) assertion of the need to move beyond the study of ethnic 
differentials between health practitioners and service users in clinical interactions, by 
exploring (from the perspectives of pre-registered mental health student nurses and 
nursing educators) the rift between professional and lay understandings of health 
and illness and the clinical encounter. 
The ‘Family’ and ‘Multicultural Clinical Interactions’ 
No matter how they are conceptualised or organised, the family is an intrinsic feature 
of the cultural and social fabric of society. As Fitzgerald (2004, p. 489) suggests, the 
family is a “cultural universal and a cultural icon”. The family provides a key context 
for socialisation by helping to forge a person’s identity and by moulding that person’s 
36 
 
behaviour in relation to others (Ember and Ember, 1992; Gropper, 1996; Ravertz, 
1998; Winkelman, 1999; 2005; Fitzgerald, 2004; Giger and Davidhizar, 2004; 
Galanti, 2008). It is the context in which the beliefs, values, attitudes, and customs 
that guide much of everyday life are learnt and reinforced (Bonder, Martin and 
Miracle, 2001; 2002; 2004). Even if a person’s family is not physically or emotionally 
accessible, it may still exert an important influence on their life (Fitzgerald, 2004).  
Despite its universality, “much ink has been used up, in anthropology and 
comparative sociology, trying to define ‘the family’” (Keesing and Strathern, 1998, p. 
233). Thus, there is no great surprise that practitioners find the concept of family 
seemingly simple, yet difficult to understand and deal with during their ‘multicultural 
clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992; 2004). One standard anthropological definition 
of the family is that it can be understood as “a social and economic unit consisting 
minimally of one or more parents and their children” (Ember and Ember, 1988, p. 
329). According to Fitzgerald (2004), such a simple definition, however, belies the 
complexities of family configurations and reconfigurations that emerge over time and 
in relation to things like marriage, births, deaths, divorces, migration, illnesses, and 
other relevant factors. Although some ideal family configuration may be identified at 
a given place and point in time, in any given society there is a great deal of diversity 
in family structure, role, and responsibilities (Sparling, 1991; Hartley, 1995; Ingoldsby 
and Smith, 1995; Gropper, 1996; Winkelman, 1999; 2005; Galanti, 2008). Patterns of 
parenting, marriage, kin relationships, and responsibilities vary across and within 
cultures, as does the nature of family life, childrearing, and care of the aged 
(Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-
O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997). Responsibilities and roles within families 
also are structured by age and gender (Fitzgerald, 2004). 
This diversity in family form, role, and responsibility is readily apparent in 
multicultural societies where there is immigration and internal migration (Fitzgerald, 
2004). Family relationships are most often based on ‘blood’ and genealogical ties, 
but other criteria can be used to determine family membership, both in the long term 
and for special situations (e.g., god parents) (Winkelman, 1999; 2005).  A member of 
a family based on ‘fictive’ kin ties may acquire similar rights and responsibilities to a 
member of a family that is organised around blood and genealogical ties (Fitzgerald, 
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2004). All these factors illustrate that the concept of family is a cultural construction 
or ‘cultural unit’ (Sparling, 1991) that is constantly redefined and reconfigured. In 
addition, even within a distinct cultural group, each family unit must be considered as 
unique (Storer, 1985; Sparling, 1991; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and 
Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997).  
Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) note that the literature on the cultural construction 
of the family has tended to suggest that it plays a more involved and critical role in 
the lives of its members in non-western societies. Often this literature dichotomises 
the family form by using terms such as ‘idiocentric’ (self-centred) versus 
‘sociocentric’ (social group centred), or ‘individualist’ versus ‘collectivist’ (Hofstede, 
1980; Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1994a; Brislin and Yoshida, 1994; Berry, Poortinga, 
Breugelmans and Chasiotis, 2011). However, some academics have pointed out that 
such broad conceptual distinctions need to be treated with caution (Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a; Seeley, 2006).  
As the family forms a central feature of most people’s lives, pre-registered mental 
health student nurses often interact with service users’ families during clinical 
placement (Bonham, 2004). The clinical anthropological (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-
O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; 2001; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Fitzgerald, 2004; 
Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2001; 2002; Galanti, 2008), transcultural nursing 
(Murphy and Clark, 1993; Kim, 1998; Spence, 1999; Boi, 2000; Gerrish, 2000; 2001; 
Ozolins and Hjelm, 2003; Cortis, 2004; Cioffi, 2005; 2006; Hultsjo and Hjelm, 2005; 
Lundberg, Backstrom and Widen, 2005; Vydelingum, 2006; Berlin, Johansson and 
Tornkvist, 2006; Severinsson, 2008; Berlin, 2010), and related health sciences 
literature (Phipps, 1995; Fadiman, 1997; Yang, Shek, Tsunaka  and Lim,  2006), has 
suggested that families are part of the everyday discourse of health care 
practitioners. This discourse about families is cultural discourse, as it “is grounded in 
cultural ideas and ideals about families” (Fitzgerald, 2004, p. 489). Much of the 
transcultural and anthropological nursing literature (Gardenswartz and Rowe, 1998; 
Luckmann, 1999; Giger and Davidhizar, 2004; Boyle, 2008; Galanti, 2005; 2008; 
Holland and Hogg, 2010) also has encouraged nurses to understand the role that the 
family can play in a service user’s life and to involve families in the care of service 
users. For a variety of reasons, it also is clear that when mental illness is involved, 
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the family may play a somewhat different role than if the family member is suffering 
from a physical illness (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a).                                                                                                                                            
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the philosophical, theoretical and conceptual context of this 
study. A meaning-centred (Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; Good, 1994) 
medical anthropological paradigm was chosen, because of its compatibility with the 
cultural constructionist philosophical approach of this study (Gaines, 1991; 1992). 
The structure and types of clinical placement were described and pre-registered 
mental health student nurses’ clinical encounters with service users and/or other 
participants such as the service user’s family members were conceptualised as 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). ‘Multicultural clinical interactions’ 
are embedded in the health care system and draw on aspects of its three sectors 
(Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984). The service user’s family is central to the everyday 
discourse of health care professionals (Whybrow, Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 
1996; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; 2001; Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a; Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Russell, et al., 2002; Fitzgerald, 2004; 
Seeley, 2006; Galanti, 2008); and therefore the cultural meaning of family (Sparling, 
1991) was addressed in this background chapter.    
The concept of culture used in this study is firmly located in the ‘mentalist’ 
perspective (Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1996; Fitzgerald, Williamson and 
Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1998) and was then linked to the concept of culture general 
competency (Fitzgerald, 2000). The central concept of culture is key to 
understanding institutional, professional and a student nurses’ personal values 
(Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002), ‘clinical realities’ (Kleinman, Eisenberg and 
Good, 1978), notions of the ‘self’ (White and Marsella, 1982; Seeley, 2006), family 
(Fitzgerald, 2004), definitions of ‘abnormality’ (Good and Good, 1986), and 
‘explanatory models’ (Kleinman, 1980). The next chapter conceptualises pre-
registered mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ as the 
transaction of explanatory models (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Kleinman, 
1980). These explanatory models are situated in the ‘clinical realities’ of ‘disease’ 
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and ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 1977), cultural notions of the ‘self’ (White and Marsella, 
1982; Seeley, 2006), and the problematic clinical concept of ‘insight’ (Jacob, 2010).     
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Chapter 2 
‘Disease’-‘Illness’ Perspectives, ‘Explanatory Model’ (EM) 
Transactions, Conceptions of ‘Self’, and ‘Multicultural 
Clinical Interactions’ 
Introduction 
Applying a culturally informed and ‘meaning centred’ (Good and Good, 1981; 
Gaines, 1982a; 1991; 1992; Good, 1994) medical anthropological perspective 
enables one to explore the illness beliefs and behaviours that are brought by 
participants to ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). The ‘explanatory 
model’ concept (EM), which was originally developed by Arthur Kleinman (1980), is 
one such culturally informed and meaning centred medical anthropological concept. 
Kleinman’s (1980) explanatory model concept concretises the important 
anthropological distinction between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 1977) and the 
related ‘emic’-‘etic’ perspectives (Skultans and Cox, 2000). The anthropological 
distinction between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ is based on a perspectivist view, in that 
distress may be understood in different ways, depending on whether the 
phenomenon is approached from the vantage point of the ‘professional’ (etic) 
perspective (sector) of ‘disease’ or the ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ (emic) (sectors) 
conceptions of ‘illness’ (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984).     
The explanatory model concept (Kleinman, 1980) refers to the cultural notions about 
a specific episode of illness and its treatment, which is held by all those engaged in 
the clinical process. While explanatory models must always be seen in context, as 
they are applied in response to a specific episode of illness, they also draw on 
particular cultural belief systems or ‘cultural theories of illness’ that a person or a 
group of people hold about a given set of symptoms or illnesses (Good and Good, 
1981; Landy, 1983; Parry, 1984; Meadows, 1991; Mattingly and Beer, 1993; 
Hudelson, 1994; Moss-Morris and Petrie, 1994; Helman, 2000; 2007; Winkelman, 
2009). These cultural theories or belief systems may locate the cause of a person’s 
illness within the individual, natural, social, supernatural or moral domain (Landy, 
1983; Helman, 2000; 2007; Lipsedge, 2007), and these domains have been 
associated with either ‘personalistic’ or ‘impersonalistic’ casual assumptions 
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(Eisenbruch, 1990). A person’s illness may be constructed as having proximal and 
ultimate causes and, thus, more than one cultural theory of illness can be involved at 
the same time (Helman, 2000; 2007).    
Kleinman’s (1980) explanatory model concept is critical to understanding the 
assumptions and expectations (Mullavey-O’Byrne and Fitzgerald, 1995) that health 
practitioners, such as pre-registered mental health student nurses bring to their 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992).The incompatibility of a service 
user’s and/or their family’s explanatory models with the models held by a mental 
health practitioner is often the basis for ‘disconfirmed expectancies’ (Mullavey-
O’Byrne and Fitzgerald, 1995) and ‘critical incident’ narratives (Laws and Fitzgerald, 
1997; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). 
‘Multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) in the ‘professional’ sector 
(Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) of mental health care have been conceptualised as 
the transaction of service users’ and/or family members’ and mental health 
practitioners’ explanatory models (Kleinman, 1980).    
The explanatory model construct (Kleinman, 1980) also is related to the problematic 
clinical concept of ‘insight’ (Johnson and Orrell, 1995; McGorry and McConville, 
1999; Saravanan, et al., 2004; Jacob, 2010). Indeed, it has been argued that an 
alternative explanation for the label of ‘low insight’ is the incongruence of a service 
user’s explanatory model for their distress with that of the explanatory model of the 
mental health practitioner and primary medical system (McGorry and McConville, 
1999). However, the mainstream psychiatric literature (e.g., Endicott, et al., 1982; 
Wilson, Ban and Guys, 1986; Kay, Fisbein and Opler, 1987) has focused almost 
exclusively on the psychological and neurological basis of insight; and in mental 
health nursing, the dominant concern has been with treatment compliance 
(Pinkihana, Happell, Taylor and Keks, 2002; Coombs, Deane, Lambert and Griffiths, 
2003). Thus, the social and cultural aspects of insight, including the role of 
explanatory models have been downplayed (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002).    
Through its conceptions of ‘self’ (Geertz, 1973; 1983), I will discuss how medical 
anthropology can enhance the understanding of pre-registered mental health student 
nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). Specific notions of the 
self not only underlie explanatory models of distress (Kleinman, 1980), but all 
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aspects of clinical practice and care (Seeley, 2006). Although the mental health 
nursing profession can be seen as an occupational culture with its own particular 
systems of thought, worldviews, explanations, beliefs, norms, rules, and values 
(Holden and Littlewood, 1991; Andrews and Boyle, 2003; Lovering, 2008; Galanti, 
2008; Berlin, 2010), wider cultural views of ‘self’ (Seeley, 2006) are built into the 
frameworks of nursing training, assessment, and treatment approaches.   
‘Etic’ and ‘Emic’ Perspectives  
The debate about ‘etic’ versus ‘emic’ meanings (Skultans and Cox, 2000), which has 
underpinned much work in medical anthropology, including the ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ 
perspective distinction (Eisenberg, 1977), the related ‘explanatory model’ (EM) 
(Kleinman, 1980) concept, the notion of ‘category fallacy’ (Kleinman, 1977; 1988a), 
and the ‘rationality’ and ‘relativism’ debate (Hollis and Lukes, 1982), has been 
shaped by the historical legacy of its parent discipline of socio-cultural anthropology. 
The ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ concepts are derivatives of the linguistic terms ‘phonetic’ and 
‘phonemic’ (Pike, 1966). While the term ‘phonetic’ refers to patterns of sound 
sequences and relationships of contiguity-where things are placed in relation to each 
other, the term ‘phonemic’ is concerned with relations of semantic or meaning 
similarity (Skultans and Cox, 2000). The distinction between ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ 
meanings can be elaborated respectively in terms of ‘form’ and ‘content’ (Littlewood, 
2000), and in terms of imposed meanings and subjective internal meanings 
(Skultans and Cox, 2000). Medical anthropologists (e.g., Swartz, 1998; Galanti, 
2008) have recommended that mental health practitioners integrate both 
perspectives to provide a more complete and holistic picture of a person’s distress.  
The Anthropological Distinction between ‘Disease’ and ‘Illness’ 
Medical anthropologists (e.g., Hahn, 1995; Winkelman, 2009) have used the 
umbrella term ‘malady’ to encompass the array of concerns about compromised 
well-being. The maladies of ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ normally are considered as 
synonyms; however, medical anthropologists have made an important conceptual 
distinction between the two terms (e.g., Fox, 1968; Fabrega, 1972; Eisenberg, 1977; 
Cassell, 1978; Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Kleinman, 1980; Helman, 
1981; 2000; 2007; Hahn, 1995). The anthropological distinction between ‘disease’ 
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and ‘illness’ is based on the view that the same phenomenon (distress) may be 
understood in different ways, depending on whether the phenomenon is approached 
from the ‘clinical reality’ of the ‘professional’ (etic) perspective (sector) of ‘disease’, or 
the ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ (emic) (sectors) conceptions of ‘illness’ (Kleinman, 1978; 
1980; 1984; Harwood, 1981; Pool and Geissler, 2005).     
This distinction is important to bear in mind, because as Bhui and Bhugra (2002) 
explain; a service user’s perception of their symptoms may well be markedly different 
from a mental health practitioner’s conceptualisation of the service user’s symptoms. 
The ‘disease’ vs. ‘illness’ conceptual distinction is embedded within a relativist and 
meaning-centred theoretical framework (Good and Good, 1981), and furthermore, is 
crucial for the medical anthropologist who is trying to demonstrate how the elicitation 
of the service user’s perspective is critical to the delivery of culturally sensitive care 
(Chrisman and Johnson, 1996).   
There is agreement among medical anthropologists (e.g., Eisenberg, 1977; 
Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Good and Good, 1981; Hahn, 1995) that the 
concept of ‘disease’ refers to the pathological processes of body or mind that are 
confirmed by scientific and biological methods (Chrisman, 1986; 1991; Pilowsky, 
1997). Diagnostic tools and laboratory tests are required to achieve this ‘objective’ 
understanding, and ill health tends to be reductively defined as a deviation from 
biologic norms (Krefting and Krefting, 1990). These biologically caused mental 
disorders are assumed to have a universal aetiological basis and discrete and 
recognisable symptoms regardless of the culture in which they are manifested 
(White and Marsella, 1982). In psychiatric diagnosis, overt signs and symptoms are 
assumed to be direct manifestations of an underlying pathology, which is most likely 
located in an individual’s brain (White, 1982b).    
Some specialisms within the ‘professional’ sector of biomedicine (Kleinman, 1978; 
1980; 1984), such as psychiatry, mental health nursing, and occupational therapy, 
also do work with psychological, behavioural, and social models of mental illness 
(Winkelman, 2009). However, the biomedical model still is dominant and is 
embodied in both the ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (DSM) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987; 1994) and the ‘International Classification 
of Mental and Behavioural Disorders’ (ICD) (World Health Organization, 1992). Thus, 
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from the biomedical perspective of ‘disease’, biology is assumed to be more basic 
and significant than psychological, cultural, social, or moral issues in the aetiology 
and manifestation of distress (Krefting and Krefting, 1990; Littlewood, 2000).   
Kleinman (1980) has criticised the biomedical perspective of ‘disease’ for denying 
the person’s experience of ‘illness’, by its exclusive focus on the presumed 
underlying pathology. How a person understands their illness experience is primarily 
of relevance to the clinical task of formulating a diagnosis, which according to 
Pilowsky (1997, p. 21), is a “‘pattern recognition’ exercise involving comparison of 
symptoms with classical patterns”, which have been developed within a materialist 
framework (Grof, 1985). A psychiatric diagnosis is however not based on direct 
observation, but is an interpretation (using cultural categories [of the DSM and ICD]) 
of a patient’s interpretation (using their personal and cultural categories) (Kleinman, 
1996).  
The patient presents more than with a disease, in that they present with an “illness 
experience, which provides a context of meaning to the disease” (Andary, Stolk and 
Kilmidis, 2003, p. 86). There have been different views put forward in the medical 
anthropology literature about the meaning of the concept of ‘Illness’ (Kleinman, 1980; 
Good and Good, 1981; Hahn, 1995; Fabrega, 1997). The majority view however, is 
that the concept of ‘illness’ refers to devalued changes in being, as experienced, 
described, and explained by the sufferer of distress (Chrisman, 1986; Hahn, 1995). 
According to Helman (1981, p. 548), ‘illness’ is the “subjective response of the 
patient to being unwell: how he (or she), and those around him (or her), perceive the 
origin and significance of this event; how it effects his (or her) behaviour or 
relationships with other people; and the steps he (or her) takes to remedy the 
situation”. Thus, it is the phenomenon on which people base their ‘help seeking 
behaviour’ and resort to treatment (Chrisman, 1977).  
The concept of ‘Illness’ encompasses personal, interpersonal, and cultural reactions 
to distress (Krefting and Krefting, 1990). Lewis-Fernandez and Kleinman (1995) 
noted that ‘illness’ is as much a cultural category as language. While both language 
and illness are deeply influenced by biologic parameters, they also are constructed 
in diverse ways by local social formations (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). In 
addition to the changes we may experience in the interior of our bodies, what we 
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experience as undesirable or as ‘illness’ may come from many sources and 
conceptual frameworks (Foster and Anderson, 1978; Helman, 2000; 2007). The 
concept of illness involves meanings that have deep affective roots in a person’s 
lifestyle, including the social relationships through which these meanings are 
communicated (Chrisman, 1991). A person’s illness behaviour also is a normative 
experience, as “‘approved’ ways of being ill” are both learnt and shared (Kleinman, 
Eisenberg and Good, 1978, p. 252).      
At the same time, the perspectives of ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ are not separate entities, 
but rather are ‘explanatory models’ (EM) (Kleinman, 1980), which to some extent, 
overlap. The ‘explanatory model’ (EM) concept (Kleinman, 1980) aids in concretizing 
the ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ distinction and the related ‘etic’-‘emic’ perspectives 
(Chrisman and Johnson, 1996; Chrisman and Zimmer, 2000; Skultans and Cox, 
2000). As Eisenberg (1977) explained, such models are ways of constructing ‘clinical 
reality’ and imposing meaning on the chaos of the phenomenological world. They 
mirror multilevel relations between separate aspects of a complex, fluid, and total 
phenomenon called ‘sickness’ (Hahn, 1995; Winkelman, 2009).    
Conceptions of the ‘Self’ and their Relevancy to Understanding Pre-
Registered Mental Health Student Nurses’ ‘Multicultural Clinical 
Interactions’ 
It is through its conceptions of ‘self’ and ‘personhood’ as mediated by culture, and 
therefore, as relative within and across cultural contexts, that medical anthropology 
can enrich the understanding of pre-registered mental health student nurses’ 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Seeley, 2004; 2005; 2006). Although notions of 
‘person’ and ‘self’ often are used interchangeably, some clarification is necessary. 
More specifically; “the notion of self-entails reflexivity and an opposition of ‘self’ and 
‘other’ which ‘person’ does not” (White and Marsella, 1982, p. 21).            
Cultural anthropologists (e.g., Geertz, 1973; 1983; Heelas and Lock, 1981; Gaines, 
1982b; Gaines and Hahn, 1982; Shweder and Bourne, 1982; 1984; White and 
Kirkpatrick, 1985) have posited that the ‘Western’ tendency to view the ‘self’ as 
located inside an individual body, that is, invariant across contexts, introspective, and 
capable of change, and as a “bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational 
and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, judgement, and 
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action that is organized into a distinctive whole” (Geertz, 1983, p. 59), is a 
sociocultural construction, rather than a biological given or genetic imperative. In the 
words of the Indian psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar (1990, p. 443); “cultural 
ideas...pervade the innermost experience of the self. One cannot therefore speak of 
an ‘earlier’ or ‘deeper’ layer of the self beyond cultural reach”. These anthropological 
perspectives also have criticised psychological conceptualisations of the ‘self’, for 
restricting the understanding of cultural influences on the ‘self’ to superficial overt 
behaviours, and as something as distinct from a person’s basic feelings and conflicts 
(Seeley, 2006).    
Nucci (1997) has referred to such anthropological theorists as ‘cultural 
constructivists’. As cultural constructivists, “embrace a psychological relativism in 
which personhood and the individual are cultural variants rather than expressions of 
some underlying set of psychological realities” (Nucci, 1997, p. 6). Thus, from the 
standpoint of ‘cultural constructionism’, understanding of oneself does not grow from 
an ‘inner’ essence, which is relatively independent of the social world, “but from 
experience in a world of meanings, images and social bonds” (Rosaldo, 1984, p. 
139). Rather, than being enduring, bounded inner entities, selves are a creation of 
acting and understanding that is derived from culture (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 
2002).    
In this cultural constructionist understanding of self, modes of relationship-both “with 
other persons and with the natural and supernatural worlds-vary greatly from culture 
to culture” (Seeley, 2006, p. 76), and the self’s experience of time, space, 
relationship, identity, as well as its ways of constructing meaning is highly variable 
cross-culturally. By their suggestion, that every historical era and cultural context 
creates specific and distinctive configurations of the self, cultural constructionist 
viewpoints, provide perspectives that are largely absent from clinical theory (Seeley, 
2006).                                                                                                                                                                    
Explanatory models (EM) of illness (Kleinman, 1980), the subject matter of the next 
section in this background chapter, lie at the intersection of culturally mediated 
conceptions of self (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002) and ‘cultural theories of 
illness’ (Helman, 2000; 2007), both of which are likely to be universal aspects of 
cultural knowledge (White and Marsella, 1982). As Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran 
47 
 
(2002, p. 16) explained; “the notion of boundaries, ascribed identity, notions of self 
and the interface between these levels of experiences are commonly present in 
cases of mental illness”. Thus, in the context of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ 
(Fitzgerald, 1992), mental health practitioners encounter distressed service users 
whose issues lie in ‘identity’ and ‘self’. Pre-registered mental health student nurses 
and other practitioners who work with distressed service users, must make a special 
effort to understand the ways in which these distressed states are understood, 
experienced, and interpreted by service users in their care (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and 
Curran, 2002).    
From the ‘professional’ sector (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) of a biomedically 
dominated mental health care sector, the causation of psychopathology is 
characteristically located within the individual, as in its constitution, history, and 
personality (White and Marsella, 1982; Littlewood, 1990; Seeley, 2006; Marsella and 
Yamada, 2007). This is then the appropriate focus for psychiatric intervention. The 
criteria for mental health in the ICD (World Health Organization, 1992) and the DSM 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987; 1994), assume that the person should 
have a stable and individualist sense of self that is defined as being separate and 
independent from others (Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003). As Mercer (1986) and 
Littlewood and Lipsedge (1997) have argued, this emphasis on the individual has 
meant that questions of intergroup relations and economic power is reinterpreted 
through a focus on the individual as victim.    
Such a cultural conception of psychological illness can be distinguished from many 
non-Western and minority cultures where either supra-individual powers or social 
relationships are commonly perceived as causative factors for distress or misfortune 
(White and Marsella, 1982; Marsella and Yamada, 2007). For example, 
anthropologists (e.g., White, 1982a; b; Shweder, 1991) have drawn attention to how 
the community (especially the family) rather than the physical body is the essential 
unit for conceptualising distress in certain cultural contexts. Not only “is the family the 
locus for what we might term ‘psychopathology’, but physical symptoms too can be 
understood only through the individual’s relationships with others” (Littlewood, 1990, 
p. 316). That is, a disturbed body reflects disharmony in the social order and 
appropriate interventions are more somatic and moral rather than psychological. 
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These cultural understandings are distinct from the old western assumption that non-
Western societies have undifferentiated selves. Rather, the notion of self may be 
differentiated according to quite different criteria, which frequently are ‘moral’ rather 
than ‘psychological’ (Harre, 1986; Littlewood, 1990).   
Mental health nursing and other professions in the biomedical dominated 
‘professional’ sector (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) of mental health care, not only 
embody ‘Western’ notions of the self in their view of ‘psychopathology’, but also 
actively promote them in their everyday practice and care (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-
O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; 2001; Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2001; 2002; 2004; 
Seeley, 2006). When mental health practitioners encourage their service users to 
function autonomously, to separate from their parents, to become more assertive 
and expressive, or to pursue their self-interests, they are encouraging them to enact 
Western ideals of ‘selfhood’ (Seeley, 2006). A person who does not desire 
autonomy, rejects personal responsibility, and who is seen as being ‘dependent’ on a 
group, is likely to be perceived by a mental health professional as being 
psychologically immature and inadequate (Andary, Stolk and Kilmidis, 2003). Indeed, 
medical anthropologists and some theorists in the health sciences have argued that  
values such as autonomy, independence, and privacy are reflective of a ‘highly 
individuated’ notion of ‘self’ (Gaines, 1982b; Gaines and Hahn, 1982; Dyck, 1989; 
1991; 1998; Krefting, 1991b; Holden and Littlewood, 1991;  Kinebanian and Stomph, 
1992; Herberg, 1995; Paul, 1995; Whiteford, 1995; Hocking and Whiteford, 1995; 
Gerrish, 2000; Whiteford and Wilcock, 2000; Robinson and Gilmartin, 2002; 
Whiteford and Wright St-Clair, 2002; Andrews and Boyle, 2003; Awaad, 2003; 
Hanssen, 2004; Bourke-Taylor and Hudson, 2005;  Galanti, 2008; Lovering, 2008; 
Berlin, 2010; Sobo and Loustaunau, 2010).    
These are values that have been shown to prevail in Western health care settings 
(Whybrow, Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1996; Russell, et al., 2002; Fitzgerald, 
2004) and in the practice of nursing (Gerrish, 2000; Galanti, 2005; 2008). Thus, 
implicit in this cultural construction of the self is a culturally based conception of 
‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’, a specific view of how emotions should be expressed, 
regulated, interpreted, and experienced, and a specific view of how a person should 
relate to others (Andary, Stolk and Kilmidis, 2003). As Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran 
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(2002) note, a mental health worker “who assumes a certain notion of self, of 
boundaries and of ascribed identity will often fail when confronted with a patient who 
does not share his or her beliefs” (p. 16).                                                                                                                                         
Cultural constructionist conceptions of the self are, however, sometimes flawed by 
an inattention to intragroup and interpersonal differences (Seeley, 2006). At the 
same time, anthropological perspectives about cross-cultural variations in the self 
are helpful to student nurses and other mental health practitioners working with 
service users from different cultures, as they portray the vast range of possible 
human selves encountered in ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992).  
‘Multicultural Clinical Interactions’ as ‘Explanatory Model’ (EM) 
Transactions                                                                                                                                                                         
Introduction                                                                                                                                                                
Different approaches have been proposed by medical anthropologists and health 
scientists to make sense of the beliefs and behaviours associated with the 
aforementioned concepts of ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 1977). Of particular 
note for this background discussion is the ‘health beliefs model’ (Beck, 1974; 
McSweeney, Allen and Mayo, 1997; Mikhail and Petro-Nustas, 2001) and the 
‘explanatory model’ (EM) (Kleinman, 1977; 1978; 1980; 1988a; b; Kleinman, 
Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Kleinman and Benson, 2006). The health beliefs model 
is underpinned by a positivist epistemology, which is reflected in its central 
assumption that people make rational choices and decisions about the prevention 
and treatment of disease (Good, 1994).  
From the perspective of meaning centred medical anthropology (Good and Good, 
1981; Gaines, 1982a; 1991; 1992; Good, 1994), the health beliefs model can be 
criticised for being too health provider focused, and more importantly for failing to 
acknowledge the influence of culture on health beliefs and help seeking behaviour. 
The positivist approach underpinning the health beliefs model is incompatible with 
the cultural constructionist and meaning-centred theoretical basis of this research 
study.  
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The explanatory model (EM) is based on a culturally situated meaning or view of 
illness (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Kleinman, 1980), and is different, 
therefore, in fundamental ways from the positivist-orientated health beliefs model. In 
particular, the explanatory model (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978; Kleinman, 
1980) concept is based on a meaning-centred (Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 
1982a; 1991; 1992; Good, 1994) and cultural relativist approach (Swartz, 1998) to 
understanding beliefs about distress, help seeking (Chrisman, 1977) and illness 
behaviour. On this basis the explanatory model is congruent with the cultural 
constructionist stance of this study. 
The explanatory model concept also is integral to this study for three further reasons. 
The first reason follows on from one of the underlying premises of this study, which 
is that rather than examining specific cultural differentials about distress, a more 
useful approach is to explore (from the perspectives of mental health student nurses 
and their nursing educators) the rift between biomedical and lay understandings of 
distress (Lambert and Sevak, 1996; Carpenter-Song, Nordquest Schwallie and 
Longhofer, 2007).                                                                                                                                                                     
Secondly, the explanatory model concept has framed the cultural critique of the 
clinical concept of ‘insight’ (McGorry and McConville, 1999; Saravanan, et al., 2004; 
Jacob, 2010), a subject which is discussed in a later section of this background 
chapter. While there is broad agreement in the mainstream psychiatric literature that 
loss of awareness of deficits and denial of illness are largely a direct product of 
whatever disease process underlies mental illness, the alternative argument is that 
the assessment of ‘insight’ is shorthand for the compatibility of a service user’s 
explanatory model and conditions of treatment with that of a mental health 
practitioner’s explanatory model and treatment of psychopathology (Perkins and 
Moodley, 1993; Johnson and Orrell, 1995; 1996; Beck-Sander, 1998; Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Saravanan, et al., 2004; Jacob, 2010).   
Thirdly, the explanatory model concept overlaps with the theme of the next 
background chapter-the ‘normative uncertainty’ (Good and Good, 1986) evaluation 
dilemma, and clinical judgements about ‘normality’ and ‘psychopathology’. 
Diagnostic errors or errors in the assessment process may occur if a service user 
holds an explanatory model that is incompatible with the assumptions of the mental 
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health practitioner’s explanatory model (Kleinman, 1980; Eisenbruch, 1990; 
Kirmayer, Young and Robbins, 1994; Sang, 1996; Lefley, Sandoval and Charles, 
1998; Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003). 
It is important to bear in mind that when reviewing studies that have used 
explanatory models to explore mental health professionals’ clinical interactions, that 
these studies will inevitably reflect their specific cultural context and the concerns of 
the health care providers working in them. Furthermore, during the search of the 
literature, I could not find any empirical studies which have examined the influence or 
role of explanatory models on pre-registered or registered mental health nurses’ 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992).  
The Meaning of the ‘Explanatory Model’ (EM) Concept 
In his seminal book ‘Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture’, Arthur Kleinman 
(1980), a renowned psychiatrist and medical anthropologist, defined the ‘explanatory 
model’2 (EM) as “the notions about an episode of sickness and its treatment that are 
employed by all those engaged in the clinical process, whether patient or clinician” 
(p. 105). Kleinman (1980, p. 105) goes on to outline five major issues which 
explanatory models seek to answer in relation to a specific episode of illness: (1) 
aetiology or causation; (2) time and mode of the onset of symptoms; (3) patho-
physiology; (4) course of the illness (which includes the appropriate illness behaviour 
and perceived level of severity of the disorder); and (5) appropriate treatment 
response.    
These five notions or components of an explanatory model (Kleinman, 1980) are 
responsive to fundamental questions concerning the ‘why’, ‘what’, and ‘how’ of 
Illness (Fitzgerald, 1992; Weiss and Somma, 2007). The explanatory models held by 
mental health practitioners tend to address most or all of these five factors. In 
contrast, service users’ and their family members’ explanatory models deal with what 
are perceived as the most pressing and salient issues at the time (Kleinman, 1980). 
For example, a few anthropological studies have shown how some lay explanatory 
                                                          
2
 Other terminology used in the research literature for the concept of ‘explanatory model’, has 
included: ‘illness model’ (Turk, Rudy and Salovey, 1986), ‘illness representation’ (Leventhal, Meyer 
and Nerenz, 1980), or ‘illness schema’ (Angel and Thoits, 1987). For sake of consistency and for its 
original definition, the term ‘explanatory model’ (Kleinman, 1980) is used in this thesis.  
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models mainly emphasise the causes and consequences of an illness, with very little 
attention given to pathological mechanisms (White, 1982b). Explanatory models also 
influence many aspects of illness behaviour such as help seeking, treatment 
compliance, patient satisfaction, and coping (Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003). That 
is, they not only “disclose the significance of a given health problem for patient and 
family” (Kleinman, 1980, p. 106), but, “they guide choices among available 
treatments” (Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003, p. 85).    
The initial idea behind the explanatory model concept was to draw on social 
anthropological understandings of subjective experiences of distress and to apply 
them directly to psychiatric practice (Dein, 1997; 2003; Bhui and Bhugra, 2002; 
2004). According to Weiss and Somma (2007, p. 131), the explanatory model 
framework “provided a means of bridging cultural differences between patients and 
clinicians with different backgrounds in multicultural practice settings and they also 
provided a means of bridging conceptual differences and promoting empathy and a 
therapeutic alliance, even when patients and clinicians came from similar cultural 
backgrounds”. So one of the reasons why Kleinman’s work has been so important to 
the field of clinical practice is the emphasis on the need for health practitioners and 
service users to negotiate their ‘clinical realities’ or social constructions of the illness 
experience.        
In general, however, explanatory models are not shared or negotiated in 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), as they often “conflict and have 
negative therapeutic consequences” (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002, p. 29). 
The mental health practitioner’s explanatory model may be so different from the 
service user’s and/or their family’s explanatory model that they may well misinterpret 
it. Writing in the context of clinical psychiatry, Kleinman has suggested (1980) that 
the mental health practitioner will almost certainly “fail to treat problems that are part 
of the patient’s EM, but not the medical EM” (p. 116). The likely outcome is that the 
service user and/or their family will reject or fail to comply with the treatment 
recommended by the health practitioner. Indeed, Callan and Littlewood (1998) 
demonstrated how service user satisfaction in relation to their treatment by mental 
health professionals is associated with shared and negotiated explanatory models.   
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In a research sense, the appeal of the explanatory model concept has been in its 
application to the examination of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) 
and the consequences resulting from the incompatibility between service users’ and 
health practitioners’ explanatory models of illness (Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997; 
Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Shapiro, Hollingshead and Morrison, 2002; Kai, et al., 
2007; Pieper and MacFarlane, 2011). Krefting and Krefting (1990) in particular, have 
noted how health care professionals in the primary medical system and lay people 
may “differ greatly in their understandings of a particular illness episode and 
especially in etiology, labelling or diagnosis, and treatment” (p. 115).   
It is overly simplistic to construct ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) 
as a transaction between the explanatory models of a service user and a mental 
health practitioner. As in certain incidences, a mental health practitioner may need to 
negotiate with the explanatory models of a service user’s family members or 
between the explanatory models of a service user and their family members 
(Chrisman, 1991; Chrisman and Zimmer, 2000). A service user may sometimes be 
even caught in the middle between a practitioner and their family’s explanatory 
models for their distress (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a).     
Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) research on ‘multicultural clinical interactions’   
from the perspectives of occupational therapists working in mental health settings in 
Sydney, Australia, illustrated the differences that may occur between a service user’s 
family’s explanatory models and the ‘biopsychosocial’ explanatory model for mental 
illness. This issue, which often was a source of confusion and conflict for the 
occupational therapists in their self-reported ‘multicultural clinical interactions’, was 
related to explanatory model differences about the cause, nature, progress, and 
prognosis of the service user’s distress. A service user’s family’s belief that demons 
or other kinds of supernatural entities was the ultimate cause of their relative’s 
distress, which the occupational therapists’ ‘biopsychosocial’ model ascribed to 
mental illness, emerged in several of the ‘critical incident’ narratives collected during 
the research.   
Fitzgerald et al.(1997a) also found that even if a service user unconditionally 
accepted an occupational therapist’s ‘biopsychosocial’ explanatory model for their 
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illness, there was still scope for the explanatory model of that service user’s family 
support network to be at odds with the explanatory model of the occupational 
therapist. This finding was supported by Chrisman and Zimmerman (2000), who 
suggested that the explanatory models of a service user and their family members 
may diverge considerably. As Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) pointed out, it is 
often difficult for mental health practitioners to realise that a family member’s 
explanatory model may be one of many that a distressed service user holds in mind. 
Thus, there is a need for practitioners to appreciate that a service user and their 
family members may not share the same explanatory models.        
Another important and aforementioned influence on the development of the 
explanatory model framework has been the contribution of the so called ‘etic’-‘emic’ 
paradigm (Skultans and Cox, 2000) and the anthropological distinction between 
‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 1977). The perspectivist view provided by the 
‘etic’-‘emic’ paradigm and the anthropological distinction between ‘disease’ and 
‘illness’ was brought directly into mental health practitioners’ clinical practice and 
training with the emergence of the explanatory model concept (Katon and Kleinman, 
1981; Littlewood, 1990). In particular, the task of eliciting service users’ explanatory 
models shares a common interest in elaborating ‘emic’ accounts of illness (Weiss, 
1997; Kleinman and Benson, 2006). That is, while there is a need for mental health 
practitioners to explain their cultural beliefs and values and how they view distress,   
there also is a need to understand these things from the service user’s and their 
social network’s perspective (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978). According to 
Kleinman and Benson (2006, p. 1674), “explanatory models ought to open clinicians 
to human communication and set their expert knowledge alongside (not over and 
above) the patient’s own explanation and view point”. There is a need to understand 
not just the service user’s perspective (explanatory model), but also the service 
user’s perception of the mental health practitioner’s perspective (explanatory model).  
Explanatory models are embedded in larger cognitive systems that are derived from 
and constructed by cultural and social structural arrangements (Kleinman, 1980). 
Both service users’ and health practitioners’ explanatory models share a common 
body of meanings with members of their subcultural group that in turn is influenced 
by the wider contextual web of shared meanings, which Good and Good (1981) have 
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referred to as ‘semantic illness networks’. Some of the initial formulations of the 
explanatory model concept in the ethnomedical literature dealt insufficiently with how 
explanatory models are elicited and modified within the context and processes of 
social interactions (Dein, 2003). However, as explanatory models are culturally 
based, they are therefore, dynamic and susceptible to change (Kleinman, 1980). 
Explanatory models are not hermeneutically sealed, but are actively constructed and 
negotiated with the explanatory models of other participants and the wider social 
environment (Katon and Kleinman, 1981). They may also change when the situation 
does not meet the expectations of a person’s model (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). 
Although explanatory models are embedded in culture and society, they may also 
take on unique forms within specific families and individuals (Fitzgerald, 1992). 
‘Cultural Theories of Illness’ and ‘Explanatory Models’ 
While explanatory models must always be seen in context, as they are employed in 
response to a given episode of illness (Kleinman, 1980), they also draw on particular 
cultural belief systems that a person or a group of people hold about the cause of a 
set of symptoms or illnesses (Good and Good, 1981; Landy, 1983; Parry, 1984; 
Meadows, 1991; Mattingly and Beer, 1993; Hudelson, 1994; Moss-Morris and Petrie, 
1994; Helman, 2000; 2007; Lipsedge, 2007; Winkelman, 2009). These ‘cultural 
theories of Illness causation’ typically derive from the ‘individual’3, ‘natural’4, ‘social5’, 
‘supernatural6’, or ‘moral’7 domain (Landy, 1983; Helman, 2000; 2007; Lipsedge, 
2007). Furthermore, an episode of illness may be regarded as having ‘proximal’ and 
‘ultimate’ causes (Helman, 2000; 2007), and these causes may derive from different 
                                                          
3
 According to Helman (2000; 2007), lay theories of illness causation ascribe the origin of a person’s 
illness within the individual body, and thus, the responsibility for the illness falls primarily on the ‘sick’ 
person themselves. A person’s illness may therefore, be evidence of their carelessness, and they 
“should feel guilty for causing it” (Helman, 2007, p. 135).    
4
 The natural domain of illness causation is concerned with the living and inanimate natural 
environment (i.e., climatic conditions, influence of planetary bodies, injuries, infestation by parasites, 
infections, or influence of environmental irritants) (Helman, 2000; 2007). 
5
 The social domain focuses on the interpersonal level for the causation of illness (i.e., illness is a 
result of witchcraft, sorcery, or the evil eye), where other people are blamed for one becoming ill 
(Helman, 2000; 2007). 
6
 Theories of illness causation that are concerned with the supernatural world ascribe illness to the 
external agency of supernatural entities, such as gods, spirits, or ancestral shades (Landy, 1983; 
Helman, 2000; 2007).    
7
 Illness may be linked to transgressions of a moral nature. Moral theories are invariably fused with 
supernatural theories of illness causation, as illness may be perceived as a divine form of punishment 
for breaching a religious taboo or violation of a behavioural norm (Shweder, 1991; Lipsedge, 2007). 
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domains or cultural theories of illness causation (i.e., ‘individual’, ‘natural’, ‘social’, 
‘supernatural’, or ‘moral domain’).   
So it is important to recognise that ‘individual’, ‘natural’, ‘social’, ‘supernatural’ and 
‘moral’ cultural theories of illness causation are not necessarily mutually exclusive or 
incompatible (Helman, 2000; 2007). Indeed, these aetiological factors may be linked 
together (multicausal) (Helman, 2000; 2007) in a particular episode of illness (Lloyd, 
et al., 1998; McCabe and Priebe, 2004). For example, ‘supernatural’ theories of 
illness causation tend to involve ‘personalistic’ assumptions (Eisenbruch, 1990), 
meaning that an external (supernatural) personal agent acted intentionally to cause 
the illness, due to some moral transgression on the part of the sufferer of the illness 
(Shweder, 1991).  
Snow’s (1983) study of health beliefs is instructive in this regard, as it illustrated how 
supernatural and moral theories of illness causation could become fused among 
their sample of low-income African Americans. The African Americans in Snow’s 
study explained the cause of  illness as being a ‘reminder’ from God for some 
behavioural lapse, such as neglecting to go to church regularly, not saying one’s 
prayers, or not thanking God for daily blessings. Illness was thus perceived as a 
'whuppin', a divine punishment for sinful behaviour, ‘moral error’, and not thinking or 
acting in a spiritual enough way. From the perspective of Snow’s African American 
cohort, seeking help from the biomedical and ‘professional’ (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 
1984) sector of the health care system was not considered appropriate for the 
treatment of illness. A ‘cure’ for these African Americans, rather, involved the 
acknowledgment of sin, sorrow for having committed it, and a vow to improve one’s 
future behaviour. Prayer and repentance for one’s sin cured illness.  
Viewing suffering as a distinctive morally and/or supernaturally influenced form of 
distress raises the fundamental question of bafflement-“why me” (Kleinman, 1988b, 
p. 29)? Although we may accept that illness is part of nature and that it happens 
through a predictable series of circumstances, or by accident or bad luck, the search 
for meaning still may remain strong (Dein and Lipsedge, 1998). Elworthy (1989) and 
Fitzgerald (1992) have suggested that during our life course we are faced with a 
whole world of phenomena that baffles understanding, and therefore, we search for 
meaning in an attempt to comprehend it. Explanatory models as expressions of 
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belief systems and cultural theories of illness (Helman, 2000; 2007) may be viewed 
as a way of attaching meaning to the suffering that illness causes (Gil, 1998). In this 
light, we can see how supernatural forces are often invoked to make sense “of things 
that have no meaning, like incomprehensible ills, adversity, and death, which strike 
haphazardly and inexplicably return” (Gil, 1998, p. 18). According to Dein and 
Lipsedge (1998), all religions and all belief systems “provide a vocabulary of 
suffering” (p. 145) and this may be personal, communal, or universal.        
By contrast, biomedical or what Eisenbruch (1990) has termed as ‘impersonalistic’ 
explanations for illness tend to absolve the sufferer of primary responsibility for their 
illness and “thus, anyone, even ‘good people’ (including therapists) can have a 
mental illness” (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a, p. 86). In a strict sense, biomedical 
aetiologies of illness remove the primary grounds upon which ‘stigma’ may be based 
(Swartz, 1998). As stigma is associated with social disgrace and being deemed ‘bad’ 
by society, and it usually implies that a person or their socially significant others are 
engaged in some form of socially disapproved behaviour (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). 
While moral problems and/or supernatural causes of illness may be a pressing 
concern for a service user and their family, these concerns are not considered within 
the biomedical framework of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and 
the ICD (World Health Organization, 1992), other than as indicators of 
psychopathology (Kirmayer, Young and Robbins, 1994; Pilowsky, 1997; Swartz, 
1998). 
The extent to which biomedical explanatory models of ‘illness’ do in fact avoid moral 
judgements has been hotly debated by medical anthropologists (e.g., Lock and 
Gordon, 1988). Some medical anthropologists (e.g., Kleinman, 1988b; 1992; 
Kleinman and Kleinman, 1991) have even argued that all explanations of illness 
embody a moral message. As Weitz (1991, p. 35) explained; “social constructions of 
all illnesses develop through subjective, moral judgements that declare ill persons 
less socially worthy than healthy persons and somehow responsible for their 
illnesses”. At the most basic level, to define something as a disease or illness is to 
deem it undesirable (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). That is-to make a moral 
judgement about its meaning and value.  
The Meaning of Lay and Practitioner ‘Explanatory Models’                                                                                                                                             
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Lay explanatory models are said not to possess single referents, but instead, are 
seen to represent semantic networks that loosely link a variety of concepts and 
experiences (Good, 1977; Lloyd, et al., 1998). Kleinman has (1980) suggested that 
“vagueness, multiplicity of meanings, frequent change, and lack of sharp boundaries 
between ideas and experiences are characteristic of lay explanatory models” (p. 
107). In most cultures, lay explanatory models are part of the complex body of 
inherited folklore, which in industrialised countries is increasingly influenced by the 
mass media and the biomedical model of ‘disease’ (Eisenberg, 1977; Tseng and 
McDermott, 1981; Tseng and Streltzer, 2008). They may be part of wider concepts 
about the origins of misfortune in general (‘cultural theories’ and illness ‘domains’) 
(Landy, 1983; Helman, 2000; 2007; Lipsedge, 2007). Moreover, it should be noted 
that these lay explanatory models may refer to specific conditions, or are used 
generally and without differentiation (Tseng, 2001). Ethnicity, socio-economic status, 
and education influence the choice of metaphor and ‘idiom’ for the expression of 
distress (Nichter, 1981).                                                                                                                                                                      
In Kleinman’s (1980) initial definition of the concept, the idioms, metaphors, and 
logics of lay explanatory models are substantially different to the explanatory models 
applied by mental health practitioners. According to Kleinman (1980), health 
practitioners’ explanatory models tend to rely on “single casual trains of scientific 
logic” (p. 107). Atwood Gaines (1982b) and Maureen Fitzgerald’s (Fitzgerald, 1992; 
2004; Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1994; 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne 
and Clemson, 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a)  respective anthropological research 
on psychiatrists and occupational therapists has demonstrated how health 
practitioners’ explanatory models are invariably based on the cultural assumptions of 
biomedicine and influenced by  practitioners’ professional socialisation and 
subsequent clinical interactions. In the context of nursing, Ketefian and Redman 
have written (1997, p. 15) that “a western perspective generally pervades organising 
concepts and frameworks in nursing and thus, is a dominating influence in 
knowledge development and research”. However, Kleinman (1980) argued that if the 
explanatory models employed by practitioners are to be practically effective, they 
usually must “diverge considerably from biomedical and other professional theories” 
(p. 108).  
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Other medical anthropologists (e.g., Gaines, 1982c; Stein, 1990; Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a; Joel, et al., 2003) have suggested that practitioners’ explanatory models 
draw on all sectors of the healthcare system. Both Fitzgerald and colleagues’ 
(1997a) ‘critical incident’ focused research on the ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ of 
Australian based occupational therapists and Joel and colleagues’ (2003) study with 
mental health case workers in India found that mental health practitioners’ may hold 
coexisting and not necessarily congruent explanatory models. These explanatory 
models not only drew from the ‘professional’ sector of biomedicine (Kleinman, 1978; 
1980; 1984), but also from ‘popular’ and ‘folk’ sectors of the healthcare system. At 
the same time, as Ketefian and Redman (1997) noted, the dominative influence on 
nurses’ and other mental health practitioners’ explanatory models, tends to be the 
biomedical model of ‘disease’ (Eisenberg, 1977). As Patel and colleagues’ (1995) 
argued, while an individual practitioner may strive admirably to understand the 
contribution of their service user’s culture to the conversation created between them 
in the clinical process, they will rarely give the same scrutiny to the role of their own 
culturally determined belief system.   
In a focused ethnographic study, which explored the clinical interactions between 
mental health professionals and Afro-Caribbean service users in London (Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran, 2002); it was found that practitioners’ gave little consideration 
to understanding service users’ and/or their family members’ explanatory models. In 
particular, the studied clinical interactions seemed to take on the form of practitioners 
trying to convince and educate service users of the health professional’s biomedical 
explanatory model for their distress. However, these biomedical explanatory models 
did not seem to have any meaning for service users and/or their family members, 
and even if they did have any meaning, the meaning was entirely negative.     
Similarly, studies examining clinical interactions from the perspectives of Australian 
based mental health occupational therapists (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a), British based 
medical students (Kai, Bridgewater and Spencer, 2001), Swiss junior doctors in 
general practice (Hudelson, 2005; 2006), Canadian paediatric residents (Lingard, 
Tallett and Rosenfield, 2002), emergency care nurses working in Sweden (Ozolins 
and Hjelm, 2003), and general nurses working in a medical directorate in the south 
of England (Vydelingum, 2006) have all found that while health practitioners referred 
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to the culturally influenced illness beliefs of their service users, they did not view 
themselves as holding cultural beliefs about illness. The health practitioners in these 
studies portrayed themselves as the bearers of ‘fact’, while service users and their 
family members were presented as the bearers of culture and belief. As Fitzgerald 
and colleagues’ (1997a) explained; there was the explicit assumption that the   
explanatory model which informs the ‘professional’ (sector) perspectives of health 
practitioners was the correct model, rather than an alternative interpretation of a 
service user’s distress.                                                                                                                                                                                         
Drawing on the work of the sociocultural anthropologist Sharon Traweek8 (1988), the 
medical anthropologist Janelle Taylor (2003a; b; 2010) has persuasively argued that 
health practitioners working within the primary sector of biomedical health care 
operate in what she defined as a “culture of no culture” (2003b, p. 556)-that is “a 
community defined by the shared cultural conviction that its shared convictions were 
not in the least cultural, but rather, timeless truths” (Taylor, 2003b, p. 556). Within 
this ‘culture of no culture’, biomedical knowledge is understood not to be “merely 
‘cultural knowledge’, but real knowledge” (Taylor, 2003b, p. 556).      
Much of the work carried out by medical anthropologists (e.g., Chrisman and 
Maretzki, 1982; Clark, 1983; Good, 1995a;b; Santiago-Irizarry, 1996; 2001; Hunt, 
2001; 2005; Good, James, Good and Becker, 2002; Fox, 2005; Hunt and DeVoogd, 
2005; Borovoy and Hine, 2008; Brown and Barrett, 2010) has questioned “the 
                                                          
8
 Sharon Traweek’s (1988) ethnographic study of high-energy physicists working at the Stanford 
Linear Accelerator sought to contextualise this community’s systems of thought in relation to their 
systems of social action. Thus, Traweek sought to situate the science of high energy physics in 
relation to the patterned ways that this community of physicists organised themselves socially.  
Traweek also was interested in how this community reproduced itself and how it produced new 
generation of physicists who would take their places within its social and professional hierarchies, 
while at the same time, assuming the community’s values, assumptions, and goals as their own. In 
particular, Traweek (1988, p. 14)  states: “I believe that to understand how scientific and technological 
knowledge is produced we must understand what is uncontested as well as what is contested, how 
the ground state is constructed as well as how the signals called data are produced. When I speak of 
the shared ground I do not mean some a priori norms or values but the daily production and 
reproduction of what is to be shared…the forces of stability, the varieties of tradition, in a community 
dedicated to innovation and discovery”. As Janelle Taylor (2003b) explained in her article for The 
Journal of Academic Medicine; what emerges from Traweek’s (1988) study is how the world of high 
energy physics could be depicted as a ‘culture of no culture’-that is, a community defined by the 
shared cultural belief that its convictions shared among its community members were not in the least 
cultural, but were rather timeless truths.  
As Taylor (2003b) goes on to argue; while clinicians differ from physicists in many aspects, what 
underpins a clinician’s training is the confidence in the truth of biomedical knowledge to alleviate 
suffering. From such a perspective, biomedical knowledge, like the knowledge generated by high 
energy physicists, may be perceived as a ‘culture of no culture’.  
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privileged status” (Lock and Gordon, 1988, p. 7) and ethnocentrism (Sobo and 
Loustaunau, 2010) associated with the biomedical model which has dominated the 
provision of mainstream mental health services in the UK and other Western 
societies. For medical anthropologists, and the ‘new cross cultural psychiatry’ 
framework, biomedicine like other healing traditions is an ‘ethnomedical’ system 
(Hahn and Kleinman, 1983)-that is, a cultural construction with its own sets of 
beliefs, assumptions, values, behaviours, biases, and sub-specialisms (like 
psychiatry and mental health nursing).         
In addition, the health practitioner’s grounds for negotiation with the explanatory 
models of the service user and/or their family members can be influenced by factors 
such as socio-economic status, ethnicity, gender, and age (Parsons, 1990). A 
Swedish qualitative study (Wachtler, Brorsson and Troein, 2006) of general 
practitioners’ consultations with immigrant patients reinforced such a view, as 
practitioners’ willingness to engage with patients’ explanatory models were 
associated with such variables as educational level, gender, age, social class, and 
having an urban or rural upbringing. Moreover, reflected in health policy and 
philosophies of mental health care are the cultural majority’s beliefs about 
‘abnormality’, which exert an important influence on the course and outcome of 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). The 
explanatory models of individual practitioners and service users may therefore, be a 
secondary influence on ‘multicultural clinical interactions’.                                                                                                                                                                                
Furthermore, the mental health practitioner’s explanatory model may not be fully 
conveyed to a service user and their family members, thus leading to communication 
breakdown. In many cases, this breakdown is a consequence of ‘language 
discordance’ (e.g., between the mental health practitioner and the service user), but 
extra linguistic and cultural factors can come into play (Sobo and Seid, 2003; Sobo, 
2004; 2009). Miscommunications during ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ 
(Fitzgerald, 1992) occur even when adequate translation is not an issue (Clark, de 
Baca, Reidy and Turner, 2002). As Sobo and Seid (2003, p. 98), explained: “the 
content of what is communicated may be poorly understood if it is not explained in 
terms that are familiar to the listener”.  This is a critical issue in ‘multicultural clinical 
interactions’, because as Hahn (1995), Good and Good (1993), and Bonder, Martin 
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and Miracle (2002) have discussed, the intensive training that a health practitioner 
receives may create a gulf with their service users. In other words, all clinical 
interactions are multicultural (Fitzgerald, 1992).                                                                                                                                                        
According to the medical anthropologist Elisa Sobo (Sobo and Seid, 2003; Sobo, 
2004; 2009), if mental health practitioners are to better serve people from all 
cultures, including ones that are similar to their own, they should develop 
‘communicative competence’. ‘Communicative competence’ is about the care that 
must be taken when translating technical terms into lay language and how “the 
content of the conversation must be made culturally relevant” to the service user and 
their support network (Sobo and Seid, 2003, p. 98).    
‘Insight’ and ‘Explanatory Models’ 
Traditional Definitions of ‘Insight’ and its Clinical Implications 
The examination of ‘insight’ is a salient component of clinical examination and 
phenomenology, and is used as a diagnostic criterion of schizophrenia9. Its definition 
can be traced back to the work of Aubrey Lewis (1933) and Karl Jaspers (1959), who 
distinguished between awareness of illness and a lack of insight. In 1933, Aubrey 
Lewis (1933) defined ‘insight’ as a correct attitude to morbid change in oneself and 
the realisation that the illness is mental. Similarly, in the 1970’s, Carpenter, Strauss 
and Barktko (1973), described lack of insight as a symptom of schizophrenia which 
was evaluated as being merely present or absent.    
These traditional conceptualisations of the clinical concept of insight have supported 
the view that insight is absent in psychosis and that it is an all or none phenomenon 
(Saravanan, et al., 2005; Chakrabarty and Basu, 2010). For example, 97% of 
patients examined in the ‘International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia’ (World Health 
Organization, 1973) were recorded as not having insight (Wilson, Ban and Guys, 
1986). Using these categorical definitions, insight is assessed by instruments such 
as the ‘positive and negative syndrome scale’ (Kay, Fisbein and Opler, 1987). This 
categorical or unitary assessment of insight has resulted in many people with 
schizophrenia not meeting the required standard (Jacob, 2010).   
                                                          
9
 As in the ‘Flexible System’ and the ‘Present State Examination’ (Endicott, et al., 1982). 
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‘Multidimensional’ Definitions of ‘Insight’ 
The traditional uni-dimensional measurement (e.g., Lewis, 1933; Jaspers, 1959; 
Carpenter, Strauss, and Barktko, 1973) of insight has been replaced with 
multidimensional perspectives (e.g., David, 1990; Amador and David, 1998; Mintz, 
Dobson and Romney, 2003). Multidimensional constructs of insight have been 
supported empirically (e.g., Greenfield, Strauss, Bowers and Mandelkern, 1989; 
Zimmerman, 1991; David, Buchanan, Reed and Almeida, 1992; Birchwood, et al., 
1994). The convention in psychiatric practice now is to follow Amador and David’s 
(1998) multidimensional conceptualisation of insight, which includes: (1) awareness 
of mental disorder; (2) understanding of the social consequences of disorder; (3) 
awareness of the need for treatment; (4) awareness of specific signs and symptoms 
of the disorder; (5) the attribution of symptoms to the disorder.    
Instruments also have been devised to assess and quantify insight. These 
instruments have included the ‘Insight and Treatment Attitudes Questionnaire’ 
(McEvoy, Apperson and Applebaum, 1989), the ‘Schedule for Assessment of Insight’ 
(David, 1990), and the ‘Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorders’ (Amador, 
Strauss, Yale and Gorman, 1991). Moreover, the psychiatric literature has indicated 
that insight is a good indicator of compliance with treatment and prognosis and 
greater quality of life (McEvoy, Freter and Everett, 1989; Buchanan, 1992; Kemp and 
Lambert, 1995; McGorry and McConville, 1999).    
However, these types of study have largely been conducted in Western countries 
and with cultural majority derived samples, and therefore, the cross-cultural validity 
of the clinical measurement of insight has not been adequately addressed 
(Saravanan, et al., 2004). It is evident from these traditional (e.g., Lewis, 1933; 
Jaspers, 1959; Carpenter, Strauss and Barktko, 1973) and multidimensional (e.g., 
David, 1990; Amador and David, 1998; Mintz, Dobson and Romney, 2003) 
definitions of insight that the mainstream psychiatric research literature focus has 
been on the supposed psychological and neurological basis of insight, in that the 
loss of awareness of deficits and denial of illness are ascribed to whatever disease 
process underlies mental illness (Johnson and Orrell, 1996). That is, the clinical 
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concept of insight employs biomedical conceptions of ‘disease’ (Eisenberg, 1977) 
and psychopathology (Saravanan, et al., 2007a). 
Unsurprisingly, much of the mental health nursing literature has taken up the issue of 
insight at the point of treatment compliance (Pinkihana, Happell, Taylor and Keks, 
2002; Coombs, Deane, Lambert and Griffiths, 2003). According to Hamilton and 
Roper (2006), this concern reflects the pragmatic nursing interest about whether a 
service user warrants more or less nursing attention, and more specifically, whether 
the service user takes or refuses the prescribed medication. The nurse’s primary role 
is to administer treatment, rather than judge diagnoses (Hamilton and Roper, 2006) 
and hence, the reason why the nursing literature has been quiet on the issue of 
whether service users possess insight or at what level.    
‘Insight’ and the Influence of Culture 
The more recent ‘multidimensional’ definitions of insight (e.g., David, 1990; Amador 
and David, 1998; Mintz, Dobson and Romney, 2003) have been criticised from 
cultural perspectives (Lazare, 1989; Littlewood, 1990; Perkins and Moodley, 1993; 
Johnson and Orrell, 1995; 1996; Beck-Sander, 1998; David, 1998; McGorry and 
McConville, 1999; Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Saravanan, et al., 2004; 
2005; 2007a; Hamilton and Roper, 2006; Lipsedge, 2007; Fernando, 2010; Jacob, 
2010). In particular, a major criticism of multidimensional clinical conceptualisations 
of insight is that they still fail (like their traditional uni-dimensional predecessors) to 
take into account cultural and individual ‘idioms’ of distress (Nichter, 1981). 
Explanatory models that are incompatible with the biomedical account of 
psychopathology are discounted (Littlewood, 1990). Even in parts of the non-
Western world, non-biomedical explanatory models are excluded from the clinical 
assessment of insight (Jacob, 2010). As Jadhav (2000, p. 42) notes:  
“Local worlds, their core moral and cultural values, and a rich vocabulary associated 
with bodily problems and expressed through a range of non-English languages, are 
often glossed over or pruned to fit into conventional psychiatric nosological systems 
(DSM and ICD). This process of systematically acquiring a culture-blind ability is 
considered credible and meritorious, both locally and internationally”.      
Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran (2002, p. 13) explained, that service users “may 
disagree with their clinician’s views that they are ill, not as a result of the illness itself, 
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but because they hold different beliefs about the nature of mental illness”. All mental 
illnesses in the biomedical model are considered medical diseases, and a failure to 
subscribe to such a point of view often results in the clinical judgement that the 
person lacks insight (Jacob, 2010). Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran (2002, p. 89), note 
that assessment is always “derived from the assessor’s perspective”. Thus, the 
clinical concept of insight can alternatively be seen as a form of control, as a way of 
dismissing the service user who resists the practitioner’s explanatory model for their 
distress (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). Hamilton and Roper (2006) also have 
challenged the clinical assumption that in relation to the assessment of a service 
user’s insight, a unitary professional opinion will always emerge. As Hamilton and 
Roper argue, there are likely to be several practitioners examining a single case-in 
which case, several different professions may be represented, with opinions 
informed by biomedical, social, psychological, moral, and common sense ideas.      
Research that has examined the clinical interactions between mental health 
professionals and Afro Caribbean service users in London (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and 
Curran, 2002) has problematised the clinical concept of insight. In particular, these 
researchers found that practitioners’ use of the ‘Birchwood Insight Scale’ (Birchwood, 
et al., 1994), revealed far more about a service user’s disagreement with psychiatric 
intervention and medication than it did about awareness of mental illness. Such 
scales are problematic, as insight depends on a service user acknowledging that 
they have a mental illness and not any other problems. Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran 
(2002) presented a case example of a service user who perceived that something 
was wrong with them, yet ascribed the cause to a non-biomedical explanatory model 
(in this case, the service user attributed the cause of their distress to the practices of 
voodoo), had the same extremely low score on the insight measure as someone who 
felt there was absolutely nothing wrong with them. The clinical concept of insight had 
no cultural validity for this service user. This finding is not surprising, as the concept 
of insight itself is a western clinical construct (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). 
‘Multidimensional’ clinical measurements of insight (David, 1990; Amador and David, 
1998; Mintz, Dobson and Romney, 2003) fail to acknowledge that people with 
psychiatrically defined mental disorders may hold multiple explanatory models for 
their distress (Saravanan, et al., 2004). As Kleinman (1980) has suggested, a 
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service user’s explanatory models for their distress may be diverse and 
contradictory. Research studies that have examined the cultural validity of the clinical 
concept of insight in India (e.g., Saravanan and Jacob, 2006; Saravanan, et al., 
2007a; b) have highlighted that many people who were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia had simultaneously held multiple and often contradictory explanatory 
models about the causation of their illness and help seeking strategies. In such, 
cases ‘personalistic’ (Eisenbruch, 1990) beliefs about illness causation (e.g., beliefs 
in karma, sin, punishment, evil spirits, black magic, and other supernatural and moral 
explanations), as well as ‘naturalistic’ explanatory models (e.g., degeneration, 
dysfunction) were held simultaneously.   
The authors (Saravanan and Jacob, 2006; Saravanan, et al., 2007a; b) of these 
studies discovered no one to one correspondence between illness causation beliefs 
and consequent help seeking actions (correspondence between beliefs about the 
cause of an illness and its resolution is an inherent assumption of the clinical 
measurement of insight). Help seeking behaviour in particular has a special place in 
multidimensional conceptualisations of insight. However, this research evidence from 
India (Saravanan and Jacob, 2006; Saravanan, et al., 2007a; b) suggested that 
patients and their relatives sought interventions from both the ‘professional’ sector of 
biomedicine and traditional healers in the ‘folk’ sector of the health care system 
(Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984). These explanatory models, which were held 
simultaneously, together with pluralistic help seeking approaches, reflected the 
pluralistic perspectives (explanatory models) of these patients and their family 
members.       
These authors’ (Saravanan and Jacob, 2006; Saravanan, et al., 2007a; b) 
conclusions reinforced Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran’s (2002) research findings on 
the clinical interactions of Afro Caribbean service users, confirming that current 
multidimensional measurements are not culturally sensitive in their assessment of 
insight. They also suggest that it is difficult to have definable, objective, or universal 
measures for clinical insight (Saravanan, et al., 2005). Thus, the clinical 
measurement of insight signifies in a variety of ways in which a person’s mental life 
must approximate to that of others (e.g., the explanatory models of biomedicine), in 
terms of what constitutes a psychiatric defined mental illness, what beliefs are 
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considered ‘abnormal,’ and what help seeking behaviour is it reasonable to follow 
(Saravanan, et al., 2004).    
In some cultures, the diagnostic label of a mental illness is highly stigmatising10, and 
there is some evidence to suggest that service users may seek to protect 
themselves from the stigma of mental illness by denying their illness, or by 
somatising, rather than psychologising their distress (Kennard, 1979; Lally, 1989; 
McGorry, 1992; Johnson and Orrell, 1995; Hsu, 1999; Hudelson, 2005; 2006; Perron 
and Hudelson, 2006; Lipsedge, 2007). Likewise, the denial of illness has been 
associated with the unacceptability of psychiatric treatment (Johnson and Orrell, 
1995). As some academics have argued (e.g., Fernando, 1988; 1998; 2002; 2009; 
2010; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1997; Bhugra and Bahl, 1999; Bhui, 2002; Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Ndegwa and Olajide, 2003; Sewell, 2009), these issues 
may be particularly salient to groups such as the African-Caribbean community in the 
UK, who may feel fearful of psychiatry and the treatment it offers. Indeed, resisting 
labels and explanatory models that have been applied to their distress may be seen 
as important statements by service users (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). In 
this way, social life can be seen as a ‘negotiation of meanings’ (Marcus and Fischer, 
1999).           
For these reasons, the ‘lack of insight’ label may point to a lack of agreement about 
the explanatory models used by the practitioner and the service user in 
understanding the cause, nature, prognosis, and treatment of the service user’s 
distress (McGorry and McConville, 1999). As Beck Sander (1998) suggested, the 
concept of explanatory model “goes to the heart of many concerns about the 
usefulness of the global construct of insight” (p. 587). Most importantly, the omission 
of social and cultural influences in the assessment of insight has negative 
implications for the care and treatment of service users (Johnson and Orrell, 1995). 
The stakes are highest “when the mental health system is supported by a legal 
                                                          
10
 There are several negotiable components in the definition of ‘stigma’ (Hutchinson and Bhugra, 
2000), and as such, the concept of stigma is itself negotiable (Link and Phelan, 2001). This is 
because its meaning is primarily embedded in the sociocultural milieu in which it originates (Kleinman, 
et al., 1995). A broad conceptualisation of stigma includes: a mark that sets an individual apart; links 
that individual to some undesirable characteristic; rejection, isolation, and/or discrimination against 
that individual (Jones, et al., 1984). In addition to the physical mark or label, the process of 
stigmatisation includes behavioural, cognitive, and sociological characteristics (Hutchinson and 
Bhugra, 2000). 
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system where patients can be treated involuntarily” and against their will (Hamilton 
and Roper, 2006, p. 420). In response to such criticisms, Saravanan and colleagues’ 
(2004; 2005) have argued for cultural perspectives to be taken into account when a 
person’s insight is assessed, suggesting that this could be achieved by bringing the 
assessment of insight into line with the DSM-IV’s (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) recommendations around the assessment of delusional phenomena. In 
particular, the DSM-IV encourages practitioners to compare the content of a person’s 
delusions with their local and cultural standards.   
Critiques of the ‘Explanatory Model’ (EM) Framework 
Despite the strong appeal of the explanatory model framework and its relevancy to 
understanding ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), the concept of 
explanatory model has not been without its fair share of critics (e.g., Thomas, 1978; 
Taussig, 1980; Young, 1982; Fisher and Todd, 1983; Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 
1987; Lazarus, 1988; Parsons, 1990; Campbell, 2000; Williams and Healy, 2001; 
Dein, 2003).These criticisms have derived from both ‘critical theory’ and 
‘deconstructionist’ approaches. Proponents of critical theory have argued that the 
interpretation of events by social actors and the meanings which they assign to those 
events are structured by their historical participation in the social hierarchy (Young, 
1982). Critical theorists point out that health practitioners and service users have 
little opportunity to participate in the active construction of explanatory models 
(Young, 1982). Rather, critical theorists view explanatory models as the outcome of 
historical and ideological relations of economic and social inequality. A political 
economy perspective (Farmer, 2003) is therefore, central to the critical theory 
critique of the explanatory model concept.   
Although later accounts of the explanatory model concept (Kleinman, 1988b) have 
emphasised their fluidity, contradictions, and shifting content, some academics have 
maintained reservations about the concept. These reservations stem from the view 
that explanatory models only have limited relevance to the actual process of clinical 
interactions (Williams and Healy, 2001). In particular, Williams and Healy (2001) 
have characterised explanatory models as reified devices and as implicitly fixed and 
static. The issue of language discordance (i.e., between practitioners and service 
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users) also has been neglected in discussions about the elicitation of and negotiation 
with service users’ explanatory models. As Parsons (1990) has noted; it is not 
always the case that practitioners and service users are able to communicate 
coherently in the same language. When language discordance is an issue, and when 
a medically trained interpreter is not readily available, it may be difficult if not 
impossible for a practitioner to have any understanding of the service user’s 
explanatory model (Parsons, 1990).        
Despite these legitimate criticisms, the explanatory model is integral to the meaning- 
centred theoretical perspective (Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; 1992; Good, 
1994).The explanatory model concretises the important anthropological distinction 
between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 1977) and the related ‘etic’-‘emic’ 
perspective (Skultans and Cox, 2000). And as I have already pointed out, 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) can be conceptualised as the 
transaction of explanatory models.  
Summary 
This background chapter has presented ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ 
(Fitzgerald, 1992) as the transaction of ‘explanatory models’ (EM) or different 
perspectives and ‘clinical realities’ (Kleinman, 1980). These perspectives, 
explanatory models, or clinical realities (Kleinman, 1980) are grounded in the 
important medical anthropological distinction between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ 
(Eisenberg, 1977) and the related ‘etic’-‘emic’ paradigm (Skultans and Cox, 2000). 
Embedded as they are in culturally variant conceptions of the ‘self’ (White and 
Marsella, 1982; Seeley, 2006) and ‘cultural theories of (domains) Illness’ (Helman, 
2000; 2007), explanatory models provide context to an alternative understanding of 
‘insight’ (Jacob, 2010) and other salient cultural issues that may emerge for pre-
registered mental health student nurses in clinical placement. The next chapter 
relates this discussion of explanatory models to the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986).  
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Chapter 3   
‘Abnormality’ or ‘Normality’: The ‘Normative Uncertainty’ 
Evaluation Dilemma and ‘Multicultural Clinical Interactions’                                                                                                                 
“The two forms of examination, whether they stem from the sick or healthy man, set 
up a standard of normality, and it is exactly here, before starting with our main 
theme, that our difficulties begin. We do not know what normal is, and what an exact 
definition of normality consists of. Our conceptualizations of normality differ 
considerably, depending on our orientation, be it cultural, social, psychological, or 
medical”. 
(Hirsch, 1962, p. 85) 
Introduction 
‘Multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) can present assessment 
dilemmas for mental health practitioners. More specifically, the research literature 
describes at least two problematic clinical areas where these assessment dilemmas 
emerge for practitioners in practice. Firstly, the practitioner may face difficulties in 
differentiating religious rituals from the rituals that may be symptomatic of obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) (Good and Kleinman, 1985; Greenberg and Witztum, 
1991; 2001; Guarnaccia, 1997; Guarnaccia and Kirmayer, 1997; Kirmayer, Young 
and Hayton, 1997; Al-Issa and Oudji, 1998; Yossifova and Loewenthal, 1999; 
Kirmayer, 2001; de Silva and Bhugra, 2007; Loewenthal, 2007; Rego, 2009). 
Secondly, the practitioner can encounter the dilemma of having to distinguish 
between ‘normative’ religious beliefs, behaviours, and experiences, and psychotic 
illness (Gaines, 1988; 1995; Loewenthal, 1995; 2006; 2007; Dein, 2000; 2004; 
2010a; b; Lu, 2004; Bartocci and Dein, 2007; Tobert, 2007; 2010).      
At the same time, this ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 
1986) manifests itself in other ways and will occur in any clinical situation where a 
practitioner faces the dilemma of distinguishing between mental illness and culturally 
supported behaviours and personality traits (Galanti, 2008). When it comes to 
understanding service users’ ‘idioms of distress’, culture and beliefs about how 
culture influences behaviour can create considerable confusion for practitioners.   
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In the absence of clear diagnostic and assessment criteria that distinguish between 
‘culture’ and ‘psychopathology’ (Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003; Tseng and 
Streltzer, 2008; Stolk, 2009), practitioners have been reported as relying on their 
own intuition and ‘gut instincts’ (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003), or 
seeking out possible ‘strategies’ or ‘procedures’11 (Romiszowski, 1984) from a 
contradictory and confusing cross-disciplinary evidence base. While scholars (e.g., 
Helman, 1984; Lovinger, 1984; Westermeyer, 1987; Jackson and Fulford, 1997; 
Lefley, Sandoval and Charles, 1998) have made attempts at providing practitioners 
with such clinical criteria, some of these criteria have been criticised as being too 
specific to a particular belief system, or for including dubious criteria (Andary, Stolk 
and Klimidis, 2003; Stolk, 2009). However, the decontextualisation of service users’ 
experiences results in the pathologisation of culturally ‘normative’ phenomena, 
‘category fallacy’ errors (Kleinman, 1977; 1988a), and poor health care experiences 
and outcomes for service users (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Callan and Littlewood, 
1998; Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). 
Having discussed these concerns and the problems that arise from the ‘normative 
uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986), the final sections of this 
background chapter will situate this dilemma within a wider debate that has 
concerned both the biomedical and social sciences-the unresolved difficulty of 
defining ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ (Helman, 2000; 2007; Fernando, 2002; 2010; 
Winkelman, 2009).  Indeed, this debate is intimately tied to wider cultural ideas about 
what is considered ‘normal’ (Dillard, et al., 1992; Swartz, 1998). The disciplines of 
psychiatry, psychology, and medical anthropology have struggled to establish 
workable criteria against which to judge behaviour as ‘normal’, ‘abnormal’, or 
‘pathological’ (Offer and Sabshin, 1966; Good and Good, 1986; Tseng, 1997; 
Stevenson, 2010). Three models for understanding mental ‘abnormality’ are evident 
in cultural psychiatry and these models have corresponded closely to the interpretive 
models used by anthropologists attempting to make sense of the apparent diversity 
                                                          
11
Romiszowski (1984, p. 110) defined a strategy as “a schema of interrelated general principles”, and 
a procedure as “a fixed sequence of steps that should be performed to achieve a given aim”. Mental 
health practitioners need access to resources and strategies to help them in clinical problem solving 
(Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). However, problems arise when such resources are used in an 
unquestioning fashion, or are viewed as procedures or ‘recipes’ for success (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; 
Gunaratnam, 1997; 2001).  
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of human societies (Shweder and Bourne, 1982; Fernando, 1988; Helman, 2007; 
Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans and Chasiotis, 2011). The three models of 
‘absolutism’, ‘universalism’ and ‘cultural relativism’ not only have important 
consequences for the nature and conduct of research enquiry (Kleinman, 1988a), 
but also have implications for how the ‘normative uncertainty’ (Good and Good, 
1986) evaluation dilemma is attended to in practice. As they are discussed in the 
context of the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma, the concepts of religion 
and spirituality are central to this background chapter. I will therefore, begin this 
background chapter with a conceptual overview of these two related, but distinct 
concepts. 
Religion and Spirituality: Similar, but Distinct Concepts 
Since the 1990’s, the mental health literature has differentiated between the 
concepts of religion and spirituality (Zinnbauer, et al., 1997; Speck, 1998; Fernando, 
2002; 2010). While spirituality is a common feature of different religious traditions, it 
also is possible to be spiritual outside the context of organised religion (King and 
Dein, 1999; Loewenthal, 2007). Both of these terms are fuzzy concepts (Fernando, 
1988; 2003). However, religion usually refers to “socially based beliefs and traditions, 
often associated with ritual and ceremony”, whereas spirituality generally “refers to a 
deep-seated individual sense of connection through which each person’s life is 
experienced as contributing to a valued and greater ‘whole’, together with a sense of 
belonging and acceptance” (Dein, Cook, Powell and Eagger, 2010, p. 63).      
Scholars have tended to agree that religion involves affiliation and identification with 
a religious group, cognitive factors (beliefs), and emotional and experiential factors 
(Ember and Ember, 1988; 1992; Shafranske and Maloney, 1996; Winkelman, 1999; 
2005). Although some religious systems do not have beliefs concerning the 
existence of supernatural beings, the belief in supernatural beings is a defining 
feature of many religions (Dein, 2000). The monotheistic religions also hold the view 
that the source of existence (i.e., God as a spiritual being) is also the source of moral 
directives (Loewenthal, 2007). Dein (2000) has recommended the usage of the 
alternative term of ‘ultimate reality’ in place of supernatural beings. According to 
Dein, this ultimate reality is set apart from mundane earthly reality and is treated as 
‘sacred’. Through the enacting of religious rites, a person may be able to enter this 
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sacred reality, and for a time transcend their mundane existence and earthly 
troubles. All the major religions depend on social organisation for communicating 
their ideas and practices (Fernando, 2002; 2010). 
Anthropologists have found that ritual is characteristic of all religious systems 
(Winkelman, 1999; 2005). Although there is some debate around the definition and 
meaning of ‘ritual’, most anthropologists would agree that the term refers to a form of 
repetitive behaviour that often has an element of symbolic communication and 
therefore, does not have a direct instrumental effect (Dein, 2000). Religion like 
spirituality is firmly embedded in culture and may be a major part of a person’s 
worldview (Winkelman, 1999; 2005). As Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) note, 
religion explains both the natural and the supernatural world, the relationship 
between the two realms, and the place of humans in the universe. For many people, 
religion is an integral part of how they view life, how they relate to others, and is a 
source of beliefs, values, and behaviours (James, 1961; Browning, Gobe and 
Evision, 1990; Krippner and Welch, 1992). Religion may both reflect and validate the 
social order, and influences how people should and should not behave (Tseng and 
McDermott, 1981). 
In the social sciences, the topic of ‘religious experience’ has been marginalised 
(Dein, 2011); however, it is important to this background review. Although, William 
James (1961) considered religious experiences to be pre-cultural and pre-cognitive, 
Simon Dein (2011) in a recent paper has argued against this perennialist position, by 
suggesting instead that such experiences and their narration are culturally 
constructed. Dein (2010b, p. 524) also explains, that “religious experiences are 
polythetic in the Wittgenstein sense, as having ‘family resemblances’ rather than 
possessing a single criterion that they all must share”. Religious experiences have 
been associated with a variety of labels “including mystical, ecstatic, numinous, born-
again, anomalous, paranormal, out-of-body, flow, transcendental, and conversion 
experiences” (Dein, 2010b, p. 524). Based on a survey of the ‘Alister Hardy Society’ 
archives, Jakobsen (1999) found that people in Western societies tended not to 
share their negative religious experiences for fear of being labelled as mentally ill. 
The meaning of ‘spirituality’ has been discussed extensively in the nursing research 
literature (e.g., Narayanasamy, 1999; Narayanasamy and Owens, 2001; Tanyi, 
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2002).This literature, however, has particularly focused on the following agreed 
dimensions: A search for fulfilment and meaning; finding a purpose in life; 
relationships with others; an individual’s essence as a person; and as something 
which integrates the mind, body, and the emotions (McEwen, 2005). Spirituality may 
be expressed through art, poetry, and myth, as well as religious practice (Dein, 
Cook, Powell and Eagger, 2010). Spirituality is thus a more inclusive concept than 
religion (Dein, 2000; 2004; 2010a). When a service user’s distress is coloured by 
religion or spirituality, it may be difficult for a practitioner to differentiate between 
what is ‘culturally normative’ and what is ‘psychopathological’ (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and 
Curran, 2002).   
The ‘Culture’ or ‘Psychopathology’ Clinical Dilemma 
This discussion of the ‘culture’ or ‘psychopathology’ clinical dilemma is related to the 
previous background chapter on ‘explanatory models’ (Kleinman, Eisenberg and 
Good, 1978), the clinical concept of ‘insight’ (Jacob, 2010), cultural conceptions of 
‘self’ (Seeley, 2006), and their influence on practitioners’ ‘multicultural clinical 
interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) are among only a 
few researchers (also see Sanderson, Vandenberg and Paese, 1999; Eeles, 2001; 
Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003; Tobert, 2007; Stolk, 2009) who have explored 
empirically the clinical implications of this dilemma. They (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a) 
found that occupational therapists working in mental health service settings were ill 
prepared and lacked the knowledge to satisfactorily address the problems presented 
by the ‘culture’ or ‘psychopathology’ dilemma. The occupational therapists expressed 
doubt about whether a service user’s beliefs and behaviours was evidence of an 
underlying psychopathology, or of cultural differences in ‘normative’ experience. To 
take this dilemma one stage further: “When are such things the product of illness and 
when are they products of culture” (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a, p. 91)? Are they always 
both and if they are both, when can they be considered as both? 
Gaines (1995) suggests that it may not be possible to make a sharp distinction 
between ‘culture’ and ‘psychopathology’, since “rarely is a mind so disordered...that 
even in illness it does not make extensive use of cultural materials, whether 
negatively, that is, against society or not” (p. 282). Even when ‘organic’ psychiatric 
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disorders are considered the content of hallucinations12 and delusions13 reflect the 
way a given community structures experiences (Weinstein, 1962; Gaines, 
1988).Traits that a person displays may not necessarily be symptomatic of 
psychiatrically defined illness, but part of his or her orientation to culture (Galanti, 
2008). These dilemmas arise not only for practitioners but are central questions in 
disciplinary fields that focus on transcultural mental health (Prince, 1979; Fernando, 
1988; 2010; Swartz, 1998; Winkelman, 2009).         
The way that practitioners deal with such questions or dilemmas has important 
implications for their service users (Minas, 1991; Good, 1996). Failure to understand 
the influence of culture on a service user’s behaviour and beliefs can result in two 
main types of assessment errors (Rack, 1982; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Dein and 
Lipsedge, 1998). First, culture naiveté on the part of the practitioner may result in 
culturally sanctioned phenomena being misdiagnosed as mental illness. For 
example, ‘glossolalia’ may be misdiagnosed as ‘schizophrenic speech disorder’ and 
‘possession’ as ‘schizophrenic passivity’ (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1997). In such a 
case, when a person is not distressed, but is perceived as being ill, an injustice may 
be done and limited resources used to address a problem that does not exist 
(Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). 
Second, there is a risk that the reverse may apply-a practitioner may assess the 
signs and symptoms of mental illness as cultural differences (Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a). In such a case, the service user’s distress may not be adequately 
addressed, and in the worst case scenario, the service user will be harmed in some 
way (Dein and Lipsedge, 1998). This error can be attributed to what Stein (1985) has 
                                                          
12
 Hallucinations are traditionally defined in psychiatry as perceptions, which lack sufficient basis in 
external stimuli, even though the person places their origin in the outside world (Leff, 1981). These 
perceptions can be auditory or even relate to taste and smell (Al-Issa, 1977; Westermeyer, 1987; 
Vega, et al., 2007; Vespia, 2009).  
13
 The term ‘delusion’ in psychiatry has traditionally denoted an erroneous belief that is nonsensical to 
others and which is held in the face of evidence to the contrary (Oltmanns, 1988).This definition 
encompasses the key elements of a delusion as originally formulated by Karl Jaspers (1968): ‘Falsity’, 
‘subjective certainty’, and ‘incorribility’. More recently, a ‘dimensional’ approach has been proposed 
(Pierre, 2001). ‘Conviction’, ‘preoccupation’, ‘negative affect’, and ‘extension’ (the degree to which the 
delusion affects a person’s life) are considered as dimensions of delusions (Kendler, Glazer and 
Morgenstern, 1983; Garety and Hemsley, 1994; Applebaum, Clark Robbins and Roth, 1999). The 
DSM-IV also refined the definition of a delusion to one that is not “ordinarily accepted by other 
members of the person’s culture or subculture” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 765).      
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referred to as ‘culture as a red herring’, which is revealed when a practitioner begins 
to treat individuals differently simply on the basis of their presumed cultural 
background. As Stein (1985, p. 4) argues, a “clear distinction must always be made 
between what a patient’s culture is and what clinicians presume it to be”. Other 
assessment errors may also occur-a wrong diagnosis may be given, or the severity 
of the illness may be under or overestimated (Fitzgerald, Mullavey- O’Byrne, Twible 
and Kinebanian, 1995). 
Littlewood and Lipsedge (1997) have placed the perception of mental abnormality 
along a dynamic spectrum, ranging from the organic psychiatric illnesses such as 
dementia, which have a defined biological aetiological basis, to what they regard as 
the vaguer and more diffuse patterns of ‘adaptive’ or ‘maladaptive’ behaviour that 
can only be examined and assessed in relation to the cultural context. In the case of 
the organic psychiatric illnesses, there are measures of physical abnormality, such 
as changes in body temperature or blood chemistry-which are similar to those 
measures available in general medicine-the ‘form’ of organic psychiatric illnesses are 
very similar across cultural contexts. By contrast, the patterns of behaviour at the 
social end of the spectrum (e.g., suicide attempts or delinquency) are only 
recognised as being ‘abnormal’ according to “the norms of behaviour in a particular 
community at a particular time” (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1997, p. 191).These 
patterns of behaviour at the social end of the spectrum are more likely to be 
perceived as the consequence of free will, than those conditions at the biological end 
of the scale.     
Located in the middle of this spectrum lies the most problematic area of mental 
‘abnormality’- the psychoses (e.g., schizophrenia) and neuroses (e.g., phobias and 
anxiety states). Littlewood and Lipsedge suggest that the psychotic illnesses have 
greater affinities with the biological end of the spectrum, while the neuroses seem 
closer to the social end. However, they also note that the description of mental 
illnesses as each being located somewhere along this biological-social spectrum is 
somewhat over-simplified. Indeed, they argue that the perception of psychological 
‘abnormality’ is itself filtered by cultural norms. As Raymond Prince (1992, p. 289) 
explained:   
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“Highly similar mental and behavioural states may be designated psychiatric 
disorders in some cultural settings and religious experiences in others…Within 
cultures that invest these unusual states with meaning and provide the individual 
experiencing them with institutional support; at least a proportion of them may be 
contained and channelled into socially valuable roles”. 
The Pathologisation of Religion and Spirituality in Clinical Practice 
For many people the religious and spiritual dimensions of culture are among the 
most important elements that structure their experiences, beliefs, values, behaviours 
and ‘explanatory models’ and ‘help seeking’ (Chrisman, 1977; Kleinman, 1980; 
Browning, Gobe and Evision, 1990; Krippner and Welch, 1992). However, scholars 
(Freud, 1907; 1961a; b; Ellis, 1980; 1986; Dawkins, 2006) and professional bodies 
(Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1976) from the biomedical and 
psychological sciences have regarded religious and spiritual beliefs as delusions, on 
the basis that religion and spirituality is inherently fabricated and therefore, the 
beliefs that are associated with it are false. Perhaps it is not surprising that the 
theologian Hans Kung (1986) has referred to religion as psychiatry’s last taboo.        
Such an attitude has also been shown to exist among mental health practitioners 
(Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1995; Bhugra, 1996; Fry, 1998; King and Dein, 1999; 
Fernando, 2003; 2010), whom according to Lukoff, Lu and Turner (1992, p. 673), 
“have tended to either ignore or pathologize the religious and spiritual dimensions of 
life”. As a result, “individuals who bring religious and spiritual problems into their 
treatments are often viewed as showing signs of mental illness” (Lukoff, Lu and 
Turner, 1992, p. 673).Thus, the risk of a ‘prejudicial’ analysis of religious phenomena 
is high (Crossley, 1995). In such a situation, a misdiagnosis and ‘category fallacy’ 
(Kleinman, 1977; 1988a) error can occur, the service user may be detained against 
their will, be given inappropriate treatment, and suffer iatrogenic harm (Bragdon, 
1993; Charters, 1999).  
A focused ethnography on the clinical interactions between practitioners and Afro-
Caribbean service users in mental health service settings in London found a 
prevailing negative attitude among practitioners towards the issues of religion and 
spirituality (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). In some cases, service users’ 
religious or spiritual concerns were not assessed in their cultural contexts, but were 
just assumed to be aspects of psychopathology. Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran 
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provided a clinical case example of this-a service user was told on several occasions 
by staff members that their religiosity pointed to schizophrenia. These statements 
heightened this service user’s feelings of alienation and sense they were not being 
listened to. Other researchers (Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1996; Johnson and Friedman, 
2008) have suggested that service users may feel increasingly isolated and 
misunderstood when their religious or spiritual beliefs, and accompanying 
behaviours and experiences, are ignored or misdiagnosed as psychopathology. This 
again may also lead to adverse outcomes, including blocking any future attempts at 
help seeking.                                                                                                                                                                    
The picture seems more mixed in the psychiatric nursing literature, with academic 
attention being placed more on the concept of spirituality than religion. While some 
scholars (Narayanasamy and Owens, 2001; Vandover and Bacon, 2001; Como, 
2007) have suggested that spirituality is a valued and integral component of holistic 
practice, others in the profession have concluded that while most nursing theories 
and models embrace the concept of holistic practice and describe individuals as 
having spiritual needs, the concept of spirituality and provision of spiritual care is 
basically neglected (Oldnall, 1995; 1996; Fry, 1998; Martsoff and Mickley, 1998; 
Swinton, 2001; Malinski, 2002). Fry (1998) highlighted an attitude among nurses 
where issues of “religion and spirituality are generally marginal issues bordering on 
the psychotic or, at least, ‘misguided normal’ and should be ignored in order to focus 
on reality based issues” (p. 28).  
The tendency by practitioners to pathologise service users’ expressions of religiosity 
and spirituality stem from a number of concerns; not least, the role of religion and 
spirituality in the lives of people diagnosed with severe mental illness (Sims, 1992; 
1994; Clarke, 2001); the not infrequent religious content of delusions and 
hallucinations (Sims, 1995; Siddle, 2000; Koenig, 2007); and the ‘normative 
uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986).It also is fuelled by 
practitioners concern with liability, when related to ‘command’ hallucinations 
experienced by some service users (for instance, a person whose homicidal or 
suicidal impulses are attributed to the voice of God) (Fallot, 1998). Furthermore, 
when practitioners have looked for associations between religion/spirituality and 
specific anxiety disorders, ‘obsessive compulsive disorder’ is another category in 
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which such relationships are assumed to be present (Loewenthal, 2007). Not only 
have religious obsessions been reported to frequently occur (Tek and Ulug, 2001), 
but it is possible that practitioners may assume there is some relation between 
particular clinical features of obsessive compulsive disorder, such as thought-action 
fusion (i.e., the belief that thinking is equal to doing), perfectionism, rituals, and 
doubts on the one hand, and religious practices, thought patterns and moral 
concerns on the other (de Silva and Bhugra, 2007). 
The reported (Fry, 1998; King and Dein, 1999; Fernando, 2003; 2010) lack of 
sensitivity by practitioners to the cultural forces of religion and spirituality in the lives 
of service users reflects a general and powerful trend in the ‘professional’ sector of 
mainstream mental health services in the UK and elsewhere. In other words, the 
ontological primacy that the mental health professions have historically given to 
“biology over culture” (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002, p. 98).This reductionist 
focus on biological factors (Grof, 1985; Tobert, 2007; 2010) combined with “historical 
biases against religious and spiritual experiences, impedes culturally sensitive 
understanding and treatment of psycho-religious and psycho-spiritual problems” 
(Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1992, p. 676). This is despite the fact that Judeo-Christian 
thought has played an influential role in contemporary conceptualisations of self, 
agency and personhood (Delaney and DiClemente, 2005). Barrett (2003) argues that 
Post-Reformation Christian conceptions of the interior and privatized self inform 
contemporary notions of psychopathology, including the conceptualisation of 
schizophrenia as involving disturbances of thought.  
There may be other reasons why practitioners avoid spiritual or religious issues in 
clinical practice. Fallot (1998) has suggested that practitioners may be unfamiliar or 
feel uncomfortable with the content of service users’ religious talk. How does a 
practitioner understand religious experiences and language, especially if they are 
from a different religious background, or has had painful experiences with religion, or 
has little interest in or commitment to religious concerns (Loewenthal, 1995)? At the 
same time it may in practice be more difficult for practitioners to appreciate subtle 
distinctions regarding religious concerns and activities that are common in their own 
experience and cultural context (Fallot, 1998). 
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‘Normative Uncertainty’: Religion, Spirituality, Culture, and the 
Differential Diagnosis Dilemma 
Practitioners are likely to encounter situations where a service user’s distress is so 
significantly coloured by religion or spirituality that judgements may be required from 
both the ‘professional’ sector of mental health services and the religious sector 
(Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). Differentiating between ‘normative’ religious/ 
spiritual phenomena and psychopathology can be extremely difficult, because of the 
similarities in phenomenology between pathological symptom expression and the 
unusual perceptual characteristics and behaviours found in these types of 
experiences (Prince, 1992; Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1995; Levy, 1996; Littlewood and 
Lipsedge, 1997; Lu, 2004; Matthews and Tseng, 2004; Loewenthal, 2007). Good 
and Good (1986) have defined this clinical concern as “the problem of normative 
uncertainty” (p. 11). In that, one of the major difficulties facing practitioners, “is to 
determine whether particular behaviours or forms of experience are abnormal and 
therefore a symptom of illness or simply different but normal within the patient’s own 
cultural context” (Good and Good, 1986, p. 11). However, at the same time, cultural 
judgements about ‘normalcy’ often masquerade in diagnostic manuals and 
instruments as scientific objectivity (Good and Good, 1986). 
A case study (Guarnaccia and Rodriguez, 1996) of three ‘Bilingual, Bicultural 
Psychiatric Programs’ (BBPP) for ‘severely mentally ill’ Hispanic individuals in New 
York City illustrates this dilemma of ‘normative uncertainty’. Hearing voices was a 
prominent feature of client reports (a classic symptom of schizophrenia). However, 
both the content of the client reports (e.g., hearing one’s name called when there 
was no one there), and the contexts in which they appeared also suggested the 
possibility that these voices were related to cultural expectations and religious 
beliefs. Guarnaccia and Rodriguez reported that one of the programs received a 
referral for a client who kept claiming that he could see a dead relative. The referring 
agency had assumed he was hallucinating and needed to be admitted for inpatient 
care. However, staff members working at the BBPP were able to assess the non-
delusional nature of the client’s experience, and thus were able to aid the person and 
return him to the community. The authors of this study note that while “caution is 
needed not to stereotype all Hispanics as believing in spirits and spiritual healing, it 
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is also important to explore the possibility that the client’s own understandings of 
auditory hallucinations may be related to these beliefs” (Guarnaccia and Rodriguez, 
1996, p. 430).Thus, specific symptoms may have particular cultural meanings, which 
present challenges to the assessment process, and without some cultural knowledge 
of these experiences and assessment questions that tap these dimensions, accurate 
diagnostic judgements using standard psychiatric nosology are difficult to make 
(Guarnaccia, et al., 1992). 
To my knowledge, only one study (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Williams, 2003) 
has specifically examined how mental health nurses assess the clinical significance 
of spiritual and religious experiences. Using semi-structured interviews, which 
incorporated vignettes of spiritual type experiences, this study showed how 14 UK 
registered nurses employed a complex and inter-relating set of criteria when 
attempting to distinguish between spiritual experiences and psychopathology. Not 
only was the nature of the spiritual experience considered by the nurses involved in 
the study, but the outcome of the experience (positive or negative) was an important 
evaluative factor, together with the personal and cultural context in which the 
experience occurred. These nurses also reported using their intuition and ‘gut 
instincts’, and emphasised the importance of close engagement with service users to 
achieve a rounded and holistic view of their experiences. Furthermore, team working 
was reiterated as a way of reducing idiosyncratic decision making, and a nurse’s 
holistic assessment of spiritual experiences was combined with a tolerance of 
ambiguity and an awareness of one’s own subjectivity. Moreover, while the nurses 
identified that spiritual experiences could cause distress, at the same time, they 
identified that individuals diagnosed with severe mental illnesses could also have 
genuine spiritual experiences-it was not necessarily the case that a person would 
experience either one or the other. From the perspective of ‘meaning centred’ 
medical anthropology (Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; 1992; Good, 1994), 
this study is important, as it highlights the need for nurses and other mental health 
professionals, to assess spiritual experiences within their cultural contexts. A 
limitation of this research however, is that the study did not combine the semi-
structured interviews with actual observations of how nurses evaluate the clinical 
significance of spiritual experiences during practice.      
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As psychotic episodes are associated with changes in previous beliefs and levels of 
functioning, some prior knowledge about the service user may be important when 
addressing concerns about ‘normative uncertainty’ (Good and Good, 1986). At the 
same time, applying this prior knowledge is problematic when very gradual changes 
have occurred and beliefs have evolved over time (Kingdon, Siddle, Farooq and 
Rathod, 2010). Paradoxically, radical changes in beliefs such as ‘being born again’ 
can signify a religious experience, but can also occur with psychotic beliefs. It has 
also been suggested (Kingdon, Siddle, Farooq and Rathod, 2010) that it may be less 
problematic for the practitioner to detect a psychotic episode when the person has 
not previously expressed an interest in religious or spiritual matters, and when there 
is a noticeable increase in the intensity of a person’s religious or spiritual interests. 
Although such changes may point to distress and psychopathology; “it is not 
uncommon for people to use familiar, yet previously unaccessed belief systems to 
explain and cast meaning on their experiences” (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002, 
p. 98). Paloutzian, Richardson and Rambo (1999) note, there is little evidence to 
suggest that religious conversion is dysfunctional, or that those people converting 
from one religious tradition to another become more judgemental, hostile, or coercive 
towards other people. Some studies (e.g., Bhugra, et al., 1999; Bhugra, 2002a) also 
show that changes in religious activity follow, rather than precede, a psychotic 
episode. Even in cases when severe mental illness is evident, there is a therapeutic 
value in assessing a person’s religious or spiritual ideations to salvage the 
‘normative’ dimensions of their experience (Bradford, 1985). 
As previously noted, it can be difficult for practitioners to differentiate between hyper 
religiosity and ‘obsessive compulsive disorder’14 (Good and Kleinman, 1985; 
Guarnaccia and Kirmayer, 1997; Al-Issa and Oudji, 1998; Kirmayer, 2001; Bartocci 
                                                          
14
 ‘Obsessive compulsive disorder’ is classified as a major anxiety disorder and is well described in 
the research literature (see de Silva and Rachman, 2004; Rego, 2009).The essential features of 
‘obsessive compulsive disorder’ are recurrent obsessions or compulsions that are severe enough to 
be time consuming or cause marked distress, or significant impairment (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). These compulsive behaviors are mostly associated with overt motor action (e.g., 
repetitive hand washing, checking things, touching, and arranging objects), but they can also be 
internal or covert (e.g., counting backwards from ten to one or silently saying a prayer a fixed number 
of times). In most cases, obsessions and compulsions are interlinked. The obsession generates 
discomfort and/or anxiety, which is dissipated, albeit temporarily, by the successful completion of the 
compulsive behavior (de Silva and Bhugra, 2007).   
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and Dein, 2007; de Silva and Bhugra, 2007). In cultures where the regular 
performance of both public and private rituals may be central, the assessment of 
obsessive compulsive disorder is complicated by the need to ascertain when the 
ritual behaviour has become psychopathological (Kirmayer, Young and Hayton, 
1997). Important life transitions, rules about protecting oneself from ‘pollution’ and 
mourning observances may lead to an intensification of ritualistic behaviours, which 
without considering their cultural context may be viewed as evidence of obsessive 
and compulsive behaviour (Guarnaccia, 1997). 
Superficially, religious rituals and obsessive compulsive behaviours share some 
common characteristics, such as the prominent role of cleanliness and purity, the 
need for rituals to be carried out in specific ways and a set number of times, and the 
fear that arises from performing the ritual incorrectly (Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1995). 
An article by Dulaney and Fiske (1994) compared ritual behaviours from a wide 
range of cultural contexts with compulsions that were identified in psychiatric texts, 
and found considerable parallels between the specific behaviours carried out during 
rituals and by people with obsessive compulsive disorder, though there were marked 
differences in the motivations underlying these behaviours. In the performance of 
rituals, the behaviours are part of a cultural meaning system that brings order to the 
world, whereas in obsessive compulsive disorder, behaviours occur in isolation and 
with meanings that are regarded as bizarre and of doubtful efficacy by others in the 
service user’s community and potentially, by the service user themselves. According 
to Dulaney and Fiske (1994, p. 247-248), it “is this meaninglessness and 
incompatibility, not the morphology of the actions or the content of the thoughts, that 
constitutes OCD”. This notion furthers the concern that the clinical application of the 
‘obsessive compulsive disorder’ diagnosis may be more complex than many 
practitioners appreciate (Guarnaccia, 1997). 
Furthermore, the clinical significance of religious activity and behaviour remains a 
concern for both comparative psychopathology and clinical practice (Littlewood, 
1983; Dein and Littlewood, 2007). Greenberg and Witztum (1991; 2001) present an 
example from their research, in which an individual whose concern with correctly 
saying his prayers led him to spend nine hours a day in prayer, instead of the usual 
forty to ninety minutes spent by other Ultra-Orthodox Jews engaged in this practice. 
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Even the 1971 report of the ‘Anglican Commission on Christian Doctrine’ suggested 
that the practice of prayer could at times lead to doubts over a person’s sanity 
(Brown, 1994). ‘Category fallacy’ (Kleinman, 1977; 1988a) errors can occur when 
practitioners are unfamiliar with the context and basic tenets of a religion’s beliefs 
and practices (Greenberg and Witztum, 1991; 2001; Dein, 2000). As Loewenthal 
(2007) notes, if one knows that a religious tradition requires cleanliness before 
prayer or purification from sin by confession for example, it may be tempting to 
conclude that obsessive-compulsive disorder may be fostered by these religious 
demands and by the over-zealous wish for spiritual purity. Despite research 
evidence (e.g., Greenberg and Witztum, 1991; 2001; Lewis, 1998) indicating that 
religiosity is associated with non-clinical scrupulosity and does not actually cause 
obsessive compulsive disorder, there remains a persistent diagnostic bias. Gartner 
and colleagues’ (1990), Yossifava and Loewenthal (1999), and Lewis (2001), have 
all found that clinicians, clinical trainees, and lay people were more likely to assess a 
person as suffering from obsessive compulsive disorder when that person was 
described as being religiously active. 
The ‘Category Fallacy’ Error 
Related to the anthropological distinction between ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 
1977) is Kleinman’s (1977; 1988a) concept of ‘category fallacy’ error. A ‘category 
fallacy’ error occurs when ‘illness’ (Eisenberg, 1977) as defined and experienced by 
the service user is made to fit in with psychiatric nosologies and ‘explanatory models’ 
(Bhugra and Bhui, 1997). As Kleinman (1988a, p. 14-15) explains, “the reification of 
one culture’s diagnostic categories and their projection onto patients in another 
culture, where those categories lack coherence and their validity has not been 
established, is a category fallacy”. The ‘disease’ perspective is so powerful and 
convincing to practitioners that it is difficult to think about distress in any other 
meaningful way (Chrisman, 1991). This difficulty occurs despite the fact that all of us 
are raised to understand illness from nonprofessional perspectives (Chrisman and 
Johnson, 1996).          
The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) recognised the potential 
for ‘category fallacy’ errors by cautioning the practitioner who is “unfamiliar with the 
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nuances of an individual’s cultural frame of reference” that they “may incorrectly 
judge as psychopathology those normal variations in behaviour, belief, or experience 
that are particular to the individual’s culture” (p. xxxiv). Practitioners are also warned 
in the DSM-IV-TR about attributing hallucinations and possession experiences to 
psychopathology, as these phenomena may be considered as normal in the person’s 
cultural reference group. The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, 
p. 281) states: “Ideas that may appear to be delusional in one culture (e.g., sorcery 
and witchcraft) may be commonly held in another. In some cultures, visual or 
auditory hallucinations with a religious content may be a normal part of religious 
experience (e.g., seeing the Virgin Mary or hearing God’s voice)”.      
When the service user’s cultural or religious background is ignored or pathologised 
(Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002) category fallacy errors may occur. Or as 
Fernando (2002) succinctly puts it; what a practitioner “finds in a ‘mental state’ is as 
much a reflection of the observer as the so-called patient” (p. 117). Sanderson, 
Vandenberg and Paese (1999) reported on an experiment which highlighted the 
potential problem of category fallacy errors in the assessment process. In this study, 
fourteen mental health professionals were presented with a range of vignettes which 
described quasi-religious experiences, and were asked to indicate how authentic 
they thought these experiences were and whether they considered them to be 
pathological. The findings of this study revealed that those experiences that 
professionals considered to be more pathological were also judged by them to be 
less authentic. Furthermore, pathology was correlated with the experience being 
considered as unconventional by the professionals. Sanderson, Vandenberg and 
Paese argued that this showed that assessments were made primarily with 
reference to practitioners’ own cultural norms, and thus, questioned the legitimacy of 
mental health assessment in a multicultural society. 
Religion, Spirituality and Psychopathology: Matters of Diagnostic 
‘Concern’ 
Although psychiatric diagnoses are a medical responsibility, mental health nurses 
are actively involved in the assessment process by providing data and observational 
descriptions that inform psychiatric diagnoses (Crowe, 2006). Fallot (1998) notes 
that many practitioners want to know how to connect the religious and spiritual 
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concerns that are presented to them by service users in mental health settings with 
commonly used diagnostic categories. However, diagnostic criteria are not always 
helpful for practitioners attempting to assess the clinical significance of religious/ 
spiritual phenomena. In such cases, the border between fantasy and reality is often 
elusive, especially when one is dealing with beliefs whose truth cannot be objectively 
corroborated (Koenig, 2007).         
An effort was made by the ‘culture task force’ (Alarcon, 1995; Kleinman, 1996; 
Mezzich, Kleinman, Fabrega and Parron, 1996) for the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) to incorporate information on cultural variations in 
symptomatology, although as Kirmayer, Young and Hayton (1997) noted, the basic 
structure of the diagnostic criteria remained largely unchanged.  However, the DSM-
IV’s introduction of the ‘V’ (V.62.89) code, ‘Religious or Spiritual Problem’, in the 
section entitled ‘Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention’, does 
offer practitioners the possibility that the religious or spiritual content of 
symptomatology is problematic and worthy of clinical attention, but is not attributable 
to a mental disorder (Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1992; 1995; 1996; Lukoff, 2010; Lukoff, 
Lu and Yang, 2011). This includes distress related to “the loss or questioning of faith, 
problems associated with conversion to a new faith, or questioning of spiritual 
values” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 685). After making the 
determination that the spiritual or religious problem is not attributable to a mental 
disorder, the ‘V’ code goes on to state that it is the practitioner’s duty to decide 
whether or not the particular spiritual or religious concern warrants attention in the 
mental health setting (Fallot, 1998).   
However, the ‘V’ code raises the problematic issue of where to place the boundaries 
between the functions of the religious and mental health professions, and how 
mental health practitioners can avoid the ethically and professionally dubious 
situation of offering opinions on religious or spiritual functioning (Loewenthal, 2007). 
It also is important for practitioners to realise that for many people with severe 
mental distress, “religious issues may be cause for distress but are not themselves 
expressions of a mental illness” (Fallot, 1998, p. 14). These include the variety of 
concerns that people without mental illness may have about religion (for example, 
how to deal with personal or family conflict about religion, or how to cope with 
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changes in spiritual convictions or practice). They also include concerns that medical 
anthropologists would place under the broad rubric of ‘sickness’ 15(Hahn, 1995; 
Winkelman, 2009), such as the social stigma that is related to a person’s mental 
health problem-for instance, being excluded or marginalised in faith communities, 
feeling shame about periods of religious disengagement, or having difficulties sorting 
through religious aspects of acute psychotic experiences (Fallot, 1998).    
The inclusion of the ‘V’ code in the DSM-IV is, however, a significant improvement 
over previous editions of the DSM. In particular, the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric 
Press, 1987) had simply associated all forms of religion or spirituality with signs of 
severe psychopathology (Post, 1992; Dein, 2000; 2004; 2010a; Bartocci and Dein, 
2006; Vega, et al., 2006; Lukoff, 2010).The admission in the DSM-IV that 
judgements about psychotic illness must be tempered by the cultural context of 
religious practice is an acknowledgment of the entanglement of religious practices, 
cultural beliefs, and mental illness (Sanderson, Vandenberg and Paese, 1999).        
First, DSM-IV suggests that the evaluation of the clinical significance of religious 
phenomena cannot be separated from the cultural context of the person being 
assessed. It also highlights the clinical consequences of misdiagnosing religious 
practices and beliefs as evidence of psychosis (Fallot, 1998). 
Furthermore, in ‘Appendix 1’ of DSM-IV, it is acknowledged that unique cultural 
patterns may account for specific beliefs and practices more accurately than 
generalised judgements based on ‘universalised’ psychiatric symptoms, drawing on 
several examples of religion’s function as both explanatory framework and social 
structure. Many academics (e.g., Gabbard, Twenlow and Jones, 1982; Lovinger, 
1984; Barnhouse, 1986; Alonso and Jeffrey, 1988; Greenberg and Witztum, 1991; 
2001; Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1992; 1995; Dein and Littlewood, 2007) have 
emphasised the importance of understanding the person’s religious convictions and 
that of his or her religious community in order to make an adequate assessment of 
psychopathology. However, this can obviously pose problems where an idiosyncratic 
                                                          
15
 The anthropological concept of ‘sickness’ refers to the social responses to distress and the social 
reality of distress (Hahn, 1995; Schulze and Angermeyer, 2003). ‘Sickness’ has been described as 
the totality of ‘disease’ and ‘illness’ (Young, 1982; Littlewood, 1989) and “occurs when the condition 
becomes known, recognised, interpreted and communicated into the world of meaning” (Lovering, 
2008, p. 15).   
88 
 
religious experience becomes the new norm for an emerging cultural group 
(Littlewood, 1983; Pierre, 2001). 
The second implication is that the assessment of spiritual or religious phenomena 
must take into consideration the person’s overall functioning (Greenberg and 
Witztum, 1991; 2001; Sims, 1992; 1994; Fallot, 1998; 2001; Peters, Joseph and 
Qarety, 1999; Clarke, 2001; Dein, 2010a; Kingdon, Siddle, Farooq and Rathod, 
2010; Peters, 2010; Abdul-Hamid, 2011). For example, delusions of a religious  
nature may not necessarily be ‘abnormal’ in content (e.g., they may adhere to 
mainstream Christian doctrine and be based on the Bible), but rather, it is the fact 
that the person is entirely immersed in his or her religious pre-occupation (e.g., 
reading the Bible all day), the potential emotional and behavioural consequences of 
the beliefs (e.g., extreme distress if the closeness to God temporarily wanes), and 
self-neglect or complete passivity (e.g., in the face of God’s omnipotence), which 
make the ideation pathological (Peters, 2010). 
Perhaps, the most commonly cited way of differentiating religious phenomena from 
psychosis has been in terms of ‘outcomes’ (Dein, 2010b). Jackson and Fulford 
(1997) suggested that psychosis and spiritual experience could not be differentiated 
on the basis of form or content, rather the experience is considered non-pathological 
if it produces insight, is utilised to solve the initial problem, is life enhancing, and is 
generally adaptive. In contrast, psychosis is seen as detrimental to the life course. 
However, as Fernando (2002, p. 39) argues, a  “person’s level of fulfilment and 
identity, not just as an individual but also as a part of a group or society” can “be very 
different in different cultures”. Thus, a person’s functioning must be considered in its 
cultural context (Stolk, 2009). The primary source of problems in the assessment of 
religious phenomena, then, is the decontextualisation of these phenomena (Kilshaw, 
Ndewga and Curran, 2002). 
There is of course the third implicit possibility of “not addressing spirituality because 
its expression is neither attributable to a mental disorder nor problematic enough to 
require clinical attention” (Fallot, 1998, p. 16).The assessment of spiritual and 
religious issues in DSM-IV is only considered in a problem focused way (Fallot, 
1998). However, for many people with severe mental illnesses, spirituality and 
religion is more of a resource than a difficulty. A number of studies have supported 
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this conclusion (e.g., Lindgren and Coursey, 1995; Sullivan, 1998; Kirov, Kemp, 
Kirov and David, 1998; Tepper, Rogers, Coleman and Malony, 2001; Russinova, 
Wewiorski and Cash, 2002). In particular, a British study by Kirov, Kemp, Kirov and 
David (1998), assessed the importance of religious coping in 52 consecutively 
admitted psychotic patients and found that two thirds of these patients reported that 
they used religion to cope with their mental illness. As Fallot (1998) suggests, this 
recognition is significant because of the clinical bias that invariably assimilates the 
content of religious talk among people with mental illness to their psychopathology. 
Although there may be some reason for this attribution in the assessment of acute 
psychotic episodes, there is no compelling evidence that religion or spirituality per se 
is more problematic than any other domain of experience for people coping with 
mental illness (Fallot, 1998).  
In fact, clinical reports have indicated that people who are not acutely psychotic may 
gain a great deal from the exploration of their religious or spiritual experiences 
(Kehoe, 1999). A more comprehensive assessment of a person’s spirituality or 
religion is then required that moves beyond the mental disorder categorisation in the 
DSM-IV and which considers more holistically the place of spirituality or religion in 
the overall context and life of the person (Fallot, 1998). Despite this ‘hard won’ 
ground with the introduction of cultural factors into the DSM (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; 2000), research has revealed that there remains a major gap in 
the implementation of these factors in clinical practice. In particular, a survey (Stolk, 
1996) of 88 clinicians in Melbourne, Australia, the majority of who were working in 
mental health crisis teams, found that just 10% of clinicians were aware of any of the 
cultural features identified in the DSM-IV.   
The current edition of the ‘ICD’ (World Health Organization, 1992) did not include a 
similar ‘V’ code category. Abdul-Hamid (2011) argued that the inclusion of a 
‘Religious or Spiritual Problem’ category in the ‘ICD-10’ may have provided 
practitioners with assistance in differential diagnosis. In ICD-10, the cultural context 
for diagnostic criteria is considered only in relation to the category of ‘trance’ and 
‘possession’ disorders (Mitchell and Roberts, 2009). According to the ICD-10, these 
disorders are associated with a temporary loss of both the sense of personal identity 
and full awareness of one’s surroundings. In some instances, the ICD-10 notes, the 
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person acts as if taken over by another personality, spirit, deity, or ‘force’. However, 
this category only includes ‘trance disorders’ that are involuntary or unwanted, which 
intrude into ordinary activities, and occur outside religious or other culturally 
accepted situations. 
‘Normality’ or ‘Abnormality’ 
The boundary between ‘culture’ and ‘psychopathology’ relates to a wider question of 
substantive significance-the question of ‘normality’ (Helman, 2000; 2007). This is a 
topic of much controversy, even in the limited domain of psychiatry, quite apart from 
the arguments put forward by cultural relativists (Fernando, 1988; 2002; 2010; 
Dillard, et al., 1992; Bains, 2005).That is, what beliefs and behaviours can be 
considered as being ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’16 , and by what criteria can they be 
judged (Offer and Sabshin, 1966; Tseng and McDermott, 1981; Grof and Grof, 1992; 
Prince, 1992; Hughes, 1996; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Tseng, 1997; Swartz, 1998; 
Tseng and Streltzer, 2008; Stevenson, 2010)? Is mental illness universal and is 
there some universal standard by which to evaluate what psychiatrists have termed 
as mental illness (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a)? Is it evenly distributed? Is there a 
temporal dimension to what is considered as ‘abnormal’ (Conrad and Schneider, 
1980; Dein, 1997; Benatar, 2006)? Is there a range within which all societies set the 
boundaries of what can be considered as ‘normal’ (Brown, Gregg and Ballard, 
1998)?        
As Fitzgerald and colleagues (1997a) explained, such “questions go beyond whether 
or not a particular behaviour is evaluated as mental illness by the people involved, 
and ask if such behaviour is indicative of mental illness, no matter how it is judged or 
who does the judging” (p. 93). The search for an answer or solution to this dilemma 
has been one of the primary research concerns in the disciplinary fields that focus on 
transcultural mental health (Kleinman, 1977; 1980; Fabrega, 1989; Littlewood and 
Lipsedge, 1997; Fernando, 1988; 2002; 2003; 2010; Gaines, 1992; Swartz, 1998; 
Helman, 2000; 2007; Winkelman, 2009). It also presents itself as a dilemma for 
mental health practitioners at the level of ‘clinical reality’ (Kleinman, 1980; Good and 
                                                          
16
 If behaviour is seen as ‘abnormal’ within a culture, but is seen as ‘normal’ by an outsider, it is called 
‘autopathological’. When behaviour is viewed as ‘normal’ within a culture, but is perceived by an 
outsider as ‘abnormal’, it is called ‘heteropathological’ (Tseng and McDermott, 1981). 
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Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; 1992). The ‘culture’ vs. ‘nature’ debate can be seen to 
have developed as a special instantiation of the Aristotelian polarisation between 
‘form’ and ‘matter’ (Skultans and Cox, 2000). But whereas the significant partner in 
Aristotle’s duality is ‘form’, their relative weighting has been reversed in 
contemporary debates about ‘culture’ and ‘nature’. Clifford Geertz (1984, p. 272) 
famously suggested that there is a “tendency to see diversity as surface and 
universality as depth”. Whatever relative weighting is given to ‘culture’ or ‘nature’, 
however-that is, whether one views oneself as a ‘rationalist’ or ‘relativist’–“we cannot 
ignore the work of culture” (Skultans and Cox, 2000, p. 15). 
Within the academic sphere of cultural psychiatry, three schools of thought have 
attempted to address the question about the ‘universality’ of mental illness: 
‘absolutism’, ‘universalism’ and ‘relativism’ (Swartz, 1998; Fernando, 2002; 2010; 
Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans and Chasiotis, 2011). These schools of thought have 
closely paralleled the development of the interpretive models used by 
anthropologists in their attempts to make sense of the apparent diversity of human 
societies (Fernando, 2002; 2010). Indeed, these fundamental questions cluster 
around a set of issues addressed in a famous collection of essays with the title 
‘Rationality and Relativism’ (Hollis and Lukes, 1982); and these confront the 
anthropological discipline more forcefully than they do any other academic form of 
enquiry. They not only have important consequences for the nature and conduct of 
research enquiry (Kleinman, 1988a), but also have implications for how the issue of 
‘normative uncertainty’ (Good and Good, 1986) is attended to in ‘multicultural clinical 
interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992).     
‘Absolutism’ and ‘Universalism’  
The ‘absolutist’ school of thought perceives the ‘form’ and ‘content’ of psychological 
phenomena as basically the same across cultural contexts (Littlewood, 2000; Berry, 
Poortinga, Breugelmans and Chasiotis, 2011). Similarly, ‘universalist’ perspectives 
accept that there are cross-cultural similarities in the ‘form’ of psychological 
phenomena (Littlewood, 2000). However, within the ‘universalist’ position, there is an 
assumption that the ‘content’ of psychological phenomena is influenced by culture 
(Littlewood, 2000).That being said, this ‘pathoplastic’ (Argyle and Beit Hallahmi, 
1975; Tseng, 1997) model of mental disorder has regarded the role of culture in the 
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shaping of distress as secondary at best (Jenkins and Barrett, 2003). ‘Absolutist’ and 
‘universalist’ schools of thought use psychiatric diagnostic systems as the ‘standard’ 
and therefore, impose an ‘etic’ perspective on the observed phenomenon of interest 
(Swartz, 1998; Skultans and Cox, 2000). 
The research literature indicates that both the ‘absolutist’ and ‘universalist’ positions 
have typically used four methods to differentiate between ‘normality’ and 
‘abnormality’ (Offer and Sabshin, 1966; Tseng and McDermott, 1981; Fernando, 
1988; 2010; Westermeyer, 1985; 1987; 1993; Hughes, 1996; Tseng, 1997; Swartz, 
1998; Marsella and Yamada, 2007; Stevenson, 2010). Offer and Sabshin (1966) 
originally defined these four methods of differentiating between ‘normality’ and 
‘abnormality’ respectively as, the ‘standard diagnostic method’ (‘normality as health’), 
the ‘psychoanalytic perspective’ (‘normality as utopia’), the ‘statistical approach’ 
(‘normality as average’), and by the ‘assessment of function’. 
The ‘Standard Diagnostic Method’  
‘Standard diagnostic’ methods are used by mental health practitioners to assess 
whether a person is ‘mentally ill’ (Offer and Sabshin, 1966). This approach is 
concerned with the “view that normality or pathology can be clearly differentiated by 
the nature of the phenomenon itself and the judgement can be made by trained 
professionals” (Tseng and Streltzer, 2008, p. 76). In its approach to diagnosis-
classification of patterns of psychopathologic interest, it adopts the perspective of 
general medicine, formally labelled ‘nosology’, which has been characterised as an 
“eclectically assembled, chronologic polygot of different terms and ideas that reflect 
every layer of nosologic thinking from antiquity to the present” (Feinstein, 1977, p. 
193). I have already outlined how this ontological approach to defining mental 
‘abnormality’ is related to the ‘clinical reality’ of ‘disease’ (Eisenberg, 1977; Kleinman, 
1980).  
In the ideal biomedical diagnosis, it should be possible to gather a specific set of 
signs and symptoms, which are unequivocal indicators of an underlying pathology 
(Swartz, 1998). It is however, recognised in the major psychiatric diagnostic texts 
(e.g., ICD, DSM) that this ideal is in fact unattainable (World Health Organization, 
1992; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). A ‘sign’ is defined as anything that 
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can be observed which indicates disease (Offer and Sabshin, 1966). For example, if 
a person talks to non-existent people, or claims to be hearing the voices of aliens, he 
or she will be considered as suffering from a mental condition that has a pathological 
basis based on such ‘signs’ (Tseng, 1997). A ‘symptom’ is what the patient 
complains of-tiredness, for example (Tseng, 1997). If ‘abnormality’ is identified, 
treatment consists of eradicating the signs and symptoms and hence, the underlying 
pathology (Offer and Sabshin, 1966).  
A further feature of the ‘standard’ diagnostic method is that it is based on the 
‘Cartesian Dualism’-or the ‘dogma of the ghost in the machine’ (Ryle, 1949; Lock and 
Gordon, 1988; Good, 1994), asserting that the mind is separate from the body and 
“that there are mechanical causes of corporal movements and mental causes of 
corporal movements” (Fernando, 2002, p. 46). The ‘standard’ diagnostic method 
remains the dominant clinical approach in the ‘professional’ sector (Kleinman, 1978; 
1980; 1984) of mental health services in the UK and other western countries 
(Fernando, 1988; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2009; 2010; Bhui, 2002; Sewell, 2009).                                                                                                                                                                             
The ‘Psychoanalytic’ Model  
The ‘psychoanalytic’ model and its decision-making about ‘normality’ and 
‘abnormality’ are related closely to the ‘standard diagnostic method’ of biomedicine 
(Swartz, 1998). According to the psychoanalytic tradition, which originates from the 
work of Sigmund Freud (1991/1905), psychological signs and symptoms, as well as 
a variety of other non-pathological phenomena such as ‘slips of the tongue’, relate to 
underlying pathology of a psychological rather than a physical basis. In the 
psychoanalytical model, psychopathology is psychic in nature, but operates in a 
manner analogous to physical pathology, and treatment involves the eradication of 
the “underlying pathology” (Swartz, 1998, p. 54). While much has been written about 
the moral, philosophical and cultural underpinnings of the Freudian worldview, for the 
purposes of this background discussion it is enough to note the similarities in 
structure between the psychoanalytic system and the biomedical one. An important 
contribution of the psychoanalytic model, however, is that by insisting that there is a 
range of behaviours in the way that people conduct their lives, Freud (1991/1905) 
refused simply to label behaviour as ‘abnormal’. He instead stressed the continuities 
94 
 
between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour, by arguing that even people considered 
as functioning well live with pathological parts of themselves.  
‘Statistical’ Approach 
Freud’s (1991/1905) idea that there exists a range of human behaviour relates well 
to the ‘statistical’ approach to defining ‘abnormality’ (Offer and Sabshin, 1966; 
Swartz, 1998; Rogers and Pilgrim, 2005). ‘Abnormality’ in the statistical approach is 
simply defined as “different from the norm or rule” (Swartz, 1998, p. 54). In the 
statistical approach, it can be specified how far from the average we want a 
characteristic to be before we label it as ‘abnormal’ (Offer and Sabshin, 1966). The 
concept of mean is universal, yet the range of mean often needs adjustment for 
different populations (Tseng, 1997). Theoretically at least, there is no value attached 
to the term ‘abnormal’ in the statistical model, as it simply means different from most 
other people and does not specify in which direction the difference occurs (Tseng 
and McDermott, 1981; Stevenson, 2010).  
Assessment of ‘Function’  
From a functional perspective, a person’s behaviour is evaluated primarily by its 
impact on that person, other people, and the wider environment (Tseng, 1997; 2001; 
2003; Tseng and Streltzer, 2008). So the criterion for judging ‘normality’ or 
‘abnormality’ is not just “whether the condition provides (healthy) function or 
(unhealthy) dysfunction” (Tseng and Streltzer, 2008, p. 45) for the individual, but also 
the person’s behaviour is evaluated for its perceived impact on the social context. 
For example, behaviour that is openly hostile and aggressive, that frequently disturbs 
one’s family, neighbours, or wider society is normally considered as ‘deviant’ and 
sometimes as being ‘pathological’ (Tseng and McDermott, 1981; Helman, 2000; 
2007). In contrast, what is considered as asocial and quiet behaviour may not be 
considered as ‘dysfunctional’ or labelled as ‘pathological’ if it does not cause any 
problems for other people and wider society (Tseng, 1997; Tseng and Streltzer, 
2008).  
The Multidisciplinary Mental Health Team and the Hegemony of the 
‘Standard Diagnostic Method’ 
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An important clinical feature of the ‘professional’ sector (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 
1984) of the mental health services in the UK today, is the importance of the 
‘multidisciplinary’ or ‘mental health team’ approach (Bonham, 2004; Clarke and 
Walsh, 2009).The mental health team, which typically comprises occupational 
therapists, social workers, mental health nurses, psychiatrists, and in some cases lay 
counsellors, may allow for different ‘explanatory models’ (Kleinman, 1980) of mental 
‘abnormality’. However, Fernando (2003) has argued that in most mental health 
settings in the UK, it is the biomedical model on which psychiatry is based that 
dominates; and it does so in two ways.  
First, although various conceptual models of understanding mental distress are 
presented in the training of mental health practitioners other than psychiatrists (and 
even sometimes in the training of psychiatrists), the biomedical (biological) 
conception of mental illness, which conceptualises mental health problems as being 
caused by pathological lesions, is the base line or ‘standard’ for the assessment that 
is used (Fernando, 2003). Although pre-registered mental health student nurses 
typically explore psychological, social, cognitive, and biopsychosocial models of 
mental illness in their formal education at university, once they reach clinical 
placement, they are confronted with a biomedical dominance that is hard to 
challenge (Bassett and Baker, 2012). Second, when it comes to understanding 
‘clinical reality’ (Kleinman, 1980; Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; 1992) in 
mental health settings, the approach used by the psychiatrist typically overrides all 
the other disciplinary approaches, in part because of the power exercised 
(in)formally by psychiatrists in the current mental health system (Fernando, 2003). 
This is particularly the case for what Fernando (1998) has described as the ‘hard 
end’ of psychiatry, namely when compulsory powers are used to impose treatment 
and in forensic mental health settings. Thus although team members may well have 
experienced training approaches with very different emphases, the team as a whole 
will tend to work from the assumptions of the medical model where ‘standard 
diagnostic methods’ are paramount.          
Evaluating ‘Absolutism’ and ‘Universalism’ from the ‘Meaning 
Centred’ Perspective 
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Offer and Sabshin’s (1966) four approaches to defining ‘normality’ need to be seen 
in context-in their case, the context of the American way of life and worldview 
(Fernando, 2003). Once questions of culture are introduced one needs to look at the 
picture through the perspective of cultural ‘norms’. In short we need to recognise that 
each culture has its own norms for health, for ideal states of mind, and for the 
functioning of individuals in society (Fernando, 2002; 2010). Clearly, ‘absolutist’ and 
‘universalist’ approaches do not give equal weight and value to ways of seeing the 
world that depart from the ‘etic’ oriented ‘standard’ diagnostic method and its 
affiliated perspectives (Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003; Stolk, 2009). That is, they 
do not give careful attention to the notion that one’s way of seeing the world shapes 
how one sees the world (Swartz, 1998).  
A further feature of these approaches is that they tend to look at mental disorders as 
existing ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered (White and Marsella, 1982; Kleinman, 
1988a). Viewing mental disorders “as a thing is an example of what is known as 
reification-a process of viewing” phenomena as “fixed and static entities” (Swartz, 
1998, p. 13). However, in keeping with the ‘meaning centred’ approach of this 
research study, the definition of ‘abnormality’ in absolutist and universalist 
approaches is an interpretation of someone’s experience from the ‘clinical reality’ of 
‘disease’ (Eisenberg, 1977; Kleinman, 1980; Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; 
1992; Good, 1994).    
In the previous chapter I alluded to how absolutist and universalistic approaches 
have in common two primary features. First, they are based on an ‘individualistic’ 
(Gaines, 1982b; White and Marsella, 1982; Shweder and Bourne, 1982; 1984) 
conception of the self, which does not make reference to spiritual or supernatural 
causation of illness (Seeley, 2006). Second, on the surface they do not make moral 
judgements about ‘abnormality’ (Kleinman, 1988b; Shweder, 1991; Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a; Swartz, 1998). As we have seen, mental abnormality is viewed as a medical 
or psychological problem, or ‘statistical’, or ‘functional’ deviation from the ‘norm’ 
(Offer and Sabshin, 1966)-and the scientific method adopted by these approaches 
emphasises rationality and a dispassionate perspective rather than a moralistic one 
(Swartz, 1998).  
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Cultural Relativist Perspectives  
Drawing their inspiration from Wittgenstein’s (Kishik, 2008) notion of ‘forms of life’, 
relativists are concerned less with the physical aetiology of distress than with the 
psychological, behavioural, and socio-cultural dimensions associated with them 
(Prince, 1992; Prince, Okpaku and Merkel, 1998). Medical anthropology’s emphasis 
on cultural relativism also has different implications for the question of ‘normality’ and 
‘abnormality’, and, at the level of ‘clinical reality’ (Kleinman, 1980; Good and Good, 
1981; Gaines, 1982a; 1992), for the issue of ‘normative uncertainty’ (Good and 
Good, 1986). From a cultural relativist perspective, it is obvious that different cultures 
have different ideas about ‘abnormality’, but “it is less obvious how such abnormality 
is defined and recognised” (Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1997, p. 189). This may lead to 
uncertainty for mental health practitioners in clinical practice.      
The relativist perspective has weak and strong forms (Prince, Okpaku and Merkel, 
1998). While not denying the role of physical factors in the aetiology of severe 
mental illness, weak forms of the relativist perspective hold the view that what is 
‘normal’ is culturally defined and can only be understood properly when considered 
within its cultural context (Winkelman, 2009). The strong form of cultural relativism 
considers that what is experienced as distress in each cultural system is so unique 
that it is impossible to make any valid cross-cultural comparisons (Gaines, 1992).  In 
the context of this background discussion, the important point to make is that 
regardless of whether a weak or strong form of cultural relativism is adopted, “the 
question of what is normal versus what is abnormal can be appropriately determined 
only in the context of a person’s cultural expectations, beliefs, and situation” 
(Winkelman, 2009, p. 208). Thus relativists incorporate the worldviews of the people 
being studied or treated, and therefore adopt an ‘emic’ approach to understanding 
distress (Castillo, 1997a; b; c; Brown, Gregg and Ballard, 1998; Cockerham, 2000). 
At the same time the incorporation of a culturally relativist perspective into clinical 
practice raises concerns and questions. Who “determines whether or not the 
experience is culturally congruent? What criteria should be used in making the 
determination? What aspects or dimensions of the experience are important in these 
kinds of decisions” (Sanderson, Vandenberg and Paese, 1999, p. 608)? The 
‘sharedness’ of beliefs, experiences, and behaviours alone may not be a sufficient 
98 
 
criterion for making a distinction between culture and psychopathology, since the 
sharing of beliefs, experiences, and behaviours does not exclude the possibility that 
they are pathological (Gaines, 1988; 1995; Pierre, 2001). An alternative criterion may 
need to be proposed, such as the extent of ‘sharedness’ or ‘reasonableness’ in 
terms of the culture at large (Gaines, 1988; 1995).     
Moreover, a person’s spiritual or religious experiences do not necessarily indicate 
psychopathology, even if they are considered as atypical within their cultural context 
(Johnson and Friedman, 2008). For example, it is generally not perceived as ‘normal’ 
within some cultural contexts to have directly heard the voice of God or to have 
communed with spiritual entities. Yet many people who are not actively affiliated with 
any religious or spiritual movement that may endorse these types of experiences 
claim to have had similar experiences (Romme and Escher, 1989; Tien, 1991; Grof 
and Grof, 1992; Bragdon, 1993; Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger and Gorsuch, 1996; 
Poulton, et al., 2000; Tobert, 2007; 2010). Argyle (2000) has reported that around 
one third of the population in Britain, Australia, and the US has had some kind of 
spiritual experience. Although these experiences may appear to be incongruent with 
the expectations of one’s cultural reference group, they do not necessarily signify 
psychopathology, the determination of which invariably depends on the worldview of 
the mental health practitioner, and his or her openness to non-pathological altered 
states of consciousness (Tobert, 2007; 2010; Johnson and Freidman, 2008).  
Summary 
At the core of this review discussion is the major controversy that has divided 
medical anthropologists and scholars from the health sciences, namely the concept 
of cultural relativism and its implications for the assessment and treatment of 
psychological ‘abnormality’. As Hughes (1996, p. 137) has suggested, “the clear 
specification of when a pattern of norm-violating behaviour passes from being an 
instance of mere chicanery or criminality to that of pathology is one of the most 
vexing issues in the fields of psychiatry and social deviance”. Whether we approach 
the phenomenon of distress from an ‘absolutist’, ‘universalist’, or ‘relativist’ school of 
thought will influence how culture is attended to in the evaluation, assessment, and 
treatment of psychopathology. ‘Absolutist’ and ‘universalist’ perspectives approach 
the issue of ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ from an ontological position of biological 
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primacy, so that the cultural context for a service user’s distress is irrelevant to the 
assessment process or only shapes the content of the disorder (Argyle and Beit 
Hallahmi, 1975; Tseng, 1997). By contrast, ‘cultural relativist’ schools of thought 
approach the problematic issue of ‘normative uncertainty’ (Good and Good, 1986) 
with regard also for the ‘emic’ perspective of the service user and their wider social 
circle.  
Fernando (2002; 2010) and Stevenson (2010) have argued that on their own, neither 
the absolutist/universalist nor cultural relativist approaches offer reliable guides for 
identifying ‘abnormality’. After all, they argue, it is perfectly feasible to behave in a 
way that is determined as being ‘statistically unusual’, ‘dysfunctional’, or ‘culturally 
inappropriate’ without requiring medical treatment. Fernando (2002; 2010) suggests 
that absolutist/universalist and cultural relativist perspectives are inadequate for two 
primary reasons. Firstly, biological, social, and psychological factors all influence the 
nature of what emerges as a ‘distress’ in a given cultural setting. The social 
construction of illness within a cultural setting, such as its norms for health, 
functioning of individuals in society, and ideal states of mind are important, but are 
not the only considerations. Secondly, cultures are not distinct and unchanging 
entities, as there is always a constant interchange between cultures, although 
powerful forces may impact on the nature of these changes (also see Watters, 
2011). As Skultans and Cox (2000, p. 15) noted, “the true value of this debate lies 
not in deciding whether culture or nature has more depth but rather in sensitizing 
medical anthropologists and cross-cultural psychologists to the ubiquity of culture”. 
No professional consensus has emerged to guide mental health practitioners in the 
sensitive area of ‘normative uncertainty’ (Good and Good, 1986). In fact, the advice 
that is given is often confusing and contradictory, thus exacerbating practitioners’ 
uncertainty. As Neeleman and King (1993) and Stolk (2009) more recently 
suggested, the absence of guidelines may give rise to idiosyncratic practice, 
inadequate concepts of religion, spirituality, and their relevance to all aspects of the 
clinical process; and potentially to the outright dismissal of service users’ religious or 
spiritual beliefs, experiences, and practices.   
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
Introduction 
The focus of this study was to explore the primary cultural issues and the responses 
to these issues in pre-registered mental health students nurses’ clinical placements. 
An anthropologically informed research design (Sobo, 2009) grounded the 
exploration of these issues and responses. Given the complexity of student nurses’ 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), the nature of the research 
questions, the anthropologically informed research design, and the meaning centred 
perspective (Good and Good, 1981; Gaines, 1982a; Good, 1994), a qualitative 
strategy was clearly indicated and applied.   
Stories or narratives are integral to culture (Kleinman, 1988b; Mattingly, 1998a; b) 
and they are the mainstay of what anthropologically informed research collects and 
analyses (Sobo, 2009). Alongside this global orientation to narrative construction, the 
storied accounts of the student nurses and nursing educator participants were based 
on ‘critical incidents’ (Fitzgerald, 2000). A description of the ‘critical incident’ 
approach and its application to the study is outlined in this chapter. Although critical 
incidents can be generated by various qualitative methods, the ‘critical incident’ 
(Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic interview (Spradley, 1979) was the method 
chosen for this study. This approach to generating critical incident narratives is 
concerned with eliciting meanings ascribed to specific experiences and events 
through guided reflection (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). It also aids in uncovering the 
tacit dimensions of clinical practice, generates ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973), 
and is concerned with understanding and meaning in context (Laws and Fitzgerald, 
1997; Odawara, 2005; McAllister, et al., 2006). It therefore was congruent with the 
anthropologically informed research design.  
The critical incident approach has been used successfully across a number of 
professional fields in the health and nursing sciences. However, it is in the study of 
intercultural or ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Arthur, 2001; 2004; Fortune, 2002; 
Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Whiteford and McAllister, 2006; McAllister, et 
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al., 2006; McAllister and Whiteford, 2008) that the approach has shown particular 
utility. Thus, the ‘dependability’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the findings was 
enhanced by following recognised and relevant procedures of data collection. The 
discussion in this chapter then moves on to detailing the method. A ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973) is given of the access arrangements, ethical protocols, recruitment of 
participants, the characteristics of participants, data collection, and member checking 
strategies. Underpinned by a constructivist approach (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), 
thematic analysis was applied to the corpus of data and the resultant themes and 
categories emerged through the ‘constant comparative process’ (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967).                                                      
An Anthropologically Informed Research Design    
An anthropologically informed research design provided the overall methodological 
framework for this investigation. The medical anthropologist and health services 
researcher Elisa Sobo (2009) outlined the fundamental aspects of an 
anthropologically informed research design in her recent text ‘Culture and Meaning 
in Health Services Research: A Practical Field Guide’. In this text, Sobo (2009) 
recognised the practical limitations on full immersion in clinical settings and defined 
an anthropologically informed approach as “ethnographic in aim, even when 
contingencies mean that it cannot be truly ethnographic in scope (i.e., when 
immersion cannot happen)” (p. 77). As Sobo (2009, p. 76) notes, “most HSR (Health 
Services Research) cannot qualify as ethnography per se, simply because of the 
nature of what the communities under study are engaged in and the necessity for 
researchers to respect their workplace, health and rehabilitation, and sickroom and 
deathbed needs”. Like ethnographic research, an anthropologically informed 
approach places priority “on holism and a systems perspective that favours emic 
points of view, achieves critical distance, and takes a reflexive stance toward the 
research context” (Sobo, 2009, p. 77). Anthropologically informed research 
subsumes an ethnographic epistemology-even though it does not entail the fully-
fledged ethnographic research process. Although this PhD study was not traditionally 
ethnographic, it “was anthropologically informed; anthropology’s ‘signature’ was 
valid” (Sobo, 2009, p. 76).        
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An anthropologically informed design underpinned this study, as ethical and access 
contingencies meant that immersion in and observation of student nurses’ 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) was not feasible. In terms of 
ethical contingencies, there was the concern that observing student nurses in clinical 
situ would increase the level of anxiety for the students and alter their clinical 
placement experience. Gaining consent and access to carry out ethnographic 
research in clinical placement settings would have been difficult, and observation of 
student nurses’ clinical interactions could have added to the distress of service 
users. The level of anxiety for both student nurses and service users is likely to be 
heightened in mental health care settings. Indeed, the student nurses’ own ‘critical 
incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) accounts collected for this study, conveyed the everyday 
stresses of working in such pressured, and in many cases, distressing conditions. 
When considering the lack of power in certain occupational groups-such as junior 
healthcare staff (e.g., student nurses), these challenging ethical questions may be 
heightened (Savage, 2000). Similar concerns have been raised by Spence (1999) in 
her hermeneutical research on the experiences of New Zealand based nurses caring 
for culturally diverse service users. At the same time, the lack of opportunity to 
observe the actual practices of student nurses in ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ 
was a limitation of this study. As Lambert and Mckevitt (2002, p. 211) explain; “what 
people (including health professionals) say can be different from what they think and 
do”. Clinical interactions are shaped by contingent circumstances and forms of 
practical reasoning that are not always expressed orally in interview type situations. 
This project was anthropologically informed in other important respects. The student 
nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ were contextualised in the wider ‘health 
care system’ (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) and the fluid culture of mental health 
nursing (Suominen, Kovasin and Ketola, 1997). Thus, the study was holistic and 
systems focused. The perspectives of the participants’ were prioritised by using 
methods that evaded, as far as was possible, the unnecessary imposition of 
researcher-driven categories on the data collection and analytical processes. As I 
will discuss in the following sections of this chapter, the primary method of this study 
drew upon ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic interviews 
(Spradley, 1979). ‘Critical incidents’ are a subset of the narrative technique 
(Fitzgerald, 2001) that is often used in anthropologically informed and ethnographic 
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health services research. The ‘critical incident’ focused ethnographic interview, 
“generates ‘thick’ description, uncovers tacit dimensions of practice and generates 
whole chunks of data” (McAllister, et al., p. 371-372). This approach also minimises 
the social response bias that may occur when discussing issues of research interest 
in general terms (Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997), and allows for the understanding of 
meaning in context (McAllister, et al., 2006). Furthermore, the analytical categories 
which emerged from this study were grounded in the data-an analytical process 
known as ‘inductive category development’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  
By taking a critically applied medical anthropological position (Shaw, 2005), critical 
distance (Browner, 1999) was attained in this PhD study. According to Sobo (2009), 
critical distance “entails the ability to question categories from an outside or 
detached perspective” (p. 72) and promotes an awareness of their socially and 
culturally constructed dimensions. This study critically examined the student nurses’ 
frames of reference (Tebbutt and Wade, 1985), the culture of mental health nursing, 
and the clinical placement settings in which the students were situated. Thus, I 
sought to escape the critical conundrum posed by the unnecessary opposition 
between ‘applied’ and ‘theoretical’ medical anthropology17 (Shaw, 2005; Hahn and 
Inhorn, 2009). My non-clinical background also meant that technically I was an 
outsider, and by this very status, I could maintain a critical distance. A reflexive 
stance was taken to the research context and to decisions about methodology, data 
collection, and the analytical process. As such, I have striven to present the 
methodological process in enough detail-so that others are able to arrive at similar 
conclusions.   
                                                          
17
 While scholars and practitioners in the health and nursing sciences (e.g., Kim, 1991; Brach and 
Fraser, 2002;  Betancourt, 2004; Papadopoulos, Tilki and Lees, 2004) have shown a keen interest in 
the concept of ‘culturally competent’ health care (there are literally thousands of academic articles), 
the engagement of medical anthropologists (with important exceptions) has been less notable (Stone, 
1992; Santiago-Irizarry, 1996; 2001; Lambert and Sevak, 1996; Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997; 
Fitzgerald, Clemson and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1997; 2001; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Hunt, 2001; 2005; 
Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2001; 2002; 2004; Wayland and Crowder, 2002; Briggs, 2003; Taylor, 
2003a; b; 2010; Manderson  and  Allotey, 2003; Sobo and Seid, 2003; Sobo, 2004; 2009; Fox, 2005; 
Hudelson, 2005; 2006; Hunt and DeVoogd, 2005; Shaw, 2005; Dein, 2006; Kleinman and Benson, 
2006; Galanti, 2008; Sobo and Loustaunau, 2010; Willen, Bullon and Good, 2010; Good, et al., 2011).  
Shaw (2005) notes two broad medical anthropological approaches to the issue of cultural 
competence-those who seek to modify clinical practice and attempt to make it more culturally 
appropriate, and those who critique the models of culture and identity mobilised in such programs.      
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The methodological perspective of this PhD study also shared some characteristics 
with ‘focused clinical ethnography’ (Leininger, 1985; Kleinman, 1992; Muecke, 1994; 
Morse and Field, 1995; Roper and Shapira, 2000; Germain, 2001). Like focused 
ethnography, this study defined the notion of ‘key informants’ (nursing educators), as 
persons with a store of knowledge and experiences to share, relative to the 
phenomenon of inquiry (Roper and Shapira, 2000). This notion of ‘key informant’ is 
different to how the concept is interpreted in traditional ethnography, where the 
ethnographer has the opportunity to develop close relationships with their informants 
over time (Emerson, 1983). Like focused ethnography, this study was concerned 
with a delineated form of inquiry and with a relatively narrow band in the cultural 
spectrum of local worlds (Leininger, 1985). The cultural phenomena relevant to this 
study arose out of specific ‘cultural scenes’(Spradley and McCurdy, 1972), ‘social 
dramas’ (Turner, 1974), and ‘critical incidents’ (Fitzgerald, 2000), which were drawn 
from accounts of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ in placement settings.                                                                                                                                                                
A Qualitative Strategy 
Given that the study was concerned with exploring the meaning of pre-registered 
mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’, a qualitative strategy 
was used (Good, 1992; Cresswell, 1994; Whiteford and Wright St-Clair, 2002; Flick, 
2008a). This qualitative strategy is explicated in more detail over the following 
sections of this chapter. Particular emphasis is given to the value of exploring 
student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ through the storied nature of 
experience, or more specifically, by the elicitation of ‘critical incident’ narratives 
(Fitzgerald, 2000). Stories are integral to culture and anthropologically informed 
research (Sobo, 2009), and qualitative data can help the researcher get a feel for the 
story line-that is, for the meaning that motivates people towards action or inaction as 
the case may be. The meaningful assessment of participants’ ‘critical incident’ 
narratives by the open-ended process of ethnographic interviewing (Spradley, 1979) 
was considered as the most suitable method in this research context.                                                                                                                                        
The Meaning of ‘Critical Incidents’: Contextualising the Narratives 
of Student Nurses’ ‘Multicultural Clinical Interactions’ 
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‘Critical incidents’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) were central to the methodological foundations 
of this research project, as they were the basis of the narratives that participants 
shared with me during the ethnographic interviews (Spradley, 1979). However, one 
has to be clear about the context in which the term ‘critical incident’ is used, as it is a 
fuzzy concept with multiple and contrastive meanings (see, Flanagan,1954; 
Fitzgerald, 2000; Cortazzi, 2001; Turunen, 2002; Chell, 2003; Turunen, Tossavainen 
and Verlio, 2004; Mikkonen, 2005). In historical studies, the term ‘critical incident’ 
(Tripp, 1993) has referred to some event or situation that marked a significant turning 
point or change for a person, institution, or social phenomenon. Similarly, in the 
health sciences, this term is synonymous with experiences that are drawn from 
unintended consequences; and a negative outcome usually defines whether 
something is viewed as ‘critical’ or not (Hunter, Spence and Scheinberg, 2008). 
Moreover, in biomedicine, the term has implied legal connotations (Hunter, Spence 
and Scheinberg, 2008), as in a case of clinical negligence, which could have, or did, 
lead to unintended harm to a person (e.g., patient); or a situation which has or is 
likely to occur in the context of ‘critical care’18 (Reed, 1994); or a ‘trouble case’ 
example-such as when a clinician and patient disagree over what is considered to be 
acceptable standards of behaviour (Kaufert, Kilage and Kaufert, 1984). 
Other concepts have also been used as synonyms for the term ‘critical incident’, and 
these concepts seem to denote a more positive meaning (Turunen, 2002). In the 
psychological literature, ‘authentic experience’ (Rahilly, 1993), ‘symbolic growth 
experience’ (Frick, 1987; 1990), and ‘significant life experience’ (Merriam and Clark, 
1993) have been used as synonyms for critical incidents. These synonyms for critical 
incidents all appear to describe the transformative effects of such significant events 
(Edwards and Fitzgerald, 2001). Furthermore, Brim and Ryff’s (1980) concept of ‘life 
event’ refers to a situation that is assigned properties in terms of the informant’s 
perception of the event. The purpose of eliciting a ‘life event’ is to gain an 
understanding of the subjective nature of meaningful experience.   
In the context of student nurses’ and their nursing educators’ recollections of  
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) in placement settings, it was 
                                                          
18
 ‘Critical care’ (Reed, 1994) is a phrase often applied in nursing practice and is used to define the 
types of work that goes on in ‘Accident and Emergency’ (A&E) and ‘Intensive Therapy Units’ (ITU). 
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more helpful to draw on Fitzgerald’s (2000) adaptation of Brislin and colleagues’ 
(Brislin, 1981; 1990; 2000; Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie and Yong, 1986; Brislin and 
Yoshida, 1994) definition of ‘critical incident’. In particular, Fitzgerald (2000, p. 190) 
defined ‘critical incidents’ as “distinct occurrences or events which involve two or 
more people; they are neither inherently negative nor positive, they are merely 
distinct occurrences or events which require some attention, action or explanation; 
they are situations for which there is a need to attach meaning”. Like ethnography 
(Fitzgerald, 1997), critical incidents can be viewed as both ‘product’ and ‘process’. A 
critical incident is a ‘product’-in the sense that it is recorded output, which has a 
particular construction and is available to a wider audience, as a tool for critical 
analysis and further study (Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1998). As I describe in 
the recommendations (conclusion chapter) section of this thesis, critical incidents 
can be used as educational tools to assist future undergraduate mental health 
student nurses in understanding cultural and mental health issues, and applying 
clinically relevant anthropological concepts. At the same time, a critical incident is a 
‘process’ and an interactive event, as there is a social exchange of meanings in a 
particular context (Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1996; Fitzgerald, Williamson 
and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1998). As a ‘process’, a critical incident is a symbolic 
representation of a ‘multicultural clinical interaction’. The critical incident engages our 
attention, arouses our curiosity, and requires some explanation if we are to attach 
meaning to the interactive event (Fitzgerald, 2001).  
Critical incidents also can be viewed as ‘social dramas’, or as “units of aharmonic or 
disharmonic process” (Turner, 1974, p. 37). Like ‘social dramas’, Sue and Sue 
(1990, p. 245) suggest that critical incidents represent a “conflict of cultures, values, 
standards, or goals”, but according to Fitzgerald (2000, p. 190), they “do not 
necessarily arise out of conflict situations”. Such ‘conflict’ usually results in 
‘disconfirmed expectancies’ (Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1994a, b; 1999; Fitzgerald and 
Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1994; 1995; 1996; 1998; Mullavey-O’Byrne and Fitzgerald, 1995; 
Mullavey-O’Byrne and West, 2001), where the ‘multicultural clinical interaction’ 
(Fitzgerald, 1992), ‘event’ (Cortazzi, 2001), ‘cultural scene’ (Spradley and McCurdy, 
1972), or ‘social drama’ (Turner, 1974):     
“Did not play out in quite the way the respondent or narrator anticipated. It may have 
had a result viewed as negative-one that may have evoked a disquieting state of 
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emotional arousal (e.g., frustration, anxiety, a sense of having lost control). However, 
just as often the result was viewed as positive in that there was a better than 
expected result. In both cases there is a need for explanation, a need to attach 
meaning”.    
(Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 190) 
‘Disconfirmed expectancies’ may lead to a sense of ‘cultural dissonance’ and an 
inability to deconstruct the interaction in a way that leads to satisfying solutions and 
strategies for care (Fitzgerald and Paterson, 1995; Mullavey-O’Byrne and West, 
2001).                                                                                                                                                          
‘Critical incidents’ are a subset of the narrative technique (Aranda and Street, 2001; 
McCance, McKenna and Boore, 2001; Schaefer, 2002), which has often been used 
in ethnographic and anthropologically informed health services research (Fortune, 
2002; Lovering, 2008; Yule, 2008). It is based upon the idea that we communicate, 
problem solve, understand, relive, and try to give meaning and coherence to 
distinctive events through narratives and story making (Kleinman, 1988b; Bruner, 
1990; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997b; Mattingly, 1998a; b; Russell, et al., 2002). The value 
of accessing the storied nature of experience has been developed by the efforts of 
Ricouer (1985), Bruner (1990), Riessman (1993), and Kleinman (1988b) among 
others. According to Kleinman (1988b, p. 49), narratives “shape and even create 
experience” and the “plot lines, core metaphors, and rhetorical devices that 
structure...narrative are drawn from cultural and personal models for arranging in 
meaningful ways and for effectively communicating those meanings”. Thus, 
narratives communicate cultural understandings within a specific context and link 
culture, meaning, and experience (Campbell, 2000; Fitzgerald, 2000). Narratives 
have additional distinct features, the primary ones being universality, sequentiality, 
and intentionality (Wicks and Whiteford, 2003).                                                                                                                                                       
However, while a conventional narrative has a resolution or endpoint, a critical 
incident is typically a story with an issue to be resolved, or the resolution is less than 
satisfactory and not well understood (Fitzgerald, 1996; 1997; McAllister, et al., 2006). 
As a result, the incident is open to alternative explanations and interpretations 
(Fitzgerald, 2001).While clinical case studies invariably contain pieces of 
decontextualised information, critical incidents are more reflective of what happens in 
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the process of clinical interactions (Armstrong and Fitzgerald, 1996; Fitzgerald, 
Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; 2001; Edwards and Fitzgerald, 2001; 
Clemson, Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 2001; Fitzgerald, Williamson, Russell 
and Manor, 2005). The major features of critical incidents involve an event structure 
(which reports happenings), a description structure (background information 
necessary to understand the incident-time, place and people involved) and an 
evaluation structure (which presents the narrator’s perspective on the events-their 
meaning, relevance and importance) (Cortazzi, 2001).                                                                                                                               
The Generation of ‘Critical Incident’ Data: Considering the 
Alternatives  
Introduction                                                                                                                                                                  
Having set out its meaning and definition, it is important now to consider the 
relevancy of the ‘critical incident’ approach (Fitzgerald, 2000) to the research at 
hand. As Sandelowski (2000, p. 335) has observed, no method is “absolutely weak 
or strong, but rather more or less useful or appropriate in relation to certain 
purposes”. Given its specific narrative orientation (Fitzgerald, 2000); its congruence 
with an anthropologically informed (Sobo, 2009) research design; its concern with 
eliciting meanings ascribed to specific experiences and events through guided 
reflection (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a); the focus on the immediacy of experience 
(Fitzgerald, 2001); the generation of ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz, 1973); the 
uncovering of tacit dimensions of clinical practice (Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997); its 
concern with understanding and meaning in context (Odawara, 2005; McAllister, et 
al., 2006); the complexity of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992); and 
the paucity of research in the area; the ‘critical incident’ focused (Fitzgerald, 2000) 
ethnographic interview (Spradley, 1979) approach was adopted in this study. Before 
I discuss these strengths and the relevance of the ‘critical incident’ focused 
ethnographic interview approach in more detail, I will review the other commonly 
cited methods for generating critical incident data. However, I will firstly provide a 
brief description of how the critical incident approach has been applied to topics of 
interest in the health sciences. 
The ‘Critical Incident’ Approach and the Health Sciences    
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The ‘critical incident’ approach was first popularised by the aviation psychologist 
John Flanagan19 (1954), but has since been adapted and used successfully across a 
number of professional fields in the health sciences. From the 1960s onwards, the 
approach has made its most profound impact on nursing research and education 
(Cormack, 1983; 1996; Benner, 1984). According to Narayanasamy and Owens 
(2001), this approach brings credence to nurses’ practice, because it is largely 
concerned with the real rather than the abstract world and acknowledges the 
constraints that nurses’ encounter in their work. 
The sheer diversity of nursing related topics to which the approach has been applied 
and the variety of qualitative methods used to collect ‘critical incident’ data 
demonstrates the versatility of this inductive approach to data generation (Dachelet, 
et al., 1981; Norman, Redfern, Tomalin and Oliver, 1992; Byrne, 2001). In particular, 
the approach has been used effectively in the study of nurses’ interpersonal 
communication skills (Clamp, Gough and Land, 2004); community psychiatric 
nurses’ use of humour during interactions with service users (Struthers, 1999); 
dealing with aggressive ward visitors (Laight, 1995); emergency nursing (Burns and 
Harm, 1993; Wahlin, Wieslander and Fridlund, 1995); oncology care (Cohen and 
Sarter, 1992); nurses’ responses to the spiritual needs of their patients 
(Narayanasamy and Owens, 2001); language awareness (Irvine, et al., 2008); 
rehabilitation care (Rimon, 1979); how nurses’ emotions affect patient care (Gow, 
1982); assessing nurses’ competency and expertise (Benner, 1984); exploring the 
function of the psychiatric nurse (Cormack, 1983); standards of care (Grant and 
Hrycuk, 1985; Cox, Bergen and Norman, 1993; Beech and Norman, 1995; Grant, 
Kreimer and Bannatyne, 1996; Kemppainen, 2000); treatment of older people (Reed, 
1994); and community nursing care (Malin, 2000).   
More importantly, the critical incident approach has shown real utility in the study of 
intercultural or ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Arthur, 2001; 2004; Fortune, 2002; 
Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Whiteford and McAllister, 2006; McAllister, et 
                                                          
19
 The ‘critical incident technique’ (CIT) has been developed for a wide range of specific purposes by 
business, industry, organisational psychologists, and other professional groups. Safety checklists, 
guidelines for action in emergency situations, and the establishment of occupational performance 
criteria are examples of the applied outcomes of this approach (Burgoyne and Hodgson, 1983; 
Bygrave, 1989; Chell, 2003).   
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al., 2006; Lovering, 2008; Yule, 2008; McAllister and Whiteford, 2008). It is the work 
of the medical anthropologist Maureen Fitzgerald and colleagues’ at the ‘Intercultural 
Interaction Project’20 in the ‘School of Occupational Therapy’ at The University Of 
Sydney (Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1994a;b; Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1995; 1996; 
1998; Fitzgerald and Paterson, 1995; Mullavey-O’Byrne and Fitzgerald, 1995; 
Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1996; 2000; 
2001; 2004; Fitzgerald, et al., 1996; 1997a; 1997b; Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997; 
Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; 2001; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-
O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997; Fitzgerald, Robison, Clemson and 
Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1997; Fitzgerald, Williamson and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1998; 
Clemson, Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1999; Edwards and Fitzgerald, 2001; 
Mullavey-O’Byrne and West, 2001; Russell, et al., 2002; Fitzgerald, Williamson, 
Russell and Manor, 2005) however, who have most significantly advanced 
understandings of the particular saliency of the critical incident approach to 
researching clinical interactions and intercultural learning processes. Thus, the 
‘dependability’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the PhD study findings was enhanced by 
following a recognised approach to data collection.      
Collecting ‘Critical Incidents’ 
‘Critical incidents’ can be collected in situ or retrospectively, or by using a 
combination of these approaches (Clamp, 1980; Burgoyne and Hodgson, 1983; 
Brookfield, 1987; 1990; 1992; 1993; Callery and Smith, 1991; Cormack, 1993). 
When used within an ethnographic approach, critical incidents can be derived from 
participant observation by giving meaning to the interpretation of naturally occurring 
events (Fitzgerald, 1997). In doing so, many forms of data are drawn on by the 
ethnographer to make sense of what they see and experience (Fitzgerald, Paterson 
and Azzopardi, 1997). Given the aforementioned problems with gaining access to 
mental healthcare settings in the UK, it was not practical or feasible to use this 
approach. In regard to the methodological contingencies with using this approach, it 
would have been difficult for a third person to remain unobtrusive while collecting 
                                                          
20
 The ‘Intercultural Interaction Project’, which began in 1992, was developed to: 1) Research culture 
and communication issues in clinical care and 2) provide occupational therapy students with an 
opportunity to use the research process to develop cultural knowledge and communication skills that 
would be useful to them in clinical practice (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). 
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critical incident data during student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’. Rimon 
(1979) has suggested that it is likely that an outsider “would not only prove to be 
annoying to the staff and patients while attempting to do this (collect critical 
incidents), but also would preclude the spontaneous occurrence of many of the 
incidents, which so depend on a confidential and private atmosphere for the nurse 
and patient” (p. 406).Thus, retrospective methods are usually preferred by 
researchers. 
An added advantage of the retrospective elicitation of critical incidents is its focus on 
the description of actual events rather than the description of things as they should 
be (Hasselkus and Dickie, 1988). The retrospective reporting of incidents in this PhD 
study helped the participants to describe incidents that occurred in their recent or 
less recent past; and therefore the long and short term experience that shapes 
mental health nursing was brought up in the interview sessions (Cormack, 1996). 
Indeed, the longer term consequences of student nurses’ clinical interactions 
became clear, as some of the participants described the development of therapeutic 
relationships with service users over a period of many weeks.  
However, the literature highlights some limitations of collecting critical incidents 
retrospectively. The problem of ‘hindsight bias’ (Cope and Watts, 2000) is frequently 
mentioned in this research literature-although Chell (2003) argues that the 
participant usually has good recall, as by their very nature, these type of accounts 
are ‘critical’. Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) research for the ‘Intercultural 
Interaction Project’ found that even when more current critical incidents could have 
been talked about, many of their participants still talked about incidents from past 
clinical encounters. These past encounters remained as ‘critical incidents’ for these 
participants, as they were ‘social dramas’ (Turner, 1974) that were not satisfactorily 
resolved in their minds and thus, still needed working through. In the context of this 
PhD study (with the exception of one case), the participants had no problem with 
recalling critical incidents from mental health student nurses’ clinical placements.   
A commonly cited retrospective method of eliciting critical incidents is by their written 
generation (Martin and Mitchell, 2001). Rosenal (1995) suggests that this method 
reveals the experience of the nurse who writes them. With this particular method, a 
set of instructions is given about what kind of incident should be identified and the 
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author of the incident is then instructed to detail the context in which the incident 
occurred, why it made a significant impression on them, and what they remembered 
feeling or thinking at the time (Smith and Russell, 1993; Smith, 1998). The written 
generation of incidents has been described as an efficient process, saving the 
researcher valuable time that would be expended in an interview situation 
(Brookfield, 1987). This method has also been used in studies where participants 
had difficulties in verbalising their experiences (Rosenal, 1995).      
When compared to their elicitation by ethnographic interview (Spradley, 1979), 
written critical incidents tend to be limited by their lack of information depth. Salander 
(2002) has argued that written critical incidents are invariably too short and may 
comprise sweeping and generalised evaluations without specifics. By contrast, the 
ethnographic interview allows the researcher to ask questions of expansion and 
clarification to obtain additional details about the incident (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-
OByrne and Clemson, 1997). As Narayanasamy and Owens (2001) argue, the 
written generation of critical incidents is best used in conjunction with in-depth 
interviews, where the issues highlighted in the written narratives benefit from further 
exploration in the context of an interview. In the context of this PhD study, ‘thick 
description’ (Geertz, 1973) was prioritised over any perceived gain in efficiency, and 
therefore the written narration of incidents was not considered as a primary method 
for generating incidents.  
Another technique for generating critical incidents is by asking participants to draw 
them. This approach was formulated by the psychologists Cortazzi and Roote (1973; 
1975), who outlined the procedure in their text ‘Illuminative Incident Analysis’. 
Although, the drawing of critical incidents has been used as a reflective tool in 
education, I could find no literature evaluating its use as a data collection method. 
Thus, this method of generating incidents was not deemed appropriate for this study. 
A common method used by qualitative researchers (Morgan, 1997; Barbour, 2007; 
Krueger and Casey, 2009), and one that can also be used in the exploration of 
critical incidents, is the focus group (Callery and Smith, 1991). However, Farrington 
(1993) raises the possibility of participants feeling threatened by the process of self-
disclosure within a group context. I did not feel that self-disclosure was necessarily 
an issue for the participants in this PhD study. Indeed, self-reflection in group clinical 
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supervision sessions is a fundamental aspect of the education of student nurses 
(Bonham, 2004). Rather, my justification for not using focus groups for the primary 
method of generating critical incidents is the same reason for not using the written 
method. That is, the group context does not offer one the prospect of eliciting rich 
and ‘thick’ descriptive (Geertz, 1973) critical incidents of student nurses’ ‘multicultural 
clinical interactions’.     
A further strategy is to use pre-formulated critical incidents (usually elicited in 
previous interviews) as a stimulus for discussion and the generation of new incidents 
(Clemson, Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1999). In this approach, the participant 
is asked to reflect on a pre-prepared incident and to discuss what they think is going 
on in the incident. Usually the same pre-prepared incident is presented to a number 
of participants and this enables the researcher to engage in comparative analysis 
across participants and participant groups (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne and 
Clemson, 2001). For example, the participants may include health professionals, 
service users and community members, or the groups may represent participants 
from one or more health professions. This approach was clearly not congruent with 
the purpose of this PhD research.  
There is however, a more useful way of generating critical incidents for the purposes 
of understanding mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’, 
and this approach was chosen for this study. Based on a similar approach to that 
used by Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a) at the ‘Intercultural 
Interaction Project’, ethnographic interviews (Spradley, 1979) were used to generate 
critical incident data for this research. Fitzgerald (2000) described this approach as 
the ‘critical incident’ focused ethnographic interview. According to Spradley (1979, p. 
55), an ethnographic interview is “a particular kind of speech event” that is used to 
generate cultural data.  
As I will describe in more depth in a later section of this chapter, critical incidents 
were elicited from the student nurse participants by asking them to describe a 
particular situation they had experienced or heard about during clinical placement 
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where they believed that culture21 was important to that situation. I also asked each 
student nurse participant to describe how that important cultural issue in that 
particular situation was dealt with. Similarly, I asked each nursing educator 
participant to talk in depth about a particular situation where culture was an issue for 
a pre-registered mental health student nurse in clinical placement, and to describe 
how this cultural issue in that situation was dealt with. In this way, the participant 
chose the incident or incidents they wanted to relate. Spradley’s (1979) typology of 
ethnographic interview questions was then used to explore the incident and to obtain 
additional information and the participant’s interpretation of the incident. Before I turn 
to the description of the data collection process, I will first outline the rationale for 
using the ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic interview 
(Spradley, 1979) in this study.  
The ‘Critical Incident’ Focused Ethnographic Interview                                                                                                                                                    
Asking a person to relate a story (critical incident) from their clinical practice is said 
to be an effective way to establish trust and rapport with that person (Fitzgerald, 
2001). Similarly, Ghaye (2005) describes ‘critical incident’ storytelling as a relational 
act, as stories are not only told to others, but there is also reciprocity in the telling of 
(and response to) the story. Inviting a person to describe a specific event or 
interaction from their clinical practice tends to be less intimidating and takes away 
some of the anxieties that the participant may feel if they were asked directly to 
reflect on their own concepts of professional practice (Brookfield, 1990). According to 
Brookfield (1987), when more directive questions are put to a person whose ego is 
invested in being perceived as a competent worker, he or she is hardly likely to admit 
to experiences that demonstrate their inability “to perform well in a particular 
situation” (p. 98). ‘Critical incident’ focused (Fitzgerald, 2000) ethnographic 
interviews (Spradley, 1979) were especially valuable to exploring the cultural issues 
in pre-registered mental health student nurses’ clinical placements, as these issues 
were explored “without the obvious social response bias associated with discussing 
such issues in general terms” (Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997, p. 36). Response bias or 
translation competence (Spradley, 1979) was reduced by placing the participant in 
                                                          
21
 The term ‘culture’ was intentionally left undefined, as it was participants’ ascribed meanings about 
this concept and its perceived influence on student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ that was 
the study focus.       
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the role of ‘cultural expert’. As Spradley notes, ethnographic interviewing is a means 
of learning from, rather than studying people.                                                                                                                                          
The ‘critical incident’ focused ethnographic interview has the potential to access the 
tacit dimensions and fuzziness (Bruner, 1996) of clinical practice, as during the 
narration of the incident, the person is talking about themselves without necessarily 
being consciously aware of this (McAllister, et al., 2006).Critical incidents therefore, 
provide a means of probing a person’s assumptive world. The research literature 
(Giroux, 2007) indicates that a further strength of this method is the completeness of 
the generated data. By asking the participant to provide meaningful insights into their 
own motives and actions, critical incidents can be covered in considerable detail and 
the researcher can prompt the participant to reveal their feelings about the specific 
situation (Odawara, 2005). A semi-structured interview may also elicit a fine grained 
analysis of a person’s motives and actions. However, the linkage between contexts, 
strategies and outcomes (Chell and Pittaway, 1998; Pittaway, 2000; Chell and 
Allman, 2003) is more readily teased out with an ethnographic interview approach. A 
‘critical incident’ focused ethnographic interview is centred on a specific event that 
can be explicated in terms of what happened, how it was handled, and what the 
consequences were. By contrast, a semi-structured interview does not require the 
participant to focus in such a specific way (Chell, Howarth and Brearley, 1991).                                                                                                      
Thus, the ‘critical incident’ focused ethnographic interview can provide invaluable  
insights into the psychological and cultural prerogatives that motivated a person’s 
actions (Snell, 1992; Pittaway, 2000), and a running experiential commentary of 
meaningful events and reactions to those events (Brookfield, 1992; 1993). 
Importantly, from an anthropological perspective, this approach has the potential to 
understand complex and meaningful issues in cultural context (Laws and Fitzgerald, 
1997). Aside from participant observation, other methods provide little, if any, 
contextual information; and for socio-cultural anthropologists, context is everything 
(Fitzgerald, 1997). By contrast, quantitative methods or simple question and answer 
formats are unable to tease out context and its impact on the situation, and the way 
that the person interprets it (Laws and Fitzgerald, 1997).  
‘Critical incident analysis’ (CIA) (Cohn, 1989; Parker, Webb and D’Souza, 1994; 
Ghaye and Lillyman, 1997; 2000; Greenwood, 1998; Ghaye, 2005) has been and is 
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currently used in the training of student nurses and other health practitioners (Kim, 
1991; Arthur, 2004). In particular, it is used to promote clinical reasoning and 
decision making skills (Cormack, 1996). Indeed, it is generally accepted that 
reflection on clinical practice is a hallmark of competent professional practice, which 
allows for the development of new skills, attitudes and knowledge (Schon, 1987; 
Kemmis, 2004). Critical incident analysis in nursing education involves students in 
writing about or reflecting on experiences from clinical placement.  
Thus, the student nurse participants were already familiar with the concept of 
actively reflecting on clinical practice and using ‘critical incident analysis’ to develop 
learning. This is an additional justification for using the ‘critical incident’ focused 
ethnographic interview approach in the research. In a study that evaluated an 
interdisciplinary health science students fieldwork program in Vietnam (Whiteford 
and McAllister, 2006; McAllister and Whiteford, 2008), ‘critical incident’ focused 
ethnographic interviews provided a structural basis for analysis and meaning 
ascription that may not have been as well developed through more formal means of 
data generation. Many of the student nurses in this PhD study reported that 
reflection on their critical incident stories provoked insights into their own clinical 
practice. The student nurse participants achieved these insights by drawing on their 
own accumulated clinical experiences and knowledge. Story telling is a basic form of 
communication and is consistent with the way that health practitioners interact with 
colleagues to address issues in clinical practice (Russell, et al., 2002). As this study 
and previous research has found (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Whiteford and McAllister, 
2006; McAllister and Whiteford, 2008), practitioners are comfortable with narrative 
reasoning and the talk story approach of ethnographic interviewing.   
Sampling Process    
Selecting the Participants                                                                                                                                                         
Prior to the recruitment of participants and the collection of data, institutional review  
ethical approval was obtained from my host institution and the University nursing 
school where the research was conducted. As the collection of data took place in 
four nursing education centres that are attached to a University nursing school, an 
occupational health assessment and criminal records bureau check was undertaken, 
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and an NHS research passport was obtained. There were however, administrative 
problems22 with the new NHS research passport system (introduced in 2009) and 
frustratingly, the process for acquiring a passport took over a year to be completed.  
Pre-registered (years two and three) mental health student nurses were self-selected 
from four nursing education centres attached to a University nursing school in the 
north of England. Students from the first year (2010-2011 cohort) of the Diploma/BSc 
in mental health nursing were not considered for this study, as I felt that they needed 
time to establish themselves and gain confidence in clinical situations. The nursing 
educators informed me that during the first year of the Diploma/BSc mental health 
nursing pathway, many of their students struggled to come to terms with the basic 
theoretical and applied aspects of nursing. I therefore did not want to further burden 
these first year students by asking them to participate in the study. Clinical 
placements during the first year are also less intensive than in years two and three of 
the undergraduate mental health nursing pathway. In year one, the duration for 
placements is only eight weeks and involves a placement in a general nursing 
setting. By contrast, in years two and three of the Diploma/BSc mental health nursing 
pathway, the clinical practice component is more prominent, as each placement’s 
duration is twelve weeks and takes place in a variety of hospital, forensic and 
community mental health settings (Bonham, 2004). I felt that it was important that 
students should have at least one academic year of clinical placement experience 
behind them; hence my decision to focus the research on years two and three 
students.  
In terms of facilitating access to the University nursing school, a meeting with the 
professor (who had overall academic responsibility) of the undergraduate mental 
health nursing pathway was arranged. During this meeting, the theoretical basis, 
methodology, selection criteria, recruitment strategies, and data collection 
procedures were discussed. The nature and purpose of the study was then 
disseminated in the form of an information sheet to the academic coordinators for the 
years two and three undergraduate mental health nursing pathway. I was then 
invited by the academic coordinators to give an oral presentation of the research to 
                                                          
22
At one point in the NHS research passport application process, my own personal health information 
was lost by Human Resources. I only discovered that my health information had gone missing when 
my GP reported that he had received no contact from Human Resources. 
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each of the second and third year undergraduate mental health nursing branch 
cohorts at the four education centres. To ensure a high level of student attendance, 
the oral presentations were arranged to take place at the beginning or at the end of 
lecture sessions. Typically, the duration of each presentation was about 15 minutes 
and an extra 5 minutes was allocated for any student queries. A study information 
sheet was given to the students at the presentations and sheets were left behind for 
anyone who was absent at the presentations.        
Due to a low student uptake and to achieve ‘data saturation’ (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985), the oral presentations had to be given to all ten student cohorts (2010-2011) 
across the four nursing education centres. A further study information sheet was 
then emailed to the students who had indicated their interest in participating in the 
research. It was likely that the low uptake of students in each cohort to the study was 
the consequence of the administrative delays in obtaining an NHS research 
passport. In particular, forward planning of participant recruitment was undermined 
by this delay, as the passport was not received until half way through the student 
nurses’ academic year (2010-2011). By the time I had arrived on the scene, students 
were already immersed in completing assignments or engaged in clinical placement.  
In addition to the self-selected sample of students, a purposive sample (Patton, 
1990) of undergraduate second and third year mental health nursing educators was 
selected from the academic faculty of this University nursing school. By their depth of 
experience as clinical educators and as former practitioners (including their own 
experiences as student nurses), these educators provided important insights about 
mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ in clinical 
placements. More specifically, it is in clinical supervision sessions23 that student 
nurses share with their peers and educators the kinds of ‘critical incident’ stories 
                                                          
23
During every twelve week clinical placement, students go back to their nursing education centre for 
three days of clinical supervision. Clinical supervision sessions typically last between 1 and 1.5 hours, 
with an additional 30 minutes set aside to talk about any issues deemed inappropriate for group 
discussion (Ashmore, Carver, Clibbens and Sheldon, 2012). Each session normally has between 10-
12 students and one nursing educator. Clinical supervision is defined as “a formal process of 
professional support and learning which enables individual practitioners to develop knowledge and 
competence, assume responsibility for their own practice and enhance consumer protection and 
safety of care in complex clinical situations” (Department of Health, 1993, p. 15). The purpose of 
clinical supervision is to encourage students to reflect on their clinical placement experiences, to help 
identify solutions to problems arising from clinical practice, and increase the understanding of 
professional issues (Ashmore and Carver, 2000).   
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discussed in the methodology and findings chapters of this thesis. As a nursing 
educator explained to me during the course of an interview, “it is in the clinical 
supervision sessions when you get to hear their stories and you tend to get 
interesting stories”. Thus, the nursing educator participants could be described as 
‘key informants’ (Hudelson, 1994), who were considered as “individuals who possess 
special knowledge, status or communication skills, who are willing to share their 
knowledge and skills with the researcher, and who have access to perspectives or 
observations denied the researcher through other means” (Gilchrist and Williams, 
1999, p. 74). Key informants are purposefully selected on “theoretical and personal 
considerations-for the insights and interpretations they bring to the research topic” 
(Hudelson, 2005, p. 312). 
In accordance with the anthropologically informed research design, the aim of the 
recruitment strategy was to establish the range of cultural phenomena and to select 
information rich cases that would illuminate the research questions. Including the 
perspectives of nursing educators and student nurses can be seen as a form of data 
triangulation (Knafl and Brietmayer, 1989; Flick, 2008b). The triangulation of data 
sources maximises the range of data, which contributes to a more complete and 
nuanced understanding of study topics (Krefting, 1991a).  
Participants  
Thirty six transcripts of interviews with second and third year pre-registered mental 
health student nurses were analysed. In addition to participating in an interview, a 
third year student volunteered to write a critical incident narrative. The data set also 
included seven transcripts of interviews conducted with second and third year 
undergraduate mental health nursing educators. With the exception of one third year 
student, background information was clearly recorded for all the student participants. 
Just over half (n=20) of the student participants were recruited from the second year 
undergraduate cohort (2010-2011). Most of the participants (n=34) were enrolled on 
a BSc programme. The other 2 students were studying for undergraduate diplomas.  
Thirty three of the student nurses identified themselves as from a ‘White-British’ 
background, one as ‘Black Caribbean’, and one each from ‘Any Other Ethnic group’ 
and ‘Any Other White background’. The majority of the student participants were 
female, as only six of these participants were male. Just under half of the 
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participants (n=17) recorded their age as between 18-25, four as aged between 26-
30, six as aged between 31-35, three as aged between 36-40, four as aged between 
41-45, one as aged between 46-50, and one participant did not record their age 
band. All of these participants recorded English as their first language; however, five 
of the participants recorded at least one second language. All of the nursing 
educators were female and of the lecturer grade. Three of the educators were 
involved in the teaching and clinical supervision of second year undergraduate 
mental health student nurses, with the rest of the interviewed educators (n=4) having 
the same responsibilities for third year cohorts.  
The decision to limit the number of student participants to thirty six was based on 
practical reasons and a feeling that the collected data was sufficient. By the end of 
the data collection, I had given oral presentations of my research to all the second 
and third year undergraduate mental health nursing cohorts (2010-2011). Time 
limitations prevented the additional recruitment of second year students from the 
following year group (2011-2012). Given the protracted delay with obtaining an NHS 
research passport and the subsequent problems with recruitment planning and 
recruiting participants, the ethnographic interviews carried out for this study had 
generated a sufficient and wide range of ‘critical incidents’. I also had the experience 
which Colaizzi (1978, p. 70) described as “a certain empty but ‘distinct’ feeling of 
being satisfied” with the adequacy of the generated data. The length of the critical 
incidents varied from a few lines to a few pages-and in one case, an entire forty five 
page interview transcript. These critical incidents provided data about different kinds 
of placements, from community to hospital and forensic settings.          
Data Collection Process    
Location and Arrangement of Interviews  
It was unlikely that most of the student nurses would of had the time or the 
opportunity (due to coursework and other responsibilities) to participate in an 
interview at my host institution; so the participation rate was maximised by 
conducting interviews at the four nursing education centres which students were 
attached to. The interviews were normally conducted at lunch time (in between 
lectures) or after lectures had been completed for a particular day. The students 
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reported that they found this arrangement convenient, as the interviews fitted in with 
their tight study schedules and other commitments. On the rare occasions when 
there were no lectures scheduled, the student was given their travel expenses for 
attending the interview. A quiet room for the interviews was prearranged with the 
education centre administrator. Duration of interviews ranged between thirty minutes 
and two hours. The location of interviews with the nursing educators was 
predetermined by the educators themselves-generally in the person’s office or in a 
quiet room at the education centre. Duration of these interviews ranged between one 
hour and two and a half hours.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Ethical Procedures and Recording Interviews   
The participant information and informed consent sheet was read out at the 
beginning of each interview. During this process, participants were reminded of the 
research purpose, that their participation was voluntary and confidential, and that 
they were free to withdraw from the interview at any time. In all cases, written 
consent was obtained. The participant was asked not to use the name of the clinical 
placement setting or anyone involved in the ‘critical incident’. On rare occasions the 
details of a critical incident was slightly modified to protect the identity of the setting 
and the people mentioned in the narrative. To help preserve participants’ anonymity, 
student nurse participants are identified only by gender and year of undergraduate 
study in this thesis.  
The recording of the interview was determined by the wishes of the participant; and 
in all cases, the interviews were audio recorded. Audio-recording of the interviews 
helped me to listen attentively during the sessions. These audio recordings were 
kept in a secure and locked place that was only accessible to the researcher. 
Background information (i.e., contact details, age, gender, ethnicity, and languages 
spoken) about each participant was collected at the interview’s end. The interview 
notes, audio files, transcriptions, and any other data were destroyed on completion 
of the study. As a way of showing appreciation and establishing rapport, hospitality in 
the form of refreshments and snacks was offered to all of the participants. 
Moustakas (1990) suggests that such measures facilitate a sense of comfort and 
encourage openness and self-disclosure.                                                                                                                                                                            
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Conducting Interviews 
All interviews were based on the ethnographic form or style (Spradley, 1979). The 
function of the ethnographic interview is to generate cultural data by asking 
participants ‘descriptive’, ‘structural’, and ‘contrast’ questions. According to Spradley, 
these question types should complement each other. By using these ethnographic 
style questions, ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) narratives were elicited from the 
participants. As the incidents emerged through the open-ended process of 
ethnographic interviewing, their generation was congruent with the cultural 
constructionist perspective of this study. Each participant chose the incident, or in 
many cases, the incidents they wanted to relate.    
The student nurse participants were asked to describe a particular situation they had 
experienced or heard about during clinical placement where they believed that 
culture was important to that situation. I also asked each student nurse participant to 
describe how that important cultural issue in that particular situation was dealt with. 
Similarly, I asked each nursing educator participant to talk in depth about a particular 
situation where culture was an issue for a pre-registered mental health student nurse 
in clinical placement, and to describe how this cultural issue in that situation was 
dealt with. These ‘descriptive’ ethnographic questions elicited utterances in the 
participant’s native language and encouraged the participant to talk about a 
particular ‘cultural scene’ (Spradley and McCurdy, 1972) from clinical placement. 
Spradley (1979) notes that this type of ethnographic question offers the participant a 
canvas by encouraging them to paint a word picture of their experiences.        
Further ethnographic type questions were used to elicit more information (expansion) 
or for clarification purposes. ‘Structural’ ethnographic questions allowed me to 
“discover information about domains, the basic units in an informant’s cultural 
knowledge”, and to “find out how informants have organised their knowledge” 
(Spradley, 1979, p. 60). ‘In this particular clinical case, what were all of the reasons 
that you experienced frustration in your role as a mental health student nurse’, was 
an example of a ‘structural’ question that I used in the study. Furthermore, ‘contrast’ 
ethnographic questions helped me to “discover the dimensions of meaning which 
informants employ to distinguish the objects and events in their world” (Spradley, 
1979, p. 60). ‘What were the differences between a case where religion framed a 
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psychotic illness and a case where religion was not a factor in the framing of 
psychotic illness’, was an example of a ‘contrast’ question used in the study.         
According to May (1991), at the conclusion of an interview, the researcher should 
ensure that no data are missed (e.g., when ‘good byes’ are being said). During the 
closure of interviews (when the audio recorder was switched off) participants 
frequently mentioned something that was considered relevant to understanding their 
experiences. On these occasions, I asked participants for their permission to record 
this information in my field notes. The closure of each interview also involved 
providing an explanation as to what would happen to the data; assurances regarding 
the destruction of the audio files following study completion; a brief discussion about 
the transcription process; asking the participant if they would like to check their 
transcript through when it was completed; (in the case of student nurses) asking the 
participant if they would like to take part in a follow up telephone interview to discuss 
the transcript and any other aspects of the interview session; and asking all of the 
participants if they would like to participate in a later focus group session (for the 
purpose of member checking). After every session, field notes describing the context 
and the process of the interview were recorded.     
Transcription and Member Checks  
The methodological direction of a study has implications for the form and content of 
transcripts (Roberts, 2004). This study focused on the thematic content (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Miles and Huberman, 1994) of ‘critical incidents’. As such, the aim of 
the transcription process was to provide a verbatim and accurate representation of 
the data content. Once transcribed, a copy of the transcript was sent to the 
participant for verification and feedback. Participants were asked if they wanted to 
change or remove anything in the transcript. This strategy reinforces the view that 
research should be seen as a negotiated process (Doyle, 2007) rather than as 
something imposed by the researcher. In nearly all cases, changes were minor or 
additional information was volunteered by the participant. However, in one case, a 
participant had deleted and edited part of their transcript. The participant stated that 
the intention of the editing and deletion of material was to protect the identity of her 
clinical placement and co-workers.   
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This process constituted the first stage of member checking, albeit at a descriptive 
level (Seale, 1999). Member checking is basically what the term implies-an 
opportunity for members (participants) to check (approve) the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data they have provided (Carlson, 2010). This strategy ensured 
that I had transcribed the interviews accurately and decreased the chances of 
misrepresentation (Krefting, 1991a).It also presented participants with an opportunity 
to volunteer any information that was not mentioned during the interviews and to add 
emphasis to their original accounts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The inquiry thus 
became a more participative and dialogical undertaking (Schwandt, 1996). Many of 
the participants expressed their appreciation at being given the opportunity to review 
their account, which provides further evidence of member checking being an ethical 
act (Cutcliffe and McKenna, 2002).    
The transcripts, which were sent to the student nurse participants, also included an 
attachment where they could write about any critical incidents that they had forgotten 
to mention at the interview or had occurred since the interview session. Guidance 
was given for this process. Furthermore, the student nurse participants were given 
the option of discussing the written ‘critical incident’, the transcription process and/or 
what they had discussed during the interview session in a follow up telephone 
interview. It was recognised that the time for discovery in single face to face 
interviews was limited (Sobo, 2009) and that leads could be followed up in more 
detail by conducting telephone interviews.     
Repeat interviewing may also prevent some of the problems with social desirability 
factors and concerns that an interviewee may have in terms of presentation of self 
(Sobo, 2009). When participants are not available in person (i.e., due to study or 
clinical placement schedules); telephone interviews are a valuable data collection 
tool (Sobo, 2003). However, only one written critical incident was elicited and the 
person in question opted not to participate in the follow up telephone interview. It 
seemed that a heavy study workload combined with the demands of forty hour week 
or more placements meant that students simply did not have the time to participate 
in these activities.  
Morse (1998) has argued that the product of qualitative research must be different 
from the descriptive accounts provided by participants. Therefore, what Lincoln and 
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Guba (1985) referred to as a ‘terminal member check’ was conducted at the final 
stage of analysis. Cutcliffe and McKenna (2002) argue that participants need to 
recognise something of themselves and their world in the final analysis. Angen 
(2000) made a similar point by suggesting that the theoretical findings must evoke an 
immediate feeling of authenticity, a smile of recognition, or an ‘ah ha’ experience 
among the participants. This form of member checking, “implies a more cooperative 
approach between the researcher and the researched” (Angen, 2002, p. 389).     
Due to its potential capacity to tap cultural frameworks (Callaghan, 2005) and to 
“explore any difference in the responses of participants to tentative findings” 
(Barbour, 2007, p. 90), the focus group method (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990; 
Morgan, 1997) was chosen for the final stage member checking. The facilitation of 
social interaction in a focus group may help “make manifest shared, cultural norms 
as well as bringing to light important culturally shaped or influenced ways in which 
people in groups can contest these norms” (Sobo, 2009, p. 179). The potential of 
member checks to generate further data and understanding is often overlooked in 
the academic literature. However, Barbour (2007, p. 90) suggests that “presenting 
preliminary findings can provide an opportunity to involve research participants in 
working collaboratively to furnish explanations”. This is a much more useful 
approach than viewing such exercises as providing corroboration or validation of 
one’s findings (as is implied in the term ‘respondent validation’ [Bloor, 1997]) (Sobo, 
2009). In the study context, the focus group member checks produced new insights 
into student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’. For example, ‘risk behaviour’ 
was mentioned as a criterion in differentiating mental illness from culturally validated 
phenomena in the focus groups, but was only briefly and implicitly touched upon in 
the interview sessions.  
Three focus groups were held at nursing education centres closest to the 
participants and this strategy maximised participation. However, owing to the 
aforementioned delays with obtaining an NHS research passport, none of the third 
year cohort of student nurses (2010-2011) was able to attend the group discussions. 
The third year students had completed their studies by the time of these focus 
groups, and due to work commitments and other responsibilities were unable to 
attend these sessions. Furthermore, some of the second year students (2010-2011) 
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contacted me to indicate that they were unable to attend a focus group discussion 
due to clinical placement commitments. Three of the nursing educator participants 
also were absent at the time of the focus group discussions. The students and 
nursing educators who were able to participate in a focus group discussion were 
then separated into three different groups (e.g., nursing educator focus group n=4; 
student nurse focus group 1 n=11; student nurse focus group 2 n=3). There have 
been strong arguments in the focus group literature (e.g., Morgan and Krueger, 
1993; Morgan, 1997) against mixing categories of participants across authority and 
status lines, because of ethical issues and the probability that the discussion will be 
uncomfortable at best and conflict-ridden at worst.  
Two weeks before each focus group, the participants were provided with a formal 
invitation letter, a summary of preliminary findings, and a participant information and 
informed consent sheet. Information and consent sheets were also handed out to the 
participants at the beginning of the focus group session. In the invitation letter, 
participants were asked to prepare for the focus group by reading through the 
summary of findings. As a way of showing gratitude to the participants and to 
encourage a relaxed atmosphere, refreshments and snacks were provided at the 
sessions (Krueger and Casey, 2009). At the beginning of each session, the purpose 
of the focus group was explained, reassurances were given in regard to participants’ 
anonymity, and agreement was secured from group members with respect to 
participants’ confidentiality. In each of the focus groups, the participants were then 
asked to evaluate whether the themes presented in the summary of findings report 
reflected their own experiences of pre-registered mental health student nurses’ 
clinical placements. Having secured the agreement of the participants, the focus 
groups were audio recorded. The duration of the sessions was between one hour 
forty minutes and two hours thirty minutes. Group members were debriefed at the 
end of each session and this gave participants the opportunity to raise any issues or 
concerns. Participants were also asked if they wanted to erase any comments they 
had made during the discussion. The content of the focus groups was transcribed 
verbatim.    
Data Analysis 
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Introduction 
A thematic analysis based on a constructivist approach (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) 
was applied to the corpus of data generated from the ‘critical incident’ focused 
ethnographic interviews and the three focus groups (member checks). In this 
analytical process themes and categories are not predetermined, but emerged 
inductively (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell and Alexander, 1990; Gibbs, 2007; Saldana, 
2009) from multiple reviews of the data (Norton, et al., 1991). This approach to data 
analysis was compatible with the anthropological orientation of the research design 
and its emphasis on staying close to the ‘emic’ accounts of participants. In 
endeavouring to be more explicit about the processes of constructivist thematic 
analysis, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 344-351) posited some operational 
refinements. These refinements are concerned with ‘unitizing’ and ‘categorizing’ the 
data. The ‘constant comparison’ method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which was 
used throughout the analysis process, involves category coding and the 
simultaneous comparison of ‘units of meaning’ of all categories, the refinement of 
categories, and the exploration of relationships and patterns across categories 
(Maykut and Morehouse, 1994).  
I decided not to use computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), 
due to a concern that computer analysis packages could alienate one from the data 
and enforce analysis strategies that conflicted with the methodological orientation of 
this study. A similar point is made by Seidel and Kelle (1995) in their discussion of 
qualitative data analysis software programmes. Preliminary analysis occurred in 
conjunction with the collection of data by writing down recurring ideas, questions and 
thoughts in a fieldwork journal. Taylor and Bogdan (1998) have described this 
process as a form of ‘discovery’, where the goal is to identify an array of potentially 
important experiences, concepts and themes. More formal and intensive data 
analysis began when the collection of data was completed and this process is now 
outlined.                                                                                                                                                                                    
Unitizing the Data 
The first step in the analysis process was to identify the chunks of meaning in the 
data–a process known as ‘unitizing’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), or what Maykut and  
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Morehouse (1994, p. 128) described as “culling for meaning from the words and 
actions of the participants in the study”. These ‘units of meaning’ formed the basis of 
larger categories of meaning (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). According to Lincoln 
and Guba (1985), a unit of meaning should have two notable characteristics. Firstly, 
it should be a heuristic that is aimed at some understanding or some action that the 
researcher needs to take. Secondly, the unit of meaning must be able to stand by 
itself-that is, it should be understandable without the need for additional information. 
The unit of meaning may be a short response, a full paragraph, or something longer 
(Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). In this PhD study-many of these ‘units’ were much 
longer than a paragraph, as unitizing short responses and sentences would have 
overly fractured the data and meant losing the contextual meaning of the critical 
incidents.       
The units of meaning were identified by a careful reading and rereading of 
transcripts. At this point, the original set of transcripts was set aside and photocopies 
of the transcripts were used for unitizing and subsequent steps of the analysis. When 
a unit of meaning was identified, a line was drawn across the page of the 
photocopied transcript to separate the unit of meaning from the next unit. In the left 
margin of the page, I then identified the exact location of the unit in the overall 
corpus of data. For example, the code 5/I/ST/Year 3/P.6, refers to the fifth (5) 
transcript of an interview (I) with a pre-registered mental health student nurse (ST), a 
third year student (Year 3) and the sixth page of the transcript (P.6). Similarly, the 
code 1/I/NE/Year 2/P.3, refers to the first (1) transcript of an interview (I) with a 
nursing educator (NE), an undergraduate year 2 educator (Year 2) and the third 
page of the transcript (P.3). In the case of the focus groups, ‘I’ for interview was 
simply replaced with ‘F’ for focus group. Following Maykut and Morehouse’s (1994) 
guidelines, the next step was to convey in a word, phrase, or short sentence the 
essence of the unit’s meaning. This word, phrase, or short sentence was then 
printed beneath the code for the unit of meaning. When further clarification of 
meaning and context for a unit was needed, the coding and unitizing of the data 
made it easy for me to go back to the intact (original) transcript and read the unit of 
meaning in its fullest context. In accordance with Maykut and Morehouse’s 
recommendations, the next step involved cutting apart the units of meaning from the 
photocopied transcripts and taping each unit onto separate 5” x 8” index cards. This 
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was done in preparation for the ‘categorizing’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the units 
of meaning; whereby the units are sorted into provisional categories (Saldana, 
2009).  
Categorizing 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 347), the second major step in 
constructivist thematic analysis is ‘categorizing’; and they provide us with a useful 
summary of this process:  
“The essential tasks of categorizing are to bring together into provisional categories 
those (units of meaning) cards that apparently relate to the same content; to devise 
rules that describe category properties and that can, ultimately, be used to justify the 
inclusion of each card that remains to be assigned to the category as well as to 
provide a basis for later tests of replicability; and to render the category internally 
consistent”.  
The logic underpinning ‘categorizing’ is the method of ‘constant comparison’ (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967), which combines inductive category coding and a simultaneous 
comparison of all the unitizing meaning cards (obtained from the transcripts of data). 
In this process, each unitizing card is compared to all the other unitizing cards and is 
then grouped with similar units of meaning to form a provisional category (Maykut 
and Morehouse, 1994). This ‘look/feel-alike criteria’ was proposed by Lincoln and 
Guba as a means of describing the emergent processes involved in categorizing 
units of meaning. Furthermore, when a unitizing card cannot be placed under a 
tentative category, a new provisional category emerges. During this process, I put 
aside all the unitizing cards which could not be attached to the provisional categories 
already formed. Later on in the analysis, I drew upon these unit of meaning cards 
which I had set aside to form new categories.  According to Goertz and LeCompte 
(1981), there is always a place for further refinement, as provisional categories are 
changed and merged (or excluded from the analysis) to form new categories. The 
goal was to develop a set of categories that provided a ‘reasonable’ reconstruction 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985) of the data which I had collected.    
Following the recommendations of Maykut and Morehouse, a ‘rule of inclusion’ was 
written-based on the perceived shared meaning of the unitizing cards in a provisional 
category. This rule was written as a propositional statement, which Maykut and 
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Morehouse (1994, p.139) defined as “one that conveys the meaning that is 
contained in the data cards gathered together under a category name”. Stated as 
propositions these rules of inclusion for the identified categories reveal what one is 
learning about the phenomena under investigation and is a crucial step in arriving at 
research outcomes (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). Rules of inclusion for provisional 
categories then served as the basis for excluding or including subsequent unitizing 
cards. Data analysis continued until all the unitizing cards had been grouped into 
substantive categories.    
The final step of the analysis was to explore the relationships and patterns across 
the substantive categories (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The aim of this process was to 
examine the propositions that could stand on their own and connect those 
propositions, which seemed to form interesting patterns and relationships. Maykut 
and Morehouse refer to the connecting of two or more propositions as ‘outcome 
propositions’. The final categories and subcategories, which emerged from this 
study, are discussed in the four findings chapters.           
Summary  
An anthropologically informed research design (Sobo, 2009) and a qualitative 
strategy provided the methodological framework for the study. Although the study 
methodology was not traditionally ethnographic “anthropology’s signature was valid” 
(Sobo, 2009, p. 76). This anthropological signature was reflected in the data 
generation, analysis and member checks. Second and third year undergraduate 
mental health student nurses and their nursing educators were recruited from four 
education centres that are attached to a University nursing school in the north of 
England. The ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic interviews 
(Spradley, 1979) helped to explore issues in-depth, in their cultural context, and from 
participants’ perspectives. These ‘critical incidents’ were based on ‘crises’ (Cortazzi, 
2001), ‘social dramas’ (Turner, 1974) and ‘cultural scenes’ (Spradley and McCurdy, 
1972), and were therefore, “event-centred” (Yule, 2008, p. 81). Member checking at 
descriptive and analytical levels was carried out, and these checks allowed for 
further understanding to take place. The data analysis applied a thematic approach 
by utilising Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) operational refinements of ‘unitizing’ and 
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‘categorizing’ and Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) ‘constant comparison’ method. I now 
move on to discuss the findings of the study.   
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Chapter 5 
 
The ‘Normative Uncertainty’ Evaluation Dilemma: A Key 
Concern of Clinical Placement 
 
 
“So in mental health you have this argument about what is normal and what is 
abnormal, and it can be a minefield sometimes just to get to the core of what is going 
off”.  
   
(Female 2nd Year Pre-Registered Student Nurse, Interview) 
 
“I don’t know why everyone picks religion when they are unwell, it is very strange 
indeed”.  
   
(Female 3rd Year Pre-Registered Student Nurse, Interview) 
 
Introduction 
The thematic analysis (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) revealed that the primary issue to 
emerge from participants’ reports of pre-registered mental health student nurses’ 
clinical placements were the  problems presented by the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
(Good and Good, 1986) evaluation dilemma. According to Good and Good (1986), 
this issue is about the challenges that practitioners face when having to determine 
“whether particular behaviours or forms of experience” are “abnormal and therefore a 
symptom of illness or simply different but normal within the patient’s own cultural 
context” (p. 11). This concern particularly arose in situations where the student nurse 
and their colleagues experienced the difficulties of differentiating psychopathology 
from normal religious beliefs, experiences and behaviours. Assessment serves as 
the focal point for mental health nursing care, planning and intervention (Ash, 1997; 
Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003), yet, assessing the significance of 
religious phenomenology was “fraught with difficulty” (Dein, 2000, p. 173).  
The ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma has been the subject of much debate 
in the related academic fields of cultural psychiatry and psychological anthropology 
for many decades (Zarrouk, 1975; Prince, 1979; 1992; Rack, 1982; Gaines, 1988; 
1995; Dein, 1997; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1997; Tobert, 2007; 2010). And a central 
concern of cultural psychiatry has been differential diagnosis and the issue of 
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religious phenomenology (Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1995; Jackson and Fulford, 1997; 
Pierre, 2001; Johnson and Friedman, 2008; Dein, 2012).     
To my knowledge, few studies (see, Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Sanderson, 
Vandenberg and Paese, 1999; Eeles, 2001; Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; 
Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003) have empirically explored the ‘normative 
uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma at the level of practitioners’ ‘multicultural clinical 
interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). In the profession of occupational therapy, Fitzgerald 
and colleagues’ (1997a) found that ‘culture’ or ‘madness’24 as they termed it, 
emerged as a primary thematic category in their qualitative study of therapists in 
Sydney, Australia. In particular, many of the occupational therapist participants 
reported having assessed beliefs and behaviours that appeared “so alien that they 
were uncertain whether or not it was a behaviour or belief that should be treated as a 
mental illness, or if it should be acknowledged as a culturally based artefact” 
(Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a, p. 65).   
Furthermore, Eeles’ (Eeles, 2000; Eeles, Lowe and Williams, 2003) qualitative 
interview study specifically examined what strategies a purposively selected sample 
of UK registered mental health nurses used to differentiate spiritual experiences from 
psychopathology. Some of Eeles’ research findings are drawn on in subsequent 
findings chapters, where I discuss how the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation 
dilemma was dealt with in mental health student nurses’ clinical placements. What is 
new and revelatory about the findings of this PhD study is that the participants were 
able to identify the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma as an important issue 
in placement settings, and could also see its ramifications for clinical practice. These 
ramifications are a particular focus of the following findings chapter.  
The latter sections of this chapter examine what participants saw as the reasons for 
this clinical dilemma. In particular, there was a perception among some of the 
student nurse participants that they lacked the culture specific knowledge to make 
informed judgements about the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma. In order 
                                                          
24
Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) used the term ‘madness’ for much the same reasons as Estroff 
(1981) gave for using the word ‘crazy’ in her ethnography: ‘Making it crazy: An ethnography of 
psychiatric clients in an American community’. They suggest that the term is not used in a diagnostic, 
sensationalistic, or pejorative way, but rather to reflect the everyday discourse of mental health 
professionals, service users, and the general public.    
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to overcome these perceived knowledge deficits, a few of the participants suggested 
that informational resources with culture specific content should be made readily 
available in placement settings. Furthermore, formal education about the ‘specific’ 
beliefs and practices of religious groups was recommended. Finally, I identify the 
pitfalls of applying culture specific knowledge to clinical issues, by drawing on the 
relevant academic literature.         
Delusions or Religious Beliefs                                                                                                                                                                    
Drawing on the work of Goodwin and Jamison (1990) and Podvoll (1987), Simon 
Dein (2004) has suggested that there is frequently an overlap between mental 
disorders and religious problems (especially in manic episodes, which may have 
mystical aspects), which makes it difficult to differentiate religious beliefs from frank 
delusions. Indeed, many of the mental health student nurse participants expressed 
uncertainty about when a service user’s religious beliefs had become pathological. 
Were the service users’ expression of beliefs delusional and therefore connected 
with their diagnosis of psychosis, or were they associated with normal religious 
thinking?        
“We had in a guy on placement who was a Jehovah’s Witness, and he was really 
involved in his church. It was hard, because as he was becoming more ill, it was 
hard to distinguish between what was part of his religion and his bipolar. I mean, 
this person had been diagnosed with bipolar. It was hard to distinguish between 
what was part of his mania, what he had sort of created for himself, and what his 
religious beliefs were before the mania. It was difficult to distinguish between those 
factors. I did not know him before his illness, but he was quite ill when I came 
across him on that placement. He was sort of incorporating....But I do not have a lot 
of knowledge either about what Jehovah Witnesses believe. But he sort of 
incorporated it, and in the end he thought he was going to be the leader of a new 
sort of.....There was going to be an end of the world, an ‘Armageddon’. And he 
believed he was going to lead everybody to a sort of new land, because he had 
been getting messages through from the newspapers that this was going to 
happen. He would also quote things from the Bible about what was going to happen 
and how he was going to be really involved in this new beginning.  
It was hard to know in this case, as he was very religious anyway, especially in the 
way he would talk and quote things from the Bible. He also had really high morals. 
But he would also quote things from the Bible when he was talking about this new 
world as well. So it was difficult to make that distinction. It was difficult to be able to 
communicate and know what he was talking about if that makes sense? All I can 
say is that it was very difficult to make that distinction between this person’s 
religious beliefs and what they were experiencing as part of a manic episode”.  
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(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
“Religion as an issue does pop up a lot for me when I am out there working in clinical 
practice. When someone with psychosis is on about hearing God, but they are also 
Christian, it is difficult to know when it is a genuine religious experience, or whether it 
is the result of chemical imbalance, or they have been smoking too much weed.  So it 
is particularly difficult when that person is already religious to ascertain wherever that 
belief is part of delusional thinking or part of a genuine religious belief. There was 
actually someone on an acute ward that I worked on who believed he had been sent 
to the ward by God. It was his mission, and he was using a lot of the lingo that you 
hear at churches, especially in the evangelical churches. And he was utterly 
convincing to the point where I am still in doubt whether he was ill or not”.  
(Male 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
The nursing educator participants reported that these concerns were often brought 
up by their students in clinical supervision sessions and lectures.  
“Yeah, the issue of communication does come up in the sessions with the students, 
and especially when the students have to respond to people who have quite bizarre 
speech and unusual ideas. And often they don’t know what to say to the client, how 
to respond, and what to believe. And it kind of fits in with what I was saying earlier 
about the problems the students have in making that determination of psychosis 
when religious beliefs are present”.      
(Nursing Educator, Interview) 
“And I think that certainly in clinical supervision when the students bring up issues 
that occurred to them while they were out there on placement. You know? They will 
say something like; ‘I’ve got this patient and I don’t know what’s going on with them. 
They keep saying this, but then they had relatives come in on to the ward and the 
relatives seem to share all these beliefs and so they can’t all be unwell’. And that 
tends to come up quite a lot in my clinical supervision sessions with the students. 
What they want is a definitive, ‘is this religion or is it part of that person’s disorder’? 
And sometimes they struggle with that grey area in between-where we don’t know. 
Maybe, it’s important as instructors, to try lots of different routes to address it”.  
(Nursing Educator, Staff Focus Group) 
These narratives brought to mind Cutcliffe and McKenna’s (2000) assertion that one 
of the fundamental skills in being a mental health nurse is to cope with constant 
ambiguity and exceptions to previous and established ways of thinking.    
A small number of the participants mentioned that it often was easier for the student 
nurse to establish psychopathology when the content of a service user’s beliefs was 
about something other than religion.    
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“The focus of last week’s lecture session was working with someone who was 
suffering from psychosis and who was perhaps experiencing unusual beliefs and 
delusions. There was a consensus in the group that it was more difficult to work with 
people who have some kind of religious belief. We were looking at a DVD-where 
someone in the programme was talking about the religious visions that they saw. 
They thought that the mother of God appeared in one of their delusions and we 
talked about that afterwards. Most of the people in the group felt that they were less 
likely to challenge those kinds of delusions with a religious content. However, I don’t 
like to use the word ‘challenge’, as it should not be about challenging beliefs, but 
about getting people to think about alternative ways of thinking about those beliefs. I 
think that students feel uncertain when working with people who have religious 
beliefs and where the content of their delusions may be based on a religious theme. 
They feel less certain in dealing with those beliefs when compared to working with 
someone who believes that they have got a computer chip in their brain, or there is a 
conspiracy to harm them. It can be difficult for students to differentiate genuine 
religious belief from a delusion”.    
(Nursing Educator, Interview) 
Trying to ascertain the ‘falsity’ of the service user’s beliefs may not get the student 
nurse very far. As Pierre (2001), and more recently Simon Dein (2012) explained, 
one cannot apply the criterion of ‘falsifiability’ to beliefs which are non-empirical and 
non-falsifiable. Dinesh Bhugra (1996) writes that the findings of anthropology is full of 
instances where similar mental/behavioural states were defined as 
psychopathological phenomena in some cultural contexts and religious experiences 
in others. A typical example is ‘glossolalia’ or ‘speaking in tongues’, which is a 
common phenomenon in Pentecostal (‘Charismatic’) types of Christianity (Grady and 
Loewenthal, 1997; Littlewood and Lipsedge, 1997). As various academics (Young, 
1967; 1976; Landy, 1983; Eisenbruch, 1990; Dein, 1997; Helman, 2000; 2007; 
Tobert, 2007; 2010) have acknowledged, many people from culturally diverse 
backgrounds will hold multiple explanatory models (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 
1978) for distress and ill health. Moreover, these models include physical and non-
physical (i.e., supernatural) causes of illness. In many cases, these explanatory 
models are fundamentally different to ‘absolutist’/’universal’ biomedical models (Offer 
and Sabshin, 1966), which assume that illness is the manifestation of organic 
disorder located within the person’s body (brain) (White and Marsella, 1982; 
Littlewood, 1990; Seeley, 2006; Marsella and Yamada, 2007).Tobert (2007, p. 5) 
observes, that the “non-physical aspects of reality are important for our re-evaluation 
of certain religious experiences, in particular those where the person experiencing or 
those near to them have either questioned the validity of the experience, or 
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considered it a symptom of a psychiatric condition”. This anthropological evidence 
calls into question existing assessment criteria for delusions, which have 
emphasised their content,  ‘bizarreness’, or ‘falsity’ in order to classify them as 
pathological (Peters, 2010).   
There also is a growing recognition that delusions are not categorical phenomena, 
but instead, exist on a continuum with ‘normal’ beliefs (Peters, Joseph and Garety, 
1999; Peters, Day, McKenna and Orbach, 1999; Peters, 2010). Moreover, the 
discontinuity model for delusions has been questioned by epidemiological research 
using standardised diagnostic instruments. These epidemiological studies found that 
10 to 28 per cent of the general non-psychiatric population experienced delusions, 
whereas the prevalence of psychoses is estimated at around 1 per cent (Eaton, 
Romanoski, Anthony and Nestadt, 1991; Kendler, Gallagher, Abelson and Kessler, 
1996; Van Os, Hansen, Bijl and Ravelli, 2001). In accordance with the continuum 
model for delusions, assessing the presence or absence of a delusion is informed by 
the careful consideration of their dimensions (Pierre, 2001; Peters, 2010). According 
to Mohr and Pfeifer (2009, p.86), none of these dimensions “is necessary or 
sufficient, but adding one to the other, result in greater likelihood of a delusion”. 
Thus, it is the degree of acceptance by the person’s religious community (which 
replaces the criterion of ‘falsifiability’) and its dimensional characteristics (conviction, 
preoccupation, negative affect [emotional distress], and extension [the impact of the 
delusion on a person’s life]), which are important considerations in assessing the 
clinical significance of religious beliefs (Pierre, 2001; Dein, 2012).    
Normative Uncertainty and the Clinical Concept of ‘Insight’    
While the clinical concept of ‘insight’ is typically used as a diagnostic criterion of 
schizophrenia (Endicott, et al., 1982) and in mental health nursing, as a key indicator 
of treatment compliance (Pinkihana, Happell, Taylor and Keks, 2002; Coombs, 
Deane, Lambert and Griffiths, 2003; Hamilton and Roper, 2006), for several of the 
student nurse participants, it seemed more to raise the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma.     
“I remember that when I was working out on community placement there was this 
African lady patient who believed that the voices she was hearing was connected to 
her religious beliefs. She thought that was perfectly acceptable for her to believe, but 
in this culture, it is not acceptable to believe that. Rather, these voices and beliefs are 
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connected to an illness such as psychosis. And she had to have depo injections for 
what was diagnosed as schizophrenia. She did not want to have those injections, as I 
think that from her perspective-psychiatric medicine was unacceptable. Rather, she 
believed that what she was experiencing had a spiritual basis. That seemed to be her 
cultural worldview if you like.    
From my perspective, I felt very torn about that and I felt very uncomfortable about 
getting involved with that. She was eventually taken back into hospital, and it was 
very upsetting to hear that. She talked to herself a lot and she would come in to have 
the depo injection, but she thought she was losing her soul when she was having the 
injection. She thought that what she was experiencing in terms of her distress was 
connected to this soul loss. She felt the mental health team were not listening to her 
about her concerns, and were taking her spiritual beliefs away from her. They were 
denying the reality of her spiritual beliefs and putting it down to a lack of insight. I 
don’t think it was in her belief system to have Westernised medicine, and I felt that 
was enforced on her whether she liked it or not.  I did not feel there was any attempt 
to understand this lady’s cultural beliefs. I am not saying that she was not ill, as 
obviously, when you look at it from the vantage point of this society and psychiatry, 
those beliefs and the symptoms of speaking to yourself and hearing voices are 
indicative of a psychosis. So in that situation, I think it is very difficult to interpret 
whether it is down to cultural beliefs or a psychosis. And in the culture of mental 
health services, the fact that she believed she was suffering from ‘soul loss’, means 
that this lady does not have insight into her illness. But I think everything was just 
passed on as part of her illness”.     
(Male 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
“I am actually working with a lady client of Lebanese origin on an older adult 
assessment ward. She has had acute psychosis, delusions, and she is still 
responding to auditory and visual hallucinations. She does not believe she is poorly. 
Rather, she thinks about her condition in a godly sense. And what she has told me 
and from some of the evidence I have read, that it is acceptable within her culture to 
hear voices and experiences and these types of hallucinations. It is seen as a gift 
that is given to them. It is currently a struggle, as she is on a Section 3. She is very 
upset, as she does not want to be having these depo injections anymore. It is 
difficult, as she has been assessed that she has no insight into her illness. It seems 
like the sensible thing to do is to treat her, because we have got a lady who from 
previous history is known that if she does come off these injections, she is going to 
be acutely psychotic. The doctor is saying that she has got no insight, but she does, 
because it is her beliefs. There are patients out there who of course do not have 
insight, and once they are well, they will look back and think I was really poorly. 
There are some patients who will never accept they are ill, because that is not their 
background and that is not their beliefs. So it is our beliefs and our judgements that 
we do put upon some of our patients.     
This lady does talk to me about where she is from and her community, and she was 
telling me about a relative of hers. I believe it was her nephew and he had visual and 
auditory hallucinations. And in her community in Lebanon, it was seen like a gift from 
the spirit world. It was given to them by the spirit world to approach other people and 
to talk about things they would not normally be able to talk about. They were like 
messages to other people in the community. It is a hard one, as it is about our beliefs 
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and what we feel is right for the individual, which depending on their history and 
background, may not be the right thing to do. I think that it is a futile attempt really to 
get her to agree with it. It is something that she believes in so strongly”.   
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
These narratives bring to mind cultural critiques of the clinical concept of ‘insight’ 
(Lazare, 1989; Littlewood, 1990; Perkins and Moodley, 1993; Johnson and Orrell, 
1995; 1996; Beck-Sander, 1998; David, 1998; McGorry and McConville, 1999; 
Saravanan, et al., 2004; 2005; 2007a; Hamilton and Roper, 2006; Lipsedge, 2007; 
Fernando, 2010; Jacob, 2010). In particular, how its assessment can alternatively be 
viewed as a judgement about the discrepancy of the service user’s explanatory 
models (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978) with that of the biomedical model. 
Thus, the assessment of insight can be a form of control and a way of dismissing the 
(‘emic’) perspective of the service user who resists the biomedical interpretation of 
their illness and help-seeking strategies (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002).     
Research evidence also suggests that in some cases, service users will try to protect 
themselves from the stigma of mental illness by denying its existence (Kennard, 
1979; Lally, 1989; McGorry, 1992; Johnson and Orrell, 1995; Hsu, 1999; Hudelson, 
2005; 2006; Perron and Hudelson, 2006). As Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran (2002) 
argue, a person may deny that they are ill not as a consequence of the illness, but as 
a conscious effort at self-protection. Similarly, Johnson and Orrell (1996, p. 1084) 
note that a lack of insight could be “a way of coping where the patient finds the 
implications of a diagnosis of mental illness or the prospect of treatment very 
unacceptable”. These issues particularly are salient for marginalised cultural groups 
who have justified concerns about psychiatric medicine and the sorts of interventions 
it offers (Fernando, 1988; 1998; 2002; 2009; 2010; Bhugra and Bahl, 1999; Bhui, 
2002; Ndegwa and Olajide, 2003; Sewell, 2009). Resisting interpretations and 
diagnostic labels may even be seen as important statements (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and 
Curran, 2002). Saravanan et al. (2004; 2005) have responded to such criticisms of 
the clinical concept of insight, by recommending that cultural perspectives be taken 
into account in assessment. In particular, they encourage practitioners to bring the 
evaluation of insight in line with the DSM-IV’s (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) guidelines on the cultural assessment of delusions.        
Religious Experience or Psychotic Hallucination 
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The participants also described the problems with differentiating psychotic induced 
hallucinations from religious experiences, although this issue was mentioned a lot 
less than the reported difficulties with assessing the clinical significance of religious 
beliefs. For the participants who mentioned this issue, the question posed was about 
whether the auditory, tactile, or visual phenomena experienced by the service user 
was an indication of a genuine experience that was congruent with the person’s 
religious background, or was it suggestive of psychotic induced hallucinations?         
Hearing voices has been classified in psychiatric nosological criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) as a classical feature of schizophrenia. However, in 
the next ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) story, the student nurse participant 
recalled the dilemmas she had encountered when determining the clinical 
significance of such phenomenology.  
“I guess she must have been admitted somewhere else, and they then sent her to 
our ward. In her notes, it said that she saw this figure that she had a name for. She 
described the figure as a black man and she had a name for it, but it did not seem to 
be someone whom she knew. Sometimes, it was a negative experience and then at 
other times, it was a positive experience. When it was a positive experience, the 
figure was guiding and helping her. But sometimes, it seemed to be more frightening 
for her. It was mentioned by some of the staff on the ward that her description of the 
figure seemed to fit a support worker who was a tall black guy. And there seemed to 
be some people who were making a link between this support worker and the figure 
that she was seeing. But I was not personally convinced by that explanation. Anyway, 
she described seeing a figure and hearing his voice. She was also experiencing 
other voices too. When we asked her what the voices were like and what they were 
telling her, it did seem to fit with a religious experience. This seemed to be the case, 
as the voices were telling her about what she should be doing, how she should live 
her life, and what sort of person she should be. But then I guess you could get the 
same kind of answer from someone who is experiencing psychosis. So I do not know 
what to think in that case”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
The accurate assessment of hallucinatory phenomena is said to be pivotal for 
culturally diverse service users, as in certain cultural contexts, hearing voices when 
no one is there and seeing images of dead relatives can be related to cultural 
expectations and religious beliefs (Guarnaccia, et al., 1992; Guarnaccia and 
Rodriguez, 1996; Loewenthal, 2007). Zandi (2013) draws on the research findings 
of AI-Issa (2000) and Alsughayir (1996) to explain that hearing voices is “a key 
presenting symptom of emotional problems, which sometimes is perceived to be 
related to supernatural events” (p. 220).   
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It has been proposed that perceptual experience lies on a continuum (Wiebe, 2004) 
and ‘hallucinatoriness’ occurs in degrees (Dein, 2012). Van Gemert (1998) has 
suggested that when experienced as occurring from inside the head, the hearing of 
voices can be a normal experience of thought, and this suggestion is backed up by 
a growing evidence base, which shows that hearing voices occurs among the 
general non-psychiatric population (Romme and Escher, 1989; Tien, 1991; Poulton, 
et al., 2000; Van Os, Hansen, Bijl and Ravelli, 2000; Johns, Nazroo, Bebbington 
and Kuipers, 2002). Another epidemiological study (Bell, Halligan and Ellis, 2006) 
found that when considering hallucinations in the domains of taste, sound, sight, 
touch, and smell, an estimated 11 per cent of the general population scored above 
that reported with psychotic inpatients.  
Thus, the differentiation of religious phenomenology from the positive symptoms of 
psychotic illness is important to the assessment process (Zarrouk, 1975; Al-Issa, 
1977; Rack, 1982). Hallucinations with religious themes are not amenable to 
empirical corroboration; therefore, Dein (2012) recommends that their clinical 
relevance should be assessed by using similar multidimensional criteria to 
delusions with religious content. That is, they should be assessed for their impacts 
on functioning, the distress associated with them, and whether they are validated by 
members from the service user’s local context and community.    
A Three Way Dilemma 
A few of the critical incidents raised by the student nurse participants posed a slightly 
different question in regard to the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good 
and Good, 1986). In fact, these participants mentioned a three way dilemma that they 
had encountered in clinical placement. The question that was raised here was not 
just about whether the service user’s behaviour was religiously motivated or was a 
product of psychopathology, but whether the service user was being a ‘difficult 
patient’(Lau, 1988; Miller, 1990; Stein, 1990; Lupton, 1994; Duxbury, 2000).     
In the next narrative, the student nurse participant talked about the difficulties she 
had with making an informed interpretation of what seemed to be non-compliant 
behaviour. The question posed by this student nurse was not just about whether the 
non-compliance could be explained by psychopathological factors or the service 
user’s religious background, but whether it was actually a conscious ‘act of 
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withdrawal’ (Duxbury, 2000). According to Miller (1990), an ‘act of withdrawal’ is the 
refusal to interact or to cooperate due to disinterest, denial, fear, protest, or for some 
other reason.      
“So it came around to doing these physical observations with this Muslim gentleman. 
He told me that he could not do it on religious grounds, as it was against his religion 
for a woman to touch him. I said to him that ‘it would really help if we weighed you’, 
but he did not want to have anything to do with it. I said to him; ‘would it help if I 
could get a gentleman to do the readings with you? I can arrange that for you if you 
wanted me to’? So I said to him; ‘I would like you to please get on the scales and I 
will not make any contact at all, and you can take the measurements for me’. He did 
not want this bloke (nurse) to do it either. He did not want me or any other female to 
do it, but he did not want this bloke to do it either. In fact, he did not want anyone to 
go near him. 
The thing is, in the past he had sort of agreed. In a way, the staff thought he was 
being a bit......I don’t know? I wonder whether in that case it was to do with culture, 
as he was saying it was against his religion and culture to allow anyone to touch him 
or be near him, or if he was just being difficult. I feel difficult saying that, as he had 
these physical observations in the past, but he was also renowned for being difficult. 
I was there for three months and not once did he have the readings taken. But it 
leaves you in a situation where you think, well how many times do I ask and should I 
be really asking? He said it was against his religion and I tried to accommodate it; 
either for him to do it, or for this guy to do it. But he still did not want to be part of it. 
So in the end the physical observations got left.  
I think he had the physical observations done about six months ago or something. 
And this is why I did not know if he was being difficult, or if it was for a genuine 
reason. Every time I turned over the page, I could see a couple of more instances, 
but on this occasion I had to put down ‘refused’. To be honest, in that case I did not 
know which it was. I mean, he could have been just difficult, and on the few 
occasions when he had done it in previous months, he might have just done it off the 
cuff and not thought about his religion. But certainly, it provoked a question in my 
mind, about which was that?            
And the second thing was in relation to interrupting him when he was listening to his 
music, which was part of his religion and also was used to block out the voices he 
was hearing in his head. However, at some point you do need to talk to people. I 
don’t want to sound bad, but it seemed as if he was using that as a reason for 
everything. And I am sure that there was a genuine reason behind some things, but 
we had quite a lot of people on there that had quite severe mental illnesses and he 
was quite paranoid as well. But it felt to me that he used it as a reason; like off the 
cuff, he would say ‘leave me alone’, and ‘I do not want to talk about it anymore’. I 
think it was difficult in that situation, as there was a problem in determining whether 
this behaviour was part of his illness or part of his religion. Or was he just being 
difficult? But because you very much want to accommodate all cultural preferences 
and consider equal opportunities, you do not want to judge that either way”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
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According to Duxbury (2000), the concept of ‘difficult patient’ means different things 
to different people, and nurses may not always identify the same difficult patient on 
their wards, units, or caseloads. Nurses can have models of ‘difficult’ patients 
(Lupton, 1993), or an “unofficial, moralistic taxonomy of types of patients” (Stein, 
1990, p. 98), which exerts an influence on the way that service users are treated in 
care settings. ‘Difficult patients’ often have been identified as persons presenting 
behaviours which create barriers to effective nursing care (Duxbury, 2000), and who 
make nurses feel frustrated, uncomfortable, or ineffective (Miller, 1990).                                                                                                                                      
‘Normative Uncertainty’ and Culture Specific Knowledge                                                                                                                                                  
There was a perception among some of the student nurse participants that they 
lacked the culture specific knowledge25 to respond effectively to the ‘normative 
uncertainty’ (Good and Good, 1986) evaluation dilemma. These participants 
mentioned that it was often difficult to assess the clinical significance of religious 
phenomenology when one was unfamiliar with the normal range of religious beliefs 
and practices that existed in a service user’s culture. This concern was brought up by 
participants in both the ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic 
interviews (Spradley, 1979) and the focus group sessions.  
“As I said before, it was hard to tell if they were actually religious references. Maybe, 
if I had more knowledge about the Koran I may have recognised some of those 
religious references. It was difficult in that case without some kind of knowledge to 
determine whether that was something related to what was said in the Koran, or was 
it just an expression of her psychosis, or was it even a bit of both? Were we just 
dismissing her concerns, assuming things were due to her psychosis, and ignoring a 
genuine religious need? And in her mind, she might have thought that I am trying to 
tell you about something really important and you think I am talking about fairies. And 
in that case you just did not know and you could not really have known. Maybe, if I 
had read the Koran right through, I might have done. I remember one of my lecturers 
saying to the class that ‘if you ever want to deal with mental health, you need to read 
the Bible’”.  
(Male 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
                                                          
25
In the context of the health and nursing sciences, ‘cultural knowledge’ involves obtaining information 
about the worldviews of different cultures (Campinha-Bacote, 1999). According to McPhatter and 
Ganaway (2003), cultural knowledge may allow the practitioner “to enter the world of culturally 
different clients in a manner that understands and preserves the legitimacy of the culture and 
effectively meets their needs” (p. 107). ‘Culture specific knowledge’ in particular, is associated with 
the ability to act competently within the context of a cultural group (Fitzgerald, 2000). Practitioners 
require a detailed knowledge of the specific cultural backgrounds of their service users in order to 
achieve this level of cultural competency (Harris, 2004; Suh, 2004).   
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“I found it really difficult to assess when the patient’s culture was alien to me. I didn’t 
really know anything about Sikhism, even though I do know a little bit more about 
Sikhism now. But it is something that I do not really know much about. So in those 
types of situations, I couldn’t really differentiate between what are normal beliefs of 
the religion and what are delusional beliefs that are part of an illness”.    
(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
According to another student nurse, the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma 
occurred with service users who held very different religious worldviews to their own.      
“I find it more difficult to differentiate a genuine religious belief from a delusional belief 
when it involves somebody who holds different religious beliefs to my own. This is 
because I am not fully aware of what their God says or what their teachings are. So it 
is harder to differentiate between a psychosis and a genuine religious belief when it 
is to do with another religion. It is not so hard to do with Islam, as that belief system is 
very similar to the Judeo and Christian kinds of traditions. But when it is to do with 
other faiths, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, you are dealing with that existential 
oneness which I am becoming more aware of through the experience of working with 
patients with those sorts of beliefs. But for me it is still harder to relate to. I would not 
be able to say with confidence that is an illness or that is an expression of a religious 
belief”.   
(Male 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
Academics in the related fields of cultural psychiatry and clinical anthropology also 
have noted the difficulties with making a differential diagnosis where the practitioner 
is unaware of the range of normal beliefs, experiences and practices in the service 
user’s culture (Westermeyer, 1987; 1993; Levy, 1996; Dein, 2000; Paniagua, 2001; 
2005). For example, Paniagua (2005) suggests that practitioners unfamiliar with the 
Hispanic cultural belief system of ‘spiritual faculties’ (which from the perspective of 
believers enables one to communicate with entities that live in an invisible world) are 
more likely to interpret such reports as signs of severe psychopathology. As 
Guarnaccia and colleagues’ (1992) explain, specific symptoms may have particular 
cultural meanings which can present challenges to the assessment process; and 
without some cultural knowledge of the service user’s experiences, and questions 
that tap these dimensions, accurate assessment using standard psychiatric nosology 
is difficult to make. Practitioners need to be at least aware of the religious issues that 
they are likely to encounter in clinical practice and assessment, and may require 
additional education about the major teachings of religious groups (Dein, 2000).      
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In some cases, the student nurse participant mentioned that they had made a 
determined effort to research the religious backgrounds of their service users. These 
attempts at self-education however, were not always successful.  
“I was looking for information on the internet with the other nurses to inform our 
judgement about whether that patient’s beliefs were a product of a psychosis or a 
product of his culture. However, it is difficult to know what is useful on the internet. 
You do not know what is appropriate or what to look at on the internet”.   
(Female 3nd Year Student, Interview) 
“In the case of the woman patient with the new age beliefs, who am I to say that her 
practices do not exist and don’t actually have any bearing on what is happening. I 
guess there is also something about an Englishman that he retreats from something 
he does not know about. I am guilty of that as anyone else I guess. I mean, I did not 
understand this lady’s beliefs, so I did some self research in an effort to understand 
them. But even after I researched the topic, it still perplexed me somewhat. I still had 
no idea what this lady’s new age beliefs were about”. 
(Male 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
Considering these problems with locating relevant culture specific information, a few 
of the student nurse participants suggested that informational resources with such 
content should be made readily available for students to use in clinical placement. It 
was felt that these informational sources would enable student nurses to make more 
informed judgements in regard to the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma.      
“It would have been easier to establish trust with this patient if we had some kind of 
resource. It would have been better if we had more information about him as an 
individual as well. It took a while to get access to his older notes. So at first we were 
going in pretty blind really. We eventually found more about his previous beliefs and 
his mother’s beliefs from his notes. When we spoke to him, he did not offer any 
information about these beliefs. However, it was obvious that they had a massive 
impact on his life. So a resource would have been helpful. We had some basic 
training on the nursing course. We were recommended a book which contained 
information about different cultures. However, I have not seen such books during 
clinical placement. I think it is important to have those kinds of books made 
accessible on the ward, as there is a very fine line between being very religious and 
being mentally ill”.   
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
Male Student 1: “I think it would be good to have some actual resources on the 
wards that you could refer to. That is really important when those assessment issues 
we talked about emerge”. 
Male Student 2: “Like a handbook or just a basic outline”. 
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Male Student 1: “You don’t even need to go into too much detail. Just like this is a 
Jehovah’s Witness and this is the key tenets of their beliefs. And then if they are 
saying something different to that you may think, well that is maybe more on the 
delusional side. You know? It does not appear to be conforming to the typical 
Jehovah’s Witness belief system”. 
Male Student 2: “Yes, yes, exactly”. 
Male Student 1: “And so a reference system on the wards might help with that”.   
(Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
Formal education about the beliefs and practices of religious groups was also 
recommended by a few of the participants.      
“We had some sessions at University about spirituality and cultural diversity. In those 
sessions, we have talked about the fact that spirituality is a big part of a person’s 
wellbeing in general. So we need to take that into account when thinking about a 
person’s care. But I would not say we have received any specific practical skills for 
dealing with people from different religious backgrounds. Like for example, what 
would you do if somebody was talking about an experience they had and how would 
you assess that? We have just been given starting points for thinking about that sort 
of stuff. So yeah, they were interesting sessions, but I do not think it necessarily 
prepared you for demanding situations such as assessments”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
“I think we should have some more lessons on religion, as it has been a topic that 
has been a bit neglected in our studies. I think I would like to know something about 
every major religion, as you can then talk about it with someone and learn from their 
experience. I mean you do not know the Bible or the Koran back to back, but you are 
able to start a conversation about it, so you can discuss it with them. That is 
comforting for someone who is religious, as it is such a big part of their lives. It is 
also important when it comes to our assessments. Because sometimes, I would like 
to back up what they have said about their beliefs or maybe challenge it”.   
  (Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
These requests for more culture specific knowledge brought to mind the ‘fact file’ or 
‘cookbook’ approach to cultural competence (Culley, 1996; 2000; 2001; 2006; 
Gunaratnam, 1997; 2001; 2004; 2007; Fitzgerald, 2000; Galanti, 2001; 2005; 2006; 
2008; Taylor, 2003a; b; 2010; Dein, 2006a; Lee and Farrell, 2006; Galanti and 
Sheikh, 2009; Joralemon, 2009; Carpenter-Song, 2011).In this approach, a 
description is given of the supposed core beliefs, customs, and practices of a cultural 
group. A textbook by Purnell and Paulanka (1998) for example, offered structured 
overviews of 16 ethnic groups, with sections on specified domains of culture.  
147 
 
It may be the case that culture specific information and education will help student 
nurses to respond effectively to the challenges of the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma. Such knowledge may provide the student nurse with a useful 
‘starting point’ (Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002) and thus, to anticipate potentially 
relevant issues. Writing in a similar vein, the nursing anthropologist Galanti (2008) 
suggests that if culture specific knowledge is used as a ‘guide post’ rather than as a 
precise ‘blueprint’, it ideally will assist the practitioner to anticipate possibilities that 
should be considered, and make sense of phenomena that have already occurred. 
However, as a starting point, further information is needed to “ascertain whether the 
statement is appropriate to a particular individual” (Galanti, 2008, p. 7).  
Significant problems can emerge where no effort is made to learn “whether the 
individual in question fits the statement” (Galanti, 2008, p. 7). One result is that one 
size fits all mobilisations of culture lack relevance for service users as well as 
practitioners (Shaw, 2005). As Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a, p. 94) explain, if 
the practitioner assumes:  
“That because this person is from a particular culture and their speech contains 
reference to something considered symbolic in that language and then assumes the 
person is speaking symbolically, but they are having hallucinations, the end result 
can be just as serious as if the story went the other way around”.  
The vital point to consider when applying culture specific information to the   
‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma is that one cannot just assume a service 
user is drawing upon symbolic language and/or behaviour (Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a).  
Indeed, it is important for student nurses to recognise that all phenomena and 
interpretations of phenomena are culturally constituted, and this is no less the case 
for illness experiences (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a). Clinical anthropologists for a long 
time now have argued that the manifestation of psychopathology cannot be 
separated from cultural theories about illness and premises about social behaviour 
more generally (White and Marsella, 1982; Dein, 1997; Jenkins and Barrett, 2003; 
Helman, 2007; Watters, 2011). As Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a, p. 95) note, 
the “way we think about such illnesses, communicate about them, behave in 
conjunction with them, and interpret such thoughts and behaviours are all mediated 
by symbolic forms of, and from, language and culture”.  
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According to Weinstein (1962), a person suffering from mental illness will often 
employ the dominant symbolic system for their cultural group. However, they are 
likely to do so in a manner that seems inconvenient and clumsy to others. In the 
case of schizophrenia, Jenkins and Barrett (2003, p. 6-7) have described the general 
state of affairs as thus: 
“In sum, what we know about culture and schizophrenia is... (that) culture is critical 
in nearly every aspect of schizophrenic illness experience: the identification, 
definition and meaning of the illness during the primordial, acute, and residual 
phases; the timing and type of onset; symptom formation in terms of content, form 
and constellation; clinical diagnosis; gender and ethnic differences; the personal 
experience of schizophrenic illness; social response, support, and stigma; and 
perhaps most important, the course and outcome with respect to symptomatology, 
work, and social functioning”. 
This reinforces the important point made earlier, that the student nurse, must not 
just assume (based on culture specific information alone) that the service user is 
using symbolic language or behaviour (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a).The student nurse 
needs to be aware that culture influences the use of language and symbolism and it 
influences how symptoms are manifested and expressed (Nichter, 1981). To use 
Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) insightful reference to Bock’s (1980, p. 38) 
interpretation of a statement made by Sigmund Freud; “things are seldom what they 
seem to be”.     
When expectations are disconfirmed (Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie and Yong, 1986; 
Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1994a; b; Mullavey-O’Byrne and Fitzgerald, 1995), it “can lead to 
a sense of cultural dissonance and dissatisfaction and a lack of ability to deconstruct 
or interpret the situation in a way that leads to satisfying solutions and strategies for 
care” (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 186). I have discussed in the literature review, how 
‘disconfirmed expectancies’ are often the basis for the kinds of ‘critical incidents’ that 
arise for practitioners in ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992). These 
issues are more likely to occur, where student nurses have to juggle the competing 
demands of manageralism, time constraints, and person-centred care (Fortune, 
2002; Fortune and Fitzgerald, 2009). As one nursing educator succinctly described 
it: 
“They (mental health student nurses) were only on the placement for a limited 
amount of time and there were things that they needed to do in order to achieve their 
competencies. One was to fit in with the staff team and another was to get to know 
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the clients as quickly as possible. So they would end up short cutting the theoretical 
nursing process as fast as they could. So they were up and running very quickly. 
They would try to do this to an unnatural level really. It can take time to get to 
understand a patient properly. I mean, it can take some time to build the therapeutic 
relationship with the person. However, in the placement environment, there is 
sometimes an implicit expectation, that in order to demonstrate competence, they 
have got to be seen to be rolling their sleeves up and doing it. Spending time with 
patients may not be a priority in such a context”.    
(Nursing Educator, Interview) 
Add to this mix, the additional barrier of language discordance (Sobo and Seid, 
2003; Sobo, 2004; Sobo and Loustaunau, 2010) between the student nurse and 
service user, then it may not be hard to envisage the attractiveness of the idea that 
culture can be reduced to a ‘technical skill’ (Good, 1995b). That is, a series of ‘do’s’ 
and ‘don’ts’ that define how to treat a person of a ‘given’ cultural background 
(Betancourt, 2004), and for which practitioners can be trained to develop ‘expertise’ 
in (Kleinman and Benson, 2006).    
This ‘fact file’ approach is related to the concept of ‘culture specific competency’ 
(Fitzgerald, 2000). According to Fitzgerald (2000, p.185), this concept is concerned 
with:      
“The ability ‘to participate in the everyday web of social relationships, even if at a 
limited or reduced level’ (Marshall, 1996, p. 250). It means ‘possessing a social 
intelligence inside and being able to express or communicate that intelligence in 
meaningful ways’ (Marshall, 1996, p. 252), and ‘having sufficient cultural knowledge, 
reasonable mental blueprints for culturally appropriate behaviour’ (Clement, 1982, p. 
195), to pass (Goffman, 1959; 1963) ‘as an insider, as a real fictive member of a 
particular cultural group’ (Fitzgerald, 2000, p. 186). In this sense of the term, cultural 
competency is more in line with the way it is used in ethnoscience and, therefore, 
‘culturally patterned behaviour and artefacts are but epiphenomena of this 
competence’ (Clement, 1982, p. 194).    
To have insufficient cultural knowledge or to be unable to express that one 
possesses such knowledge is to be culturally incompetent and situates the person 
as an outsider, an impaired or disabled person, or even as a non-person (e.g., 
Armstrong and Fitzgerald, 1996; Fitzgerald and Armstrong, 1993; Ingstad and 
Whyte, 1995; Marsella and White, 1982-4; Marshall, 1996).To be viewed as 
culturally incompetent or even to believe that one is viewed as culturally incompetent 
(Fitzgerald, 1995; Fitzgerald and Paterson, 1995), can have a profound effect on a 
person’s concept of self and their behaviour. In mental health, culture specific 
competency is more often related to evaluations of a person’s mental status, by 
oneself or others, to determine whether or not a person is mentally ill or 
incompetent”. 
150 
 
To obtain this type of cultural competency requires an extensive period of 
socialisation, which few practitioners will have the time, skills, or opportunities to 
develop (Fitzgerald, 2000). Furthermore, student nurses are rarely assigned to 
monocultural or even bicultural placement settings, and therefore need to be able to 
work with service users from very diverse cultures and the diversity that presents 
itself within each cultural group. Thus, an exclusive focus on attaining culture specific 
knowledge will have “limited utility in most modern health care contexts” (Fitzgerald, 
2000, p. 186). Such calls for ‘fact file’ (Gunaratnam, 2008) type knowledge, highlight 
a lack of understanding of contemporary anthropological conceptualisations of 
culture (Sobo, 2009), or at best, a restrictive understanding of culture as a materialist 
concept (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995).                                                                                                                                                                                
Summary 
The primary issue to emerge from participants’ accounts  of  pre-registered mental 
health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992), were the  
difficulties with distinguishing psychopathology from religious experiences, beliefs, 
and practices. This issue was related to the clinical anthropological concept of the 
‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986). Determining the 
‘falsity’ of hallucinations and delusions with religious content may prove to be a 
fruitless effort, as these phenomena are super-empirical and non-falsifiable. Rather, 
they should be viewed as existing on a continuum (Peters, Joseph and Garety, 1999; 
Peters, Day, McKenna and Orbach, 1999; Wiebe, 2004; Peters, 2010) and their 
clinical relevance needs to be assessed on a multidimensional basis (Pierre, 2001; 
Mohr and Pfeifer, 2009; Dein, 2012). Several of the participants situated the clinical 
concept of insight in the context of the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma. 
While ‘insight’ is typically used as a diagnostic criterion of schizophrenia (Endicott, et 
al., 1982), the student nurse participants’ narratives brought to mind the cultural 
critiques of this assessment measure. 
Some of the participants felt that these assessment dilemmas were a consequence 
of their lack of cultural knowledge. In particular, it was difficult to evaluate the 
significance of religious phenomenology when the student nurse participant was 
unfamiliar with the range of normal religious beliefs and behaviours which existed in 
the service user’s culture. Mental health practitioners need at least to be made 
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aware of the kinds of religious issues that they are likely to encounter in practice, and 
also may require additional education about major religious teachings (Dein, 2004; 
2010a).         
Culture specific knowledge when presented in the form of ‘fact files’ (Gunaratnam, 
1997; 2001; 2004; 2007) can privilege and separate cultural processes from 
individual and subjective experience (Dein, 2006a). How people respond to illness is 
marked by intra-cultural and inter-cultural variation (Lambert and Sevak, 1996). A 
cultural deterministic application of ‘factfiles’ in decision making around the 
‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma may lead to the type of clinical 
assessment errors (Tseng and McDermott, 1981; Stein, 1985; Minas, 1990; 
Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003; 
Stolk, 2009) documented in the following findings chapter. However, if cultural 
knowledge is used as an informative ‘guide post’ rather than as a culturally specific 
‘blueprint’, it may help the student nurse to anticipate possibilities that should be 
considered, and make sense of phenomena that have already occurred (Galanti, 
2008).   
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Chapter 6 
Clinical Evaluation Errors and the Decontextualisation of 
the Service User’s Experience 
Introduction 
In this findings chapter, I will focus on participants’ reports about the assessment 
errors associated with the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and 
Good, 1986). Most of these ‘critical incidents’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) were about how  
culturally validated phenomenology was misinterpreted and/or reified as pathological 
phenomena, although other types of assessment errors were also documented. A 
core theme which linked these reported errors was the inability by some of the 
mental health staff in placement settings to assess service users’ experiences in 
their local context. That is, practitioners appeared to be guided by a ‘culture blind’ 
approach (Fernando, 2002; 2010). 
In the minds of the participants, the decontextualisation of service users’ experiences 
was explained by poor standards of care, the cultural ideology of the placement 
setting, and the political economy of care. When discussing the cultural ideology of 
the placement setting, participants described instances where (usually religious) 
phenomenology which did not fit the clinical template of psychiatric medicine was 
either ignored or pathologised. The political economy of care was reflected in 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) where there was language 
discordance (Sobo and Seid, 2003; Sobo, 2004; Sobo and Loustaunau, 2010) 
between nursing staff and the service user, and the cost and rationing of 
professional interpreter services led staff to avoid interactions with non-English 
speaking service users and to base their assessments on clinical observation alone. 
Thus, I reach a similar conclusion to Carpenter-Song (2011), who recently suggested 
that often it remains “the case that much of what mediates experiences and 
outcomes of health care falls outside of the dyadic interactions of patients and 
clinicians” (p. 180). Under such operative conditions, assessment errors and the 
decontextualisation of service users’ experiences had negative impacts on the 
standard of care and the appropriateness of psychiatric treatment.   
The Clinical Implications of Assessment Errors 
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The problems presented by the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good 
and Good, 1986) can have important clinical implications (Tseng and McDermott, 
1981; Stein, 1985; Westermeyer, 1987; Minas, 1990; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, 
Twible and Kinebanian,1995;Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 
1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 
2003; Vega, et al., 2006; Stolk, 2009), in that the failure to appreciate the role of 
culture on the expression of distress may result in one of the following six 
assessment errors.  
 Assessing cultural variations in phenomenology as psychopathology 
(Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, 
Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997). Although the experience 
is evaluated as being ‘abnormal’ by an outsider, it is seen as being ‘normal’ in 
its local context (Tseng and McDermott, 1981). 
 Assessing the signs and symptoms of psychopathology as cultural differences 
(Stein, 1985). Although the experience is regarded as ‘abnormal’ in its local 
context, it is viewed as being ‘normal’ by an outsider (Tseng and McDermott, 
1981). 
 The nature of psychopathology is misdiagnosed (Minas, 1990; Stolk, 2009).  
 The severity of psychopathology is underestimated or overestimated (Minas, 
1990; Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003).   
 There is a failure “to appreciate the significance of psychopathology to the 
patient and the patient’s family” (Minas, 1990, p. 276).    
 There is a failure “to detect psychopathology” (Minas, 1990, p. 276).  
The majority of participants’ ‘critical incident’ narratives that were about these kinds of 
assessment errors, focused on how culturally accepted phenomenology was 
misinterpreted as evidence of psychopathology. However, in the following short story, 
the student nurse participant talks about how culture, or more specifically religion, 
can be what Stein (1985) described as a ‘red herring’ in clinical decision making and 
assessment. The cultural and religious background of the service user may exert a 
‘patho-plastic’ effect on the manifestation of the illness (Tseng, 1997; 2001; 2003; 
Tseng and Streltzer, 2008).This leads to the danger of assuming it is a cultural issue, 
when in fact, it is an issue of psychopathology (Dein and Lipsedge, 1998).      
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“It is hard to see where the illness comes in and the cultural...Because things that I 
may find a bit strange....maybe, just be normal for a different culture, whereas, it 
could be their illness. So it could mean that you can miss the illness, because the 
patient’s religion can confuse the illness somewhat. So a patient’s expression of 
religious beliefs may be misleading in certain cases and could confuse the picture 
about their illness”. 
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
To put the central theme of this narrative another way; “while culture is an important 
part of all clinical interactions, it is only one possible explanation of problems and 
dissatisfactions” (Fitzgerald, 1992, p. 6-7).  
As is evident in the next narrative, cultural idioms of distress (Nichter, 1981) may 
confuse and complicate nursing assessments, leading to possible misdiagnosis and 
the wrong pharmacological treatment. 
“It was certainly a bigger issue where I used to work down in London. It was a bigger 
issue there as the client population was so diverse. We used to work with a lot of 
service users who were asylum seekers. Many of them were completely culturally 
dislocated and the undergrad students would find that very hard to get their heads 
around. I think they struggle when trying to understand the different cultural 
experiences and different manifestations of distress that they encounter during their 
clinical placements. I can think of an example of that when the students were working 
with Sri Lankan clients who were experiencing ‘Koro syndrome’. In the case of ‘Koro 
syndrome’, the sufferer believes that their penis is shrinking back into their bodies. 
Anyway, the students would really struggle with that. They were uncertain about how 
they should deal with that or how that should be assessed. They could not really 
understand why it was not a psychotic disorder, because they felt it was very much in 
line with psychosis. So everyone was saying; ‘well that’s delusional; he’s obviously 
psychotic’. So trying to explain to the students that ‘Koro syndrome’ was actually a 
cultural manifestation of loss and depression for Sri Lankan men was quite difficult.     
And that was a really interesting case, because the only reason it came to light in this 
day and age where you do not have the time to research every single case and 
symptom, was that we had a psychiatrist who was from Sri Lanka. So he translated 
for us when we were interviewing the patient. And some of the students had been 
helping to look after this guy for a few weeks. He was being treated at the time with 
anti-psychotic medication, as it appeared from his symptomatology that he had a 
presentation of psychosis. He was on a very high dose of olanzapine. However, the 
psychiatrist said to us that ‘you have interpreted it completely wrong’. So once he had 
re-diagnosed the illness, the treatment changed. The psychiatrist had said that the 
anti-psychotics would not help this person and that we should try treating him with 
anti-depressants. The gentleman in question then did get better and I think we had a 
much fuller understanding of the patient’s condition”.    
(Nursing Educator, Interview) 
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The data seemed to reveal a couple of related reasons for these assessment errors, 
all of which are covered in this findings chapter. However, the core theme which 
linked all these factors was the inability by some staff in student nurses’ placements 
to consider phenomenology in its local context. The imposition of ‘etic’ (Skultans and 
Cox, 2000) categories of ‘disease’ without due appreciation of ‘emic’ and ‘illness’ 
(Eisenberg, 1977) perspectives, was a feature of many narratives. Although a few of 
the student nurses accepted that reductionist practice was an inevitable product of 
the professional or ward culture and/or political economy of care, most of the 
students desired a more person-centred style of care.      
In terms of a prevailing professional culture, it was frequently suggested by the 
participants, that where the experience of the service user did not fit the clinical 
template, it was ignored or pathologised. This issue was raised particularly in the 
context of service users’ religious beliefs and experiences. These findings resonated 
with much of the history of psychiatry (Freud, 1961a; 1961b; Group for the 
Advancement of Psychiatry, 1976; Ellis, 1980; 1986; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987); most published psychiatric texts (Neeleman and King, 1993); 
and the majority of the mental health nursing literature (Oldnall, 1995; 1996; Fry, 
1998; Martsoff and Mickley, 1998; Swinton, 2001; Malinski, 2002). In the strict 
biomedical framework, only data that is observable and verifiable is counted and 
deemed relevant (Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003; Stolk, 2009). Non-corporeal 
phenomena are not seen of relevance to the psychiatric interpretation of the service 
user’s experience, other than as an indication of psychopathology (Kirmayer, Young 
and Robbins, 1994; Pilowsky, 1997). Natalie Tobert (2007) notes that concepts 
which fall outside the boundaries of this positivistic belief system are considered to 
be “other people’s beliefs” (p. 5), which are viewed as irrational and not part of 
material reality. Similarly, Byron Good (1994) suggests that the use of the term 
‘belief’ has connoted “error or falsehood” (p. 17), whereas, the term ‘knowledge’ is 
associated with ‘correct explanations’. These issues were highlighted in the next 
critical incident.  
“I can think of one particular situation which arose for me when I was working on one 
of the acute wards. We had a lady who came onto the ward after she was sectioned. 
Anyway, the staff on the acute ward were querying whether she was really seeing 
things and if she was psychotic. This lady was a very lovely and quiet person. She 
was a black lady in her early 60’s. She was adamant that she was not seeing things 
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like a person with a psychosis would see things. However, she kept referring to 
something. There were other things that made the nursing staff query whether this 
lady had psychosis. Anyway, from day one this lady was adamant that it was not to 
do with anything psychotic. She could see this person there and whether she was, it 
was always there. According to this lady, it was with her when she was on the ward. 
It was also with her when she was at home. When we delved into it further, it became 
apparent that this person or presence was not a psychotic delusion, but connected to 
her culture and religion. She disputed the section as well. She won the tribunal, 
because this presence was linked back to her religion and culture. This presence was 
not part of any psychotic delusion or hallucination.    
Anyway, the presence had initially been misinterpreted as evidence of psychosis. It 
was the reason why she was sectioned. This initially seemed to overshadow 
everything else, such as her religious and cultural beliefs. Though, it became evident 
from talking and listening to her that this presence was part of her culture. She was 
obviously upset about being sectioned on an acute ward. This lady had never been 
sectioned before. So it must have been a horrific thing for her to find herself in that 
position. I think everything else, such as her religious beliefs got lost in translation. As 
everybody just seemed to focus on the fact that she kept on seeing something. They 
did not realise that what she was seeing was to do with her religious beliefs. This lady 
was adamant that she did not want treatment, because she did not perceive that she 
was ill. Then I said to the other nurses on that ward; ‘well hang on a minute, let’s look 
at her cultural background’. I mean, she was very religious, as she liked to go to the 
church every Sunday. By listening and talking to her, we found out that this presence 
was linked to her religious background. What they class as ‘normal’ presentation 
psychosis was not apparent in this case. As I say, we took it further and we 
researched the background of this lady.      
I think she was very upset that basically her whole belief system was being 
challenged and undermined, and her voice was being denied. And of course you are 
administering her medication, which she did not need. But when she realised that we 
were there to listen and we were there to fight for her, she started to engage with us. 
There does seem to be an assumption in mental health that just because somebody 
has been admitted onto a ward, they must have a mental illness. It is trying to get out 
of our own fixations, by realising that not everyone who is admitted onto a ward has a 
mental illness. It could be the case that the patient’s behaviour has been 
misinterpreted by the mental health team”. 
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
This narrative and other ‘critical incident’ accounts highlighted the assessment errors 
and clinical implications that can result from the failure to adequately consider the 
role of culture in mental illness. In particular, they show that the misattribution of 
culturally accepted experiences as psychotic phenomena may lead to involuntary 
and “unnecessary treatment with antipsychotic drugs, with all the negative 
consequences of such treatment and the negative personal and social 
consequences of a psychotic diagnosis” (Minas, 1990, p. 276). As Minas (1990, p. 
276) explains, “overdiagnosis, underdiagnosis and incorrect diagnosis can all have a 
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significant impact on the appropriateness of the treatment advice given and its 
effectiveness, and on the course and outcome of the patient’s illness”. It also has 
been shown that the misinterpretation of the severity and significance of phenomena 
such as suicidal ideas in cross-cultural situations, can have unintended, but lethal 
consequences (Sabin, 1975).   
These narratives reveal that the religious identities of service users were effectively 
being challenged and undermined, and research has shown the profound isolation 
which service users may experience when their religious identities are invalidated by 
mental health professionals (Minas, 1991; Lukoff, Lu and Turner, 1996; Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). Mohr and Pfeifer (2009) note that the labelling of 
supposed delusions “as ‘religious’ often leads to an attribution of pathology to the 
spiritual and religious life of patients”, and such “labelling is indeed stigmatizing” to 
the service user (p. 92). Yet many service users draw on their religion to cope with 
the distresses and consequences of mental illness (Meador, et al., 1992). A person’s 
religion may be an integral part of how they view life, of how they relate to others, 
and may be a source of that person’s core beliefs and values (James, 1961; 
Browning, Gobe and Evision, 1990; Krippner and Welch, 1992).The invalidation of a 
service user’s religious identity, therefore, can lead to adverse outcomes, such as 
blocking any future attempts at help-seeking (Stolk, 2009).    
Male Student: “Could it then be argued that religion could be a protective factor for 
somebody at suicide risk, then? And then there is a problem if the nursing staffs 
discredits that person’s beliefs, or sees it as part of their illness. You know? If 
somebody has got this strong religious belief and that is what is supporting them and 
they think, well okay, it’s a bit hard right now, but God will help me see my illness 
through. And then the nursing staffs on the ward turn around and try and take that off 
them. We are then taking away that protective factor from that person. That is a 
really big risk in nursing practice, I think”. 
Female Student: “Yes, I agree with that. By doing that you are effectively taking 
away something that means a lot to a person by discrediting it”. 
(Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
Calabrese (2011) notes, from his recent research into the ‘culture of medicine’ and 
patients’ perspectives on psychiatric treatment, that a single negative experience with 
mental health services can be “transferred to an entire institution or to the process of 
seeking psychiatric services generally” (p. 190).    
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This decontextualisation process was not restricted to the issue of religion. 
Participants also described cases where what appeared to be a ‘normal’ and 
personal lifestyle choice of the service user was fitted into a clinical and diagnostic 
template. Once again, these ‘critical incidents’ underscored the need to assess the 
person’s behaviour in its local context.  
“There was a lady who was admitted to the older adult acute assessment ward 
where I am on placement at the moment. She was admitted to the ward with what 
seemed to be acute anxiety and clinical depression. The struggle that I found when 
doing her admission and going over her care plans.....Was that again, from the 
cultural angle for this lady.....It was normal........I don’t like that word normal, but for 
her, it was normal to stay in bed until 11 o’clock or 12 o’clock even. And then she 
would get up to have her breakfast. I think her day was quite staggered. She would 
probably have a little tea in the evening and she would not go to bed until really late.   
I found that it was really difficult to try and get her to settle in on the ward, because 
on a ward, I suppose it is thrust on the patient the routines and rules. And it is very 
much like; ‘come on, we have got to do the bed and breakfast is ready’. If they don’t 
have breakfast or don’t get out of bed, it is immediately documented. They are 
refusing to get up and they are refusing to eat so we must keep an eye on them. I 
know it is easier said than done, but people do have different lifestyles, and I think 
they should be looked at more holistically. I don’t always see it as a problem if they 
do not want to get up at 7 o’clock in the morning. It is just the way that some people 
live and I think we have got to respect these lifestyle differences and try to 
incorporate that into practice.   
So in that case, her behaviour of getting up late in the morning and not going to bed 
until very late was perceived by the nursing staffs as being an ‘abnormal’ lifestyle. 
For instance, it was documented that the patient had ‘management difficulties’, 
because she refused to get out of bed until 12 o’clock. Yes.....Yes she was admitted 
for acute anxiety and she had the symptoms of a slight depression. And sleeping a 
lot and not getting out of bed until late is a normal feature of clinical depression.    
But if you actually went over this lady’s case history and actually talked with her that 
was the lifestyle she led and was used to. So for me, it was not a ‘management 
issue’. It was rather the patient’s choice, and that is something that she has 
continued to do over a long period of time. But what they fail to realise is that they 
were not looking at her behaviour in a holistic sense. If it is this lady’s lifestyle, I 
believe that it is not therapeutic at all to put these sorts of demands on her. I believe 
it can be quite detrimental to their mental health by trying to get them to do things 
that they don’t normally do and what they don’t want to do”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
Perhaps, it should not be surprising that the service user’s behaviour was matched 
and evaluated against psychiatric diagnostic criteria. Although mental health nurses 
do not make formal diagnoses, their clinical practice will often be informed by an 
internalised diagnostic framework based on psychiatric nosological criteria (Andary, 
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Stolk and Klimidis, 2003). Nurses may find it extremely difficult to cast off the 
shackles of this framework. Since most of their training, most of their evidence based 
practice, most of the published research and most mental health team 
communications are underpinned by the ‘universalistic’ diagnostic criteria of 
psychiatry (Stolk, 2009). As Andary, Stolk and Klimidis (2003, p. 2) have written, the 
majority “of what currently is known about psychopathology, and about what are 
considered to be specific categories of mental disorder, is drawn from research that 
is conducted with Western notions of what constitutes normality and abnormality and 
what constitutes disorders such as schizophrenia and major depression”. Various 
scholars have noted, that until relatively recently, the clinical training of mental health 
practitioners has tended to dismiss alternative models for understanding and treating 
mental distress (Sue, et al., 1982; Westermeyer, 1985; Myers, Wohlford, Guzman 
and Echemendia, 1991). Rosenhan’s (1973) seminal study perhaps provides the 
most illuminating and famous example of reductionist clinical decision making in 
action, where once labelled, the patient’s every action is judged as being insane. 
Even the writing behaviour of the pseudo-patients in Rosenhan’s experiment was 
perceived to be an aspect of the patient’s supposed mental illness.  
Language Discordance and the ‘Culture Blind’ Approach  
The cultural psychiatrist Suman Fernando (2002; 2010) has written about the 
existence of a ‘culture blind’ approach in the provision of mainstream mental health 
services. In nursing practice, the ‘culture blind’ approach denies the important role 
that culture plays in the assessment, care and treatment processes (Robinson and 
Elkan, 1996; Vydelingum, 2000) and furthermore, raises questions about uneven 
power relationships and ethnocentric clinical practice (Puzan, 2003; Cortis, 2004; 
Thom, 2008). The assumption “that being ‘blind’ to something nullifies its effects or 
significance” is a “serious fallacy” (Fernando, 2002, p. 135). According to Fernando, 
two negative effects on clinical practice derive from the ‘culture blind’ approach. First, 
the service user’s experiences are seen out of context, in that, s(he) is not seen as a 
“part of a society or a group, with, for example, allegiances and hostilities towards 
other people, influenced by other people and dependant on a wide circle of people 
for what s(he) is” (Fernando, 2002, p. 132). Secondly, any differences that the 
service user presents are likely to be assessed as individual differences-that is, 
160 
 
assessed in terms of their deviance from a generalised ‘norm’, rather than something 
that is seen to reflect the service user’s upbringing and experience. As Fernando 
explains, the ‘culture blind’ approach falls into the trap of denying the reality of 
culture.  
It became apparent from listening to the ‘critical incident’ stories of participants that 
the ‘culture blind’ approach seemed to be particularly connected to, although not 
limited to, acute care contexts where there were issues of ‘language26 discordance’ 
(Sobo and Seid, 2003; Sobo, 2004; Sobo and Loustaunau, 2010) between the 
nursing staff and service users. In the opinion of the participants, the failure to 
adequately deal with the issue of ‘language27 discordance’ led to inferior and poor 
nursing care and the inability to assess service users’ experiences in their context. 
The problems arising from the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and 
Good, 1986) in mental health student nurses’ clinical placements were thus 
exacerbated.  
“I had a Chinese lady on clinical placement that I and a colleague were working with 
and whose family saw her mental illness as a sign of the devil’s work. At dinner 
times, she wasn’t allowed to sit with the rest of the family because of what the rest of 
the family believed about her illness. I was with the early intervention team and we 
suddenly noticed that when we took her out with us, she would not eat with us. She 
seemed to become very self-conscious of eating food around us. And at the time, we 
did not yet have the information about the family’s beliefs about her illness and the 
impact it had on her at meal times. So myself and the early intervention person were 
just putting it down to like; ‘oh why is she not taking the medication? She is on the 
                                                          
26
‘Language’ involves any set or system of symbols, which used in a more or less uniform fashion, 
enables people to communicate intelligibly with each other (Macquarie Dictionary, 2009). 
Furthermore, language can be translated into speech, the written word, and signs, and is the main 
mode used to convey and receive messages (Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey, 1988). As Fitzgerald and 
colleagues’ (1997a) note, just as every person is a member of a cultural group and community, each 
person knows (with very few exceptions) a language and belongs to a language speaking community. 
The concept of language is included in the broader concept of ‘communication’ (Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a). Human communication encapsulates the creation and exchange of messages that use any 
mode or channel, across a range of situations that may or may not involve face-to-face interaction 
(Fromkin, Rodman, Collins and Blair, 1988; Halliday, 1989; Bonvillain, 1993). In face-to-face 
interactions (‘interpersonal communication’), communication “is primarily dependent upon verbal and 
non-verbal channels, but other modes may also be involved, for example, written and graphic 
representations” (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a, p. 102). A shared knowledge of a language system allows 
for the exchange of information, ideas, emotions, feelings, and experiences-phenomena that all are 
important to mental health practice (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a).    
27
 The service user’s level of psychopathology can affect English language proficiency (Oquendo, 
1996). A service user who speaks English fluently when well or in recovery, can revert to their first 
language during a psychotic episode (Stolk, 1996). This is important to bear in mind, as in the field of 
mental health; the content and style of communication are frequently used as indicators of 
psychopathological status (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a).  
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anti-psychotic drugs and that should be making her feel hungry and wanting to eat’. 
So I was discussing with my colleague about the reasons why she was not eating 
with us.   
And then we started to make mistaken judgements that it may have been to do with 
her illness…And anyway, it turned out that because her family believed the devil had 
kind of come upon her, she wasn’t allowed to sit with them at the dinner table. She 
felt like she could not eat in front of us and that she had to eat in secret. She couldn’t 
eat in front of other people. But we were making wrong kinds of judgements about 
her behaviour. And that was also to do with the fact that we could not directly 
communicate with this Chinese lady. She only spoke very little English. So it was 
very hard to understand what exactly was going on with her anyway. So you had to 
kind of piece bits together and make a jigsaw, but the jigsaw didn’t always match-if 
you’ve got me? So how do you avoid making misjudgements when there are those 
evident language difficulties with the patient”?  
(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
“There was no one there on this functional and elderly ward who spoke any Polish. It 
was also the first time that I had been on that ward for one of my third year placement 
experiences. The other nursing staff members recommended trying to use prompt 
cards to communicate with this patient who could only speak Polish. I had tried to use 
prompt cards to communicate with this patient but they had not worked. Furthermore, 
the prompt cards may not capture the obvious variations in the use of Polish. The 
communication barriers made it extremely difficult to develop any sort of therapeutic 
relationship with this person. It felt like you were getting nowhere with this patient. 
She was not going to get better here on the ward if she could not communicate with 
any of the nursing staffs.      
I also did not feel that anything was being done by the nurses on that ward to 
facilitate communication with this patient. I think the mental health trust had contacted 
the patient’s family in an attempt to facilitate communication with her. But is it really 
appropriate in that context to use the family as a means of establishing 
communication with the patient? Are they interpreting what we were saying to her 
correctly? Furthermore, were they interpreting what she was saying to us correctly? I 
think that was a massive issue to deal with, especially when you are dealing with 
matters of nursing assessment. I do not think the trust was willing to get an 
interpreter in to effectively communicate with this lady. The trust is always thinking 
about things in terms of cost and savings. They want to know how long you are going 
to have the interpreter in for. Are you going to use the interpreter all day and every 
day? So in this case, it was very difficult to attend to even her basic physical needs. 
She could not even understand something simple like; ‘do you need the toilet, or do 
you need to use the bathroom’?    
I think it was also difficult to determine what her illness actually was, because of the 
communication barriers. You could not understand anything that she was actually 
saying to you. She was unable to communicate how she was feeling to you. I think 
the other nurses had used prompt cards, but had given up on using them. It was 
almost like as if they were not performing their duty of care to this person. They had 
no plan of care and had no idea of what to do with this patient. So she was just sitting 
there on her own. It was hard to work out whether she was distressed, as in some 
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languages, you have a high pitch tone and shouting may be considered normal. It 
does not necessarily mean that because they speak in a high pitch tone they are 
distressed. It is hard to understand that if they do not speak the same language as 
you. So it is very difficult to tell if they are distressed and if they are distressed-you 
may fail to understand what they are actually distressed about”.    
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
Assessment and treatment modalities are usually based on the assumption that 
service users have a basic level of facility in the English language, and furthermore, 
understand the local cultural and social context (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a).The political 
economy of care (Bullon, Good and Carpenter-Song, 2011; Calabrese, 2011; 
Carpenter-Song, 2011; Willen, 2011b) was reflected in student nurse participants 
accounts about the prohibitive cost and/or rationing of professional interpreter 
services to formal aspects of psychiatric assessment and consultations. Multiple 
policy recommendations and reviews, such as ‘Inside Outside: Improving Mental 
Health Services for Black and Minority Ethnic communities in England’(Sashidharan, 
2003), and more recently, the Department of Health’s (2005) ‘Delivering Race 
Equality in Mental Health Care’ five year action plan, have set out the case for more 
accessible interpreter services and the need for mental health professionals to be 
trained in the effective use of these services; yet the findings of this PhD research 
showed that at least the former does not appear to be happening in mental health 
student nurses’ clinical placements. Thus, barriers to communication and 
assessment at the inter-individual level “cannot be separated from organisational 
contexts and service mechanisms which play a far reaching part in shaping individual 
experiences” (Robinson and Gilmartin, 2002, p. 462).    
In such circumstances, the student nurse participants mentioned that they and their 
nursing colleagues resorted to seeking the advice and interpretation ‘skills’ of the 
service user’s family members where language barriers prevented direct 
communication with the service user. The accuracy of the family members’ advice 
was questioned and the ideal of maintaining the service user’s confidentiality and 
privacy was undermined in these instances. Indeed, as Moreno, Otero-Sabogal and 
Newman (2007, p. 331) highlighted, “interpretation is a learned skill; whereas it is true 
that every interpreter can speak at least two languages, it does not follow that every 
bilingual person is an effective interpreter”. Research indicates that the use of ad hoc 
interpreters can result in an increase in clinically consequential errors (Flores, et al., 
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2003) and undermine standards of good clinical care (Baker, Hayes and Puebla 
Fortier, 1998). Ad hoc interpreters may be “prone to omitting, adding, substituting and 
volunteering information” (Willen, 2011b, p. 72). The nursing researcher Natasha 
Thom (2008, p. 1206) points out that whether “the decision to limit the communication 
is deliberate or not, nurses could be found guilty of ethnocentrism. By not offering an 
interpreter service to the patient, the nurse is denying the patient an opportunity to 
speak in their own language within the context of their culture”. Adequate nursing 
assessments rely on (cultural) linguistic as well as clinical competencies (Bradby, 
2001). As Culley and Dyson (2010, p. 46) explain; “clinical care can easily be 
compromised without adequate language support: a proper history cannot be taken; 
symptoms or problems can easily be missed or misinterpreted; expensive and 
unnecessary tests can be carried out; inappropriate treatments may be prescribed; 
and patient adherence may be reduced”. 
Clinical observation28 is an important and integral component of mental health 
nursing assessment (Barker, 2004; Plant and Stephenson, 2008; Ryrie and 
Norman, 2009), but the findings of this PhD research revealed that where the 
service user was unable to/or had difficulties with speaking English, the nursing staff 
in clinical placement ward settings were relying on this mode of assessment alone. 
Such a mode of assessment is likely to be heavily influenced by a clinical and 
diagnostic (‘etic’) template (Stolk, 2009), and may lead to ‘depersonalisation’ 
(Lelliott and Quirk, 2004; Quirk and Lelliott, 2004) and the failure to consider service 
users’ experiences in their local context. Not only does such reductionist practice 
exacerbate the difficulties presented by the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation 
dilemma, but ‘category fallacies’ (Kleinman, 1977; 1988a) and the aforementioned 
clinical assessment errors (Tseng and McDermott, 1981; Stein, 1985; Minas, 1990; 
Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-
                                                          
28 According to Ryrie and Norman (2009), clinical observation “is a continuous form of data 
collection” (p. 220) that forms an important part of mental health nursing assessment. Clinical 
observation can be relatively informal, by involving an evaluation of the service user’s appearance, 
behaviour and interactions (Ryrie and Norman, 2009). By contrast, structured clinical observation 
involves the use of pro-formas, which are usually completed by the nurse, but in some cases, are 
completed by the service user. Another type of clinical observation that is used by mental health 
nurses is concerned with documenting biochemical and physiological indices (Barker, 2004; Plant 
and Stephenson, 2008).     
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O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997; Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Andary, Stolk 
and Klimidis, 2003) were more likely to occur.  
“But in the case of assessing her symptoms, because this patient could not speak 
any English, it was a lot harder to do that. The nursing staff on that acute 
assessment ward would mainly assess her symptoms by clinical observation. They 
tended to avoid finding out from the lady why she would do certain things. And if they 
wanted to find out about the reasons why she was doing certain things or about 
aspects of her culture, they would not ask the lady, but her family members, who 
could speak some English. It became apparent that she would only drink boiled 
water, but she also had a psychiatric history of self-harm. So it was very much like; 
‘shall we allow her to get the hot water herself’? She let it cool down a bit, but she 
never drank cold water while she was on that ward. And that was quite........So I think 
the communication problems meant that the staff did not really develop a proper 
therapeutic relationship with this lady. It was very much like; ‘hello how are you’, and 
that was it really. It was not as in-depth as it would be with a patient where English 
was their first language. I think that most of the nursing staffs just gained most of 
their information about this lady from her psychiatric history, which was recorded in 
her clinical case notes, or by consulting with the family members who could speak 
English. 
But as a student, you just get a lot more time to spend with a patient and to see them 
more as a person, rather than just as an ‘illness’ or ‘diagnostic category’. So the 
nursing staffs were monitoring her behaviour and when they needed some more 
information, they consulted with her family or her case notes. The problem there was 
that they were not asking her about how she was feeling and therefore, it was based 
more on a subjective opinion of how she was feeling at the time, or why she was 
acting like that. And we had no information from the lady about her culture or 
anything like that. So it was useful to have access to the interpreter when the nursing 
staffs could, as we may have been getting inaccurate information about her culture 
and illness from the family members”.  
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
“I have just finished working in an older adult functional assessment ward with clients 
who were suffering from functional disorders such as psychoses and schizophrenia. 
Anyway, I will describe my experiences of working with two patients on this unit, one 
of whom was Polish, and I believe the other patient was from India. There are lots of 
different angles from which I can talk about, in terms of how the staff worked with 
these two patients. The first definite issue that occurred to me was that the nursing 
staffs were quite reluctant to actually communicate with these two patients. They 
were quite reluctant to go into these two patient’s rooms and communicate with them. 
From my observations of the nursing staff, I noticed that they were looking through 
the window of these patient’s rooms to assess what they was like, rather than 
actually interacting with them. I think that the nurses did not want to interact with 
these patients, because of the perceived difficulties with understanding their dialects 
and the language barriers. It was as if they did not want to get involved in that, 
because they had other things to do. So that was the first thing that occurred to me. 
Communication is such an integral part of nursing and especially, mental health 
nursing. It runs through everything we do in the nursing process. In mental health 
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nursing, being able to communicate effectively with patients is vital, especially where 
physical signs and symptoms are not so apparent. In mental health nursing, we use 
the communication process to understand everything from assessing a person’s 
condition to issues around treatment”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
Many of the service users in Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran’s (2002) London based 
ethnography of the conflict which existed between mental health professionals and  
black service users, complained that the clinicians based their assessments just on 
the clinical observations of mental health nurses. The clinicians therefore did not try 
to understand service users’ perspectives or points of view. One of the service users 
reported that none of the psychiatrists on an acute assessment ward had ever 
actually spoken with her, and she was confused about how they could have 
assessed her properly.   
As the student nurses in this PhD study witnessed, verbal communication is vital and 
intrinsic to holistic nursing assessment (Murphy and Clark, 1993; Gerrish, Husband 
and Mackenzie, 1996; Baldonado, et al., 1998;  Kim, 1998; Gerrish, 2001; Robinson, 
2002; Ozolins and Hjlem, 2003; Gerrish, Chau, Sobowale and Birks, 2004; Cioffi, 
2005; 2006; Lundberg, Backstrom and Widen, 2005; Jirwe, 2008; Jirwe, Gerrish and 
Emami, 2010) and the philosophy and practice of person-centred care (Reynolds 
and Cormack, 1990; Gerrish, 2000; Vydelingum, 2000; 2006; Peckover and Chidlaw, 
2007; Perget, 2008; Pergert, Ekblad, Enskar and Bjork, 2007). According to some of 
the participants, where the service user was unable to/or had problems with 
speaking English, nurses were even minimising or avoiding interaction with the 
service user. A few of the participants suggested that this avoidance was a reflection 
of nurses’ anxieties with their own communication deficiencies, while others 
mentioned that nurses’ interactions with non-English speaking service users were 
constrained by the competing demands on nurses’ time. One participant even 
suggested that the practice of avoidance was possibly down to ‘laziness’. 
“And it relates back to some of what I was saying earlier in this discussion about how 
the nurses and students manage their anxiety when differentiation issues between 
religion and mental illness and language issues are apparent. That it can seem a 
natural way to manage anxiety or the feeling of being uncomfortable. That is, the 
best way would be to avoid it. So it’s within that kind of framework”. 
(Nursing Educator, Staff Focus Group) 
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Male Student 1: “I don’t know….And I think it is a flaw of me if you like.  And I keep 
thinking I’m going to change and do differently, but I don’t. And I’m always guilty of 
this on wards and I don’t know if everybody else is the same? I mean, you sort of 
latch on to the more approachable and more easy to handle patients. You build a 
rapport with them. What I mean, is the patients you can hold those conversations 
with and where you do not have the communication barriers. And then the ones who 
perhaps, you think there is a language barrier or a cultural barrier you tend to stay 
away from. Whether I do it consciously, subconsciously, or just out of laziness, I do 
not know? And then I suddenly find myself thinking; I’ve been here two weeks on this 
placement and I haven’t said hello to this guy and I don’t know much about him. And 
I think that sometimes, I am guilty of that as a student nurse. I don’t know if nurses 
are guilty of it also? I don’t know if all of students are? I know that I’m guilty of doing 
that”. 
Male Student 2: “Yes…You know? Line of least resistance and going for the patient 
that is easier to interact with”. 
(Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
“I can honestly say that it puts you in a difficult position when you are trying to deal 
with assessment and cultural issues and there are language barriers with the 
patients. It questions your role as a student nurse, due to the difficulties I had in 
understanding and communicating with these patients. It really unsteadied you in 
your role, because it was really difficult to understand what they were saying and you 
were trying to go in their rooms, do your observations, do your job, and be efficient at 
the same time. Obviously, I did go and try and talk to these patients, but at the same 
time, you are trying to balance these demands on you as a nurse. We were told in a 
lecture recently that you can be efficient, effective and compassionate nurses all at 
the same time. However, in liveable reality, constraints on time, when you have those 
communication problems, limit how person-centred you can be with your patients. So 
you can’t spend the amount of time that you require to address a particular person’s 
needs. We do not have the time or the resources to give somebody what they need. 
So that is very frustrating”.     
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
The sociolinguist and health services researcher Anne Pauwels (1995) suggests that 
there has been a tendency in the health professions “to ask fewer questions of and 
to say less to patients who do not speak English than is the case with their English 
speaking patients” (p. 45). ‘Inexperience’, ‘anxiety’, ‘fear of the unfamiliar’ (due to an 
unfamiliarity with cultural differences), and ‘disempowerment’ have all been identified 
in the academic literature as reasons for practitioners minimising contact and limiting 
communication with service users with limited or no facility in the host country’s 
language (Pauwels, 1990; 1995; Kai, et al., 2007; Peckover and Chidlaw, 2007; 
Shahnavaz and Ekblad, 2007; Jirwe, 2008; Jirwe, Gerrish and Emami, 2010). The 
consequences of such an avoidance strategy can be serious. Assessment errors 
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(Tseng and McDermott, 1981; Stein, 1985; Minas, 1990; Fitzgerald, Mullavey- 
O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and 
Williamson, 1997; Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003; Stolk, 
2009) followed by inappropriate treatment and management is the result of the 
failure to consider the service user’s perspective. Shahnavaz and Ekblad’s (2007)   
focus group study of Swedish interprofessional psychiatric teams found that staff 
members avoidance of non-Swedish speaking service users, led to these service 
users being offered less time for psychiatric consultation and investigation. In such 
circumstances, adherence to prescribed psychiatric treatment may be adversely 
affected due to the service user receiving minimal, if any, information about what is 
perceived to be wrong with him or her (Pauwels, 1995).This in turn creates 
unnecessary anxiety, and thus the service user is then unlikely to take the necessary 
steps to manage their condition.      
The ‘critical incident’ narratives presented in this findings chapter has shown that the 
cultural ideal of ‘person-centred’ care was shattered in student nurses’ clinical 
placements. In particular, participants mentioned that service users with limited or no 
English language proficiency were unable to communicate their concerns and 
distresses with mental health staff. The result was that these service users were left 
isolated and alone in psychiatric wards. Similar issues were highlighted in 
Vydelingum’s (2000) qualitative study of non-English speaking Hindu and Muslim 
patients in an acute care context in the south of England. In particular, the patients 
reported feeling that they were just ‘passing through’, were ‘alone in a crowd’, and 
‘trying to fit in’ with a culturally alien place. The ‘alone in a crowd theme’ revealed the 
extreme loneliness and isolation felt by these patients. This feeling of isolation was 
reinforced by the sense that nurses were often too busy to respond to patients’ need 
for information about assessments, diagnoses, and medication. Some of the patients 
even reported having to rely on their English speaking carers at visiting times to 
convey their concerns to the nursing staffs. Likewise, Jirwe, Gerrish and Emami’s 
(2010) qualitative interview study of Swedish based student nurses’ experiences of 
intercultural communication showed that where there was no shared language, the 
service user was unable to convey their sense of distress to the student nurse. 
Subsequently, the student nurse was then only able to speculate as to what was the 
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source of the service user’s distress, and was therefore unable to provide 
appropriate support. 
Summary 
Misunderstanding the role and significance of culture in mental illness was connected 
to an inability by practitioners in clinical placement settings to evaluate the 
experiences of service users in their local (‘emic’) contexts. Both the political 
economy of care and/ or the cultural ideology of the primary medical system   
negatively impacted on appropriate clinical assessment and standards of care. The 
reductionist assessment practices, which were documented in participants’ accounts, 
clearly conflicted with the meaning centred anthropological perspective that “tries to 
see people in context to better understand their experience of illness”(Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran, 2002, p. 8). The tendency to view ‘others’ from the dominant 
lens of one’s culturally normative standards raised questions about uneven clinical 
power relationships and a ‘culture blind’ and ethnocentric approach to practice 
(Fernando, 2002; 2010; Thom, 2008). I will expand on these findings in the following 
two chapters, by further exploring how the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma 
(Good and Good, 1986) was dealt with in preregistered mental health student nurses’ 
clinical placements.      
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Chapter 7 
‘Dealing’ with the ‘Normative Uncertainty’ Evaluation 
Dilemma: Outcome Criteria and Other Strategies 
Introduction  
This is the first of two findings chapters which explore how the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986) was dealt with in pre-registered mental 
health student nurses’ clinical placements. These chapters, therefore, are more 
orientated although not exclusively to the second research question. As the 
‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma was the most central issue to emerge 
from self-reports of students’ clinical placements, it should not be surprising that 
participants talked at length in the interview and focus group sessions about how this 
issue was attended to in clinical practice.   
In this chapter, I describe strategies that the participants reported,  which bore some 
resemblance to what the academic literature has defined as the criterion of 
‘outcomes’ (Jackson and Fulford, 1997). The participants’ seemed to focus on three 
dimensions of the criterion of ‘outcomes’-the ‘impact on functioning’, ‘the assessment 
of risk’, and the ‘emotional valence’ of the service user’s experience. Their utility in 
the differentiation of psychopathological phenomena from religious/culturally 
sanctioned experiences has been debated in the academic literature (e.g., Sims, 
1992; Pierre, 2001; Siddle, Haddock, Tarrier and Faragher, 2002; Koenig, 2007) and 
I contextualise participants’ narratives by drawing on this literature. Two other 
strategies were also mentioned by some of the participants and they are dealt with in 
the latter sections of this chapter. These two strategies were categorised in the 
thematic analysis as ‘relying on intuition’ and ‘religious coping and psychopathology’. 
First, I outline a definition of the criterion of ‘outcomes’.     
The Criterion of ‘Outcomes’   
The criterion of ‘outcomes’ is perhaps the most commonly cited strategy for 
differentiating psychotic phenomena from religious phenomenology (Dein, 2010b). In 
Eeles’ research (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003), the nurse 
participants used the criterion of ‘outcomes’ to refer to “the events or changes to the 
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individual which occurred as a result of the experience” (Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 
2003, p. 200). Furthermore, it is suggested that negative as opposed to neutral or 
positive outcomes indicate psychopathology (Jackson and Fulford, 1997). Both 
religious and psychotic experiences are considered to be the product of stress or 
‘existential crisis’; but if the person gains insight and uses it to solve the initial 
problem, the experience will be self-limiting and non-pathological (Jackson and 
Fulford, 1997). Psychotic illness is “generally seen as detrimental to the life course”, 
whereas, a religious experience is viewed “as life enhancing and generally adaptive” 
(Dein, 2010b, p. 537). On the other hand, many people have evaluated their 
psychotic experience “as part of a process through which they reached, from their 
perspective, a constructive spiritual reorientation” (Jackson, 2001, p. 183). In this 
study, participants’ accounts focused on three criteria of ‘outcomes’-the ‘impact on 
functioning’, ‘the assessment of risk’, and the ‘emotional valence’ of the experience.                                                                                                                                                                                  
Criterion of ‘Function’  
Many of the student nurse participants stressed the importance of assessing the 
service user’s level of function in different aspects of their lives. When a service 
user’s behaviour had a negative impact on activities of daily living, psychopathology 
was indicated.     
“Again, being not that culturally aware, I do not think there are that many religions 
that involve praying so many times a day. You know? I might be wrong. But her 
actual need to....She might be out of the room for all of ten minutes and then she 
would be back in her room again. And if you looked through the window to see what 
she was doing, then nine times out of ten she would be praying. And in the real world 
if you like, such as in a community setting, that would have stopped her going to the 
shop, socialising and working. And that would take over her entire life. So it could be 
possible that her need to pray was exacerbated by the psychosis. I think that could 
have been the case that the constant need to pray was exacerbated by the 
psychosis. So there was a real impact on her ability to function and do the things that 
we normally take for granted”.  
(Male 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
“But they clearly did have mental health issues, as their illness was affecting their 
functioning. I remember going to this person’s flat one day and things were 
completely chaotic. Things were left everywhere and all over the stairs. Everything 
seemed to indicate a very chaotic and disordered lifestyle. The purpose of the visit 
was to pick him up and take him to a rehab place where he could have some respite, 
because he was getting completely stressed out in his home surroundings. And so 
when I was waiting for him to pack all of his stuff...........You know? He had this 
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suitcase, which was falling apart and he was tying the suitcase around with a jumper. 
He was taking all these crazy things with him, such as bows, arrows, feathers, and 
things he would not need. And there were things that looked like bits of rubbish tied 
together”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
The registered mental health nurses in Eeles’ (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and 
Wellman, 2003) research also considered that psychopathology was evident where 
a person was unable to minimally function in basic living and work related activities. 
In contrast, an ability to function in these activities indicated self-discipline, ordered 
thought, and grounding in reality-characteristics which were believed to be absent in 
cases of mental illness. The ‘criterion of function’ (Tseng and McDermott, 1981; 
Swartz, 1998; Koenig, 2007) is compatible with the ‘absolutist’ and ‘universalist’ 
(Offer and Sabshin, 1966) models of psychopathology that was outlined in the 
background review. In the ‘absolutist’/‘universalist’ models, psychopathology “is said 
to exist when a combination of symptoms occurs, including deteriorating ability to 
function within social or occupational contexts”, plus “deteriorating ability to care for 
oneself” (Tobert, 2007, p. 54). Similarly, Sims (1992) writes that psychopathology is 
evident if the lifestyle, behaviour and direction of the person’s personal goals are 
consistent with the natural history of mental disorder rather than with a personally 
enriching life experience.                                                                                                                                                                       
The assessment of the service user’s behaviour (function) did not just account for 
its perceived impact on the service user, but also its impact on other people and the 
service user’s wider community. In the minds of these student nurse participants, 
behaviour which disturbed or intimidated family, neighbours, and the wider 
community was considered as ‘dysfunctional’ and suggestive of mental illness. 
Cultural and societal standards of ‘normality’ came to the fore in these ‘critical 
incident’ accounts. Note that in the next three narrative extracts; the student nurse 
participants also drew on the ‘absolutist’/‘universalist’ criterion of ‘insight’ 
(Carpenter, Strauss and Barktko, 1973) in making their assessments about a 
service user’s behaviour.   
“He had schizophrenia, but he did not believe he had that diagnosis or there was 
anything wrong with him. He just thought he was fine, although that was clearly not 
the case. He just wanted to continue the way that he wanted to live without any 
trouble or anyone getting at him. But he had all kinds of issues because of the way 
he kept his flat and he had loads of problems with the local council. I believed he was 
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being summoned to court because of this chaotic behaviour and the effect it was 
having on his neighbours. So his life was impacting on everyone around him, 
including his neighbours. So his behaviour was a real problem, as it was starting to 
impact on the people around him”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
“I think that his doctor was rather looking at it from the angle that his expression of his 
religious beliefs was too extreme now. I think there is a level in society where 
something is deemed unacceptable and I think it had reached the point where it was 
not acceptable anymore. I mean, his behaviour could be viewed as being extreme, as 
he was trying to influence other people and tell them about why they should be 
Christian. He was like trying to pass his books off; like he would say to people ‘read 
this’. And he was like saying ‘God be with you’ and things like that. It was 
overwhelming, but I guess it was down to what the doctor said it was, as being 
evidence of a psychosis. And he was diagnosed as being psychotic because it was 
affecting his home life. And he did not have any insight into the level of his behaviour 
and the problems that it was causing. He was also doing these drastic things in 
public, such as street preaching. And he did not really get on that well with his family. 
Again, there was this problem with putting all this stuff on ‘Facebook’ and all these 
social networking sites. And he was trying to do just that really and just trying to 
spread the word”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
In the next narrative extract, it was not the ideas or beliefs of the service user that 
are under question or judged as ‘abnormal’. Rather, it was the extremity of the 
service user’s behaviour and the social context in which it was performed that 
enabled the student nurse and her colleagues to regard the service user’s behaviour 
as pathological.  
“Another case involved a man from a white British background. He had travelled the 
world and spent quite a lot of the time in India. I can’t remember the name for his 
religion, as it was quite an obscure religion, but it involved the use of some kind of 
‘water therapy’. Anyway, the practice involves cooling your body temperature down 
with very cold water and this was the reason why he was admitted on to the ward. 
He had flooded his house, but he also wanted to practice that water therapy on the 
inpatient ward. Obviously, his behaviour was quite challenging for the staff, as it was 
any tap that he was trying to pour water from. He would be in the kitchen on the ward 
and he would like be in a little area of the lounge where you can make drinks, and he 
would continue to do it if he had access to water. If he had water, he would take it 
with him and use it to cool himself down.  
It was easier to make the distinction in that case with the patient who practiced the 
water therapy, because he had actually written books about this practice. So I 
managed to get a copy of the book from him and it explained quite a lot of the beliefs 
and they appeared quite normal. Though, it also appeared that the extent to which 
he was practicing these beliefs was probably not totally normal. So the extent to 
which he was practicing those beliefs was something to do with his psychosis, but he 
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would practice those beliefs when he was well anyway. So we were referring to his 
book which did help us to make that differentiation. It was his book and he had it 
published. And the book contained information about the timing, what is important to 
do, and what the beliefs are around water therapy. So by reading that book it really 
helped....It made us realise that while a belief in water therapy was a legitimate 
belief, the extent to which he was carrying it out did not seem normal and could be 
connected to the psychosis. 
He also did not believe that he was suffering from psychosis. He had no insight into 
the fact that his behaviour was now completely socially unacceptable. So that was 
another factor that we based our assessment on. He believed that you had to 
practice water therapy naked, but it appeared that his behaviour had escalated from 
that to walking out in the street naked and practicing this water therapy while being 
naked in public areas. It is probably acceptable to practice this therapy while being 
naked in one’s home or in private, but he would also practice this water therapy 
naked in places like ponds and stuff. So clearly that behaviour was not seen as 
being appropriate or acceptable. As I was saying, it was not the beliefs which was 
really under question, but rather the extent to which he practiced these beliefs and 
where he practiced them”.  
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
In this instance, it was likely that the service user was employing symbolic systems, 
but in a manner that would have seemed inconvenient and clumsy to others 
(Weinstein, 1962). As Lukoff (1985) notes, a person with psychosis will have 
problems in establishing ‘intersubjective’ reality with other persons in their 
psychosocial environment. The symptoms of the psychotic illness will impair the 
person’s ability to relate to others. Thus, dysfunctional behaviour is assumed when a 
person’s behaviour disrupts or harms the social group in some way. The cultural 
psychiatrists Tseng and McDermott (1981) refer to the violation of group behavioural 
norms and the subsequent assessment of ‘abnormal behaviour’ as the ‘criterion of 
result’. Writing in a similar vein, the medical anthropologist Cecil Helman (2007, p. 
246) notes there are:     
“A range of possible perceptions, by members of a particular society or culture, of a 
particular form of social behaviour: whether they see it as ‘normal’ or abnormal for 
their society, and whether it is controlled, or not, by the norms or rules of that society. 
It also reflects the fact that all human groups recognise that there are certain times 
and places when people can be allowed to behave in an ‘abnormal’ way, provided 
that they are seen to conform to the strict guidelines (explicit or implicit) laid down by 
their culture for this type of situation. In this case, even if their behaviour is bizarre or 
unconventional, it is still to some extent controlled by social norms. In contrast, most 
cultures disapprove of forms of public behaviour that are obviously not being 
controlled by the rules of their society, and which they usually label as either ‘mad’ or 
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‘bad’. Thus, there are four possible zones of social behaviour according to the 
perceptions of that society, or of groups or individuals within that society”.   
In the cases of what Helman termed as ‘controlled normality’, ‘uncontrolled normality’, 
and ‘controlled abnormality’ however, there is the assumption that whether the 
person decides to conform to the social norms or not (consciously or not), the person 
is aware of what the social norms are (i.e., the criterion of ‘insight’). That is, the 
individual has “some degree of self-awareness, or insight, into their own behaviour” 
(Helman, 2007, p. 246). In contrast, “behaviour is labelled as ‘mad’ (‘uncontrolled 
abnormality’) if it is abnormal, not controlled by social norms, and has no discernible 
cause or purpose” (Helman, 2007, p. 250). According to Helman, the extremes of the 
‘uncontrolled abnormality’ dimension largely overlap with psychiatric classifications of 
the major psychoses. The use of these implicit behavioural dimensions in the 
evaluation of psychopathology was indicated in some of the ‘critical incidents’ 
collected for this PhD research. For example, in the student’s narrative about the 
service user who practiced ‘water therapy’, it could be implied that the behaviour was 
evaluated as being both ‘uncontrolled’ (e.g., the naked practice of the water therapy 
in public spaces violated social norms) and ‘abnormal’ (e.g., due to the psychosis, the 
service user did not have ‘insight’ into the unacceptability of their behaviour).   
However, as Helman (2007) explained, these behavioural dimensions are not set in 
stone, but rather represent “a series of fluid categories, a spectrum of possibilities 
that are likely to change with time and circumstance and the particular perspective 
of the onlooker” (p. 246). Thus, there is a temporal and contextual dimension to 
what is commonly perceived as ‘abnormal’ (Conrad and Schneider, 1980; Dein, 
1997; Benatar, 2006). Behaviour that is viewed as “‘bad’ in one generation may be 
seen as ‘mad’ in the next” (Helman, 2007, p. 246). Furthermore, anthropologists 
have tended to accept that there is a relative range in which different societies set 
the boundaries on what can be considered as ‘normal’ behaviour (Brown, Gregg 
and Ballard, 1998; Winkelman, 2009).  
The evaluation of behaviour with regard to the ‘criterion of function’ is therefore 
influenced by cultural norms and expectations (Stolk, 2009). As Seeley (2006) 
explains, the mental health professions actively instil ‘individuated’ ideologies of ‘self’ 
and cultural expectations of function into clinical practice. Autonomy, independence, 
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and productivity are values that reflect a ‘highly individuated’ notion of ‘self’ (Gaines, 
1982b; Gaines and Hahn, 1982), and these values have been shown to underpin 
clinical practice and the ‘criterion of function’ (Dyck, 1989; 1991; 1998; Krefting, 
1991b; Holden and Littlewood, 1991; Kinebanian and Stomph, 1992; Herberg, 1995; 
Paul, 1995; Whiteford, 1995; Hocking and Whiteford, 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-
O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Gerrish, 2000; Whiteford and 
Wilcock, 2000; Galanti, 2001; 2005; 2006; 2008; Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2001; 
2002; 2004; Whiteford and Wright St-Clair, 2002; Russell, et al., 2002; Andrews and 
Boyle, 2003; Fitzgerald, 2004; Bourke-Taylor and Hudson, 2005; Seeley, 2006; 
Stolk, 2009). Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran (2002) note that a mental health worker 
“who assumes a certain notion of self, of boundaries and of ascribed identity will 
often fail when confronted with a patient who does not share his or her beliefs” (p. 
16). As the following ‘critical incident’ story illustrates, when the student nurse 
encouraged a service user to function autonomously, to become more independent 
from their parents, and to become more assertive, they were inviting them to enact 
an ‘individuated’ notion of self (Seeley, 2006), which may not have been compatible 
with the service user’s concept of self and cultural notion of functioning.    
“I was on placement in an acute setting and a young lad was admitted. He was in his 
late teens and was from a Muslim cultural background. He had older sisters who did 
everything for him. They dressed, fed, and got him up in the morning. This was 
happening in his home environment. He had no life skills at all and had not 
developed properly. His brain, social skills, and day to day functioning had not 
developed sufficiently because everything was just done for him by his relatives. 
Unfortunately, this lad began to have an episode of psychosis. In the first instance, I 
did not understand fully that this psychosis had been precipitated by his total 
dependence on his family members. I think the psychosis may have been a coping 
strategy. The psychosis was a way of expressing how he wanted to do things for 
himself. One of the nursing students on placement with me at the time was a Muslim. 
She said that the breakdown was caused by the older sisters doing everything for 
him. Everyone was saying to him that ‘you need to go out there, get a job, and learn 
how to be a man’. He did not have a clue about how to be a man. So from my 
perspective, I wanted to deal with this issue of dependence without being insulting to 
him or his family. He did make a recovery of sorts and went home. But then you 
think; have we sent him straight back into the same pampered situation?   
When we did start to teach him life skills and activities of daily living, I think his sisters 
were happy that we were teaching him these new things. However, at the same time 
you could see the female members of his family thinking, should we be doing that for 
him? So it was difficult for them to see that he was looking after himself. He found it 
difficult and very intimidating performing those activities of daily living when his family 
was there. It was almost like he was doing something wrong, even though he was 
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trying to look after himself. The mum was very resistant to the changes that we were 
implementing and you could not speak to the dad at all. He was not interested in 
what we had to say…He did not believe any of us. The sisters were the more 
receptive ones and they were willing to give what we recommended a try. They just 
wanted to see their brother get better.  
He was fine with things like washing and dressing. I think he was fine with performing 
these activities, because he did not want white female nurses chasing him around the 
ward. He was saying, ‘I will wash myself thank you’, and we were saying, ‘well could 
you please get on with it then’. We had to be quite firm with him and he seemed to be 
okay with us being firm with him. He showed to us that he could get on with it. 
However, when it came to other activities, he was much more resistant. I remember 
him being in the games room on the ward with another young lad and they were on 
the playstation. I watched him and it seemed that he was not willing to get up to fetch 
the controller that was nearby. I believe that he was not willing to fetch the controller 
himself, as everything was always handed to him and done for him. I said to him, ‘you 
can get it yourself you know’. Once you gave him that stern kick up the arse he got 
on with it, but I think he had got away with it for all those years. I don’t know whether 
it was laziness or just that it had always been done for him? Maybe he just expected 
things to be done for him. I think he needed a break from it all. I think that when he 
was on the ward, it was really only the time he had experienced some sort of 
independence in his life. As for eight hours of the day on the ward he was on his 
own. The guy had never experienced such independence during his life. So he 
developed the psychosis, as he could not cope all that well”.   
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
The practitioner needs to ascertain when activities of daily living and self-care are 
necessary for the service user’s recovery and when they are merely an imposition of 
the practitioner’s value system and family structure (Galanti, 2008).Thus, the 
“cultural meaning and significance of the individual’s level of functioning in self-care, 
autonomy, interpersonal, occupational and other areas of social functioning” 
(Mezzich, Caracci, Fabrega and Kirmayer, 2009, p. 397) need to be evaluated.  
Sims (1992) definition of function (presented at the beginning of this chapter 
section) relates to another important concept in the health and nursing sciences - 
that of ‘lifestyle’. The issue of ‘lifestyle’ was implicitly touched on in the previous 
student nurse’s ‘critical incident’ narrative and also came out in many of the 
interview narratives that were concerned with the ‘criterion of function’ in mental 
health assessments. In some of these cases, the student nurse or their colleagues 
in clinical placement seemed to have difficulties in separating psychopathology from 
lifestyle choices.   
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“My students are all on community placements at the moment. So they are out there 
visiting people’s homes in the community. What I have noticed and picked up on is 
how so many of them are really struggling with issues around tidiness and 
cleanliness and what they perceive as abnormal in that regard. I mean, it maybe 
somebody’s choice to live an untidy lifestyle. You know? It does not have to be an 
indicator of poor functioning. It does not have to be a symptom of mental illness. So 
students have difficulties around differentiating that. You know? Is it a chaotic and 
unhealthy lifestyle indicating mental illness, or is it just somebody’s personal choice 
to live like that”?   
(Nursing Educator, Interview) 
“We had one patient who was sort of in the culture of art and that posed quite a 
difficult scenario for the mental health team that was working with him, because his 
lifestyle did not seem very adaptive to us. His perception of art was completely 
different to the perception of the people that were working with him and seemed to 
be impacting on his everyday living and the people around him. He felt that getting a 
bike and putting it in an alleyway which blocked other people’s entrance to the place 
where he lived was art. So he was being told by art students at a local university that 
he was very artistic and how amazing these bits of art were. But to us who were 
working with him on his mental health problems, these bits of art looked just like 
rubbish. It looked like he was just accumulating rubbish and putting them in different 
places. So that was difficult to deal with, because what we were saying to him was, 
‘you’re cluttering your accommodation and you’ve got a risk of being evicted’. In his 
eyes, he was part of this art culture.   
So that was a tricky one to handle, because it was kind of going against what his 
culture that he was living in was. And he even said that he can’t understand why- 
because he believes that we don’t understand him. He just thinks he’s been in the 
(mental health) services for so long that people believe that everything he does is 
part of his mental illness. So it is a really tricky one really because... It’s as if, as 
professionals, we’re overlooking…Not overlooking, but not being really sensitive to 
what our patients are doing. We are maybe classifying them as symptoms of a 
mental illness, rather than just thinking it may be part of their culture and how they 
normally live. I think I do that sometimes with the patients”.   
(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 2) 
The issue of ‘lifestyles’, which runs through these two narratives, has been defined 
in the occupational therapy literature as the degree, range, and balance of self-care, 
work, and leisure, which are organised into daily, weekly, or otherwise regular 
routines (Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1996). Furthermore, these routines are 
seen to affect motivation, learning skills, socialisation, and personal opportunities for 
growth and development. The term ‘occupational lifestyle’ also is frequently used in 
occupational therapy, and refers to “a person’s total pattern and manner of going 
about occupations” (Kielhofner, 1995, p. 31). While there is a personal element to 
178 
 
the patterning of lifestyle, these patterns reflect the wider organisation of the social 
and cultural group to which the individual belongs29 (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a).These 
points about lifestyle again demonstrate the need for practitioners to consider 
carefully the cultural meaning of functioning.             
‘Multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) not only involve the values of the 
service user and/or their family, but also the cultural values of the practitioner and 
their profession (Gardenswartz and Rowe, 1998; Galanti and Sheikh, 2009). Cultural 
standards of ‘normality’ and ‘function’ involve other factors such as appropriate 
dress, smell, body adornments, communication styles, emotional states, facial 
expressions, tone of voice, and use of language. The important thing to note is that 
these factors are all influenced by culture and the ‘appropriate’ communication of 
these factors varies by social context and relationship (Pauwels, 1995; Helman, 
2007). Social norms also vary by age group, gender, occupation, and social rank, 
and a host of other social and cultural factors. Some scholars (e.g., Fitzgerald, 
Mullavey-O’Byrne and Clemson, 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Galanti, 2008; 
Awaad, 2003; Yang-Shek, Tsunaka and Lim, 2006; Kondo, 2007; Lovering, 2008) 
have argued that the philosophical and cultural basis of nursing and related health 
professions needs to be re-evaluated. This re-evaluation especially is needed in 
clinical interactions and cultural contexts where this philosophical basis is not 
shared. As Minas (1990, p. 278) explains, in order “to recognise the cultural 
dimension in patients and their illnesses, clinicians must first become aware of their 
own cultural encumbrances”. 
The Assessment of ‘Risk’       
During the two focus groups with the student nurses, participants repeatedly brought 
up the assessment of ‘risk’ as a means of differentiating psychopathological from 
religious and cultural phenomena. Considering its saliency in the group discussions, 
it is surprising that the topic of ‘risk assessment’ was not touched on more explicitly in 
the interviews. In the focus groups, participants mentioned that the ‘risk of harm’ was 
a more important assessment criterion in differentiating psychopathology from 
religious/culturally sanctioned experiences than the content or falsity of beliefs. In 
                                                          
29
Research by Fitzgerald and Mullavey-O’Byrne (1996) found that many students in the health 
sciences conflate the concepts of lifestyle and culture, and culture was not viewed as something that 
influences lifestyle.    
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particular, the participants focused on the perceived ‘risk of harm’ that the service 
user posed to themselves and/or to the people around them. A service user who 
believed that he was an angel with wings that could fly, and who would try to 
demonstrate this by jumping off tables in an acute assessment ward (posing a health 
and safety risk and serious self-injury risk), and another service user who would not 
leave her bed to eat and drink, because she did not want to miss anything that (she 
believed) the angels were saying to her (‘risk of self-neglect’), were examples of 
religious themed delusions that could pose ‘risk to oneself’. The risks of self-harm, 
suicide and the service user jeopardising their own personal safety were also 
mentioned and associated with religious type delusions.     
Furthermore, in one of the interviews, a student nurse mentioned the perceived risk 
that a Spanish service user’s reported conviction30 in their religious healing abilities 
posed to other people on an acute assessment ward. The student in this case talked 
about how the nursing staff prevented the service user from giving herbs to her fellow 
service users on the ward. It seemed that from the student’s version of events, the 
service user was utterly convinced of the curative or healing properties of these 
herbs in the treatment of her fellow service users’ mental illnesses. However, 
according to the student, there was a fear among the nursing staff that the ingestion 
of such herbs would interact negatively with the effects of prescribed medication. 
Eeles’ (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003) aforementioned research with 
registered mental health nurses also found that ‘risk to self’ (by neglect or self-harm) 
and ‘risk to others’ (being aggressive, or by acts such as fire setting) were important 
criteria in the clinical evaluation of spiritual experiences. These issues of ‘risk to 
oneself’ and the ‘risk to others’, which were posed by delusions with religious content 
are conveyed in the following narrative extracts.      
“If there are no consequences to that person’s religious experiences…..Negative 
or…Whatever…Then fine. But I don’t think it’s fine that you can believe what you 
like. When it starts to have kind of you know harmful consequences on the patient, 
then those beliefs are not acceptable. I mean, they go from fasting to their starving 
themselves, or they think that they’re sent or whatever. Or they start to punish 
themselves and flog themselves, or whatever. I think those lines have then been 
crossed”. 
                                                          
30
 ‘Conviction’ is seen as one of the measurable dimensions of delusions with religious content (Hole, 
Rush and Beck, 1979; Kendler, Glazer and Morgenstern, 1983; Garety and Hemsley, 1994; Eisen, et 
al., 1998; Appelbaum, Robbins and Roth, 1999; Pierre, 2001; Dein, 2012). 
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(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 2) 
“I think from what I’ve experienced…I think that as long as what they’re saying isn’t 
posing any risk to themselves or anybody else, then I can handle what they’re 
saying. It then does not matter what they believe, as it is not causing them or 
anybody else any harm. Yes…. I had one guy who thought that God had given him 
special powers to remove evil forces that might be residing inside other people and 
that he’d have to get those out of those people.  So that posed then a risk to other 
people…..About how is he going to get things out of people and he discussed what 
he would do. So I think it can be quite risky at times”.   
(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
These extracts highlight the clinical significance of differentiating delusional beliefs 
with religious content from normal religious beliefs (Dein, 2004; 2010a; Mahgoub, 
2008; Mohr and Pfeifer, 2009). As Kingdon and colleagues’ (2010, p. 241) note, 
although many practitioners “will recall instances of patients with religious delusions 
who for the most part sit and quietly read the Bible, religious delusions can result in 
risk to the patient and others”. Some of these delusions may focus on literal 
translations of passages in the Bible and other religious texts, and include themes 
such as plucking out the ‘offending eye’31, severing the ‘evil arm’, ‘autocastration’, or 
cutting out the ‘sinning’ tongue (Blackner and Wong, 1963; Kushner, 1967; Waugh, 
1986; Field and Waldfogel, 1995; Thara and Eaton, 1996; Mucci and Dalgalarrondo, 
2000; Siddle, Haddock, Tarrier and Faragher, 2002; Reeves and Liberto, 2006).   
Another piece of research (Patton, 2004) discovered that approximately half of the 
reported cases of self-inflicted eye injury were associated with psychotic 
preoccupations about sinfulness and higher deities. Scarnati, Madry and Wise’s 
(1991) research is of significance to student nurses working in forensic placement 
settings. Their study of psychiatric prisoners in an American penal institution showed 
that 61% of the inmates believed that God or the Devil communicated directly with 
them, whereas, some of the prisoners believed that God or the Devil commanded 
them to do things. Delusions with religious content also have been associated with 
poorer prognoses and outcomes (Mohr and Pfeifer, 2009). However, the publications 
just cited have not always clearly defined the proposed mechanism of action for the 
consequences of having delusions with religious content (Siddle, Haddock, Tarrier 
and Faragher, 2002). These studies do appear, though, to validate student nurses’ 
                                                          
31
 A person literally following the command in Matthew 5:29 of the Bible: “If your right eye causes you 
to sin, gauge it out and throw it away. It is better for you to lose one part of your body than for your 
whole body to be thrown into hell”.  
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reported concerns with risk and being able to adequately distinguish religious themed 
delusions from normal religious beliefs. Moreover, we must be mindful of the reported 
tendency by mental health practitioners to pathologise service users’ expressions of 
religion and spirituality (Sims, 1992; 1994; Clarke, 2001). As Fallot (1998) notes, this 
tendency is fuelled by concerns with legal liability and the ‘command’ hallucinations 
experienced by some service users. 
Emotional Valence  
Some of the participants suggested that negative emotional valence was an 
important criterion in distinguishing between culturally normal and psychopathological 
phenomena. For these participants, high levels of distress and negative emotions 
indicated psychopathology.   
“I think that if their (service user’s) religious beliefs are not doing them any harm then 
fine. However, this is not obviously the case if their religious beliefs are doing them 
harm in some way. What I mean is if they are very negative and distressing, then 
you have to assess it is mental illness on that basis. As a nurse, you can’t ignore that 
negativity and distress”.  
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
“The lady that I was just talking about had a diagnosis of schizophrenia and she 
believed that God was telling her that she was evil. And I think that was quite heart 
breaking for everyone on the ward, as she was such a lovely woman and clearly was 
not evil at all. It was really difficult to say to her, ‘no, this isn’t true’, because she may 
have then perceived you as a liar or that God was lying to her. So you could not say 
to her that it was not God speaking to you, or that it was a voice in your head that 
was saying those things. And you could tell it was an abnormal experience, as she 
was clearly in distress all the time. I believe that from her background and notes, she 
was a ‘Seventh Day Adventist’. It was really heart breaking to see her consumed by 
the voices in her head and her distress. She would hear these voices all the time and 
she would just sit down and cry. So that was an abnormal experience to me. I found 
that really difficult to handle, because while I don’t have a problem in principle with 
people being religious, I just thought how is this helping you? It just seemed to be 
making her more ill and more miserable all the time. It did not seem to be a coping 
strategy for this lady. Rather, it was contributing to her problems and exacerbating 
her condition. But rather than find ways to move forward and forgive herself, she just 
seemed to blame herself all the time. And she kept on thinking that she was a bad 
person and how she had made a complete mess of her life. And when she was well, 
she was just a lot happier and obviously, she did not talk about the voice which had 
told her how evil she was. She would sit and happily read a Bible and sing hymns. 
And she would encourage you to sing along with her and what not. So she was 
talking about her religion, but in a more positive and supportive way”.         
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
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Assessing the clinical significance of religious phenomena by ‘emotional outcome’ is 
supported in the research literature (e.g., Slade, 1976; Buckley, 1981;  Oxman, et al., 
1988; Grof and Grof, 1990; Greyson, 1997; Honig, 1998; Lewis-Fernandez, 1998; 
Peters, Joseph and Garety, 1999; Peters, Day, McKenna and Orbach, 1999; Pierre, 
2001; Butler, 2006; Cardena, Weiner, Van Duijl  and Terhune, 2006; Menezes and 
Moreira-Almeida, 2009; 2010; Peters, 2010; Moreira-Almeida and Cardena, 2011). 
For one student nurse participant, the positive nature of a service user’s religious 
experience was one of the factors that excluded the possibility of psychopathology. 
The student distinguished this case from the more distressing and negative 
experiences with religious content, which she often encountered on acute 
assessment wards. Again, this interview extract highlights the negative impact on a 
service user’s wellbeing when their experiences are not considered in their context. 
“I have found from my own experience on acute placements that even if people are 
not overtly religious when they are well, when they are poorly religion comes to the 
forefront far more. This was the case for quite a few of the patients that I encountered 
whilst working on this acute ward. It was different in the case of this lady, as she was 
very positive and religion was part of her everyday life. The religious vision she saw 
just seemed to be a very normal and everyday thing to her. There was no distress in 
this case. In fact, the most distressing thing for this lady was that the staff did not 
initially believe her experiences. They had questioned the validity of her experiences 
by interpreting the religious vision as evidence of psychosis. In fact, it later turned out 
that she was not suffering from mental illness at all. It was just misinterpretation on 
the part of the doctors”.   
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview)                                                                                                                                               
The criterion of ‘emotional outcome’ is not a fool proof strategy in the assessment of 
religious phenomena (Peters, 2010). Indeed, it has been reported that some 
psychotic patients have regarded their voices as benevolent (Chadwick and 
Birchwood, 1994) and others have enjoyed their company, and even tried to invoke 
them (Romme and Escher, 1989). The following narrative also raises the issue of 
whether ‘etic’ measurements of function always correspond with a person’s 
subjective fulfilment. 
“I have come across a gentleman who’s like…His belief in God and belief he was on 
a path to help God gave him a lot of confidence. He didn’t have a lot of confidence 
before and all of a sudden he had this new found confidence, and he felt able to go 
out, which he was not able to do before in the past. To him, it didn’t matter that no 
one believed him, as he felt empowered by it and it really empowered him as well. It 
gave him so much confidence and in the end he learnt to control it and to not talk to 
people as much about it. Which was sad in a way, as he felt like he couldn’t”.  
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(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1)    
Peters (2010) suggests that some patients with psychosis have deliberately refused 
neuroleptic medication, or ingested cannabis (or other drugs) to restore their 
psychotic states. Presumably, the inducement of a psychotic state is preferable to a 
non-psychotic reality. Furthermore, although the initial stages of a religious 
experience can be accompanied by personal suffering that suffering can be 
overcome as the person comprehends and gains control over the experience 
(Menezes and Moreira-Almeida, 2009). Thus, using emotional outcome to make a 
differential diagnosis between a religious experience and a mental disorder with 
religious content is not without its problems.  
Other Strategies  
‘Relying On Intuition’             
A small number of the student nurses reported relying on their own intuitive instincts 
when trying to differentiate psychopathological from culturally normative phenomena. 
In the next narrative, the student described this intuitive instinct as a ‘gut feeling’.                                                                                                                              
 “It was difficult at first as you are just a student. You are on this ward to learn and 
observe, but acute wards can be very manic and stressful at times. As a student you 
can also be a bit unsure of yourself, as you are developing your skills as a nurse in 
that ward environment. You don’t always believe in yourself because you have not 
got the experience like the registered nurses. However, somebody said to me quite 
early on in my education that ‘gut feelings count for quite a lot’. And when evaluating 
whether that patient’s experience of the ‘Guardian Angel’ was part of her culture or 
something connected to a mental illness-I just had the ‘gut feeling’ that it was a 
normal experience and part of her culture. ‘Gut feelings’ seem to be an important 
element in nursing”.     
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
The issues (importance) of ‘time’ and ‘being with a patient’ are brought out in this 
focus group narrative. 
Male Student 1: “Again, it’s a difficult one of course-unless you know the patient and 
you know their cultural history and cultural beliefs. I think we do use that as nurses a 
lot of the time and you do use emotional response sometimes. Sometimes you use 
that and just get a feeling don’t you that something’s not right? There is that instinct 
that something is different and connected to a psychosis. You can then chat with the 
other nurses on the ward and see if they have that perception as well. If you know 
their normal behaviour and then suddenly one day they do something that’s 
abnormal and outside that normal behaviour, then it does kick in….You think that 
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there is something different here. But it takes a long time sometimes to get….You 
have to build up that rapport anyway and you have to build up that therapeutic trust 
with a patient. You have to take time to do that”. 
Male Student 2: “Especially on the ward if you know what I mean? That ‘instinct’ 
really is so important. But as my colleague was saying, it can take time to develop 
with patients. If you know someone well enough it doesn’t matter where they’re from, 
who they are, religion, or colour of skin, or anything. If you know them or get to know 
them, then you know their culture. They may be acting normally within the context of 
their culture, but it may initially seem bizarre to you as a nurse-when you do not 
know them. But as long as you get the time to know them and you sort of understand 
them, then when they do something that is even abnormal in the context of their 
culture, then you can pick up on it quite quickly. So I think it is about how much you 
know the patient, which you get to know by spending time with them. You get to 
know how that person behaves in a certain situation. But that kind of ‘instinct’ can 
take weeks to sort of establish with someone anyway”. 
(Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 2) 
The registered mental health nurse participants in Eeles (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe 
and Wellman, 2003) aforementioned research drew on their intuitive feelings when 
assessing the nature of spiritual experiences. These intuitive feelings were reported 
as being grounded in the therapeutic relationship and in a subjective analysis of the 
person under assessment. In some cases, the nurse participants suggested that they 
could detect subtle perturbations in their ability to relate to the service user and with 
“their interpersonal comfort or discomfort with those under evaluation” (Eeles, Lowe 
and Wellman, 2003, p. 204). This discomfort was associated with psychotic illness in 
the person under evaluation. Eeles related this ‘intuitive’ nursing ability to the 
‘praecox feeling’ concept (Schwartz and Wiggins, 1987). 
The use of ‘intuition’ in the nursing process has been criticised for being ‘unscientific’ 
and as an ‘irrational’ form of understanding (Ainsworth and Wilson, 1994). On the 
other hand, it is seen as the hallmark of an ‘expert’ nurse practitioner and an intrinsic 
feature of the phenomenological approach to nursing (Benner, 1984). Easen and 
Wilcockson (1996) argue that intuition should be viewed as a non-linear reasoning 
process, which draws on relevant resources of knowledge and former experiences. 
From an anthropological perspective however, these intuitive feelings are influenced 
by the personal/ familial culture of the student nurse and the cultural baggage of the 
primary medical system (Fitzgerald, 1992; Hahn, 1995). All clinical interactions are 
‘multicultural’ (Fitzgerald, 1992).      
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Religious Coping and Psychopathology  
As psychosis is said to involve changes to previous belief systems, some 
knowledge of the service user’s background may usefully inform the assessment 
process (Kingdon, Siddle, Farooq and Rathod, 2010). However, it can still be 
difficult for the practitioner to determine exactly when the person started to develop 
psychotic ideas, especially when gradual change has occurred and the person’s 
beliefs have evolved other time (Kingdon, Siddle, Farooq and Rathod, 2010). 
Furthermore, an increase in religious activities and/or religious conviction may not 
necessarily indicate psychopathology, but rather could signify an attempt at coping 
with the distress of mental illness (ICMR, 1988; Bhugra, et al., 1999; Bhugra, 
2002b; King, Weich, Nazroo and Blizard, 2006).      
In terms of the empirical findings, a few of the student nurses described how it was 
often easier to distinguish delusions from normal religious beliefs where the 
service user appeared to have no religious beliefs prior to the onset of psychosis. 
Conversely, it seemed more difficult to separate psychopathology from normal 
religious beliefs when the service user had a religious background before the 
development of psychosis.    
“I’ve had some service users who are very religious and I haven’t known them before 
they might become ill. So I don’t know whether that’s part of their illness or not, but if 
it supports them you can be supportive of that. On the other hand, if you know they 
have no religious background from their psychiatric history and they start expressing 
loads of religious ideas-then you can take that as a sign of their illness”.   
(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 2) 
In the next narrative, the student nurse interprets a sudden religious conversion 
during a psychotic episode as evidence of psychopathology. This brought to mind 
William James’ (1961) observation that sudden religious conversion is more likely to 
occur in the ‘sick soul’ than in the ‘healthy minded’. 
“There was another patient on this ward and she had never shared with the nursing 
staffs before any Muslim beliefs. Then she suddenly decided that she was a Muslim. 
She was convinced that she was a Muslim and she had been for her entire life. This 
was with a lady from a white ethnic background who had expressed no religion 
before this. There was nothing in her notes about this. She was sectioned, but she 
was allowed out on escorted leave. And she then just came back in on the ward one 
day and she was dressed fully in the Muslim attire. She was like; ‘I am a Muslim and I 
have always been’. But that was probably more to do with her illness. She sort of 
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showed the same.....As this other lady. Was she copying this other lady and her 
religious practices? So it was hard to say. I think it was one of the healthcare 
assistants that said to her; ‘do you realise that you cannot drink and smoke when you 
are a Muslim’? And she was like; ‘well I can. I can in mine’. So in that sense, it was 
probably something to do more with her illness that was causing her to act like that. 
She was somebody where their illness did make them act differently and she had so 
many different personalities and things. So it was definitely easier with that patient 
than the Afro-Caribbean lady that I mentioned. With the other Afro-Caribbean lady, 
there was no way for us nursing staffs to say; ‘well, it is a product of her illness’. 
There was no way that we could say that because nobody knew and nobody had 
come into contact with her before.  We did not know her full background and about 
her religion-so we could not make that determination”. 
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
One of the concerns expressed by practitioners in Kilshaw, Ndegaw and Curran’s 
(2002) qualitative study of mental health professionals’ clinical interactions with Afro-
Caribbean service users, was if a service user had suddenly become religious or 
more religious recently. Such changes in religious conviction were seen by the 
professionals as pointing to psychopathology. Thus, religion was, in many cases, 
regarded as pathological, problematic, and harmful. As Loewenthal (1999; 2007) 
notes, there is much evidence in the clinical literature to suggest that the past 
tendency to misdiagnose religious coping behaviour as symptomatic of 
psychopathology still endures in clinical practice.    
Although such changes in religious conviction and/or activity might be evidence of 
increasing distress, only viewing it in this light is problematic (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and 
Curran, 2002). A few of the student nurse participants mentioned that the service 
user under their care and supervision was possibly drawing on religious practices to 
cope with the distress of psychosis. The implication, therefore, was that the practices 
were not necessarily psychopathological. 
“On the acute assessment ward there was a lady who came in and she was….When 
they brought her in and assessed her, she had surrounded herself with crosses. She 
had just got Christianity crosses everywhere and I believe that it was a new religion 
for her. But that was seen as part of her psychosis. She was like really… She was 
turning to God and stuff. But she’s just gone through a divorce. She just like split up 
from her husband. She has got no family over here…So it might be just that she was 
very distressed at that time”. 
(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
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Koenig (2007) notes in his review of the religion and psychotic disorders literature 
that much attention has focused on the role that religious conversion plays in the 
aetiology of psychoses. Several studies (e.g., ICMR, 1988; Bhugra, et al., 1999; 
Bhugra, 2002b) have found that changes in religious activity or interest follow rather 
than precede the onset of psychotic illness. In particular, research, which has been 
conducted in India, revealed that 22% to 27% of patients with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia reported an increase in religious activity following their diagnosis 
(ICMR, 1988; Bhugra, et al., 1999). These findings showed an increased resort to 
religious beliefs and practices in order to cope with the distressing nature of 
psychotic illness among a highly religious population. In a UK based study, Dinesh 
Bhugra (2002b) examined service users from four ethnic groups (e.g., 
Trinidadian/London, White/London, Asian/London, African-Caribbean) with signs of 
first-onset schizophrenia. It became evident that religious conversion was secondary 
to the development of the psychosis. Furthermore, many of the service users had 
converted to a new religion following their diagnosis. Bhugra wrote that such 
conversions were at least some attempt at regaining self-control as the self-concept 
began to alter with the emergence of psychotic symptoms. One explanation based 
on Bhugra’s findings, is that when a person is experiencing distress, they may adopt 
religious coping behaviours which decrease when there are signs of remission. An 
increase in religious conviction and/or activities, therefore, is not so much 
symptomatic of psychopathology as a form of coping with distress (Loewenthal, 
2007).   
Kilshaw, Ndegaw and Curran (2002, p. 98) also observed that it “is not uncommon 
for people to use familiar, yet previously unaccessed belief systems to explain and 
cast meaning on their experiences”. Therefore, “premature judgements rooted in a 
theoretical connection between religion and psychopathology fails to do justice to the 
multiple and diverse functions that religious and spiritual experience may play in the 
lives of consumers” (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002, p. 100). Fallot, Freeman 
and Hayden (1997) suggest that the practitioner can avoid making such premature 
judgements by making a careful assessment of the role of religious beliefs and 
practices in the service user’s overall life structure and functioning. This is especially 
important when research has shown that religion can be a coping mechanism that 
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reduces anxiety and assists in recovery from mental illness (Park, Cohen and Herb, 
1990; Fallot, 1998) and other disorders (Matthews, et al., 1998). 
Summary 
When attempting to differentiate psychopathology from culturally validated 
phenomenology, student nurses and their colleagues in clinical placement assessed  
‘functioning’, ‘risk’, and ‘emotional valence’. These assessment strategies are 
associated with the criterion of ‘outcomes’ (Jackson and Fulford, 1997). The criterion 
of ‘outcomes’ suggests that negative as opposed to neutral or positive outcomes are 
suggestive of psychopathology. In some cases, the participants made a connection 
between loss of function and a lack of ‘insight’. Some of the participants also 
described how they often relied on their ‘intuition’ or ‘gut instincts’, while others 
evaluated the experience from the perspective of the service user’s religious 
background.  
These criteria need to be considered carefully within the service user’s local context. 
This point seemed to have particular saliency for the assessment of function. Thus, a 
nuanced understanding of the “sociocultural context in which the service user lives is 
vital, not only in accurately assessing psychopathology but in evaluating skills, 
personal and social resources, and coping capacities” (Minas, 1990, p. 278). At the 
same time, culturally appropriate and therapeutic care can only occur if the 
practitioner carefully considers the influence of their personal/familial culture and the 
cultural baggage of the primary medical system (Fitzgerald, 1992). The next chapter 
further explores how the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and 
Good, 1986) was addressed in student nurses’ clinical placements. In particular, the 
focus is on approaches which saw phenomenology as not being consistent with local 
context (Wing, Cooper and Sartorius, 1974). 
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Chapter 8  
‘Dealing’ with the ‘Normative Uncertainty’ Evaluation 
Dilemma:  The ‘Importance’ of Context 
Introduction  
I describe in this chapter how mental health student nurses and their colleagues in 
clinical placement drew on their own stocks of cultural knowledge, or sought the 
advice of culturally informed staff members, the service user’s family members, or 
religious group spokespersons when differentiating psychopathology from culturally 
normative phenomena. These approaches attempted to evaluate psychopathology in 
its local (‘cultural’) context (Wing, Cooper and Sartorius, 1974).In this chapter, these 
approaches are situated within the medical anthropological literature on ‘cultural 
brokerage’ (Willigen, 2002; Lo, 2010), ‘explanatory models’ (Kleinman, Eisenberg 
and Good, 1978), and ‘clinical recognition’ (Carpenter-Song, 2011).      
Cultural Knowledge                                                                 
There were a few ‘critical incidents’ where a mental health student nurse or 
professional colleague drew upon their own personal store of cultural knowledge in 
order to differentiate psychopathology from culturally normal phenomena. A student 
nurse participant even mentioned using information she had obtained from mass 
media sources to differentiate psychotic influenced delusions from normal religious 
beliefs. The reliability of such information was not questioned in this instance. Other 
student nurse participants suggested that they applied their own religious beliefs 
when differentiating delusions from normal religious beliefs. The assessment criterion 
in these cases was based on the content of the beliefs and their (in)compatibility with 
what was perceived as religious orthodoxy. Two of these students saw the service 
user when they were well or in recovery and when they were experiencing a 
psychotic episode. Their assessment was therefore also based on the psychiatric 
history of the service user. According to these two student nurses, the psychotic 
episode had drastically altered the manifestation and content of the service user’s 
beliefs.     
“Yes, definitely….I draw on my own religious beliefs. And because of my beliefs, I 
can usually tell that someone is psychotic, as their normal religious beliefs do not 
usually go along with their illness. The psychosis seems to drastically change and 
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alter the expression of their religious beliefs to when they were well or in recovery. 
When they are psychotic, the expression of their religious beliefs does not go along 
with the conventional wisdom of a religious worldview. Even if you have got some 
background knowledge about the religion you can never get it right in their eyes”. 
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview) 
“The lady I am thinking about now was in her fifties and I had some knowledge of her 
religious beliefs because of my Irish and Catholic background. And I saw her when 
she was well as well. So she was very different when she was unwell and when she 
was in the manic phase of her bipolar illness. She had it in her head that she was 
going to marry God and she needed to divorce her husband. Which was obviously 
weird as it conflicted with her very strong Catholic beliefs? And anybody that 
disagreed with her, she got extremely angry with”. 
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
In the next narrative, a student nurse participant talked more specifically about how 
he drew on his Christian religious beliefs when differentiating psychotic delusions 
from normal religious beliefs.  
“There was this patient whose experience of God I found very hard to balance with 
my own beliefs. He was from a Christian evangelical background. I think he attended 
an Afro-Caribbean church. He had developed psychosis as a consequence of 
smoking too much cannabis. I think his parents were very much involved with the 
church. I think that his dad was a pastor at one of the churches. So his psychosis 
was induced by cannabis. But his beliefs seemed to fixate around reading the Bible 
and praying constantly, as he believed that would keep evil people and the Devil at 
bay. However, his ideas about the Devil didn’t seem to match up with Biblical 
tradition. His beliefs matched up more with a kind of mystical tradition. It was the kind 
of thing you would see in the ‘Simpsons’ cartoon.    
I come from a Christian background, so I am aware of praying and actively listening 
to the voice of God. However, when someone says ‘Jesus has told me to do this’ and 
it is directly in conflict with something in the Bible-for me personally that is a difficult 
boundary to deal with. However, as a nurse, I have got to define whether that is 
psychosis. If so, should I treat that or should I go with the recovery model, accept this 
behaviour and get them to act in a way that will be beneficial for them. So it was 
much easier to ascertain that the Afro-Caribbean gentleman was suffering from 
psychosis. In the case of the Afro-Caribbean gentleman, I could draw on my own 
personal Christian beliefs to see whether this chap’s beliefs accorded with accepted 
Christian tradition. Like I said, I could work out that his beliefs about the Devil did not 
accord with Christian tradition”.   
(Male 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
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This narrative and other critical incidents like it brought to mind the concept of ‘clinical 
recognition’32and how it should “be configured” (Carpenter-Song, 2011, p.79) in 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992).To put it another way, problems 
arise when the practitioner’s cultural knowledge or understanding of a clinical issue is 
used reductively-that is, in a way that bounds the experience of the service user by 
not asking the service user “‘who are you?’”, but to claim “‘I know who you are’” 
(Carpenter-Song, 2011, p. 179)!This critique bears resemblance to the 
anthropological critiques (Culley, 1996; 2000; 2001; 2006; Santiago-Irizarry, 1996;   
Good and Hannah, 2010; Willen, Bullon and Good, 2010; Good, Hannah and Willen, 
2011; Kirmayer, 2012) of culture specific (competence) knowledge that were 
discussed in the first findings chapter. Or as one nursing educator noted when talking 
                                                          
32
Carpenter-Song (2011) in her theory of ‘recognition’ in clinical relationships builds on Judith Butler’s 
(2005) work on the conception of the self and recognition. In particular, Carpenter-Song notes (2011, 
p. 176) that “Butler writes against a certain formulation of the self as individualistic as well as 
transparent and, thus knowable”, thus positing “the fundamental relationality and opacity of the self”. 
Such a conception of the ‘self’ as opaque and constituted through relationships holds “a specific 
implication for an ethical bearing towards the other” (Butler, 2005, p. 20) in the clinical relationship. 
Drawing on the work of the feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero, Butler (2005, p.31) states that “the 
question most central to recognition is a direct one and it is addressed to the other: ‘Who are you?’”. 
According to Butler (2005), this ‘who are you’ “question assumes that there is an other before us 
whom we do not know and cannot fully apprehend” (p. 31). Carpenter-Song (2011, p. 176) argues, 
that this “resounding question-who are you?-is a crucial one for therapeutics” and particularly “for 
mental health care because the self is fully implicated in mental, behavioural, and emotional problems 
(compare Estroff, et al., 1991)”. The conditions and dynamics of clinical recognition “consist in the 
time taken in the encounter, in remembering details of context, in continuity, in listening and bearing 
silences, and in the ineffable-what one feels ‘chest to chest, breast to breast’” (Carpenter-Song, 2011, 
p. 176). There is a need to remain constantly open and curious “and not predetermine what’s going to 
come out” of the service user’s mouth (Carpenter-Song, 2011, p. 177).   
By bringing recognition to the fore of the clinical process, Carpenter-Song suggests that the 
practitioner can elide what Foucault (1973) described in ‘The Birth of the Clinic’ as the fundamental 
shift in biomedicine from ‘how do you feel’ to an explicit focus on ‘where does it hurt’? The qualities of 
uncertainty and opacity therefore become the fundamental conditions of, rather than obstacles to the 
clinical process (Carpenter-Song, 2011). When the practitioner continues to ask the service user ‘who 
are you’, the practitioner is “introduced to greater and greater specificity and singularity” (Carpenter-
Song, 2011, p. 177), a point articulated by Paul Verhaeghe (2004) in his distinction between medical 
and clinical psychodiagnostics. This point was also echoed by John Strauss (1994, p. 106) who wrote 
that “life is in the details” and there is nothing general about life. Furthermore, recognition is never 
complete, “but instead exists on an ever elusive horizon” (Carpenter-Song, 2011, p. 178). For a 
practitioner to recognise that they do not know everything brings to mind Butler’s (2005) argument 
that recognition constitutes “a disposition of humility and generosity alike” (p. 42)–a perspective 
echoed by the ‘cultural humility’ approach to cultural competence (Tervalon and Murray-Garcia, 
1998).    
According to Carpenter-Song (2011), the ethical stance of desiring “recognition without any 
expectation of a full or final answer, may be important for all patients, and may point the way toward a 
more informed universalism” (p. 178). However, this imperative is likely to become more apparent in 
clinical contexts of ‘hyper diversity’ (Hannah, 2011), where service users have different expectations 
of care, help seeking behaviours, and limited English language proficiency (Betancourt, Green, 
Carrillo and Park, 2005). At the same time, one cannot deny the structural constraints of the political 
economy of care or the cultural ideology of the primary medical system on the dynamics of clinical 
recognition (Lo, 2010). Carpenter-Song (2011, p. 180) notes that practitioners “can only be good as 
the conditions in which they practice”.        
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about how mental health student nurses apply their own religious beliefs in 
differentiating delusions from normal religious beliefs:     
“But I do wonder if that alternatively means that there was only one interpretation for 
those patients as well. Does that make sense? So it is kind of the right thing to do, 
but it is also worrying…That might limit things too much the other way and there then 
isn’t a balance”. 
(Nursing Educator, Staff Focus Group)  
In contrast, ‘clinical recognition’ “implies a stance, an inclination toward the other that 
desires to know but understands the utter impossibility of realizing that longing” 
(Carpenter-Song, 2011, p. 179). The concept of clinical recognition therefore, is 
grounded in the experiences of service users and practitioners and approaches 
difference (‘otherness’) through openness (Carpenter-Song, 2011).  
In the next critical incident, the student nurse participant described in detail how they 
were able to provide significant input to a primary health assessment. The student 
was able to do so by drawing on their own cultural knowledge of a form of self harm 
that the nurse in charge of the assessment was not culturally aware of. Thus, the 
clinical evaluation error: Diagnosing the signs and symptoms of psychopathology as 
cultural differences (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; 
Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Stolk, 2009) was avoided in this clinical interaction. The 
other important point to note is that the student did not just draw on this cultural 
knowledge to make an assumption (‘I know who you are’ [Carpenter-Song, 2011]) 
about the service user’s behaviour. In fact, according to the student’s account of 
events, this cultural knowledge was used as a ‘guide post’ (Galanti, 2008) to explore 
the meaning and context of the behaviour with the service user (‘who are 
you?’[Carpenter-Song, 2011]).   
“I was recently on a primary health assessment where we had a young guy come 
in….Who came in and he was describing interactions with his friends that the nurse 
undertaking the assessment had no knowledge of. He was talking about self-harm 
and he was saying that he and his friends do these ‘smileys’. It just made me 
realise the barriers and the cultural differences, because I knew what he was talking 
about, even though the nurse doing the assessment didn’t. And I could then explore 
with him, about whether he was doing this on his own or with his friends. The nurse 
in charge of the assessment was a lot older than me. I think she was in her early 
sixties and she had no idea about what a ‘smiley’ was. A ‘smiley’ is where you light 
up a lighter and then burn yourself. It then leaves a scar that looks like a smile. So 
the nurse in charge was thinking that it was just about him having a laugh with his 
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mates. However, for me knowing what a ‘smiley’ was….I was able to say to him, 
‘well do you do it on your own or do you do that with other people’? He said ‘no, I do 
it on my own most of the time’. It is normally carried out in a situation where a group 
of friends is goading each other on. I have known people to do it, because of peer 
pressure and trying to show off and stuff like that. Of which he said he did do, but 
he also went on to say he did it on his own, which is in a completely different 
context.  
I had not heard of people doing ‘smileys’ on their own before. I went away thinking 
that obviously, that must be abnormal behaviour. I felt that in this situation, I was 
able to contribute a lot more information to the assessment. I was able to inform the 
nurse who had no knowledge of what a ‘smiley’ was and what it involved and stuff 
like that. So I felt I could contribute and actually say it was self-harm. I mean, the 
nurse initially just thought, it was him just larking around with his mates and she had 
no idea of what it was. He just kept saying ‘smileys’ and that was really the only 
information that he was giving. And she was sitting there thinking; well what is that? 
I then asked him, ‘what situations do you do it in? Is it on your own or is it with a 
group of people and how often do you do it’? And I was just trying to get as much 
information about it as possible. Rather, than just dismissing it as an act of larking 
around with his mates. He also had ADHD and he had very high anxiety. He was 
learning about how to manage that and involved in that was the self-harm. He said 
that he burnt himself with a lighter as it was a release and it made him feel that he 
was in a bit more control of things. It could have been easy to say ‘oh, it is just him 
larking around with his friends’. But the reality of the situation was that he was also 
doing it on his own and for different reasons rather than just people goading him 
on”.    
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview) 
This student’s narrative shows that even the assessment of risk is not always a cut 
and dried issue and may need to account for cultural norms (in this case, the 
subcultural norms regulating the practice of ‘smileys’) and the context in which the 
behaviour was enacted.  Once again, we can see the possible relevancy of Helman’s 
(2007) ‘dimensions of social behaviour’ model in understanding how the student 
nurse participant came to define the service user’s behaviour as a form of self-harm 
(‘uncontrolled abnormality’), rather than as a culturally normal behaviour (i.e., a 
‘smiley’ is a culturally acceptable form of behaviour when carried out in a group 
context with friends [‘controlled abnormality’33])-albeit in its subcultural context.     
                                                          
33
 Helman (2007, p.247) defined ‘controlled abnormality’ in the following quotation. 
“Most societies, especially those with rigid codes of normal behaviour, often make provision for 
certain specified occasions where these codes are deliberately flouted or inverted, and ‘abnormal’ 
behaviour whether of the individual, or of the group, becomes the temporary norm. Despite this, their 
behaviour is actually tightly controlled in terms of where it happens, and for how long it lasts, although 
to the outsider it may appear wholly abnormal. One example of this, has been called by 
anthropologists ‘rites of reversal’ or ‘symbolic inversions’, which Babcock defines as ‘any act of 
expressive behaviour that inverts, contradicts, abrogates or in some fashion presents an alternative to 
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Cultural Brokers 
Some of the participants felt that it was important that the service user’s experience 
was understandable to someone who was perceived to share the cultural 
background of the service user. This someone could be a family member, culturally 
informed staff member, or religious group spokesperson. These are just a few of the 
‘cultural informants’ or ‘consultants’ mentioned in the academic literature (Davis, 
1994; 2000). They also bring to mind the more formal role associated with that of the 
‘cultural broker’ (Weidman, 1982; 1983).The idea of cultural brokerage was originally 
developed by the cultural anthropologists Eric Wolf (1956) and Clifford Geertz 
(1960), and has generally been seen as a way of bridging, mediating, or linking  
persons or groups from different cultures (Lo, 2010). In the clinical setting, the notion 
of cultural brokerage has been applied to studying the roles of nurses (e.g., the 
nurse as broker between the service user and the primary medical system), cultural 
interpreters34, medical interpreters, and group spokespersons35 (Tripp-Reimer and 
Brink, 1985; Barbee, 1987; Jezewski, 1990; Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002; 
Hsieh, 2006; Fontes, 2008). A cultural broker helps to decrease the disparity 
between the cultures present in a clinical interaction by providing the participants 
(i.e., practitioners and service users) with information about one another’s cultures 
and medical systems (Fitzgerald, 1992). The following definitions help to convey the 
essence of cultural brokerage in the clinical context: 
“An intervention strategy of research, training, and service that links persons of two 
or more socio-cultural systems through an individual, with the primary goals of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
commonly held cultural codes, values and norms be they linguistic, literary or artistic, religious, or 
social and political’. Often they are ways of ‘letting off steam’, of allowing people to express 
themselves, and feel free of social constraints, but only under controlled conditions”.   
34 There are a number of people (e.g., medical anthropologists) and organisations that can act as 
‘cultural interpreters’ (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997). The role of 
these people and organisations is to provide access to relevant cultural knowledge that may inform 
clinical practice. This knowledge may be culture specific or more general. An example of the type of 
person that performs this role is someone who is a member of the same group as the service user, 
but who is somewhat familiar with the procedures, systems and values of the primary medical system 
(Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002). The ‘Transcultural Mental Health Centre’ in Australia and the UCL 
(CCS) ‘Cultural Consultation Service’ are examples of such organisations. The UCL ‘Cultural 
Consultation Service’ provides ‘cultural formulations’ for service users and health professionals in the 
NHS and private healthcare sector.   
35
 This can be a person or organisation who claims the role of spokesperson for a group of which the 
service user is assumed to be a member (Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002). Tribal elders, religious 
authorities, and public figures representing a recognised organisation are examples of group 
spokespersons, and can all emerge as brokers in clinical interactions.  
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making community service programs more open and responsive to the needs of the 
community and of improving the community’s access to resources”.    
(Willigen, 2002, p. 131) 
“A cultural broker is a person who serves go between functions at the edges of 
cultural groups in contact. They often interpret the behaviour of members of each 
group to the other. Because they are usually native to one group but have some sort 
of language skill with the other, even if it is only a partial knowledge or trading 
language, they have specialized expertise that is not shared with other members of 
either group. Such individuals are invaluable in situations of culture contact”. 
(Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002, p. 117) 
Cultural brokerage draws on the perspectives of ‘cultural relativism’ (Ben-Tovim, 
1987; Fitzgerald, 1992), particularly the necessity for the practitioner to understand 
something about the culture in which a person is embedded before deciding whether 
apparent symptoms are pathognomic and evidence of an underlying psychiatric 
disorder (Bhugra and Bhui, 1997). For example, the content of a person’s delusions 
is derived from their cultural orientation and is therefore liable to be recognised as 
such, if the practitioner consults with people who share a similar cultural outlook to 
the service user (Lyles and Hillard, 1982; Gaines, 1988; 1995; Rack, 1990; Levy, 
1996; Paniagua, 2005). Seth Donal Hannah (2011, p. 40) notes that this “reflects the 
theory of explanatory models that underlies how cultural issues are often understood 
in the contemporary culture of medicine”. However, Hannah (2011, p. 40) suggests 
that “by seeking the advice of cultural brokers or others who share the cultural 
identity of the patient”, the practitioner does so “in a way that uses identity as a proxy 
for culture”. As Hannah (2011, p. 40) explains: 
“The use of identity as a proxy for culture makes sense when the link between the 
two is strong. But what happens when the link breaks down? If clinicians and support 
staff are operating on the assumption that racial or ethnic membership is coherent 
and persistent and that members of these groups share a bundle of relevant cultural 
characteristics, they may treat patients differently on the basis of that assumption. 
This works fine as long as the cultural assumption is accurate. When it is not, 
inappropriate stereotyping, misdiagnosis, and mistrust can occur”.         
Hannah notes that a classic example is the tendency of psychiatrists to over 
diagnose black males with schizophrenia (Good, James, Good and Becker, 2002). In 
particular, research (Metzl, 2010) has indicated that this over diagnosis is based on 
psychiatric assumptions about the cultural characteristics of black males (e.g., the 
assumption that black males are prone to violence).   
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Consulting with Family       
The anthropologist sees social relationships such as familial ties as integral to the 
understanding of an individual (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). Moreover, 
anthropological perspectives stress that the self is not bounded, but develops and 
changes as a result of several factors (Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Seeley, 
2006). Gaines (1995) has argued that family members may be experts in the logic of 
their own culture and therefore, “can serve as guides to the assessment of 
acceptable and unacceptable ideation and behaviours based thereupon” (p.283).  
Similar arguments were made by some of the student nurse participants.        
“But I think it’s difficult to differentiate between their psychosis and culture and what 
they believe in, unless you know their history and their family background and what 
they do in terms of their religion. You need to consult with that person’s family 
members as it’s difficult to know whether they are having delusional beliefs or 
hallucinations, or if it is a cultural belief. You need that cultural context really and the 
family is an important part of that context”. 
(Male 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 2) 
Two of the critical incident stories specifically were about how the family became 
involved in the assessment of a service user’s expression of religious belief. These 
participants spoke about the value of exploring religious norms with the service 
user’s family. One of these participants talked about the importance of involving the 
service user’s family network in a multidisciplinary team meeting, in which the 
‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986) was a significant 
issue. In this case, the mental health team tried to resolve the issue by evaluating 
the service user’s beliefs within the context of the family’s religious life. When placed 
in the context of the family’s cultural frame of reference, the service user’s beliefs 
were seen as delusional and therefore associated with a psychotic illness.                                                                                                                                                                    
“We got the family involved with the ‘MDT’ (multidisciplinary team) meetings. Where 
with the patient’s family, we were trying to work out what was going on in this case 
and find out more information about the patient’s and family’s religious background. 
By finding out more about the family’s religious background, we were hoping that we 
could find out whether this patient’s religious beliefs were genuine or were 
associated with the psychosis. So we held lengthy discussions about that with the 
family members. It appeared from what the family members were saying to us at the 
‘MDT’ meetings that his beliefs were not a genuine expression of the family’s 
religious beliefs. We were able to conclude from those ‘MDT’ discussions with his 
family members that these beliefs were more likely to be connected to the psychosis. 
Towards the end of his treatment on that acute unit, I think his brother cleared up a 
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few things, because he (service user) used to say things about this person who did 
not seem to be real to us. I think it was like his imaginary friend and when he was 
younger, he used to call out this name. So his brother cleared a lot of things up, as 
this name kept on coming up….Because his family didn’t really.....His mum and dad 
did not realise who this imaginary person was. But he kept talking about his god and 
this imaginary friend. But it was still hard to make that call and I think it would have 
been much harder if his family was not there to clear things up. But as I was saying, 
it was quite useful to consult with the patient’s brother, and it did appear that what 
most of what he was saying did not relate to the family’s religious beliefs”. 
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview)  
The actions of the student nurse participant and her professional colleagues in this 
instance was congruent with the advice set down in the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 765), that “the belief is not one ordinarily accepted 
by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of 
religious faith)”. With the input of the service user’s family, the ‘culture as a red 
herring’ clinical assessment error (Stein, 1985)-that is, assessing the signs and 
symptoms of mental illness as cultural differences–was avoided in this situation 
(Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; Dein and Lipsedge, 
1998; Stolk, 2009). The value of consulting with the service user’s family about the 
issue of ‘normative uncertainty’ is supported in the limited amount of empirical 
research on the topic. Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a) qualitative study found that 
it was only after working with the service user’s family that some of the mental health 
occupational therapist research participants began to realise how important cultural 
issues were to particular cases. This point is reflected in the following quotation from 
an interview with an occupational therapist.     
“It was only after the family was involved that I could see how different their values 
and beliefs were, that I could see that culture was playing an important part. It 
probably would have been different if the family had not been involved. I would not 
have realised how important the role of culture was. Because he was confused and 
had difficulty expressing himself, I did not realise what a big barrier that (culture) was 
as well”. 
(Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a, p. 66)  
Similar findings emerged from Eeles’ (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003) 
research into the criteria that a purposive sample of UK registered mental health 
nurses used to evaluate the clinical significance of spiritual experiences. In 
particular, Eeles found that it was more important that the experience was 
understandable to those people close to the service user (e.g., family members) than 
198 
 
it was to be sanctioned by the mental health nurse. As Eeles, Lowe and Wellman 
(2003) note, many of their nurse participants “were keen to discover how those close 
to the subject understood what was happening to them; did they think it normal, were 
they concerned about the individual’s behaviour”? (p. 202).    
However, the practitioner also needs to be mindful of any conflict between the family 
and the religious organisation that the service user is involved with (Kingdon and 
Finn, 2006). Indeed, the family may view the service user’s involvement with the 
religious organisation as undesirable or even as an aspect of the service user’s 
psychopathology (Kingdon, Siddle, Farooq and Rathod, 2010). Furthermore, there 
can be personal antipathies between family members that place into question the 
value of consulting with family members; not to mention valid concerns about 
protecting the privacy of the service user (Rack, 1982; Kirmayer, Young and Hayton, 
1997). The latter issue with specific reference to service users from non-English 
speaking backgrounds was raised in the focus group sessions.  
Male, Student 1: “One of the things I find is that while we always gain consent from 
the patient to use their relative as an interpreter, when it is a general communication 
issue, when it is about cultural aspects and that differentiation issue of separating 
culture from illness, it seems we forget to ask the patient for their consent. It is like; 
‘well they won’t understand anyway’.  So we go straight to the family.  So how do we 
know that is what the client wants”? 
Female, Student: “And dignity as well; are you respecting that there’s certain things 
that the patient might not want you to disclose to their family”. 
Male, Student 2: “And they might not want you to disclose to their family and that’s 
why I think it’s best to ask the advice of another colleague from a similar background 
to the service user or an interpreter. Though, it is obviously difficult, because you 
then don’t get the family involvement. But there’s always….It is never clear; ‘well 
have they given consent’?  Have they signed a consent form”?  
(Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1)  
Similar issues are mentioned in the literature dealing with the ethical problems of 
family members being asked by health professionals to perform the role of 
interpreter (Pauwels, 1995; Sobo and Seid, 2003; Fontes, 2005; Culley and Dyson, 
2010). An excellent review of these ethical issues is given in Lisa Aronson Fontes’ 
(2008) book Interviewing Clients across Cultures: A Practitioner’s Guide36. To 
                                                          
36
For example, Fontes (2008, p. 149) explains that there may be “problems of perceived lack of 
confidentiality” by asking family members to act as interpreters. Fontes (2008, p. 149) suggests that 
even “if the person (family member) interpreting does not actually betray confidences”, the service 
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prevent such problems from occurring, Kingdon and colleagues’ (2010) recommend 
that mental health trusts make provision for independent cultural consultancy 
(brokerage) services.    
The value of consulting with family members about the problems presented by the 
‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma is further questioned in the following 
‘critical incident’ narrative. In this narrative, the concern arose from a different 
source; namely, that family members’ ‘explanatory models’ (Kleinman, Eisenberg 
and Good, 1978) may not always be congruent in their understanding of the service 
user’s experiences. This narrative brought to mind the question of whether the family 
member will need to have some understanding of the biomedical model of mental 
illness in order to inform decision making around the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma.        
“There was a service user on the rehab unit who was an Asian male. He was 
schizophrenic and he used to hear voices. And his brother was quite insistent that he 
took his medication and stayed on the rehab unit. He used to go home at the 
weekends from Friday to Sunday. His parents and his brothers would come and pick 
him up from the rehab unit. On one occasion however, his brother had gone back to 
India for one month and was quite anxious about him going home, as his mother was 
quite happy about him hearing voices. She thought it was normal and that he was 
chosen and special, as he could hear these voices. From the perspective of her 
cultural background, it was quite normal for people to hear voices, but the brother 
was like; ‘no, he is ill’. You know? These voices are not anything to do with culture 
but a part of his psychosis. You could not like consult with the mother or the father 
about their son’s voices. They just had no concept of mental illness at all. Anyway, 
his brother was accepting that he had schizophrenia and it was like; ‘well, he does 
need the medication’. And according to the brother, the medication did work as it 
controls some of these hallucinations that the patient was experiencing. So his 
brother’s explanation was that he was ill. But how much the patient’s mother knew 
about mental illness, I do not know really. So that was it really. I would say that was 
more about his family really and his mother’s interpretation of his illness, which 
conflicted with that of his brother’s”.                                                                                                                                                                    
(Female 3rd Year Student, Interview)  
The next narrative raised similar issues, but in this case the student nurse participant 
reported that fellow staff members were a more reliable source of information about 
the problems presented by the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma than the 
service user’s family members.        
                                                                                                                                                                                    
user may “worry about this”. Fontes’ recommends that family members should not be asked to take 
on the role of interpreter, except in cases where the service user explicitly requests their family 
member to do so.        
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“I think it’s easier to ask other staff or people that don’t have anything to do with the 
person (service user) themselves. We have got a woman on the ward at the moment 
and she knows she is unwell. But her mother is like ‘oh, it’s just the devils’. She just 
believes that her daughter is possessed by devils at the moment. So it is easier to go 
to someone else and say ‘is that normal for that religion’? Rather than a family 
member….That is my experience of that type of situation”.  
(Female 2nd Year Student, Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1)       
Bicultural and Culturally Informed Staff Members  
The mental health practitioner may seek the advice of a culturally informed or 
bicultural colleague. Paniagua (2000; 2001; 2005) suggests that such collaboration 
can reduce the risk of idiosyncratic decision making. It is implied that bicultural or 
culturally informed health professionals may be able to bridge the ‘disease’ (‘etic’) 
perspective of biomedicine and the ‘illness’ (‘emic’)  perspective (Eisenberg, 1977; 
Skultans and Cox, 2000) of the service user, and therefore, encourage practitioner 
and service user to confidently engage with each other (Robinson, 2002; Mir and 
Din, 2003; Mir, 2007).The previous ‘critical incident’ narrative suggested that it was 
preferable to seek advice from culturally informed staff colleagues than family 
members about the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma. There also were 
other critical incidents that appeared to reinforce the argument about the benefits of 
collaborative decision making with culturally informed or bicultural staff colleagues.  
“This situation took place on an acute mental health ward. The woman (service user) 
in question had special dietary requirements and would also talk about spiritual 
things. She would talk about ‘Mohammed’ as she was from a Muslim background. I 
do not know anything about Islam or about Pakistani culture. But the Pakistani nurse 
who I was working with on that ward really worked well with this lady. This nurse was 
a very informative source for all the staff members, as she had an understanding of 
the spiritual things that this woman was talking about. So she worked really well with 
her and often she (Pakistani nurse) would say to the team, ‘oh, when she says this 
she means this. Please don’t worry when she mentions Mohammed and she is on 
about this type of thing. You do not have to worry about that’. And you could see that 
without the input of this nurse, there were a lot of things that we were failing to 
understand in regards to this lady (patient). And when you don’t have that cultural 
understanding, you can slip into the mode that everything the person is saying to you 
is part of their mental illness. The (Pakistani) nurse did understand the Pakistani lady 
very well. She was like connecting two different cultures really”.    
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview)  
In many cases however, this strategy is practically unfeasible given the potential 
shortage of bicultural or culturally informed mental health professionals (Willen, 
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2011). Furthermore, a potential problem of seeking the advice of a bicultural staff 
colleague is the sociocultural proximity of that staff member to the service user and 
their community. In particular, Willen (2011, p. 124) notes that the service user could 
become “concerned about the possibility that a clinician from within their community 
might divulge private and potentially damaging information to other community 
members”. Sociocultural proximity is a particular issue where “mental health care is 
stigmatized or sanctioned within one’s cultural community” (Willen, 2011, p. 124). 
Moreover, fellow staff members are not always willing to perform the broker role 
(Hannah, 2011). While some staff members may eagerly want to volunteer cultural 
information, others may not see this as part of their responsibilities.   
Religious Group Spokespersons   
The mental health practitioner may not be in a position to give an authoritative 
assessment on the normality of a religious experience and/or practice (Greenberg 
and Witztum, 1991; 2001). A religious ‘group spokesperson’37 (Bonder, Martin and 
Miracle, 2002) may therefore perform the role of cultural broker and provide 
guidance on matters related to the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma 
(Lovinger, 1984; Charters, 1999; Loewenthal, 2007; Koenig, 2011). Thus, the 
distortion “of beliefs relative to the standards of the religious group” becomes the 
“crucial determinant of religious pathology” (Lea, 1982, p. 344).The DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) also urges mental health professionals to 
gain an understanding of the religious beliefs and value systems of their service 
users. Indeed, many religions endorse or encourage experiences that can be 
misinterpreted by the culturally unaware observer as the manifestation of psychotic 
symptoms (Loewenthal, 2007). Only one of the student nurse participants however, 
mentioned the value of seeking advice from a religious group spokesperson about 
the normality of a service user’s religious experience.  
“A pastor did visit this lady (service user) on the ward-who kept reporting that she 
could see this guardian angel, which the doctors just assumed was part of a 
psychosis. I think the pastor came from her religious community. I think her pastor 
may have supported her actually in the appeals tribunal and was helpful in helping us 
clarify the normality of this lady’s experience. Thinking about it, he did come to the 
appeals tribunal about her sectioning and I think he provided some helpful input on 
                                                          
37
Religious group spokespersons usually work on behalf of a religious organisation and invariably 
have some form of authority in the religious community (e.g., Rabbi/Priest/Imam) and credibility 
outside the context of their group (Davis, 1994; 2000). 
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that. So her pastor’s support was very important. I know that religion is quite a 
contentious point when people appear to be suffering from psychosis. As I do know 
that in some cases, it is hard to differentiate psychosis from a genuine religious 
belief. It is quite difficult to do that in practice. So her pastor was helpful in that 
regard”. 
(Female 2nd Year Student, Interview)  
The three focus groups confirmed this general impression that there was little if any 
collaboration between mental health practitioners and representatives of outside 
religious organisations. In particular, the participants mentioned the problem of 
defining membership in the relevant religious group, and also raised concerns about 
protecting the confidentiality and privacy of the service user.                                                                                                                                                     
Female Student 1: “I’ve never seen or done it myself and asked someone ‘what’s 
your local church? Do you know who’s the person in charge at this time?  Would you 
find it helpful to get in contact with them to see if they can come’?  It’s usually not 
their personal one… I mean like your personal priest. It would rather be someone 
sent from the trust”. 
Female Student 2: “I think I would want to see someone that I know rather than just 
the one from the ward that comes around…” 
Female Student 3: “Yes, the one you’ve built a rapport with over the years.  The one 
that knows what you used to be like and what your family is like, and how you 
normally are”. 
Female Student 2: “Rather than just someone that the trust perhaps decides to 
bring in and thinks is appropriate… I don’t think I have ever seen where that is done 
though”. 
(Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 1) 
Female Student: “It’s probably because of like confidentiality and things like that.  
You can’t just talk about those differentiation issues with a patient’s religious person. 
You need that permission from your colleagues’ and most importantly, the patient to 
do so”.   
Male Student: “I mean, I think it might just be a lack of understanding and 
information about that as well…Because you might not even….I don’t think it’s 
ever… It’s never really occurred inside of training where someone has suggested 
‘have you ever thought of ringing up a church to’”   
(Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Focus Group N 2) 
Nursing Educator: “And then it comes back to that lack of information thing…That 
might have been what some of the problems about how to contact particular 
members from the service user’s religious community. You know? Whether it’s a 
Rabbi or a Vicar or some other type of religious minister… And not knowing which 
one belongs to which faith is perhaps part of the issue as well”. 
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(Nursing Educators Focus Group) 
A lack of attention has been given in the academic literature to the actual form and 
parameters of partnerships between mental health practitioners and representatives 
from faith based organisations (Leavey and King, 2007). In a couple of the ‘critical 
incidents’, there was some evidence to suggest that mental health practitioners  
mistrusted or were suspicious of the intentions of the service user’s co-religionists.  
Differing explanatory models (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978) was a theme of 
these narratives.                                                             
“There was this lady patient on this acute ward. She used to attend spiritualist 
churches.  Her religious beliefs very much framed her delusions and hallucinations. 
At times she got very distressed, as she would say that she could see poltergeists. At 
other times she would say that she was being possessed. It was very difficult in trying 
to preserve her sense of dignity too. I wondered how she was going to view her 
actions when she got better. She was going out at midnight to attend this spiritualist 
church. In the eyes of that lady’s church, her behaviour is not necessarily viewed as 
being abnormal. According to her church that behaviour could mean that she is just a 
very spiritual kind of person. And she started to go to this spiritualist church more 
often. It seemed that the church was reinforcing and praising her behaviour. They did 
not see her psychotic experiences as indicating illness. The church perceived these 
experiences as spiritual occurrences. These experiences conveyed to them that this 
lady was a spiritual person rather than what we saw (the nursing staffs) as an ill 
person”.  
(Female Third Year Student, Interview) 
“We recently had a lady who came in for a primary health care assessment, which I 
was assisting and helping out on. It turned out that she was part of a new church in 
the city and they were telling her....I think it was the ‘New Life’ church and she had 
recently just joined it. And the members of this church were telling her it was evil 
forces that were causing her illness and it can’t be treated with medication, and it 
can’t be treated with other medical help. Rather, it needed to be treated through 
prayer. So this church had a completely different perception than we did, and it was 
because she was a bad person that these things were happening to her. So she 
had come for a primary health assessment and was talking about her depression, 
anxiety, money worries, and how the church was now a big part of her life.     
She was saying that the people at church will say ‘that is the person who most needs 
praying for today’. So they would all circle her, point her out, and she would go into 
the middle of the circle and they would all pray for her. She has not been able to go 
back to church since they done this and they were saying that her illness was to do 
with evil forces. They were saying she should not be seeking medical help, which 
was for me as a student nurse quite difficult to accept. I can’t remember the words 
she used, but they seemed to refer to evil forces that was in her and needed to come 
out. The way to do that was to pray, by praying to drive these evil forces out of her. 
So no, the church did not accept that it had anything to do with what we may call 
mental illness. And it made her feel really, really down and like made her feel worse 
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because it was as if it was her fault that this was happening to her. So I think 
sometimes religion might be a detriment. It might have a different view that it’s not a 
medical view, that it’s something that they’ve done wrong. And to me as a mental 
health student nurse that is not the case”.                                                                                               
(Female Second Year Student, Interview)  
Similar concerns were voiced by a nursing educator. The incompatibility of 
explanatory models was again brought to the fore in the nursing educator’s narrative.   
“I find that students and staff members find it a bit more concerning if someone is 
brought in from the outside. And I think that students worry about their religious 
practices and the potential impact on the patient. If they believe that the patient is 
experiencing religious themed delusions and they are trying to address that, I think 
they can be worried that somebody from a religious background will confirm or 
reinforce that delusion. Or the religious figure could undermine their clinical model for 
the patient’s illness. Hospital chaplains38 who are trained in mental health are 
considered as okay and acceptable, as they can deploy and understand the medical 
model of mental illness. I just think there is a perception among the students that 
people from the wider religious community will not have the same insight into a 
patient’s illness as a mental health professional does”. 
(Nursing Educator, Interview)  
Some of the ‘critical incident’ narratives collected for this PhD research, challenged  
the conventional assumption that dialogue between the faith sector and 
‘professional’ sector (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) of mental health care will 
overcome barriers of mutual mistrust and result in collaboration on relevant clinical 
matters. As the cultural psychiatrist John Cox (1994; 1996) notes, this conventional 
assumption is too simplistic, as it ignores the underlying disjuncture between 
biomedical and religious explanatory models for the origins and resolution of severe 
mental illnesses. Indeed, Leavey and King (2007) question how a mental health 
practitioner could collaborate on clinical issues with a representative of a faith based 
                                                          
38
Multi-faith chaplaincy services increasingly have become common within the ‘professional’ sector of 
mental health services. Chaplaincy services may have important connections with and knowledge 
about local religious communities (D’Souza and Kuruvilla, 2006). The mental health care chaplain has 
been viewed as an ‘expert’ in the fields of spirituality, religion and mental health (Culliford and Eagger, 
2009). Chaplains may be expected to provide the mental health team with advice on matters such as 
differential diagnosis and the controversial issues of spirit possession and exorcism (Dein, 2006b). 
Furthermore, chaplains can play a pivotal role in teaching health professionals about ‘normative’ 
religious practices and beliefs (Rattray, 2002). Dein (2004) has suggested that chaplains should 
undergo appropriate training in mental health if they are to effectively fulfil their role within the mental 
health team. Hospital chaplains in the UK receive some mental health training from the ‘College of 
Health Care Chaplains’ (Dein, 2010a).  
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organisation who believes that sin or demonic possession lies at the root of a 
person’s illness, and therefore has no concept of its biopsychosocial causes. 
Conversely, when the mental health practitioner is ignorant or unaware of the 
relevance of religious frameworks for understanding the service user’s experiences, 
seeking guidance from representatives of faith based organisations is unlikely (Cox, 
1994; 1996). Thus, the nature and extent of collaboration between representatives of 
faith based organisations and practitioners from the ‘professional’ sector of mental 
health care can be discussed in the context of their use of differing explanatory 
models39 for mental distress. Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran (2002) suggest, however, 
that it should not be a question of the practitioner sharing or having religious beliefs, 
“but in being tolerant about such beliefs and not automatically seeing them in a 
negative light or part of a pathology” (p. 97).  
Summary        
The reported ways of dealing with the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma 
(Good and Good, 1986) that were presented in this chapter relate to the broad 
anthropological tradition of cultural relativism. In this tradition, the question of “what 
is normal versus what is abnormal” (Winkelman, 2009, p. 208) can only be 
considered within the local context of the person’s (service user) cultural 
expectations and beliefs. Thus, familial and other important social relationships are 
critical to understanding the clinical significance of the person’s experience (Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran, 2002). This is supported by anthropological evidence which 
shows that the self is not bounded, but develops as a result of several factors (White 
and Marsella, 1982; Seeley, 2006). One therefore sees the necessity of 
understanding the person’s experiences within their local context. As Kilshaw, 
Ndegwa and Curran (2002, p. 98) note, when “the cultural context of the individual is 
considered, some problems that present with unusual religious or spiritual (cultural) 
content are, in fact, found to be free of psychopathology”. This is not to deny the 
critical influence of the political economy of care and/or the professional culture of 
the placement setting on the dynamics of ‘clinical recognition’ (Carpenter-Song, 
2011).   
                                                          
39
 Cox (1994; 1996) also suggests that collaboration on relevant clinical issues may occur when the 
‘explanatory models’ of the religious representative include an awareness of the complex nature of 
mental disorders (and biomedical and psychological treatments) and the mental health professional 
has respect for the theological insights and healing ministry of religious organisations.  
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Practical and ethical issues, such as concerns around protecting privacy and 
confidentiality, or a lack of information about how to access representatives from 
faith based organisations, seemed to dictate decisions about seeking the advice of 
the service user’s co-religionists or family members on matters of clinical 
assessment. In other cases, it seemed to be the incompatibility of explanatory 
models (Kleinman, Eisenberg and Good, 1978) which seemed to prevent 
collaboration between representatives of the service user’s family or religious 
organisation and mental health practitioners. Thus, there remain important questions 
about the ways in which individual and cultural values intersect in these cases 
(Bonder, Martin and Miracle, 2002).            
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Conclusion                                                                          
Introduction   
This PhD research presented ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) data on 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ (Fitzgerald, 1992) from pre-registered mental 
health student nurses’ clinical placements. ‘Multicultural clinical interactions’ are a 
normal and everyday occurrence in clinical placement settings, yet the cultures at 
play in a particular interaction may go unacknowledged along with their clinical 
implications for the participants concerned. The exploration of the issues involved in 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ can bring these cultures to awareness and 
importantly, help in the development of strategies. In turn, these ‘strategies’ 
(Romiszowski, 1984) may contribute to making ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ 
more satisfying for practitioners (e.g., mental health student nurses) and service 
users alike. Strategies and problem solving skills for enhancing ‘multicultural clinical 
interactions’ must reflect the needs and challenges of mental health student nurses 
in their local clinical realities. ‘Critical incidents’ provided a rich and ‘thick’ (Geertz, 
1973) descriptive basis for exploring these complex realities.     
The content of this chapter is based around a critical reflection on the findings and 
my recommendations for undergraduate mental health nursing curricula, and future 
research on nursing, cultural issues and mental health matters. In the ‘Reflecting on 
the Findings’ section, I stress that one of the key lessons to be drawn from the 
‘critical incident’ data about the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good 
and Good, 1986) and its clinical implications, is that mental health staff should be 
encouraged to view the experiences of their service users in context. To realise this 
goal in practice means addressing the structural problems that constrain holistic 
assessment and treatment practice. It should also mean having to work towards 
changing some of the negative professional attitudes towards religion, which have 
tended to portray religious phenomenology and practice in psychopathological terms 
(Swinton, 2001; Kilshaw, Ndegwa and Curran, 2002; Tobert, 2007; Mohr and Pfeifer, 
2009).     
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In the chapter section: ‘Recommendations for Educational Practice’; I suggest that 
‘critical incident analysis’ (CIA) in its current form and usage in nursing science 
curricula, could be usefully adapted to help student nurses to recognise the cultural 
dimension of mental health issues that occur in clinical placement settings. The 
conclusion chapter then finishes with a proposal for a focused needs analysis (Laird, 
1985) to be carried out on the cross-cultural clinical assessment training needs of 
pre and registered mental health nurses and multidisciplinary mental health teams. 
Such a focused needs analysis could usefully inform the development of the 
adaptation of ‘critical incident analysis’ that I propose in the chapter section: 
‘Recommendations for Educational Practice’. I however, begin the conclusion 
chapter with a discussion of the overall strengths and limitations of the study.   
Strengths and Limitations    
The sample was taken from four nursing education centres, which were attached to 
one university in northern England; therefore, caution should be exercised in drawing 
generalisations from the study. In particular, it is acknowledged that the educational 
instruction and clinical placement experiences of the student nurse participants in 
this study may have been different from students at other universities and 
educational institutions. However, rather than trying to make crude generalisations or 
determining the frequency of particular cultural issues, the study goal and the main 
reason for using ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) focused ethnographic interviews 
(Spradley, 1979) was to explore the rich complexity and contextual dimensions of 
mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’.   
This study explored ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ in clinical placement settings 
from the perspectives of pre-registered mental health student nurses and their 
nursing educators, and therefore, it is based on their understandings of the 
interactions described. Other data sources, such as observations of ‘critical 
incidents’ in clinical situ or interpretations of the same incident from multiple 
perspectives (e.g., the service user and/or their family members), may have 
highlighted other important issues. The study however, does contribute new 
perspectives to the transcultural nursing literature. It explored participants’ 
experiences of mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’, as 
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opposed to prior transcultural nursing studies, which have focused their attention on 
the experiences of registered general nurses. To my knowledge, there have been no 
previous empirical studies, which have focused on the meanings of undergraduate 
mental health student nurses’ ‘multicultural clinical interactions’. Whilst some cultural 
issues can be expected to emerge across the different undergraduate nursing 
branches, each branch may present unique issues and challenges for students 
working in that particular area. Although the problems with linguistic barriers have 
been documented across the different disciplinary areas of nursing for example (e.g., 
Murphy and Clark, 1993; Osborne, 1995; Baldonado, et al., 1998; Kim, 1998; 
Spence, 1999; Boi, 2000; Gerrish, 2000; 2001; Cioffi, 2003; Narayanasamy, 2003; 
Ozolins and Hjelm, 2003; Cortis, 2004; Gerrish, Chau, Sobowale and Birks, 2004; 
Cioffi, 2005; 2006; Hultsjo and Hjelm, 2005; Berlin, Johansson and Tornkvist, 2006; 
Vydelingum, 2006; Peckover and Chidlaw, 2007; Pergert, Ekblad, Enskar and Bjork, 
2007; Pergert, 2008; Tuohy, Mccarthy, Cassidy and Graham, 2008; Berlin, 2010), 
this PhD research showed that mental health nursing is based particularly on the 
assumption (Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a), that service users have a basic level of facility 
with the English language and understand the local cultural and social context.       
Reflecting On the Findings     
The ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma (Good and Good, 1986) was at the 
heart of many of the ‘multicultural clinical interactions’ described by the research 
participants. To a large degree, these ‘critical incident’ (Fitzgerald, 2000) accounts 
were about a service user’s religious beliefs, experiences or behaviours, and their 
clinical significance within the biomedical model of ‘disease’ (Eisenberg, 1977) and 
psychopathology (Offer and Sabshin, 1966). Some of the student nurse participant 
‘critical incidents’ however, seemed to question the “privileged status” (Lock and 
Gordon, 1988, p. 7) of the biomedical model, which dominates the ‘professional 
sector’ (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) of mental health services, including the clinical 
practice of nurses. This was particularly the case where the student nurse 
participants were querying clinical assessments of ‘insight’ and/or assessments of 
religious phenomenology. In these cases, there seemed to be an explicit awareness 
that the biomedical model was not necessarily the ‘correct’ model for understanding 
and assessing the service user’s experience. These participants recognised that the 
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biomedical model is another ‘ethnomedicine’ (Hahn and Kleinman, 1983), a “cultural 
construction with its own set of beliefs, assumptions, values, behaviours, biases, and 
sub-components based on a particular historical cultural tradition” (Fitzgerald, et al., 
1997a, p. 85).     
Considering the clinical implications of misdiagnosis (Minas, 1991) and the 
aforementioned clinical tendency to prematurely connect religion with 
psychopathology, all mental health professionals should be encouraged to bring their 
assessments of ‘insight’ in line with the DSM-IV’s (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) recommendations on the cultural assessment of delusions (Saravanan, et al., 
2004; 2005). Indeed, all mental health professionals should be encouraged to see 
the necessity of understanding their service users’ experiences, including religious 
experiences and phenomenology in their local context. As Kilshaw, Ndegwa and 
Curran (2002, p. 98) cogently observed, when “the cultural context of the individual is 
considered, some problems that present with unusual religious or spiritual content 
are, in fact, found to be free of psychopathology”. Similar criteria also could be 
usefully assimilated into other aspects of clinical assessment, such as assessment of 
‘function’ (Mezzich, Caracci, Fabrega and Kirmayer, 2009).    
Assessment is the focal point for subsequent nursing care, planning and intervention 
(Ash, 1997; Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003), yet assessing the clinical 
significance of religious phenomenology in particular was fraught with uncertainties 
and difficulties. There was a perception among some of the student nurse 
participants that these uncertainties and difficulties were a consequence of their lack 
of culture specific knowledge. Whilst student nurses and other mental health 
professionals clearly need to develop a foundational knowledge base in major 
religious teachings (Dein, 2004; 2010a) and basic cultural information (Fitzgerald, et 
al, 1997a), in order to inform their cross-cultural clinical assessments, a ‘fact file’ 
(Gunaratnam, 2007) and cultural deterministic application of cultural knowledge is 
best avoided. ‘Factfile’, or ‘cookbook’ approaches can separate cultural processes 
from individual and subjective experience (Dein, 2006a), and may contribute to 
clinical assessment errors (Tseng and McDermott, 1981; Stein, 1985; Minas, 1990; 
Fitzgerald, et al., 1997a; Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003; 
Stolk, 2009).  
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How does a student nurse or professional colleague understand cultural or 
religiously influenced phenomena, especially if they are from a different religious or 
cultural background, or have little interest in cultural or religious concerns 
(Loewenthal, 1995)? Encouragingly, the participants did at least report some 
situations from clinical placement where there was some attempt at assessing the 
clinical significance of culturally and religiously influenced phenomena. I would like to 
reiterate again, the importance of differentiating religious beliefs and experiences 
from psychopathology by their ‘dimensional’ characteristics, cultural influences, and 
impact on functioning (functioning assessed in cultural context [Mezzich, Caracci, 
Fabrega and Kirmayer, 2009]) (Pierre, 2001; Dein, 2012). The adaptation of ‘critical 
incident analysis’ (CIA) that I recommend for mental health nursing educational 
curricula in the next chapter section could be a useful way of introducing these 
problem solving strategies to student nurses.      
I discussed in the literature review about how these questions and issues arising 
from the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma have been a central concern of 
the academic disciplines dealing with transcultural mental health and 
psychopathology, including cultural psychiatry and medical anthropology. However, 
to my knowledge, this PhD research is the first study to empirically identify this 
dilemma at the practice level of mental health student nurses. It is surprising and of 
concern that apart from Jennie Eeles (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003) 
study, these issues have not concerned the mental health nursing research 
community. Do the mental health nursing academic and research community not see 
the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma as an important clinical issue? The 
‘critical incident’ data from this PhD study and the cultural psychiatry and medical 
anthropology literature suggest that this may be the case (see Loewenthal, 1995; 
1999; 2006; 2007; Dein, 2000; 2004; 2010a; 2012; Littlewood, and Lipsedge, 1997; 
Dein and Lipsedge, 1998).            
It is of concern that this issue has not been touched upon by the mental health 
nursing research community, because the way in which the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma is attended to may have important clinical implications for the 
service user. In particular, the ‘critical incident’ data showed that clinical evaluation 
errors (Dein and Lipsedge, 1998; Andary, Stolk and Klimidis, 2003; Stolk, 2009) and 
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misdiagnosis may result in involuntary admission and temporary revocation of rights 
and freedoms. Inaccurate assessments, such as assessing cultural variations in 
phenomenology as psychopathology, are also associated with serious risks (Stolk, 
2009).One of these risks is the long-term harmful effects of anti-psychotic medication 
on a person who is misdiagnosed as having psychosis (Lipton and Simon, 1985; 
Minas, 1991).Thus, this ‘critical incident’ material shows that whether an assessment 
is formulated well or poorly matters for both the care and treatment of service users 
(Good, 1996). These risks suggest that there now is an urgent need to investigate 
pre- and post-registered mental health nurses and other mental health professionals 
competence in making cross-cultural clinical assessments, and dealing with the 
issues presented by the ‘normative uncertainty’ evaluation dilemma. In the final 
section of this conclusion chapter: ‘Future Research Suggestions’, I make the case 
for a focused needs analysis (Laird, 1985) to be carried out on the cross-cultural 
clinical assessment needs and training requirements of pre-registered and registered 
mental health nurses and multidisciplinary mental health teams in the UK.  
My data however, suggested some wider issues, which seemed to impede attempts 
at holistic assessment. In this conclusion, I have already noted the professional 
ideological issues, but there were also structural issues. Linguistic barriers and 
‘language discordance’ (Sobo and Seid, 2003; Sobo, 2004; Sobo and Loustaunau, 
2010) negatively impacted on cross-cultural clinical assessments in placement 
settings. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of survey studies (e.g., 
Minas, Stuart and Klimidis, 1994; Stolk, 1996; 2009; Baycan, 1997; Andary, 1998), 
which have examined the cultural responsiveness and training needs of mental 
health professionals and services. The student nurse participants repeatedly 
mentioned how verbal communication was intrinsic to the assessment process and   
for relaying information about symptomatology and emotional state.   
These linguistic barriers were exacerbated by restricted access to professional 
interpreter services, which was explained largely on cost grounds. Although in many 
cases, participants mentioned that professional interpreters were used in psychiatric 
consultations, there were very few instances in the data where professional 
interpreters were called in to assist on nursing assessments, day-to-day clinical 
interactions, or therapeutic activities. Perhaps, this reflects the hierarchical structure 
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of mental health services, in which the work of the para-professions (e.g., nursing) is 
deemed of lesser importance or considered as supplementary to the core diagnostic 
and treatment tasks of the psychiatrist.    
These problems persist despite multiple policy reports and recommendations (i.e., 
Department of Health, 2005) about the need for more professional trained 
interpreters and staff training in the use of professional interpreter services. There is 
also plenty of empirical evidence to suggest that a lack of shared language between 
service user and mental health practitioner can lead to inaccurate clinical 
assessment (Zalokar, 1994), and difficulties with problem identification (Fitzgerald, et 
al., 1997a). Alarmingly, the participants in my PhD study even mentioned instances 
where mental health staff minimised their interactions with non-English speaking 
service users, preferring to base their assessments on clinical observation alone.  
Moreover, there seemed to be a general perception among the participants that 
heavy work schedules contributed to reductionist assessment and clinical practice.  
Clearly, student nurses and their colleagues in clinical placement settings need to be 
given the time to properly assess and contextualise the experiences of their service 
users. Indeed, Fitzgerald and colleagues’ (1997a, p. 125) note that “time spent 
addressing cultural needs early can avoid more time-consuming problems in the 
future”. Thus, the ‘critical incident’ material validates Carpenter-Song’s (2011) 
important and cogent point, “that much of what mediates experiences and outcomes 
of health care falls outside of the dyadic interactions of patients and clinicians” (p. 
180).          
Recommendations for Educational Practice  
The dissemination of the findings from this research may help mental health nursing 
education providers and teachers and their students become more aware of the 
interrelationships between cultural issues and mental health matters. However, the 
crucial question that needs to be posed is how this awareness can be built upon in 
nursing curricula and clinical practice. One possible strategy would be to introduce 
relevant clinical anthropological concepts (i.e., the ‘explanatory model’ [Kleinman, 
Eisenberg and Good, 1978]) and cultural issues through the use of ‘critical incident 
analysis’ (CIA) (Brookfield, 1990).  
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‘Critical incident analysis’ is widely used in nursing education (Cohn, 1989; Parker, 
Webb and D’Souza, 1994; Ghaye and Lillyman, 1997; 2000; Greenwood, 1998; 
Ghaye, 2005) for the purposes of illuminating professional reasoning and decision 
making processes (Cormack, 1983; 1996; Schon, 1987; Kemmis, 2004). Indeed, the 
student nurse participants in this PhD study were already familiar with using critical 
incident analysis to reflect on key aspects of their clinical placement experiences. 
Given its widespread adoption in the nursing sciences and students’ familiarity with 
it, my proposal is that critical incident analysis could be usefully adapted to help 
student nurses to recognise and understand the cultural dimension of issues that 
occur in clinical placement settings. As the nursing anthropologist Geri-Ann Galanti 
(2008, p. xi) notes; “the most effective way to make a point is to tell a story”. She 
goes on to explain that (p. xi): 
“People remember anecdotes much better than they do dry facts and theories. 
Theories that grow out of stories are much easier to grasp and retain than ones 
presented in a vacuum because they create a sense of empathy and resonate with 
our emotions”.  
Already, the ‘Intercultural Interaction Project’ in the ‘School of Occupation and 
Leisure’ at the University of Sydney (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and 
Kinebanian, 1995; Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997) 
has shown that critical incident analysis40 can be an effective educational tool for 
illumining cultural and mental health issues, albeit in the training of occupational 
therapists.    
Based on the academic literature (Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie and Yong, 1986; 
Brookfield, 1990; Mullavey-O’Byrne, 1999; Fitzgerald, 2000; 2001), I propose that 
there are several existing strategies for using critical incident analysis to enhance 
student nurses professional craft skills in the area of culture and mental health. 
Firstly, Fitzgerald (2001, p. 154) suggests that as a model and example: 
“A critical incident can be presented followed by a previously developed detailed 
analytical discussion of the incident based on the published theoretical literature, one 
that might also draw on the presenter’s professional craft and personal experience 
knowledge, to identify the cultural issues. In other words, the presenter would 
                                                          
40
 The ‘Intercultural Interaction Project’ showed that ‘critical incident analysis’ (CIA) can occur via one 
or more mediums of communication; including role play, storytelling, video, and textual analysis 
(Edwards, 1999).  
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present his or her critical analysis of the incident highlighting issues the presenter 
believes are important in that context. This is the approach commonly used in 
textbooks, research reports and classroom lectures. This would tell others what 
some of the issues are, and perhaps they could transfer this knowledge to another 
situation and use it to help identify cultural issues in other situations”. 
For example, the nursing educator could select a ‘critical incident’ example of a 
religious type experience that is difficult to assess as being either culturally normal or 
psychopathological. The educator could then use this example with the student 
nurses in the class to identify relevant cultural issues (i.e., the ‘normative uncertainty’ 
evaluation dilemma) and possible strategies (Romiszowski, 1984) to help address 
those issues. However, as Galanti (2008, p. xii) notes, it is important to stress that 
“there is no easy ‘recipe’ for solving problems; each individual and situation is 
different”.   
Secondly, the literature suggests (Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie and Yong, 1986; 
Brookfield, 1990; Edwards, 1999; Fitzgerald, 2000; 2001) that critical incident 
analysis can be applied as an experiential learning exercise (‘learn by doing’ 
approach), either as a focused discussion or critical reflection exercise. In these two 
approaches, critical incidents are pre-formulated41 from the clinical practice of others 
or based on students’ personal experiences of ‘multicultural clinical interactions’.  
While all these adaptations of critical incident analysis can be integrated into any 
subject within a nursing education programme, the analysis session itself, needs to 
take place in a culturally and psychologically safe context (Fitzgerald, 2000). All 
critical incident analysis sessions “involves confronting one’s cultural and personal 
beliefs, values and assumptions, and in many cases one’s past behaviours in similar 
situations” (Fitzgerald, 2001, p. 154).     
Any such strategy would need to be carefully formulated through a multistage 
developmental process (Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Twible and Kinebanian, 1995; 
Fitzgerald, Mullavey-O’Byrne, Clemson and Williamson, 1997) and undergo rigorous 
                                                          
41
 A useful source for generating pre-formulated ‘critical incidents’ on the clinical significance of 
religious experiences, beliefs and practices is the ‘Religious Experience Research Centre’ (formerly 
known as the ‘Alister Hardy Research Centre’) at the University of Wales: Trinity Saint David. This 
research centre holds an extensive archive of first hand and contemporary accounts of spiritual and 
religious experiences, which is made accessible for scholarly and educational purposes. Indeed, the 
archive already has been utilised in studies, which in their different ways, have explored the clinical 
significance of religious and spiritual experiences (Eeles, 2001; Eeles, Lowe and Wellman, 2003; 
Tobert, 2007). 
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process and outcome evaluation. As part of this developmental process, consultation 
with academics and professionals from the mental health sciences, clinical 
anthropology, cultural psychiatry, and representatives from various faith and cultural 
communities would be required. Of course, the effective translation of critical incident 
analysis learning into clinical practice will require the right structural and professional 
conditions to be in place.  
However, this educational strategy may go some way towards the debunking of the 
myth that mental health practitioners operate in what the medical anthropologist 
Janelle Taylor (2003a; b; 2010) described as a ‘culture of no culture’. Indeed, the 
purpose of this adaptation of critical incident analysis is not only to help student 
nurses come to view others (i.e., service users) as cultural beings, but importantly, to 
recognize themselves and their professional culture as emergent cultural 
constructions (Fitzgerald, 1992). As Fitzgerald notes (2001, p.155), it is the 
recognition “that culture influences all aspects of health and illness, including 
interactions between health professionals and health professionals and their clients”. 
Having been thoroughly evaluated in the nursing sciences, this adaptation of critical 
incident analysis could then be taken up in other health science professions.    
Future Research Suggestions   
This PhD research highlighted the primary cultural issues to emerge from mental 
health student nurses’ clinical placement experiences. Having explored at least 
some of these core issues and identified how they were attended to or not attended 
to in practice, I argue that there now is an urgent need to study the cross-cultural 
clinical assessment needs and training requirements of student and registered 
mental health nurses in the UK. Although there are studies of the cross-cultural 
training and clinical assessment needs of mental health professionals in the 
Australian literature (Minas, Stuart and Klimidis, 1994; Stolk, 1996; 2009; Baycan, 
1997; Andary, 1998), I could find no examples of research having examined similar 
issues with student and registered mental health nurses in the UK. I suggest that the 
proposed study could follow a similar design and approach to that of Stolk’s (2009) 
focused needs analysis (Laird, 1985) of cross-cultural clinical assessment among 
‘Crisis Assessment and Treatment Teams’ (CATTS) in Australia. In that, the 
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proposed study would attempt to identify what areas of cross-cultural clinical 
assessment UK based student and registered mental health nurses feel that their 
knowledge and skills are lacking in, and what are their cross-cultural clinical 
assessment training needs? By concentrating on the greatest needs or concerns 
(Stolk, 2009), such a focused needs analysis would help to ensure that 
recommendations about subsequent training in cross-cultural clinical assessment 
and ‘critical incident analysis’ are directly relevant to nurses in practice (Grant, 2002). 
As Shahnavaz and Ekblad (2007, p. 15) note, the delivery “of adequate training 
programmes to health care staff requires that the providers (educators) have a good 
understanding of the targeted staff, their needs and clinical context realities”.   
The ‘critical incident’ data also highlighted the fact that mental health student nurses’ 
‘multicultural clinical interactions’ tend to not just involve service users and/or their 
therapeutic management group42 (Janzen, 1978), but invariably involve other nurses 
and professionals from different disciplinary specialisms (e.g., psychiatrists). Indeed, 
Shahnavaz and Ekblad (2007, p. 27) observe that “in psychiatry, staff members with 
different cultural and social backgrounds usually interact across diverse disciplines, 
such as medical, psychological, sociological and nursing”. I therefore suggest that 
focused needs analysis research could also be directed at identifying the cross-
cultural clinical assessment needs and training requirements of multidisciplinary 
mental health teams in the UK. Kirmayer (2006, p. 126) in particular, argues that the 
“future of cultural psychiatry lies in advancing a broad perspective” where the 
multidisciplinary perspective takes a central place.            
Summary  
The conclusion chapter began with a discussion of the overall strengths and 
limitations of the study and some critical reflections on the research findings. I then 
suggested that ‘critical incident analysis’ (CIA) could be adapted to provide student 
                                                          
42
 According to Janzen (1978), the ‘therapeutic management group’ usually involves a sick person’s 
close kin and occasionally close friends, and may come into being whenever a person is faced with 
illness. Janzen goes on to describe the role of the therapeutic management group, as acting on behalf 
of a person when that person becomes ill, and rallying “for the purpose of sifting information, lending 
moral support, making decisions, and arranging details of therapeutic consultation” (p. 4). These 
decisions typically include making a diagnosis about the person’s illness, selection and seeking of 
helping (healing) alternatives, and evaluating the efficacy of a therapeutic alternative (Helman, 1984).   
.   
 
218 
 
nurses with some critical grasp of the interrelationships between cultural issues and 
mental health matters. More specifically, this adaptation of critical incident analysis 
would not only help student nurses to see others (i.e., service users) as cultural 
beings, but importantly, to also recognise themselves and their professional culture 
as emergent cultural constructions (Fitzgerald, 2001). This may help to dispel any 
myths that the ‘professional’ sector (Kleinman, 1978; 1980; 1984) of mental health 
services operates within a ‘culture of no culture’ (Taylor, 2003a; b; 2010). Such a 
training programme could be usefully informed by a process and outcome 
evaluation, and a proposed focused needs analysis of the cross-cultural clinical 
assessment needs of pre and registered UK mental health nurses. At least in the 
field of mental health nursing, this training programme would go some way towards 
reversing Suman Fernando’s (2005, p. 433) observation that: 
“Cultural psychiatry research and theory is now extensive, but as a body it is 
politically weak and has very little impact on training of professionals who by and 
large run the mainline mental health services in the UK”. 
There is also scope for such a focused needs analysis to be extended to the cross-
cultural clinical assessment training needs of multidisciplinary mental health teams.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
Bibliography 
ABDUL-HAMID, W.K., 2011.The need for a category of ‘religious and spiritual 
problems’ in ICD-11. International Psychiatry, 8(3), pp. 60-62.  
 
Al-ISSA, I., 1977. Social and cultural aspects of hallucinations. Psychological 
Bulletin, 84(3), pp. 570-587.  
AI-ISSA, I., 2000. Al Junun: Mental illness in the Islamic world. Madison, CT: 
International Universities Press. 
Al-ISSA, I. and OUDJI, S., 1998. Culture and anxiety disorders. In: S.S. KAZARIAN 
and D.R. EVANS, eds. Cultural clinical psychology: Theory, research, and practice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.127-151.   
AINSWORTH, J. and WILSON, P., 1994. Would your judgement stand up to 
scrutiny? British Journal of Nursing, 3(19), pp. 1023-1028.  
 
AJJAWI, R. and REES, C., 2008. Theories of communication. In: J. HIGGS, R. 
AJJAWI, L. MCALLISTER, F. TREDE and S. LOFTUS, eds. Communicating in the 
health sciences. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.134-141.        
 
ALARCON, R.D., 1995. Culture and psychiatric diagnosis: Impact on DSM-IV and 
ICD-10. The Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 18, pp. 449-465. 
ALONSO, L. and JEFFREY, W.D., 1988.Mental illness complicated by the santeria 
belief in spirit possession. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 39(11), pp. 1188-
1191.   
 
ALSUGHAYIR, M., 1996. Public view of the evil eye and its role in psychiatry. A 
study in Saudi society. The Arab Journal of Psychiatry, 7, pp. 152-160.  
 
AMADOR, X.F. and DAVID, A.S., 1998. Insight and psychosis. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
AMADOR, X.F., STRAUSS, D.H., YALE, S.A. and GORMAN, J.M., 1991. 
Awareness of illness in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 17(1), pp.113-132. 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 1987. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders. 3rd ed. Rev., Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric 
Association. 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 1994. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders. 4th ed., Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.  
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 2000. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV-TR. 4th ed., Arlington, VA.: American Psychiatric 
Association.    
220 
 
ANDARY, L., 1998. Cross-cultural resources survey. Connections, December, pp. 2-
3.  
ANDARY, L., STOLK, Y. and KLIMIDIS, S., 2003. Assessing mental health across 
cultures. Bowen Hills, Australia: Australian Academic Press.  
ANDERSON, J.M., 1985. The socio-cultural context of health and illness: A 
theoretical framework. In: M. STEWART, J. INNES, S. SEARL and C. SMILLIE, eds. 
Community mental health nursing in Canada. Toronto: Grace Educational 
Publishing, 1985, pp.233-245. 
ANDERSON, J.M., 1987. The cultural context of caring. Canadian Critical Care 
Nursing, 4(4), pp.7-13. 
ANDERSON, J.M., 1990. Healthcare across cultures. Nursing Outlook, 38(3), 
pp.136-139.   
ANDREWS, M. and BOYLE, J., 2003. Transcultural concepts in nursing. 4th ed., 
Philadelphia: Lippincott Williams and Wilkins.  
ANGEL, R. and THOITS, P., 1987. The impact of culture on the cognitive structure of 
illness. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 11, pp. 465-494.  
ANGEN, M.J., 2000. Evaluating interpretive inquiry: Reviewing the validity debate 
and opening the dialogue. Qualitative Health Research, 10(3), pp.378-395.  
APPELBAUM, P.S., ROBBINS, P.C. and ROTH, L.H., 1999. Dimensional approach 
to delusions: Comparison across types and diagnoses. The American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 156(12), pp. 1938-1943.     
ARANDA, S. and STREET, A., 2001. From individual to group: Use of narratives in a 
participatory research process. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 33(6), pp.791-797. 
ARGYLE, M., 2000. Psychology and religion: An introduction. London: Routledge.  
ARGYLE, M. and BEIT HALLAHMI, B., 1975. The social psychology of religion. 
Oxford: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
ARMSTRONG, M.J. and FITZGERALD, M.H., 1996. Culture and disability studies: 
An anthropological perspective. Rehabilitation Education, 10(4), pp. 247-304.   
ARTHUR, N., 2001. Using critical incidents to investigate cross-cultural transitions. 
International Journal of Intercultural Interactions, 25, pp. 41-53. 
ARTHUR, N., 2004. Counselling international students: Clients from around the 
world. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.  
221 
 
ASH, J., 1997. Psychological assessment and measurement. In:  B. THOMAS, S. 
HARDY and P. CUTTING, eds. Mental health nursing: Principles and practice. 
London: Mosby.    
ASHMORE, R. and CARVER, N., 2000. Clinical supervision in mental health nursing 
courses. The British Journal of Nursing, 9(3), pp. 171-176.   
ASHMORE, R., CARVER, N., CLIBBENS, N. and SHELDON, J., 2012. Lecturers’ 
accounts of facilitating clinical supervision groups within a pre-registration mental 
health nursing curriculum. Nurse Education Today, 32, pp. 224-228.  
 
ATKINSON, J.M., 1993. The patient as sufferer. British Journal of Medical 
Psychology, 66, pp. 113-120.    
AVRUCH, K. and BLACK, P.W., 1991. The culture question and conflict resolution. 
Peace & Change, 16(1), pp. 22-45.    
AVRUCH, K. and BLACK, P.W., 1993. Conflict resolution in intercultural settings: 
Problems and prospects. In: D. SANDOLE and H. VAN DER MERWE, eds. Conflict 
resolution theory and practice: Integration and application. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1993, pp. 131-145.     
AWAAD, T., 2003. Culture, cultural competency and occupational therapy: A review 
of the literature. British Journal of Occupational Therapy, 66(8), pp. 356-362. 
BAILEY, P.H., 1997. Finding your way around qualitative methods in nursing 
research. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 25, pp. 18-22.  
BAINS, J. 2005. Race, culture and psychiatry: A history of transcultural psychiatry. 
History of Psychiatry, 16(2), pp. 139-154. 
BAKER, D., HAYES, R. and PUEBLA FORTIER, J., 1998. Interpreter use and 
satisfaction with interpersonal aspects of care for Spanish-speaking patients. 
Medical Care, 36(10), pp. 1461-1470.  
BAKHSH, Q., 2010. Mental health: South Asian Communities. Delivering racial 
equality in mental health care-2010 and beyond: A legacy report. London and Essex: 
The Qalb Mental Health Centre and Cheetah Books.  
BALDONADO, A., BEYMER, P.L., BARNES, K., STARSIAK, D., NEMIVANT, E.B. 
and ANONAS-TEMATE, A., 1998. Transcultural nursing practice described by 
registered nurses and baccalaureate nursing students. Journal of Transcultural 
Nursing, 9(2), pp. 15-25.  
BARBEE, E., 1987. Tensions in the brokerage role: Nurses in Botswana. Western 
Journal of Nursing Research, 9(2), pp. 244-256. 
BARBOUR, R., 2007. Doing Focus Groups. London: SAGE Publications.  
222 
 
BARKER, P., 2004. Assessment in psychiatric and mental health nursing: In search 
of the whole person. Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes Ltd.   
BARNHOUSE, R.T., 1986. How to evaluate patients’ religious ideation. In: L. 
ROBINSON, ed. Psychiatry and religion: Overlapping concerns. Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychiatric Press, 1986, pp. 89-105.  
BARRETT, R.J., 2003. Kurt Schneider in Borneo: Do first rank symptoms apply to 
the Iban? In: H. JENKINS and J.H. BARRETT, eds. Schizophrenia, culture and 
subjectivity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 87-110. 
BARTOCCI, G. and DEIN, S., 2007. Religion and mental health. In: K. BHUI and D. 
BHUGRA, eds. Culture and mental health: A comprehensive textbook. London: 
Hodder Arnold, 2007, pp. 47-54. 
BASSETT, A.M. and BAKER, C., 2012. Normal or abnormal? ‘Normative uncertainty’ 
in psychiatric practice. Journal of Medical Humanities (forthcoming).  
BAYCAN, S., 1997. Exploration of training needs of mental health professionals in 
transcultural psychiatric practice: A survey of clinical staff in the Barwon South West 
Victoria. PhD thesis, University of Melbourne. 
BECK, M.H., 1974. The health belief model and sick role behaviour. Health 
Education Monograph, 2, pp. 409-419.    
BECK-SANDER, A., 1998. Is insight into psychosis meaningful? Journal of Mental 
Health, 7, pp. 25-34. 
BEECH, P. and NORMAN, J., 1995. Patients’ perceptions of the quality of 
psychiatric nursing care: Findings from a small-scale descriptive study. Journal of 
Clinical Nursing, 4(2), pp. 117-123.  
BELL, V., HALLIGAN, P.W. and ELLIS, H.D, 2006. The Cardiff Anomalous 
Perceptions scale (CAPS): A new validated measure of anomalous perceptual 
experience. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32, pp. 366-377. 
BENATAR, E.L., 2006. Cultural notions of psychopathology: An examination of 
understandings of spiritual healing and affliction across cultures. Praxis, 6, pp. 58-63.  
BENNER, P., 1984. From novice to expert: Excellence and power in clinical nursing 
practice. Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
BEN-TOVIM, D., 1986. Development psychiatry: Mental health and primary health 
care in Botswana. London: Tavistock Publications. 
BERLIN, A., 2010. Cultural competence in primary child health services-interaction 
between primary child health care nurses, parents of foreign origin, and their culture. 
Stockholm, Sweden: Karlolinska Institutet. 
223 
 
BERLIN, A., JOHANSSON, S.E. and TORNKVIST, L., 2006. Working conditions and 
cultural competence when interacting with children and parents of foreign origin: 
Primary child health nurses’ opinions. Scandinavian Journal of Caring Services, 
20(2), pp. 160-168.  
BERRY, J.W., POORTINGA. Y.H., BREUGELMANS, S.M. and CHASIOTIS, A., 
2011. Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.    
BETANCOURT, J.R., 2004. Cultural competence: Marginal or mainstream 
movement? New England Journal of Medicine, 351, pp. 953-955.  
BETANCOURT, J.R., GREEN. A.R., CARRILLO, E and PARK, E.R., 2005. Cultural 
competence and health care disparities: Key perspectives and trends. Health Affairs, 
24(2), pp. 499-505.  
BHUGRA, D., 1996. Psychiatry and religion. London: Routledge. 
BHUGRA, D., 2002a. Assessing psychiatric problems in ethnic minority patients. 
Practitioner, 246(1632), pp. 151-153.   
BHUGRA, D., 2002b. Self-concept: Psychosis and attraction of new religious 
movements. Mental health, Religion and Culture, 5(3), pp. 239-252.  
BHUGRA, D. and BAHL, V., 1999. Ethnicity: an agenda for mental health.  London: 
Gaskell Press.  
BHUGRA, D. and BHUI, K., 1997. Cross-cultural psychiatric assessment. Advances 
in Psychiatric Treatment, 3, pp. 103-110.  
BHUGRA, D., CORRIDAN, B., RUDGE, S., LEFF, J. and MALLETT, R., 1999. Early 
manifestations, personality traits, and pathways into care for Asian and White first-
onset cases of schizophrenia. Social Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology, 34, pp. 
595-599.   
BHUI, K., 2002. Racism and mental health. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.  
BHUI, K. and BHUGRA, D., 2002. Explanatory models for mental distress: 
Implications for clinical practice and research. British Journal of Psychiatry, 181, pp. 
6-7. 
BHUI, K. and BHUGRA, D., 2004. Communication with patients from other cultures: 
The place of explanatory models. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 10, pp. 474-
478.   
BHUI, K. and BHUGRA, D., 2007. Ethnic inequalities and cultural capability 
framework in mental healthcare. In: D. BHUGRA and K. BHUI, eds. Textbook of 
Cultural Psychiatry.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 81-93. 
224 
 
BHUI, K., WARFA, N., EDONYA, P., MCKENZIE, K. and BHUGRA, D., 2007. 
Cultural competence in mental health care: A review of model evaluations. BMC 
Public Health, 7, pp. 15.  
BIRCHWOOD, M., SMITH, J., DRURY, V., HEALY, F. and SLADE, M.M., 1994. A 
self-report insight scale for psychosis: Reliability, validity and sensitivity to change. 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 89(1), pp. 62-67.  
BLACKNER, K. and WONG, N., 1963. Four cases of autocastration. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 8, pp. 169-176.  
BLOOR, M., 1997. Techniques of validation in qualitative research: A critical 
commentary. In: G. MILLER and R. DINGWALL, eds. Context and method in 
qualitative research. London: SAGE Publications, 1987, pp. 37-50.   
BOCK, P.K., 1980. Continuities in psychological anthropology: A historical 
introduction. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
BOI, S., 2000. Nurses’ experiences in caring for patients from different cultural 
backgrounds. Journal of Research in Nursing, 5(5), pp.382-389.   
BONDER, B., MARTIN, L. and MIRACLE, M., 2001. Achieving cultural competence: 
The challenge for clients and healthcare workers in a multicultural society. 
Generations, 25(1), pp. 35-42.  
BONDER, B., MARTIN, L. and MIRACLE, M., 2002. Culture in clinical care. 
Thorofare, New Jersey: SLACK.  
BONDER, B., MARTIN, L. and MIRACLE, M., 2004. Culture emergent in occupation. 
American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 58, pp. 159-168.  
BONHAM, P., 2004. Communicating as a mental health carer. Cheltenham: Nelson 
Thornes. 
BONVILLAIN, N., 1993. Language, culture and communication: The meaning of 
messages. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.  
BOROVOY, A. and HINE, J., 2008. Managing the unmanageable: Elderly Russian 
Jewish émigrés and the biomedical culture of diabetes care. Medical Anthropology 
Quarterly, 22 (1), pp. 1-26. 
BOURKE-TAYLOR, H. and HUDSON, D., 2005. Cultural differences: The 
experience of establishing an occupational therapy service in a developing 
community. Australian Occupational Therapy Journal, 52, pp. 188-198.  
BOYLE, J.S., 2008. Culture, family and community. In: M.M. ANDREWS and J.S. 
BOYLE, eds. Transcultural concepts in nursing care. Philadelphia: Wolters 
Kluwer/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2008, pp. 261-297. 
225 
 
BRACH, C. and FRASER, I., 2002. Reducing disparities through culturally 
competent health care: An analysis of the business case. Quality Management in 
Health Care, 10(4), pp.15-28.   
BRADBY, H., 2001. Communication, interpretation and translation. In: L. CULLEY 
and S. DYSON, eds. Ethnicity and nursing practice. Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave, 
2001, pp. 129-149. 
BRADFORD, D., 1985. A therapy of religious imagery for paranoid schizophrenic 
psychosis. Springfield: Charles C Thomas.  
BRAGDON, E., 1993. A sourcebook for helping people with spiritual problems. 
Aptos, CA: Lightening Up Press. 
BRIGGS, C., 2003. Why nation-states and journalists can’t teach people to be 
healthy: Power and pragmatic miscalculation in public discourses on health. Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly, 17(3), pp. 287–321. 
 
BRIM, O.G. and RYFF, C.D., 1980. On the properties of life events. In: P.B. BALTES 
and O.G. BRIM, eds. Life span development and behaviour. New York: Academic 
Press, 1980, pp. 367-388.   
BRISLIN, R.W., 1981. Cross-cultural encounters: Face to face interaction. New York: 
Pergomon Press. 
BRISLIN, R.W., 1990. Applied cross cultural psychology. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE 
Publications. 
 
BRISLIN, R.W., 2000. Understanding culture’s influence on behaviour. Wadsworth: 
Thomson Learning. 
BRISLIN, R.W. and YOSHIDA, T., 1994.  Improving intercultural interactions: 
Modules for cross-cultural training programs. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications. 
BRISLIN, R.W., CUSHNER, K., CHERRIE, C. and YONG, M., 1986.Intercultural 
interactions: A practical guide. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
BROOKFIELD, S.D., 1987. Developing critical thinkers: Challenging adults to 
explore alternative ways of thinking and acting. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
BROOKFIELD, S.D., 1990. Using critical incidents to explore learners' assumptions. 
In: J. MEZIROW, ed. Fostering critical reflection in adulthood: A guide to 
transformative and emancipatory learning. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1990, 
pp. 177-193.  
 
BROOKFIELD, S.D., 1992. Uncovering assumptions: The key to reflective practice. 
Adult Learning, 3(4), pp.13-14.  
226 
 
BROOKFIELD, S.D., 1993. Through the lens of learning: How the visceral 
experience of learning reframes teaching. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
BROWN, L.B., 1994. Religion, personality and mental health. New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
 
BROWN, P.J. and BARRETT, R., 2010. Working with the culture of biomedicine: 
Conceptual tools. In: P.J. BROWN and R. BARRETT, eds. Understanding and 
applying medical anthropology. Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 2010, pp. 
272-273.   
BROWN, P.J., GREGG, J. and BALLARD B., 1998. Culture, ethnicity and behaviour 
and the practice of medicine. In: A. STOUDEMIRE, ed. An introduction to human 
behaviour for medical students. New York: J.R. Lippincott Publishers, 1998, pp. 31-
48.  
BROWNER, C.H., 1999. On the medicalization of medical anthropology. Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly, 13(2), pp. 135-140. 
BROWNING, D., GOBE, T. and EVISION, I., 1990. Religious and ethical factors in 
psychiatric practice. Chicago: Nelson Hall. 
BRUNER, J., 1990. Acts of meaning.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.  
BRUNER, J., 1996. The culture of education.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
BUCHANAN, A., 1992. A two year prospective study of treatment compliance in 
patients with schizophrenia. Psychological Medicine, 22, pp. 787-797. 
BUCKLEY, P., 1981.Mystical experience and schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
7, pp. 516-521.    
BULLON, A., GOOD, M.J.D. and CARPENTER-SONG, E., 2011. The paper life of 
minority and low-income patient care. In: M.J.D. GOOD, S.S. WILLEN, S.D. 
HANNAH, K. VICKERY and L.T. PARK, eds. Shattering culture: American medicine 
responds to cultural diversity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011, pp. 200-
216.  
BURGOYNE, J.G. and HODGSON, V.E., 1983. Natural learning and managerial 
action: A phenomenological study in the field setting. Journal of Management 
Studies, 20(3), pp. 387-399. 
BURKE, P., 1991. History of events and the revival of narrative. In: P. BURKE, ed. 
New perspectives on historical writing. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 233-248.  
BURNS, C. and HARM, N.J., 1993. Emergency nurses’ perceptions of critical 
incidents and stress debriefing. Journal of Emergency Nursing, 19(5), pp. 431-446. 
227 
 
BUTLER, J., 2005. Giving an account of oneself. New York: Fordham University 
Press.   
BUTLER, L.D., 2006. Normative dissociation. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 
29, pp. 45-62.  
BYGRAVE, W.D., 1989. The entrepreneurship paradigm: A philosophical look at its 
research methodologies’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 14(1), pp. 7-26. 
BYRNE, M., 2001. Critical incident technique as a qualitative research method. 
AORN Journal, 74(4), pp. 536-539. 
CALABRESE, J.D., 2011. “The culture of medicine” as revealed in patients’ 
perspectives on psychiatric treatment. In: M.J.D. GOOD, S.S. WILLEN, S.D. 
HANNAH, K. VICKERY and L.T. PARK, eds. Shattering culture: American medicine 
responds to cultural diversity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011, pp. 184-
200.  
CALLAGHAN, G., 2005. Accessing Habitus: Relating structure and agency through 
focus group research. Sociological Research Online [online], 10(3) Available from: 
http://www.socresonline.org.uk/10/3/Callaghan.html [Accessed: 05 April 2012].   
CALLAGHAN, P., COOPER, L. and GRAY, R., 2007. Rethinking clinical placements 
for mental health nursing students. Mental Health Practice, 10(5), pp. 18-20.   
CALLAN, A. and LITTLEWOOD, R., 1998. Patient satisfaction: Ethnic origin or 
explanatory model? International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 44(1), pp.1-11. 
 
CALLERY, P. and SMITH, L., 1991. A study of role negotiation between nurses and 
the parents of hospitalized children. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 16, pp. 772-781. 
 
CAMPBELL, J., 2000. Narrative and method in the anthropology of medicine. In: V. 
SKULTANS and J. COX, eds. Anthropological approaches to psychological 
medicine. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000, pp. 105-122. 
CAMPINHA-BACOTE, J., 1999. A model and an instrument for addressing cultural 
competence in health care. Journal of Nursing Education, 38(5), pp. 203-207. 
 
CANALES, M.K. and BOWERS, B.J., 2001. Expanding conceptualizations of 
culturally competent care. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 36(1), pp. 102-111.   
CARDENA, E., WEINER, L.A., VAN DUIJI, M. and TERHUNE, D.B., 2006. 
Possession/Trance phenomena. In: P.F. DELL and J.A. O’NEIL, eds. Dissociation 
and the dissociative disorders: DSM-IV and beyond. New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 
171-178.  
CARLSON, J.A., 2010. Avoiding traps in member checking. The Qualitative Report, 
15(5), pp. 1102-1113. 
228 
 
CARPENTER, W.T., STRAUSS, J.S. and BARKTKO, J.J., 1973. Flexible system for 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia: Report from the WHO International Pilot Study of 
Schizophrenia. Science, 182, pp. 1275-1278.   
CARPENTER-SONG, E.A., 2011. Recognition in clinical relationships. In: M.J.D. 
GOOD, S.S. WILLEN, S.D. HANNAH, K. VICKERY and L.T. PARK, eds. Shattering 
Culture: American medicine responds to cultural diversity. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2011, pp. 168-184.  
CARPENTER-SONG, E.A., NORDQUEST SCHWALLIE, M. and LONGHOFER, J., 
2007. Cultural competence re-examined: Critique and directions for the future. 
Psychiatric Services, 58 (10), pp.1362-1365.    
CASSELL, E.J., 1978. The healer’s art: A new approach to the doctor-patient 
relationship. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.  
CASTILLO, R., 1997a. Culture and mental illness: A client-centred approach. Pacific 
Grove, California: Brooks/Cole. 
CASTILLO, R., 1997b. Dissociation. In: W.S. TSENG and J. STRELTZER, eds. 
Culture and psychopathology: A guide to clinical assessment. New York: 
Brunner/Mazel, 1997, pp. 101-123. 
CASTILLO, R., 1997c. Impact of culture on dissociation: Enhancing the cultural 
suitability of DSM-IV. In: T. WIDIGER, A. FRANCES, H. PINCUS, R. ROSS, M.B. 
FIRST and W. DAVIS, eds. DSM-IV Sourcebook. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Press, 1997, pp. 943-949.    
CHADWICK, P.D.J. and BIRCHWOOD, M., 1994. The omnipotence of voices: A 
cognitive approach to auditory hallucinations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164, pp. 
190-201. 
CHAKRABORTY, K. and BASU, D., 2010. Insight in schizophrenia: A 
comprehensive update. German Journal of Psychiatry, 13, pp. 17-30.  
CHARTERS, P.J., 1999. The religious and spiritual needs of mental health clients. 
Nursing Standard, 13(26), pp. 34-6. 
CHELL, E., 2003. The critical incident technique. In: M. LEWIS-BECK, A. BRYMAN 
and T. FUTING LIAO, eds. The encyclopaedia of research methods in the social 
sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.   
CHELL, E. and ALLMAN, A., 2003. Mapping the motivations and intentions of 
technology orientated entrepreneurs. R&D Management, 33(2), pp. 117-34. 
CHELL, E. and PITTAWAY, L., 1998. A study of entrepreneurship in the restaurant 
and cafe industry: Exploratory work using the critical incident technique as a 
methodology. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 17(1), pp. 23-32.  
229 
 
CHELL, E., HOWARTH, J. and BREARLEY, S., 1991. The entrepreneurial 
personality: Concepts, Cases and Categories. London: Routledge. 
CHRISMAN, N.J., 1977. The health seeking process: An approach to the natural 
history of illness. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 1(4), pp.351-377. 
CHRISMAN, N.J., 1986. Transcultural care. In: D. ZSCOCHE, ed. Mosby’s 
Comprehensive review of critical care. St Louis: Mosby, 1986, pp. 48-68. 
CHRISMAN, N.J., 1991. Cultural systems. In: S. BAIRD, R. MCCORKLE and M. 
GRANT, eds. Cancer Nursing. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders, 1991, pp. 45-59.   
CHRISMAN, N.J. and JOHNSON, T.M., 1996. Clinically Applied anthropology. In: 
C.F. SARGENT and T.M. JOHNSON, eds. Handbook of medical anthropology: 
Contemporary theory and method. Westport: Praeger, 1996, pp. 88-109.  
CHRISMAN, N.J. and MARETZKI, T.W., 1982. Anthropology in health settings. In: 
N.J. CHRISMAN and T.W. MARETZKI, eds. Clinically applied anthropology: 
Anthropologists in health science settings. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1982, pp. 1-35.  
CHRISMAN, N.J. and ZIMMER, P.A., 2000. Cultural competence in primary care. In: 
P.V. MEREDITH and N.M. HORAN, eds. Adult primary care. Philadelphia: W.B. 
Saunders, 2000, pp. 65-75. 
CIOFFI, J., 2005. Nurses experiences of caring for culturally diverse patients in an 
acute care setting. Contemporary Nurse, 20, pp. 78-86. 
CIOFFI, J., 2006. Culturally diverse patient nurse interactions in an acute care ward. 
International Journal of Nursing, 12, pp. 319-325. 
CIOFFI, R.N., 2003. Communicating with culturally and linguistically diverse patients 
in an acute care setting: Nurses’ experiences. International Journal of Nursing 
Studies, 40(3), pp. 299-306. 
CLAMP, C.G.L., 1980. Learning through incidents. Nursing Times, 40, pp. 1755-
1758. 
CLAMP, C.G.L., GOUGH, S. and LAND, L., 2004. Resources for nursing research: 
An annotated bibliography. London: SAGE Publications. 
CLARK, L., DE BACA, R.C., REIDY, K. and TURNER, M., 2002. Is cultural 
competence all about language? Data from two Medicaid managed care systems 
serving Latinos. 101th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association: 
New Orleans. 
 
CLARK, M.M., 1983. Cultural context of medical practice: Cross-cultural medicine 
(special issue). The Western Journal of Medicine, 139(6), pp. 806-816. 
230 
 
CLARKE, I., 2001. Psychosis and Spirituality: Exploring the new frontier. ed., 
Gateshead: Whurr. 
CLARKE, V. and WALSH, A., 2009. Fundamentals of mental health nursing. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
CLEMENT, D.C., 1982. Samoan folk knowledge of mental disorders. In: A.J. 
MARSELLA and G.M. WHITE, eds. Cultural conceptions of mental health and 
therapy. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982, pp. 193-213. 
CLEMSON, L., FITZGERALD, M.H. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1999. Family 
perspectives following stroke: The unheard stories. Top Stroke Rehabilitation, 6(1), 
pp. 60-77.  
COCKERHAM, W.C., 2000. The sociology of health behaviour and health lifestyles. 
In: C. BIRD, P. CONRAD and A.M. FREMONT, eds. Handbook of medical sociology. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000, pp. 159-172.  
COHEN, M.Z. and SARTER, B., 1992. Love and work: Oncology nurses’ view of the 
meaning of their work. Oncology Nursing Forum, 19(10), pp.1481-1486. 
COHN, E., 1989. Fieldwork education: Shaping a foundation for clinical reasoning. 
The American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 43, pp. 240-244. 
COLAIZZI, P.F., 1978. Psychological research as the phenomenologist views it. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
COMO, J., 2007. Spiritual practice: A literature review related to spiritual health and 
health outcomes. Holistic Nursing Practice, 21(5), pp. 224-236. 
CONRAD, P. and SCHNEIDER, J., 1980. Deviance and medicalization: From 
badness to sickness. St Louis: C.V. Mosby and Company.   
COOMBS, T., DEANE, F.P., LAMBERT, G. and GRIFFITHS, R., 2003. What 
influences patients’ medication adherence? Mental health nurse perspectives and a 
need for education and training. Journal of Mental Health Nursing, 12, pp. 148-152.  
COPE, B., KALANTZIS, M., LO BIANCO, J., LOHREY, A., LUKE, A., SINGH, M.G. 
and SOLOMON, N., 1997. ‘Cultural understandings’ as the eighth key competency. 
Sydney: Centre for Workplace Communication and Culture. 
COPE, J. and WATTS, G., 2000. Learning by doing: An exploration of experience, 
critical incidents and reflection in entrepreneurial learning. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research, 6(3), pp. 104-24.  
CORMACK, D.F.S., 1983. Psychiatric nursing described. Edinburgh: Churchill 
Livingstone.  
231 
 
CORMACK, D.F.S., 1996. The critical incident technique. In: D.F.S. CORMACK, ed. 
The research process in nursing. Oxford: Blackwell Science, 1996, pp. 266-275.  
CORTAZZI, D. and ROOTE, S., 1973.Don’t talk-draw. Nursing Times, 69, pp. 1134-
1136.  
CORTAZZI, D. and ROOTE, S., 1975. Illuminative incident analysis. London: 
McGraw Hill.  
CORTAZZI, M., 2001. Narrative analysis in ethnography. In: P. ATKINSON, A. 
COFFEY, S. DELAMONT, J. LOFLAND and L. LOFLAND, eds. Handbook of 
ethnography. London: SAGE Publications, 2001, pp.384-394. 
 
CORTIS, J.D., 2004. Meeting the needs of minority ethnic patients. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 48(1), pp. 51-58.    
COX, J., 1994. Psychiatry and religion: A general psychiatrist’s perspective. 
Psychiatric Bulletin, 18, pp. 673-676. 
COX, J., 1996. Psychiatry and religion: A general psychiatrist’s perspective. In: D., 
BHUGRA, ed. Psychiatry and religion: Context, consensus and controversy. London: 
Routledge, 1996, pp. 157-167. 
COX, K., BERGEN, A. and NORMAN, I.J., 1993. Exploring consumer views of care 
provided by the Macmillan nurse using the critical incident technique. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 18, pp. 408-415. 
CRESSWELL, J., 1994. Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches. 
London: SAGE Publications.   
CROSSLEY, D., 1995. Religious experience within mental illness: Opening the door 
on research. British Journal of Psychiatry, 166, pp. 284-286. 
CROTTY, M., 1998. The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspectives. 
London: SAGE Publications.  
CROWE, M., 2006. Psychiatric diagnosis: Some implications for mental health 
nursing care. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 53(1), pp. 125-131.  
CULLEY, L., 1996. A critique of multiculturalism in healthcare: The challenge for 
healthcare. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 23, pp. 564-570.    
CULLEY, L., 2000. Working with diversity: Beyond the factfile. In: C. DAVIES, L. 
FINLAY and A. BULLMAN, eds. Changing practice in health and social care. SAGE 
in association with the Open University, 2000, pp. 131-142.   
CULLEY, L., 2001. Nursing, culture and competence. In: L. CULLEY and S. DYSON, 
eds. Ethnicity and nursing practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 109-127.   
232 
 
CULLEY, L., 2006. Transcending transculturalism? Race, ethnicity and health-care. 
Nursing Inquiry, 13(2), pp. 144-153.  
CULLEY, L. and DEMAINE, J., 2006. Race and ethnicity in UK public policy: 
Education and health. In: E. RATA and R. OPENSHAW, eds. Public policy and 
ethnicity. London: Palgrave Macmillan.    
CULLEY, L. and DYSON, S., 2010. Ethnicity and healthcare practice: A guide for the 
primary care team. London: Quay Books.  
CULLIFORD, L. and EAGGER, S., 2009. Assessing spiritual needs. In: C. COOK 
and A. POWELL, eds. Spirituality and psychiatry. London: The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2009, pp. 16-39.  
CUTCLIFFE, J.R. and MCKENNA, H.P., 2000. Generic nursing: The nemesis of 
psychiatric/ mental health nursing. Mental Health Practice, 3(9), pp. 10-14. 
CUTCLIFFE, J.R. and MCKENNA, H.P., 2002. When do we know that we know? 
Considering the truth of research findings and the craft of qualitative research. 
International Journal of Nursing Studies, 39, pp. 611-618.  
DACHELET, C.Z., WEMETT, M.F., GARLING, J., CRAIG-KUHN, K., KENT, N. and 
KITZMAN, H.J., 1981. The critical incident technique applied to the evaluation of the 
clinical practicum setting. Journal of Nursing Education, 20(8), pp. 15-31. 
DAVID, A.S., 1990. Insight and psychosis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 156, pp. 
798-808. 
DAVID, A.S., 1998. Commentary: “Is insight into psychosis meaningful”. Journal of 
Mental Health, 7, pp. 579-583.   
DAVID, A.S., BUCHANAN, A., REED, A. and ALMEIDA, O., 1992. The assessment 
of insight in psychosis. British Journal of Psychiatry, 161, pp. 599-602.  
DAVIES, C.A., 1999. Reflexive ethnography. London: Routledge.  
DAVIS, D., 1994. It ain’t necessarily so: Clinicians, bioethics, and religious studies. 
Journal of Clinical Ethics, 5, pp. 315-319. 
DAVIS, D., 2000. Groups, communities, and contested identities in genetic research. 
Hastings Center Report, 30, pp. 38-45. 
DAWKINS, R., 2006. The God delusion. London: Bantam. 
DEIN, S., 1997. ABC of mental health: Mental health in a multi-ethnic society. British 
Medical Journal, 315(7106), pp. 473-476. 
DEIN, S., 2000. The implications of anthropology of religion for psychiatric practice. 
In: V. SKULTANS and J. COX, eds. Anthropological approaches to psychological 
233 
 
medicine: Crossing bridges. London and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
2000, pp. 172-184.       
DEIN, S., 2003. Against belief: The usefulness of explanatory model research in 
medical anthropology. Social Theory and Heath, 1, pp. 149-162.   
DEIN, S., 2004. Working with patients with religious beliefs. Advances in Psychiatric 
Treatment, 10, pp. 287-294.    
DEIN, S., 2006a. Culture and cancer care: Anthropological insights in oncology. 
Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press.  
DEIN, S., 2006b. Religion, spirituality and depression: Implications for research and 
treatment. Primary Care and Community Psychiatry, 11(2), pp. 67-72.    
DEIN, S., 2010a. Working with patients with religious beliefs. In: R. 
BHATTACHARYA, S. CROSS and D. BHUGRA, eds. Clinical topics in cultural 
psychiatry. London: Royal College of Psychiatry, 2010, pp.293-306.   
DEIN, S., 2010b. Judeo-Christian religious experience and psychopathology: The 
legacy of William James. Transcultural Psychiatry, 47(4), pp.523-547.  
DEIN, S., 2011. Religious experience: Perspectives and research paradigms. World 
Cultural Psychology Research Review, June 2011, pp. 3-9. 
DEIN, S., 2012, 24th March 2012 and 18th Aug 2012. A position statement on 
religious delusions and hallucinations. Debating the First Principles of Transcultural 
Psychiatry.  Glasgow, University of Glasgow.  
DEIN, S. and LIPSEDGE, M., 1998. Negotiating across class, culture, and religion: 
Psychiatry in the English inner city. In: S.O. OKPAKU, ed. Clinical methods in 
transcultural psychiatry. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1998, pp. 
137-154.  
DEIN, S. and LITTLEWOOD, R., 2007. ‘The voice of God’. Anthropology and 
Medicine, 14(2), pp. 213-228.  
DEIN, S., COOK, C.C.H., POWELL, A. and EAGGER, S., 2010. Religion, spirituality 
and mental health. The Psychiatrist, 34, pp. 63-64.    
DELANEY, H.D. and DICLEMENTE, C.C., 2005. Psychology’s roots: A brief history 
of the influence of Judeo-Christian perspectives. In: W. MILLER and H.D. DELANEY, 
eds. Judeo-Christian perspectives on psychology: Human nature, motivation and 
change. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2005, pp. 271-289.  
DENZIN, N.K. and LINCOLN, Y.S., 2000. Introduction: The discipline and practice of 
qualitative research. In: N.K. DENZIN and Y.S. LINCOLN, eds. Handbook of 
qualitative research. London: SAGE Publications, 2005, pp. 1-28.  
234 
 
DEPARTMENT of HEALTH, 1993. A Vision for the Future Report of the Chief 
Nursing Officer. London: HMSO. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 2005. Delivering race equality in mental health care: 
An action plan for reform inside and outside services and the Government’s 
response to the independent inquiry into the death of David Bennett. London: 
HMSO.  
DE SILVA, P. and BHUGRA, D., 2007. Culture and obsessive compulsive disorder. 
In: D. BHUGRA and K. BHUI, eds. Textbook of cultural psychiatry. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 282-292. 
DE SILVA, P. and RACHMAN, D., 2004. Obsessive-compulsive disorder: The facts. 
3rd Ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
DILLARD, M., ANDONIAN, L., FLORES, O., LAI, L., MACRAE, A. and SHAKIR, M., 
1992. Culturally competent occupational therapy in a diversely populated mental 
health setting. American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 46(8), pp. 721-726.    
DONINI-LENHOFF, F.G. and HEDRICK, H.L., 2000. Increasing awareness and 
implementation of cultural competence principles in health professions education. 
Journal of Allied Health, 29(4), pp. 241-245.  
DOYLE, S., 2007. Member checking with older women: A framework for negotiating 
meaning. Health Care for Women International, 8(10), pp. 888-908.   
DREHER, M. and MACNAUGHTON, N., 2002. Cultural competence in nursing: 
Foundation or fallacy? Nursing Outlook, 50(5), pp. 181-186.    
D’SOUZA, R. and KURUVILLA, G., 2006. Spirituality, religion and psychiatry: Its 
application to clinical practice. Australasian Psychiatry, 14(4), pp. 408-412. 
DULANEY, S. and FISKE, P., 1994. Cultural rituals and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder: Is there a common psychological mechanism? Ethos, 22(3), pp. 243-283.   
DUXBURY, J., 2000. Difficult patients. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. 
DYCK, I., 1989. The immigrant client: Issues in developing culturally sensitive 
practice. Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 56(5), pp. 248-255.  
DYCK, I., 1991. Multiculturalism and occupational therapy: Sharing the challenge. 
Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 58(5), pp. 224-226. 
DYCK, I., 1998. Multicultural society. In: D. JONES, S.E.E. BLAIR, T. HARTERY and 
R.K. JONES, eds. Sociology and occupational therapy: An integrated approach. 
Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1998, pp. 67-81.  
235 
 
EASEN, P. and WILCOCKSON, J., 1996. Intuition and rational decision making in 
professional decision making: A false dichotomy. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 24, 
pp. 667-673.     
EATON, W.W., ROMANOSKI, A., ANTHONY, J.C. and NESTADT, G., 1991. 
Screening for psychosis in the general population with a self-report interview. Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 179, pp. 689-693. 
EDWARDS, M. and FITZGERALD, M.H., 2001, 1-4 April. Planting the seed: Critical 
incidents, cognitive development and continuing professional excellence. OT 
Australia 21st National Conference. P.49, Brisbane, Australia. 
EELES, J., 2001. A study of mental health nurses’ evaluation of spiritual experience. 
BA thesis, Oxford Brooks University. 
EELES, J., LOWE, T. and WELLMAN, N., 2003. Spirituality or psychosis? An 
exploration of the criteria that nurses use to evaluate spiritual-type experiences 
reported by patients. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 40(2), pp. 197-206.   
EISEN, J.L., PHILIPS, K.A., BAER, L., BEER, D.A., ATALA, K.D. and RASMUSSEN, 
S.A., 1998. The Brown assessment of beliefs scale: Reliability and validity. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 140, pp. 466-469. 
EISENBERG, L., 1977. Disease and illness: Distinctions between professional and 
popular ideas of sickness. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 1(1), pp. 9-23. 
EISENBRUCH, M., 1990. Classification of natural and supernatural causes of mental 
distress: Development of a mental distress explanatory model questionnaire. Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 178, pp. 712-719. 
ELLIS, A., 1980. Psychotherapy and atheistic values: A response to A.E. Bergin’s 
“Psychotherapy and religious values”. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
48, pp. 635-639.  
ELLIS, A., 1986. Do some religious beliefs help create emotional disturbance? 
Psychotherapy in Private Practice, 4, pp. 101-106. 
ELWORTHY, T.F., 1989. The evil eye: An account of this ancient and widespread 
superstition. New York: Bell Publishing Company.  
EMBER, C.R. and EMBER, M., 1988. Anthropology. 5th ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
EMBER, C.R. and EMBER, M., 1992. Anthropology. 7th ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall.  
EMBER, C.R., EMBER, M. and PEREGRINE, P.N., 2002. Physical anthropology and 
archaeology. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.   
236 
 
EMERSON, R., 1983. Contemporary field research. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland 
Press. 
ENDICOTT, J., NEE, J., FLEISS, J., COHEN, J., WILLIAMS, J.B. and SIMON, R., 
1982. Diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia: Reliabilities and agreement between 
systems. Archives of General Psychiatry, 39, pp. 884-889. 
ENGLISH NATIONAL BOARD FOR NURSING, MIDWIFERY AND HEALTH 
VISITING AND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 2001. Placements in focus: Guidance 
for education in practice for health care professions. London: ENB/DH. 
ESTROFF, S.E., 1981. Making it crazy: An ethnography of psychiatric clients in an 
American community. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press. 
ESTROFF, S.E., LACHICOTTE, W.S., ILLINGWORTH, L.C. and JOHNSTONE, A., 
1991. Everybody’s got a little mental illness: Accounts of illness and self among 
people with severe, persistent mental illnesses. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 
5(4), pp. 331-369.  
FABREGA, H., 1972. The study of disease in relation to culture. Behavioral Science, 
17(2), pp. 183-203. 
FABREGA, H., 1989. Cultural relativism and psychiatric illness. The Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 177(7), pp. 415-425. 
FABREGA, H., 1997.Earliest phases in the evolution of sickness and healing. 
Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 11(1), pp. 26-55. 
FADIMAN, A., 1997. The spirit catches you and you fall down: A Hmong child, her 
American doctors, and the collision of two cultures. New York: Noonday. 
 
FALLOT, R.D., 1998. Assessment of spirituality and implications for service 
planning. In: R.D. FALLOT, ed. Spirituality and religion in recovery from mental 
illness. San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998, pp. 13-23. 
 
FALLOT, R.D., 2001. The place of spirituality and religion in mental health services. 
New Directions for Mental Health Services, 91, pp. 79-88.   
FALLOT, R.D., FREEMAN, D. and HAYDEN, J., 1997. A spiritual assessment 
method for community connections. Washington D.C.: Community Connections. 
FARMER, P., 2003. Pathologies of power: Health, human rights, and the new war on 
the poor. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
FARRINGTON, A., 1993. Intuition and expert: Clinical practice in nursing. British 
Journal of Nursing, 2(4), pp. 228-233. 
237 
 
FEINSTEIN, A.R., 1977. A critical overview of diagnosis in psychiatry. In: V.M. 
RAKOFF, H.C. STANCER and H.B. KEDWARD, eds. Psychiatric diagnosis. New 
York: Brunner/Mazel, 1977, pp. 189-206. 
FERNANDO, S., 1988. Race and culture in psychiatry. New York: Croom Helm. 
FERNANDO, S., 1998. Forensic psychiatry, race and culture. London: Routledge.   
FERNANDO, S., 2002. Mental health, race and culture. 2nd ed., Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
FERNANDO, S., 2003. Cultural diversity, mental health and psychiatry: The struggle 
against racism. New York: Brunner-Routledge. 
FERNANDO, S., 2005.  Multicultural mental health services: Projects for minority 
ethnic communities in England. Transcultural Psychiatry, 39, pp. 420-436. 
FERNANDO, S., 2009. Inequalities and the politics of ‘race’ in mental health. In: S. 
FERNANDO and F. KEATING, eds. Mental health in a multi-ethnic society: A 
multidisciplinary handbook. Hove, East Sussex: Routledge, 2009, pp. 42-58.  
FERNANDO, S., 2010. Mental health, race and culture. 3rd ed., Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.   
FIELD, H.L. and WALDFOGEL, S., 1995. Severe ocular self-injury. General Hospital 
Psychiatry, 17(3), pp. 224-227. 
FISHER, S. and TODD, A.D., 1983. The social organization of doctor-patient 
communication. Washington, D.C.: Center for Applied Linguistics. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., 1991. The dilemma-Race? Ethnicity? Culture? The Rehab 
Journal (A publication of the Pacific Basin Rehabilitation Research and Training 
Center and the Rehabilitation Hospital of the Pacific, Honolulu, HI), 7(1), pp.5-6.   
FITZGERALD, M.H., 1992. Multicultural clinical interactions. Journal of 
Rehabilitation, April/May/June, pp. 1-5.  
FITZGERALD, M.H., 1995. The Aussie battler: Understanding hidden disability 
behaviour using cultural analogy. In: A. DAVISON, M.C. DINH, M.H. FITZGERALD 
and J.M. LINGARD, eds. Current topics in Health science. Lidcombe: University of 
Sydney, Faculty of Health Sciences, 1995, pp. 35-36.    
FITZGERALD, M.H., 1996, 31st Oct. Cultural competency education and training: 
Issues and needs. NSW Department of Health Mental Health Education and Training 
Strategic Planning Day. Sydney, Australia.    
FITZGERALD, M.H., 1997. Ethnography. In: J. HIGGS, ed. Qualitative research: 
Discourse on methodologies. Sydney: Hampden Press, 1997, pp. 48-61.     
238 
 
FITZGERALD, M.H., 2000. Establishing cultural competency for mental health 
professionals.  In: V. SKULTANS and J. COX, eds. Anthropological approaches to 
psychological medicine: Crossing bridges. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
2000, pp. 184-200.   
FITZGERALD, M.H., 2001. Gaining knowledge of culture during professional 
education. In: J. HIGGS and A. TITCHEN, eds. Practice knowledge and expertise in 
the health professions.  Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 2001, pp. 149-153. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., 2004. A dialogue on occupational therapy, culture, and families. 
American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 58, pp. 489-498.  
FITZGERALD, M.H. and ARMSTRONG, J., 1993. Culture and disability in the 
Pacific. Durham NH: University of New Hampshire, World Rehabilitation Fund. 
FITZGERALD, M.H. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1994, 17-22 April. Intercultural 
interactions in occupational therapy practice. 11th International Congress of the 
World Federation of Occupational Therapists. Pp. 1361-1363, London: World 
Federation of Occupational Therapy.  
FITZGERALD, M.H. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1995. Intercultural interactions 
in rehabilitation. In: A. DAVISON, M.C. DINH, M.H. FITZGERALD and J.M. 
LINGARD, eds. Current topics in health sciences. Sydney: The University of Sydney, 
Faculty of Health Sciences, 1995, pp. 37-39. 
FITZGERALD, M.H. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1996. Analysis of student 
definitions of culture. Physical and Occupational Therapy in Geriatrics, 14(1), pp. 67-
89.  
FITZGERALD, M.H. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1998, 22-23rd Sept. Critical 
Incident reflections. NSW Association of Occupational Therapists 8th Annual State 
Conference. Pp. 46, Gosford, NSW. 
FITZGERALD, M.H. and PATERSON, K.A., 1995. The hidden disability dilemma for 
the preservation of self. Journal of Occupational Science, 2(1), pp. 13-21. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C. and CLEMSON, L., 1997. Cultural 
issues from practice. Australian Occupational Therapy Journal, 44, pp. 1-21. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C. and CLEMSON, L., 2001. Families 
and nursing home placements: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Gerontology, 16, pp. 333-351. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., PATERSON, K. A. and AZZOPARDI, D., 1997. Aussie battlers 
(Australische ÜberlebenskämpferInnen): Method and analysis in understanding 
Australians with “hidden” Multiple Sclerosis (MS). In: U. MEISER and F.ALBRECHT, 
eds. Krankheit, behinderung und kulture. Frankfurt, Germany: IKO-Verlag für 
Interkulturelle Kommunikation, 1997, pp. 99-139.  
239 
 
 
FITZGERALD, M.H., WILLIAMSON, P. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1998. 
Analysis of therapist definitions of culture. Physical and Occupational Therapy in 
Geriatrics, 15(4), pp. 41-65. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., CLEMSON, L. and WILLIAMSON, 
P., 1997. Enhancing cultural competency training manual. North Parramatta, 
Australia: Transcultural Mental Health Centre. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., TWIBLE, R. and KINEBANIAN, A., 
1995. Exploring cultural diversity: A workshop manual for occupational therapists. 
Sydney, Australia: The School of Occupational Therapy, Faculty of Health Sciences, 
University of Sydney. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., ROBISON, S., CLEMSON, L. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 
1997. Cultural issues in physiotherapy practice. (Unpublished manuscript) Sydney: 
University of Sydney.   
FITZGERALD, M.H., WILLIAMSON, P., RUSSELL, C. and MANOR, D., 2005. 
Doubling the cloak of (in)competence in client/therapist interactions. Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly, 19(3), pp. 331-347.  
FITZGERALD, M.H., BELTRAN, R., PENNOCK, J., WILLIAMSON, P. and 
MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1997a. Occupational therapy, culture and mental health. 
Parramatta, New South Wales, Australia: Transcultural Mental Health Centre. 
FITZGERALD, M.H., MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., CLEMSON, L., WHYBROW, S. and 
WILLIAMSON, P., 1996, 20-21th Sept. Culture, culture-who’s got the culture? NSW 
9th Annual State Conference: Pp. 49, Ballina, NSW, Australia.  
FITZGERALD, M.H., YANG, T., HAY, S., MITCHELL, P., ING, V., YA, T.H., 
MATTHEY, S., DUONG, H.L., BARNETT, B., SILOVE, D. and MCNAMARA, J., 
1997b. Collaborative research: The bridge that can carry you over. In: B. 
FERGUSON and D. BARNES, eds. Perspectives in transcultural mental health. 
Sydney, Australia: Transcultural Mental Health Centre, 1997, pp. 60-68.   
FLANAGAN, J.C., 1954. The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 
51(4), pp. 327-356. 
FLICK, U., 2008a. Designing qualitative research. London: SAGE Publications.  
FLICK, U., 2008b. Managing quality in qualitative research. London: SAGE 
Publications.  
FLORES, G., BARTON LAWS, M., MAYO, S.J., ZUCKERMAN, B., ABREU, M., 
MEDINA, L. and HARDT, E.J., 2003. Errors in medical interpretation and their 
potential clinical consequences in paediatric encounters. Paediatrics, 111(1), pp. 6-
14.     
240 
 
FONTES, L.M., 2005. Child abuse and culture: Working with diverse families. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
FONTES, L.M., 2008. Interviewing clients across cultures: A practitioner’s guide. 
New York: Guilford Press. 
FORTUNE, T., 2002. Establishing an occupational milieu in aged mental health 
units: An occupational ethnography. PhD thesis, University of Sydney. 
FORTUNE, T. and FITZGERALD, M.H., 2009. The challenge of interdisciplinary 
collaboration in acute psychiatry: Impacts on the occupational milieu. Australian 
Occupational Therapy Journal, 56(2), pp. 81-88.   
FOSTER, G.M. and ANDERSON, B.G., 1978. Medical Anthropology. New York: 
John Wiley and Sons.  
FOUCAULT, M., 1973. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception. New York: Vintage Books.  
FOX, R.C., 1968. Illness. In: D. SILLS, ed. International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences. New York: Free Press/Macmillan, 1968, pp. 90-96.   
FOX, R.C., 2005. Becoming a physician: Cultural competence and the culture of 
medicine. New England Journal of Medicine, 353(13), pp. 1316-1319. 
FREUD, S., 1907. Obsessive acts, religious practices. In: J. STRACHEY, ed. 
Standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud. London: 
Hogarth Press, 1907, pp. 1953-1974.   
FREUD, S., 1961a. Civilisation and its discontents. New York: Norton. 
FREUD, S., 1961b.The future of an illusion. New York: Norton.  
FREUD, S., 1991/1905. On Sexuality: Three essays on sexuality and other works (J. 
Strachey, Trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
FRICK, W.B., 1987. The symbolic growth experience: Paradigm for a humanistic-
existential learning theory. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 27(4), pp. 406-423. 
FRICK, W.B., 1990. The symbolic growth experience: A chronicle of heuristic inquiry 
and a quest for synthesis. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 30(1), pp. 64-80.   
FROMKIN, V., RODMAN, R., COLLINS, P. and BLAIR, D., 1988. An introduction to 
language. Sydney: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
FRY, A., 1998. Spirituality, communication and mental health nursing: The tacit 
interdiction. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Mental Health Nursing, 7(1), pp. 
25-32.  
241 
 
GABBARD, G.O., TWENLOW, S. and JONES, P., 1982. Differential diagnosis of 
altered mind body perceptions. Psychiatry, 45, pp. 361-369. 
GAINES, A.D., 1982a. Knowledge and practice: Anthropological ideas and 
psychiatric practice. In: N. CHRISMAN and T. MARETZKI, eds. Clinically applied 
anthropology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1982, pp. 243-273.  
GAINES, A.D., 1982b. Cultural definitions, behaviour and the person in American 
psychiatry. In: A.J. MARSELLA and G.M. WHITE, eds. Cultural conceptions of 
mental health and therapy. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1982, pp. 167-192.   
GAINES, A.D., 1982c. The twice born: Christian psychiatry and Christian 
psychiatrists.  Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry Special Issue, 6(3), pp. 305-324.   
GAINES, A.D., 1988. Delusions: Culture, psychoses and the problem of meaning. In: 
T.F. OLTMANNS and B.A. MAHER, eds. Delusional beliefs.  New York: Wiley, 1988, 
pp. 231-258.         
GAINES, A.D., 1991. Cultural constructivism: Sickness histories and the 
understanding of ethnomedicines beyond critical medical anthropologies. In: B. 
PFLEIDERER and G. BIBEAU, eds. Anthropologies of medicine: A colloquium on 
West European and North American perspectives.  Wiesbaden, Germany: Vieweg 
and Sohn Verlag, 1991, pp. 221-258.   
GAINES, A.D., 1992. Ethnopsychiatry: The cultural construction of psychiatries. In: 
A.D. GAINES, ed. The cultural construction of professional and folk psychiatries. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 3-51.   
GAINES, A.D., 1995. Culture-specific delusions: Sense and nonsense in cultural 
context. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 18(2), pp. 281-301.   
GAINES, A.D. and HAHN, R.A., 1982. Physicians of Western medicine: An 
introduction.   Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 6(3), pp. 210-215. 
GALANTI., G.A., 2001. The challenge of serving and working with diverse 
populations in American hospitals. The Diversity Factor, 9(3), pp. 21-26.  
GALANTI, G.A., 2005. Culturally competent rehabilitation nursing. Rehabilitation 
Nursing, 30(4), pp. 123-126.  
GALANTI, G.A., 2006. Applying cultural competence to perianesthesia nursing. 
Journal of Perianesthesia Nursing, 21(2), pp. 97-102.   
GALANTI, G.A., 2008. Caring for patients from different cultures. 4th Ed., 
Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press.  
242 
 
GALANTI, G.A. and SHEIKH, A., 2009. Culturally competent healthcare. Hospital, 4, 
pp. 22-24.    
GARDENSWARTZ, L. and ROWE, A., 1998. Managing diversity in health care. San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.   
GARETY, P.A. and HEMSLEY, D.R., 1994. Delusions: Investigations into the 
psychology of delusional reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
GARTNER, J., HERMATZ, M., HOHMANN, A. and LARSON, D., 1990. The effect of 
patient and clinician ideology on clinical judgement: A study of ideological 
countertransference. Special Issue: Psychotherapy and religion, 27, pp. 98-106. 
GEERTZ, C., 1960. The Javanese Kijaji: The changing role of a cultural broker. 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2(2), pp. 228-249. 
GEERTZ, C., 1973. The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic 
Books. 
GEERTZ, C., 1983. Local Knowledge. New York: Basic Books.   
GEERTZ, C., 1984. Anti-anti-relativism. American Anthropologist, 86, pp. 263-278.   
GERMAIN, C.P., 2001. Ethnography: The method. In: P.L. MUNHALL and C.J. 
OILER, eds. Nursing research: A qualitative perspective. Norwalk, CT: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 2001, pp. 147-162.   
GERRISH, K., 2000. Individualized care: Its conceptualization and practice within a 
multi-ethnic society. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(1), pp. 91-99. 
GERRISH, K., 2001. The nature and effect of communication difficulties arising from 
interactions between district nurses and South Asian patients and their carers. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 33(5), pp. 566-574.   
GERRISH, K., HUSBAND, C. and MACKENZIE, J., 1996. Nursing for a multi-ethnic 
society. Buckingham: Open University Press.  
GERRISH, K., CHAU, R., SOBOWALE, A. and BIRKS, E., 2004. Bridging the 
language barrier: The use of interpreters in primary care nursing.  Health and Social 
Care in the Community, 12(5), pp. 407-413. 
GHAYE, T., 2005. Developing the reflective healthcare team. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
GHAYE, T. and LILLYMAN, S., 1997. Learning journals and critical incidents: 
Reflective practice for healthcare professionals. Guilford and King’s Lynn: Quay 
Books, Mark Allen. 
243 
 
GHAYE, T. and LILLYMAN, S., 2000. Reflection: Principles and practice for 
healthcare professionals. Guilford and King’s Lynn: Quay Books, Mark Allen. 
GIBBS, G., 2008. Analysing qualitative data. London: SAGE Publications. 
GIGER, J.N. and DAVIDHIZAR, R.E., 2004. Transcultural nursing: Assessment & 
Intervention. 4th ed., St Louis, Missouri: Mosby.  
 
GIL, J., 1998. Metamorpheses of the body. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.  
GILCHRIST, V.J. and WILLIAMS, R.L., 1999. Key Informant Interviews. In:  B.F. 
CRABTREE and W.L. MILLER, eds. Doing Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications, 1999, pp. 71-88.  
                                                                                                                                                               
GIROUX, I., 2007. An exploration of owner-manager problem solving practices in 
small firms: The central Vancouver Island experience. PhD thesis, University of 
Hertfordshire.  
GLASER, B.G. and STRAUSS, A., 1967. Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies 
for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine. 
GOETZ, J.P. and LECOMPTE, M.D., 1981. Ethnographic research and the problem 
of data reduction: What do I do with the five drawers of field notes? Anthropology 
and Education Quarterly, 12(1), pp.51-70.   
GOFFMAN, E., 1959. The presentation of self in everyday life. New York: Anchor 
Books. 
GOFFMAN, E., 1963. Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
GOOD, B.J., 1977. The heart of what’s the matter: The semantics of illness in Iran. 
Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 1, pp. 25-58. 
GOOD, B.J., 1994. Medicine, rationality and experience: An anthropological 
perspective. Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. 
GOOD, B.J., 1996. Culture and DSM-IV: Diagnosis, knowledge and power.  Culture, 
Medicine and Psychiatry, 20, pp. 127-132. 
GOOD, B.J. and GOOD, M.J.D., 1981. The meaning of symptoms: A cultural 
hermeneutic model for clinical practice. In:  L. EISENBERG and A.M. KLEINMAN, 
eds. The relevance of social science for medicine. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, 
1981, pp. 165-196.   
GOOD, B.J. and GOOD, M.J.D., 1986. The cultural context of diagnosis and therapy: 
A view from medical anthropology. In: M. MIRADA and L. KITANO, eds. Mental 
244 
 
health research in minority communities: Development of culturally sensitive training 
programs. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Mental Health, 1986, pp. 1-27.   
GOOD, B.J. and GOOD, M.J.D., 1993. Learning medicine: The constructing of 
medical knowledge at Harvard Medical School. In: S. LINDENBAUM and M. LOCK, 
eds. Knowledge, Power, and Practice. Los Angeles, CA: University of California 
Press, 1993, pp. 81-107.  
 
GOOD, B.J. and KLEINMAN, A.M., 1985. Culture and anxiety: Cross-cultural 
evidence for the patterning of anxiety disorders. In: A.H. TUMA and J.D. MASER, 
eds. Anxiety and anxiety disorders. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
1985, pp. 297-324. 
GOOD, M.J.D., 1992. Qualitative designs for assessing interventions in primary care: 
A discussion. In: F. TUDIVER, M.J. BASS, E.V. DUNN, P.G. NORTON and M. 
STEWART, eds. Assessing interventions: Traditional and innovative methods. 
Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1992, pp. 96-107. 
 
GOOD, M.J.D., 1995a. Cultural studies of Biomedicine: An agenda for research. 
Social Science and Medicine, 41(4), pp. 461-473.  
GOOD, M.J.D., 1995b. American Medicine: The Quest for Competence. Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press. 
 
GOOD, M.J.D. and HANNAH, S.D., 2010. Medical Cultures. In: J.R. HALL, L. 
GRINDSTAFF and M.C.M. LO, eds. Handbook of Cultural Sociology. London. 
Routledge, 2010, pp. 458-469. 
 
GOOD, M.J.D. HANNAH, S.D. and WILLEN, S.S., 2011. Shattering culture: An 
introduction. In: M.J.D. GOOD, S.S. WILLEN, S.D. HANNAH, K. VICKERY and L.T. 
PARK, eds. Shattering culture: American medicine responds to cultural diversity. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011, pp. 1-31.    
GOOD, M.J.D., JAMES, C., GOOD, B.J. and BECKER, A.E., 2002. The culture of 
medicine and racial, ethnic and class disparities in healthcare. Russell Sage 
Foundation Working Paper #, 199, pp. 594-625.   
GOOD, M.J.D., WILLEN, S.S., HANNAH, S.D., VICKERY, K. and PARK, L.T., 2011. 
Shattering culture: American medicine responds to cultural diversity. Eds, New York: 
Russel Sage Foundation.      
GOODENOUGH, W.H., 1981. Culture, language and society. Menlo Park, CA:  
Benjamin/Cummings. 
GOODWIN, F. and JAMISON, K., 1990. Manic depressive illness. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
GOW, K.M., 1982. How nurses’ emotions affect patient care: Self studies by nurses. 
New York: Springer.   
245 
 
GRADY, B. and LOEWENTHAL, K.M., 1997. Features associated with speaking in 
tongues (glossolalia).British Journal of Medical Psychology, 70, pp. 185-190. 
GRANT, J., 2002. Learning needs assessment: Assessing the need. British Medical 
Journal, 324, pp. 156-9. 
GRANT, N.K. and HRYCUK, N., 1985. How can you find out what patients think 
about their care? The Canadian Nurse, 81(4), pp. 51. 
GRANT, N.K., KREIMER, M. and BANNATYNE, J., 1996. Indicators of quality in 
long term care facilities. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 33(5), pp. 469-478.      
GREENBERG, D.  and WITZTUM, E., 1991. Problems in the treatment of religious 
patients. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 45(4), pp. 554-565.     
GREENBERG, D. and WITZTUM, E., 2001. Sanity and sanctity: Mental health work 
among the Ultra-Orthodox in Jerusalem. New Haven, CT: Yale University. 
GREENFIELD, D., STRAUSS, J.S., BOWERS, M.B. and MANDELKERN, M., 1989. 
Insight and interpretation of illness in recovery from psychosis. Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 15(2), pp. 245-252.  
GREENWOOD, J., 1998. The role of reflection in single and double loop learning. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 27, pp. 1048-1053.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
GREYSON, B., 1997. The near-death experience as a focus of clinical attention. The 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 185(5), pp. 327-333.  
GROF, S., 1985. Beyond the brain. Albany, NY: State University of New York.                                                                                                                                                                     
GROF, S. and GROF, C., 1990. A tempestuosa busca do ser. Sao Paulo: Cultrix.  
GROF, S. and GROF, C., 1992. The stormy search for self: A guide to personal 
growth through transformational crisis. New York: Tarcher. 
GROPPER, R.C., 1996. Culture and the clinical encounter: An intercultural sensitizer 
for the health professions. Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press. 
GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, 1976. Mysticism: Spiritual 
quest or psychic disorder? New York: G.A.P. Publications.  
GUARNACCIA, P.J., 1997. A cross-cultural perspective on anxiety disorders. In: S. 
FRIEDMAN, ed. Cultural issues in the treatment of anxiety. New York: Guilford, 
1997, pp. 3-20. 
GUARNACCIA, P.J. and KIRMAYER, L.J., 1997. Culture and the anxiety disorders. 
In: T.A. WIDIGER, A. FRANCES, H.A. PRINCAS, R. ROSS, M.B. FROST and W. 
DAVIS, eds. DSM-IV Sourcebook. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 
1997, pp. 925-932.    
246 
 
GUARNACCIA, P.J. and RODRIGUEZ, O., 1996. Concepts of culture and their role 
in the development of culturally competent mental health services. Hispanic Journal 
of Behavioral Sciences, 18(4), pp. 419-443. 
GUARNACCIA, P.J., GUEVARA-RAMOS, L.M., GONZALES, G., CANINO, G.J. and 
BIRD, H., 1992. Cross-cultural aspects of psychotic symptoms in Puerto Rico. 
Research in Community and Mental Health, 7, pp. 99-110. 
GUDYKUNST, W.B. and TING-TOOMEY, S., 1988. Culture and interpersonal 
communication. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications. 
GUNARATNAM, Y., 1997. Culture is not enough: A critique of multiculturalism in 
palliative care. In: D. FIELD, J. HOCKEY and N. SMALL, eds. Death, gender and 
ethnicity. London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 166-187. 
GUNARATNAM, Y., 2001. Ethnicity and palliative care. In: L. CULLEY and S. 
DYSON, eds. Ethnicity and nursing practice. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 
2001, pp. 169-187.  
GUNARATNAM, Y., 2004. Skin matters: ‘Race’ and care in the health services. In: J. 
FINK, ed. Care: Personal lives and social policy. Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press, 2004, pp. 112-144.  
GUNARATNAM, Y., 2007. Intercultural palliative care: Do we need cultural 
competence? International Journal of Palliative Nursing, 13(10), pp. 470-477. 
HAHN, R.A., 1995. Sickness and healing: An anthropological perspective. New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
HAHN, R.A. and INHORN, M.C., 2009. Anthropology and public health: Bridging 
differences in culture and society. 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
HAHN, R.A. and KLEINMAN, A.M., 1983. Biomedical practice and anthropological 
theory: Frameworks and directions. Annual Review of Anthropology, 12, pp. 305-
333. 
HALLIDAY, M.A.K., 1989. An introduction to functional grammar. London: Edward 
Arnold. 
HAMILTON, B. and ROPER, C., 2006. Troubling “insight”: Power and possibilities in 
mental health care. Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 13(4), pp. 416-
422. 
HANNAH, S.D., 2011. Clinical care in environments of hyperdiversity. In: 
M.J.D.GOOD, S.S. WILLEN, S.D. HANNAH, K. VICKERY and L.T. PARK, eds. 
Shattering Culture: American medicine responds to cultural diversity. New York. 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2011, pp. 35-70.  
247 
 
HANSSEN, I., 2004. An intercultural nursing perspective on autonomy. Nursing 
Ethics, 11(1), pp. 8-41.  
HARRE, R., 1986. The social construction of emotions. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
HARRIS, P., 2004. Culturally competent disability support: Putting it into practice. A 
review of the international and Australian literature on cultural competence. Harris 
Park, NSW, Australia: Multicultural Disability Advocacy Association of NSW (MDAA).    
HARTLEY, R., 1995. Families and cultural diversity in Australia. Sydney: Allen and 
Unwin.  
HARWOOD, A., 1981. Ethnicity and medical care. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
HASSELKUS, B.R. and DICKIE, V.A., 1988. Themes of meaning: Occupational 
therapists’ perspectives on practice. The Occupational Therapy Journal of Research, 
10(4), pp. 195-207. 
HAVILAND, W.A., 1997. Cultural anthropology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publication.  
HEELAS, P.L. and LOCK, A.J., 1981. Indigenous psychologies: The anthropology of 
the self. London: Academic Press.  
HELMAN, C., 1981. Disease versus illness in general practice. Journal of Royal 
College of General Practice, 31(230), pp. 548-552. 
HELMAN, C., 1984. Culture, health and illness. 1st ed., London: John Wright.  
HELMAN, C., 2000. Culture, health and illness. 4th ed., London: Butterworth 
Heinemann.  
HELMAN, C., 2007. Culture, health and illness. 5th ed., London: Hodder Arnold.   
HERBERG, P., 1995. Theoretical foundations of transcultural nursing. In: M. 
ANDREWS and J. BOYLE, eds. Transcultural concepts in nursing care. 
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co, 1995, pp. 3-48.   
HIRSCH, W., 1962. Geistige and seelische stormungen imjugendalter. In: Die jugend 
von heute. Berliner landesausschuss fur Gesund heitliche Volkbelehrung, 1962, pp. 
48-65.  
HOCKING, C. and WHITEFORD, G., 1995. Multiculturalism in occupational therapy: 
A time for reflection on core values. Australian Occupational Therapy Journal, 42, 
pp. 172-175. 
HOEMAN, S., 1989. Cultural assessment in rehabilitation nursing practice. Nursing 
Clinics of North America, 24(1), pp. 277-289. 
248 
 
HOFSTEDE, G., 1980. Cultures consequences: International differences in work 
related values. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications.  
HOLDEN, P. and LITTLEWOOD, J., 1991. Introduction. In: P. HOLDEN and J. 
LITTLEWOOD, eds. Anthropology and nursing. London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 1-6.   
HOLE, R.W., RUSH, A.J. and BECK, A.T., 1979. A cognitive investigation of 
schizophrenic delusions. Psychiatry, 42, pp. 312-319. 
HOLLAND, K. and HOGG, C., 2010. Cultural awareness in nursing and healthcare. 
2nd ed., London: Hodder Arnold. 
HOLLIS, M., 1994. The philosophy of social science: An introduction. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
HOLLIS, M. and LUKES, S., 1982. Rationality and relativism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
HONIG, A., ROMME, M.A., ENSINK, B.J., ESCHER, S.D., PENNINGS, M.H. and 
DEVRIES, M.W., 1998. Auditory hallucinations: A comparison between patients and 
non-patients. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 186(10), pp. 646-651. 
HOOD, R.W., SPILKA, B., HUNSBERGER, B. and GORSUCH, R., 1996. The 
psychology of religion: An empirical approach. New York: Guilford.       
HSIEH, E., 2006. Conflicts in how interpreters manage their roles in provider-patient 
interactions. Social Science and Medicine, 62(3), pp. 721-730.  
HSU, S.I., 1999. Somatisation among Asian refugees and immigrants as culturally-
shaped illness behaviour. Annals of the Academy of Medicine, Singapore, 28, pp. 
841-845. 
HUDELSON, P., 1994. Qualitative research for health programmes. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.  
HUDELSON, P., 2005. Improving patient-provider communication: Insights from 
interpreters.  Family Practice, 22(3), pp.311-316. 
HUDELSON, P., 2006. Contextualising cultural competence training of residents: 
Results of a formative research study in Geneva, Switzerland. Medical Teacher, 
28(5), pp. 465-471.  
HUGHES, C.C., 1996. Ethnopsychiatry.  In: C.F. SARGENT and T.M. JOHNSON, 
eds. Medical anthropology: Contemporary theory and method. Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 1996, pp. 131-151. 
HULTSJO, S. and HJELM, K., 2005. Immigrants in emergency care: Swedish health 
care staff’s experiences. International Nursing Review, 52, pp. 276-285. 
249 
 
HUNT, L.M., 2001. Beyond cultural competence: Applying humility to clinical 
settings. The Parkridge Center Bulletin, 24(6), pp. 3-4. 
HUNT, L.M., 2005. Health research: What’s culture got to do with it? Lancet, 366 
(9486), pp. 617-618. 
HUNT, L.M. and DEVOOGD, K.B., 2005. Clinical myths of the cultural “other”: 
Implications for Latino patient care. Academic Medicine, 80(10), pp. 918-924.  
HUNTER, C.L., SPENCE, K, and SCHEINBERG, A., 2008. Untangling the web of 
critical incidents: Ethnography in a paediatric setting. Anthropology and Medicine, 
15(2), pp. 91-103. 
HUTCHINSON, G. and BHUGRA, D., 2000. Social anthropology and stigma: The 
importance for psychiatry. In: V. SKULTANS and J. COX, eds. Anthropological 
approaches to psychological medicine: Crossing bridges. London and Philadelphia: 
Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000, pp. 233-258.   
ICMR, 1988.  Multicentre collaborative study of factors associated with the course 
and outcome of schizophrenia. New Delhi: Indian Council of Medical Research. 
INGOLDSBY, B.B. and SMITH, S., 1995. Families in multicultural perspective. New 
York: The Guilford Press.  
INGSTAD, B. and WHYTE, S.R., 1995. Disability and culture. Berkeley, Calif: 
University of California Press.   
IRVINE, F.E., ROBERTS, G.W., TRANTER, S., WILLIAMS, L. and JONES, P., 2008. 
Using the critical incident technique to explore student nurses’ perceptions of 
language awareness. Nurse Education Today, 28(1), pp.39-47. 
JACKSON, N. and POGSON, D., 1995. Client attachment in learning disabilities 
nurse education. Nursing Times, 91(3), pp. 34-35. 
JACKSON, M.C., 2001. Psychotic and spiritual experience: A case study 
comparison. In: I. CLARKE, ed. Psychosis and spirituality: Exploring the new frontier. 
London: Whurr Publishers, 2001, pp. 165-190.  
JACKSON, M.C. and FULFORD, K.W.M., 1997. Spiritual experience and 
psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 4, pp. 41-65. 
JACOB, K.S., 2010. The assessment of insight across cultures. Indian Journal of 
Psychiatry, 52(4), pp. 373-377. 
JADHAV, S., 2000. The cultural construction of western depression. In: V. 
SKULTANS and J. COX, eds. Anthropological approaches to psychological 
medicine: Crossing bridges. London and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
2000, pp. 41-66.  
250 
 
JAKOBSEN, M.D., 1999. Negative spiritual experiences: Encounters with Evil. 
Occasional Paper no. 1, 3rd Series, RERC, Oxford.   
JAMES, W., 1961. The varieties of religious experience. New York: Macmillan. 
JANZEN, J.M., 1978. The quest for therapy: Medical pluralism in Lower Zaire. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
JASPERS, K., 1959. General psychopathology. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
JASPERS, K., 1968. The phenomenological approach in psychopathology. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 114(516), pp.1313-1323. 
JENKINS, J.H. and BARRETT, J.H., 2003. Introduction. In: J.H. JENKINS and J.H. 
BARRETT, eds. Schizophrenia, culture and subjectivity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, pp. 1-29.  
JEZEWSKI, M.A., 1990. Cultural brokering in migrant farmworker healthcare. 
Western Journal of Nursing Research, 12(4), pp. 497-513. 
JIRWE, M., 2008. Cultural competence in nursing.  PhD Thesis, Karolinska Institutet. 
JIRWE, M., GERRISH, K. and EMAMI, A., 2010. Student nurses’ experiences of 
communication in cross-cultural care encounters. Scandinavian Journal of Caring 
Science, 24, pp. 436-444.  
JOEL, D., SATHYASEELAN, M., JAYAKARAN, R., VIJAYAKUMAR, C., 
MUTHURATHNAM, S. and JACOB, K.S., 2003. Explanatory models of psychosis 
among community health workers in South India. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 
108, pp. 66–69. 
JOHNS, L.C., NAZROO, J.Y., BEBBINGTON, P. and KUIPERS, E., 2002. 
Occurrence of hallucinatory experiences in a community sample and ethnic 
variations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, pp. 174-178. 
JOHNSON, C.V. and FRIEDMAN, H.L., 2008. Enlightened or delusional? 
Differentiating religious, spiritual and transpersonal experiences from 
psychopathology. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 48(4), pp. 505-527.   
JOHNSON, S. and ORRELL, M., 1995. Insight and psychosis: A social perspective. 
Psychological Medicine, 25, pp. 515-520.   
JOHNSON, S. and ORRELL, M., 1996. Insight, psychosis and ethnicity: A case-note 
study. Psychological Medicine, 26, pp. 1081-1084. 
JONES, E., FARINA, A., HASTORF, A., MARKUS, H., MILLER, D.T. and SCOTT, 
R., 1984. Social stigma: The psychology of marked relationships. New York: 
Freeman. 
251 
 
JORALEMON, D., 2009. Exploring medical anthropology. Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Pearson.  
KAI, J., BRIDGEWATER, R. and SPENCER, J., 2001. “Just think of TB and Asians, 
that’s all I ever hear”: Medical learners’ views about training to work in an ethnically 
diverse society. Medical Education, 35(3), pp. 250-256. 
KAI, J., BEAVAN, J., FAULL C., DODSON, L., GILL, P. and BEIGHTON, A., 2007. 
Professional uncertainty and disempowerment: Responding to ethnic diversity in 
health care: A qualitative study. Public Library of Science Medicine, 4(11), pp. 1766- 
1775.  
KAKAR, S., 1990. Stories from Indian psychoanalysis: Context and text. In: J. 
STIGLER, R. SHWEDER and G. HERDT, eds. Cultural psychology. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 427-445.  
KATON, W. and KLEINMAN, A.M., 1981. Doctor-patient negotiation and other social 
science strategies in patient care. In: L. EISENBERG and A.M. KLEINMAN, eds. The 
relevance of social science for medicine. London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1981, pp. 253-279.   
KAUFERT, J., KILAGE, W. and KAUFERT, P., 1984. The use of ‘trouble case’ 
examples in teaching the impact of sociocultural and political factors in clinical 
communication. Medical Anthropology, 8(1), pp. 36-45. 
KAY, S., FISBEIN, A. and OPLER, L., 1987. The positive and negative syndrome 
scale for schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13, pp. 261-276.  
KEESING, R.M. and KEESING, F.M., 1971. New Perspectives in Cultural 
Anthropology. Holt: Rineheart and Winston.   
KEESING, R.M. and STRATHERN, A.J., 1998. Cultural anthropology: A 
contemporary perspective. 3rd ed., Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College 
Publishers. 
 
KEHOE, N.C., 1999. A therapy group on spiritual issues for patients with chronic 
mental illness. Psychiatric Services, 50(8), pp. 1081-1083. 
KEMMIS, S., 2004, May 26th-27th. Knowing practice: Searching for saliences. 
Participant Knowledge and Knowing Practice Conference. Umea, Sweden.  
KEMP, R. and LAMBERT, T., 1995. Insight in schizophrenia and its relationship to 
psychopathology. Schizophrenia Research, 18, pp. 21-28. 
KEMPPAINEN, J.K., 2000. The critical incident technique and nursing care quality 
research. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(5), pp. 1264-1271. 
KENDELL, R.E., 1975. The role of diagnosis in psychiatry. Oxford: Blackwell 
Scientific Publications.  
252 
 
KENDLER, K.S., GLAZER, W.M. and MORGENSTERN, H., 1983. Dimensions of 
delusional experience. American Journal of Psychiatry, 140, pp. 466-469. 
KENDLER, K.S., GALLAGHER, T.J., ABELSON, J.M. and KESSLER, R.C., 1996. 
Lifetime prevalence, demographic risk factors, and diagnostic validity of nonaffective 
psychosis as assessed in a US community sample. The National Comorbidity 
Survey. Archives of General Psychiatry, 3, pp. 1022-1031.    
KENNARD, D., 1979. The newly admitted patient as seen by self and others. British 
Journal of Medical Psychology, 47, pp. 27-41. 
KENNEDY, M.G., 1997. Cultural competency. In: N.K. WORLEY, eds. Mental health 
nursing in the community. St Louis: Mosby, 1997, pp. 37-45.  
KETEFIAN, S. and REDMAN, R., 1997. Nursing science in the global community. 
Image: Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 29(1), pp. 11-15. 
KIELHOFNER, G., 1995. A model of human occupation: Theory and application. 2nd 
ed., Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins. 
KILSHAW, S., NDEGWA, D. and CURRAN, J., 2002. Between Worlds: Interpreting 
conflict between black patients and their clinicians. Lambeth, Southwark and 
Lewisham: Health Action Zone. 
KIM, S.R., 1998. Nurses descriptions of caring for culturally diverse clients. Clinical 
Nursing Research, 7(2), pp. 125-146. 
KIM, Y.Y., 1991. Intercultural communication competence: A systems-theoretic view. 
In: S. TING-TOOMEY and F. KORZENNY, eds. Cross-cultural interpersonal 
communication. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1991, pp. 259-276. 
KINEBANIAN, A. and STOMPH, M., 1992. Cross-cultural occupational therapy: A 
critical reflection. American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 46(8), pp. 751-757. 
KING, M. and DEIN, S., 1999. The spiritual variable in psychiatry. Psychological 
Medicine, 28, pp. 1259-1262.  
KING, M., WEICH, S., NAZROO, J. and BLIZARD, B., 2006. Religion, mental health 
and ethnicity. EMPRIC-A national survey of England. Journal of Mental Health, 
15(2), pp. 153-162. 
KINGDON, D.G. and FINN, A.M., 2006. Tackling mental health crises. Philadelphia: 
Brunner-Routledge.                                                                                                                              
KINGDON, D.G., SIDDLE, R., FAROOQ, N. and RATHOD, S., 2010. Spirituality, 
psychosis and the development of ‘normalising rationales’. In: I. CLARKE, ed. 
Psychosis and spirituality: Consolidating the new paradigm. Chichester, West 
Sussex. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 239-249.   
253 
 
KIRMAYER, L.J., 2001. Cultural variations in the clinical presentation of depression 
and anxiety: Implications for diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
62(13), pp. 22-28.  
KIRMAYER, L.J., 2006. Beyond the ‘new cross-cultural psychiatry’: Cultural biology, 
discursive psychology and the ironies of globalization. Transcultural Psychiatry, 43, 
pp. 126-144. 
KIRMAYER, L.J., 2012. Rethinking cultural competence. Transcultural Psychiatry, 
49(2), pp. 149-164.   
KIRMAYER, L.J., YOUNG, A. and HAYTON, B.C., 1997. The cultural context of 
anxiety disorders.  In: R.D. ALARCON, ed. The psychiatric clinics of North America. 
Philadelphia: Saunders, 1997, pp. 503-521.  
KIRMAYER, L.J., YOUNG, A. and ROBBINS, J.M., 1994. Symptom attribution in 
cultural perspective. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 39, pp. 584-595.  
KIROV, G., KEMP, R., KIROV, K. and DAVID, A.S., 1998.Religious faith after 
psychotic illness. Psychopathology, 31(5), pp. 234–245. 
 
KISHIK, D., 2008. Wittgenstein’s forms of life. London: Continuum.  
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1977. Depression, somatisation and the “new cross-cultural 
psychiatry”. Social Science and Medicine, 11, pp. 3-10. 
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1978. Concepts and a model for the comparison of medical 
systems as cultural systems. Social Science and Medicine, 12, pp. 85-93. 
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1980. Patients and healers in the context of culture: An 
exploration of the borderland between anthropology, medicine and psychiatry. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1984. Indigenous systems of healing: Questions for professional, 
popular and folk care. In: J.W. SALMON, ed. Alternative medicines: Popular and 
policy perspectives. London: Tavistock, 1984, pp. 138-164.  
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1988a. Rethinking psychiatry: From cultural category to personal 
experience. New York: Free Press. 
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1988b. The illness narratives. New York: Basic Books.  
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1992. Local worlds of suffering: An interpersonal focus for 
ethnographies of illness experience. Qualitative Health Research, 2(2), pp. 127-134.  
KLEINMAN, A.M., 1996. How is culture important for DSM-IV? In: J.E. MEZZICH, 
A.M. KLEINMAN, H. FABREGA and D.L. PARRON, eds. Culture and psychiatric 
diagnosis: A DSM-IV perspective. Washington: American Psychiatric Press, 1996, 
pp. 15-25.  
254 
 
KLEINMAN, A.M. and BENSON, P., 2006. Anthropology in the clinic: The problem of 
cultural competency and how to fix it. Public Library of Science Medicine, 3(10), pp. 
1673-1676. 
KLEINMAN, A.M. and KLEINMAN, J., 1991. Suffering and its professional 
transformation: Toward an ethnography of interpersonal experience. Culture, 
Medicine and Psychiatry, 15(3), pp.275-301.   
KLEINMAN, A.M., EISENBERG, L. and GOOD, B.J., 1978. Culture, illness, and 
care: Clinical lessons from anthropologic and cross-cultural research. Annals of 
Internal Medicine, 88(2), pp. 251-258.  
KLEINMAN, A.M., WANG, W.Z., LI, S.C., CHENG, X.M., DAI, X.Y., LI, K.T. and 
KLEINMAN, J., 1995. The social course of epilepsy: Chronic illness as social 
experience in interior China. Social Science and Medicine, 40(10), pp. 1319-1330.  
KNAFL, K. and BREITMAYER, B.J., 1989. Triangulation in qualitative research: 
Issues of conceptual clarity and purpose. In: J. MORSE, ed. Qualitative nursing 
research: A contemporary dialogue. Rockville, MD: Aspen, 1989, pp. 193-203.    
KOCH, T., 1994. Establishing rigour in qualitative research: The decision trail. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19, pp. 976-986.  
KOCH, T., 1999. Story telling: Is it really research? Journal of Advanced Nursing, 28, 
pp. 1182-1190.   
KOENIG, H.G., 2007. Religion, spirituality and psychotic disorders: A new era in 
mental health care. Rev. Psiquiatr. Clin., 34(Suppl.1), pp. 5-7.  
KOENIG, H.G., 2011. Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. In: J.R. 
PETEET, F.G. LU and W.E. NARROW, eds. Religious and spiritual issues in 
psychiatric diagnosis: A research agenda for DSM V. Arlington, Virginia: American 
Psychiatric Association, 2011, pp. 31-53.   
KONDO, T., 2007. Cultural tensions in occupational therapy practice: Considerations 
from a Japanese vantage point. American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 58(2), 
pp. 174-184.  
KREFTING, L., 1991a. Rigor in qualitative research: The assessment of 
trustworthiness. The American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 45(3), pp. 214-222. 
KREFTING, L., 1991b. The culture concept in the everyday practice of occupational 
and physical therapy. Physical and occupational therapy in paediatrics, 11(4), pp. 1-
16. 
KREFTING, L.H. and KREFTING, D.V., 1990. Cultural influences on performance. 
In: C. CHRISTIANSEN and C. BAUM, eds. Occupational therapy: Overcoming 
human performance deficits. Thorofare: SLACK, 1990, pp. 101-122.  
255 
 
KRIPPNER, S. and WELCH, P., 1992. Spiritual dimensions of healing. New York: 
Irvington Publishers. 
KROEBER, A.L. and KLUCKHOHN, C.K.M., 1953. Culture: A critical review of 
concepts and definitions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.  
KRUEGER, R.A. and CASEY, M.A., 2009. Focus Groups: A practical guide for 
applied research. 4th ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.   
KUNG, H., 1986. Religion: The last taboo. Washington, D.C.: APA Press.   
KUSHNER, A.W., 1967. Two cases of autocastration due to religious delusions. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 40, pp. 293-298.  
LAIGHT, S., 1995. The aggressive ward visitor: A critical incident analysis. Nursing 
Times, 91(48), pp. 40-41. 
LAIRD, D., 1985. Approaches to training and development. Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley. 
LALLY, S., 1989. “Does being in here mean there is something wrong with me”? 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 15, pp. 253-265. 
LAMBERT, H. and MCKEVITT, C., 2002. Anthropology in health research: From 
qualitative methods to multidiscplinarity. British Medical Journal, 325(7357), pp. 210-
213.  
LAMBERT, H. and SEVAK, L., 1996. Is “cultural difference” a useful concept? 
Perceptions of health and the sources of ill health among Londoners of South Asian 
origin. In: D. KELLEHER and S. HILLIER, eds. Researching cultural differences in 
health. London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 124-160. 
LANDY, D., 1983. Medical anthropology: A critical appraisal. In: J. RUFFINI, ed. 
Advances in medical science. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1983, pp. 184-314. 
LAU, R.R.,1988. Beliefs about control and health behavior. In: D.S. GOCHMAN, ed.  
Health behavior: Emerging research perspectives. New York: Plenum, 1988, pp. 43-
63. 
LAWS, R.A. and FITZGERALD, M.H., 1997. Intercultural interactions in dietetic 
practice. Australian Journal of Nutrition and Dietetics, 54(1), pp. 34-39. 
LAZARE, A., 1989. Outpatient psychiatry: Diagnosis and treatment, 2nd ed., 
Baltimore: Williams Wilkins. 
LAZARUS, E., 1988. Theoretical considerations for the study of doctor-patient 
relationships: Implications of a perinatal study. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 2(1), 
pp. 34-58. 
256 
 
LEA, G., 1982. Religion, mental health, and clinical issues. Journal of Religion and 
Health, 21(4), pp. 336-351.   
LEAVEY, G. and KING, M., 2007. The devil is in the detail: Partnerships between 
psychiatry and faith-based organisations. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 191, pp. 
97-98.  
LEAVITT, R.L., 2002. Developing cultural competence in a multicultural world. 
Magazine of Physical Therapy, 10(12), pp. 36-47.    
LEE, S.A. and FARRELL, M., 2006. Is cultural competency a backdoor to racism? 
Anthropology News, 47, pp. 9-10. 
 
LEFF, J., 1981. Psychiatry around the globe: A transcultural view. New York: 
Dekker. 
LEFLEY, H.P., SANDOVAL, M.C. and CHARLES, C., 1998. Traditional healing 
systems in a multicultural setting. In: S.O. OKAPU, ed. Clinical methods in 
transcultural psychiatry. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1998, pp. 
88-110. 
LEININGER, M., 1985. Ethnography and ethnonursing: Models and modes of 
qualitative data analysis. In: M. LEININGER, ed. Qualitative research methods in 
nursing. Orlando, FL: Grune and Stratton, 1985, pp. 33-71. 
LELLIOTT, P. and QUIRK, A., 2004. What is life like on acute psychiatric wards? 
Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 17(4), pp. 297-301. 
LEVENTHAL, H., MEYER, D. and NERENZ, D., 1980. The common sense 
representation of illness danger. In: S. RACHMAN, ed. Contributions to medical 
psychology. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980, pp. 7-30. 
LEVINE, R.E., 1987. Culture: A factor influencing the outcomes of occupational 
therapy. Occupational Therapy in Healthcare, 4(1), pp. 3-16.   
LEVY, A., 1996. Forensic implications of the difficulties of defining delusions. Medical 
Law, 15(2), pp. 257-60. 
LEWIS, A., 1933. The psychopathology of insight. British Journal of Medical 
Psychology, 14, pp. 332-348.  
LEWIS, C.A., 1998. Cleanliness is next to Godliness: Religiosity and obsessiveness. 
Journal of Religion and Health, 37, pp. 49-61.  
LEWIS, C.A., 2001. Cultural stereotypes of the effects of religion on mental health. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology, 74, pp. 359-367. 
LEWIS-FERNANDEZ, R., 1998. A cultural critique of the DSM-IV dissociative 
disorders section. Transcultural Psychiatry, 35(3), pp. 387-440. 
257 
 
LEWIS-FERNANDEZ, R. and KLEINMAN, A.M., 1995. Cultural psychiatry: 
Theoretical, clinical and research issues. Cultural Psychiatry, 18(3), pp. 433-447. 
LINCOLN, Y. And GUBA, E., 1985. Naturalistic Enquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE 
Publications.  
LINDGREN, K.N. and COURSEY, R.D., 1995. Spirituality and serious mental illness: 
A two-part study. Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal, 18(3), pp. 93–111. 
 
LINGARD, L., TALLETT, S. and ROSENFIELD, J., 2002. Culture and physician-
patient communication: A qualitative exploration of residents’ experiences and 
attitudes. Annals of Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, 35(6), pp. 
331-335.  
 
LINK, B.G. and PHELAN, J.C., 2001. Conceptualizing stigma. Annual Review of 
Sociology, 27, pp. 363-385. 
LIPSEDGE, M., 2007. Severe and enduring mental illness in relation to 
discrimination, racism, prejudice, ethnicity, and culture. In: A. RUSSELLO, eds. 
Severe mental illness in primary care: A companion guide for counsellors, 
psychotherapists and other professionals. Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 2007, pp. 65-
83. 
LIPTON, A.A. and SIMON, F.S., 1985. Psychiatric diagnosis in a state hospital: 
Manhattan State revisited. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 36, pp. 368-373. 
LITTERST, T.A.E., 1985. A reappraisal of anthropological fieldwork methods and the 
concept of culture in occupational therapy research. American Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 39(8), pp.602-604.    
LITTLEWOOD, J., 1989. A model for nursing using anthropological literature. 
International Journal of Nursing Studies, 26(3), pp.221-229. 
 
LITTLEWOOD, R., 1983. The Antinomian Hasid. British Journal of Medical 
Psychology, 56, pp. 67-78. 
LITTLEWOOD, R., 1990. From categories to contexts: A decade of the “new cross-
cultural psychiatry”. British Journal of Psychiatry, 156, pp. 308-327.  
LITTLEWOOD, R., 1998. The Butterfly and the Serpent: Essays in Psychiatry, Race 
and Religion. London: Free Association Books. 
 
LITTLEWOOD, R., 2000. Psychiatry’s culture. In: V. SKULTANS and J. COX, eds. 
Anthropological approaches to psychological medicine: Crossing bridges. London 
and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000, pp. 66-94.    
LITTLEWOOD, R. and LIPSEDGE, M., 1997. Aliens and alienists: Ethnic minorities 
and psychiatry. 3rd ed., London: Routledge. 
258 
 
LLOYD, K.R., JACOB, K.S., PATEL, V., ST. LOUIS, L., BHUGRA, D. and MANN, A., 
1998. The development of the Short Explanatory Model Interview (SEMI) and its use 
among primary care attenders with common mental disorders. Psychological 
Medicine, 28, pp. 1231-1237. 
LO, M.C.M., 2010. Cultural brokerage: Creating linkages between voices of lifeworld 
and medicine in cross-cultural clinical settings. Health, 14(5), pp. 484-504. 
LOCK, M. and GORDON, D.R., 1988. Biomedicine examined. Eds., Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic. 
LOEWENTHAL, K.M., 1995. Mental health and religion. London: Chapham and Hall. 
LOEWENTHAL, K.M., 1999. Religious issues and their psychological aspects. In: K. 
BHUI and D. OLAJIDE, eds. Cross-cultural mental health services: Contemporary 
issues in service provision. London: Saunders, 1999, pp. 54-65. 
LOEWENTHAL, K.M., 2006. Religion, culture and mental health. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
LOEWENTHAL, K.M., 2007. Spirituality and cultural psychiatry. In: D. BHUGRA and 
K. BHUI, eds. Textbook of cultural psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, pp. 59-72.  
LOPEZ, S. and LOUE, S., 2007. Research issues for improving treatment of U.S. 
Hispanics with persistent mental disorders. Psychiatric Services, 58, pp. 385-394.     
LOVERING, S., 2008. Arab Muslim nurses’ experiences of the meaning of caring. 
PhD thesis, University of Sydney.  
LOVINGER, R.J., 1984. Working with religious issues in therapy. New York: Jason 
Aronson. 
LU, F.G., 2004. Culture and inpatient psychiatry. In: W.S. TSENG and J. 
STRELTZER, eds. Cultural competence in clinical psychiatry. Arlington, VA: 
American Psychiatry Publishing, 2004, pp. 21-37.    
LUCKMANN, J., 1999. Transcultural communication in nursing. Albany: Delmar 
Publishers. 
LUKOFF, D., 1985. The diagnosis of mystical experiences with psychotic features. 
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 17(2), pp. 155-181.  
LUKOFF, D., 2010. Visionary spiritual experiences. In: I. CLARKE, ed. Psychosis 
and spirituality: Consolidating the new paradigm. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010, pp. 205-215.  
259 
 
LUKOFF, D., LU, F.G. and TURNER, R., 1992. Towards a more culturally sensitive 
DSM-IV: Psychoreligious and psychospiritual problems. The Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease, 180(11), pp. 673-682.  
LUKOFF, D., LU, F.G. and TURNER, R., 1995. Cultural considerations in the 
assessment and treatment of religious and spiritual problems. The Psychiatric Clinics 
of North America, 18(3), pp. 467-485.  
LUKOFF, D., LU, F.G. and TURNER, R., 1996. Diagnosis: A transpersonal clinical 
approach to religious and spiritual problems. In: B. W. SCOTTON, A. B. CHINEN 
and J. R. BATTISTA, eds. Textbook of transpersonal psychiatry and psychology. 
New York: Basic Books, 1996, pp. 231-249.  
 
LUKOFF, D., LU, F.G. and YANG, C.P., 2011. DSM-IV Religious and spiritual 
problems. In: J.R. PETEET, F.G. LU and W.E. NARROW, eds. Religious and 
spiritual issues in psychiatric diagnosis: A research agenda for DSM-V. Arlington, 
VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2011, pp. 171-199.    
LUNDBERG, P.C., BACKSTROM, J. and WIDEN, S., 2005. Caregiving to patients 
who are culturally diverse by Swedish last-year nursing students. Journal of 
Transcultural Nursing, 16(3), pp. 255-262. 
LUPTON, D., 1994. Medicine as culture: Illness, disease and the body in Western 
societies. London: SAGE Publications.  
LUSTIG, M.W. and KOESTER, J., 1996. Intercultural competence: Interpersonal 
communication across cultures. New York: Harper Collins.    
LYLES, M.R. and HILLARD, J.R., 1982. Root work and the refusal of surgery. 
Psychosomatics, 23(6), pp. 663-665. 
LYNCH, E.W. and HANSON, M.J., 1992. Steps in the right direction. In: E.W. 
LYNCH and M.J. HANSON, eds. Developing cross-cultural competence: A guide for 
working with young children and their families. Baltimore: Paul H. Brookes Publishing 
Company, 1992, pp. 355-370.  
MACKENZIE, A., 1994. Evaluating ethnography: Considerations for analysis. Journal 
of Advanced Nursing, 19, pp. 774-781.  
MAHGOUB, N., 2008. Case challenges: Three patients with devout religious beliefs. 
Psychiatric Annals, 38(3), pp. 174-176.   
MALIN, N.A., 2000. Evaluating clinical supervision in community homes and teams 
serving adults with learning disabilities. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 31(3), pp. 548-
557.      
MALINSKI, V., 2002. Developing a nursing perspective on spirituality and healing. 
Nursing Science Quarterly, 15(4), pp. 281-287. 
260 
 
MANDERSON, L. and ALLOTEY, P., 2003. Storytelling, marginality and community 
in Australia: How immigrants position their difference in health care settings. Medical 
Anthropology, 22, pp. 1–22. 
 
MAQUARIE DICTIONARY, 2009. Australia: Maquarie Dictionary Publishers. 
 
MARCUS, G.E. and FISCHER, M.M.J., 1999. Anthropology as cultural critique: An 
experimental moment in the human sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
MARSELLA, A.J. and WHITE, G.M., 1982-1984.  Cultural conceptions of mental 
health and therapy. Dordrecht: Reidel. 
MARSELLA, A.J. and YAMADA, A., 2007. Culture and psychopathology. In: S. 
KITAYAMA and D. COHEN, eds. Handbook of cultural psychology. New York: 
Guilford, 2007, pp. 797-818.   
MARSHALL, M., 1996. Problematizing impairment: Cultural competence in the 
Carolines. Ethnology, 35(4), pp. 249-263.  
MARTIN, G.W. and MITCHELL, G., 2001. A study of critical incident analysis as a 
route to the identification of change necessary in clinical practice: Addressing the 
theory-practice gap. Nurse Education in Practice, 1, pp. 27-34. 
MARTSOLF, D. and MICKLEY, J., 1998. The concept of spirituality in nursing 
theories: Differing worldviews and extent of focus. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 27, 
pp. 294-303.  
MATTHEWS, D. and TSENG, W.S., 2004. Culture and forensic psychiatry. In: W.S. 
TSENG and J. STRELTZER, eds. Cultural competence in clinical psychiatry. 
Arlington, VA: American Psychiatry Publishing, 2004, pp. 107-123.  
MATTHEWS, D.A., MCCULLOUGH, M.E., LARSON, D.B., KOENIG, H.G., 
SWYERS, J.P. and MILANO, M.G., 1998. Religious commitment and health status: 
A review of the research and implications for family medicine. Archives of Family 
Medicine, 7(20), pp. 118-124. 
MATTINGLY, C., 1998a. In search of the good: Narrative reasoning in clinical 
practice. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 12(3), pp. 273-297. 
MATTINGLY, C., 1998b. Healing dramas and clinical plots: The narrative structure of 
experience. Cambridge: University of Cambridge. 
MATTINGLY, C. and BEER, D., 1993. Interpreting culture in a therapeutic context. 
In: H.L. HOPKINS and H.D. SMITH, eds. Willard & Spackman’s occupational 
therapy.  Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1993, pp. 154-161.  
MATTINGLY, C. and FLEMING, M.H., 1994. Clinical reasoning: Forms of inquiry in a 
therapeutic practice. Philadelphia: Davis.  
261 
 
MAY, K., 1991. Interview techniques in qualitative research: Concerns and 
challenges. In: J.M. MORSE, ed. Qualitative nursing research: A contemporary 
dialogue. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications, 1991, pp. 188-201.   
MAYKUT, P. and MOREHOUSE, R., 1994. Beginning qualitative research: A 
philosophic and practical guide. London: Falmer Press.  
MCALLISTER, L. and WHITEFORD, G.E., 2008. Facilitating clinical decision making 
in students intercultural fieldwork placements. In: J. HIGGS, M. JONES, M. LOFTUS 
and N. CHRISTENSEN, eds. Clinical reasoning in the health professions. 
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 2008, pp. 357-366.  
MCALLISTER, L., WHITEFORD, G.E., HILL, B., THOMAS, N. and FITZGERALD, 
M.H., 2006. Reflection in intercultural learning: Examining the international 
experience through a critical incident approach. Reflective Practice, 7(3), pp. 367-
381. 
MCCABE, R. and PRIEBE S., 2004. Explanatory models of illness in schizophrenia: 
Comparison of four ethnic groups. British Journal of Psychiatry, 185, pp. 25–30. 
MCCANCE, T., MCKENNA, H. and BOORE, J., 2001. Exploring caring using 
narrative methodology: An analysis of the approach. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 
33(3), pp. 350-356. 
 
MCEVOY, J., APPERSON, L.J. and APPLEBAUM, P.S., 1989. Insight in 
schizophrenia: Its relationship to acute psychopathology. Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease, 177, pp. 43-47.  
MCEVOY, J., FRETER, S. and EVERETT, G., 1989. Insight and clinical outcome of 
schizophrenic patients. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 177, pp. 48-51.       
MCEWEN, M., 2005. Spiritual nursing care: State of the art. Holistic Nursing 
Practice, 19(4), pp.161-169.  
MCGORRY, P., 1992. The concept of recovery and secondary prevention in 
psychiatric disorders. Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 237, pp. 3-
17.  
MCGORRY, P. and MCCONVILLE, S., 1999. Insight and psychosis: An elusive 
target. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 40(2), pp. 131-142. 
MCPHATTER, A.R. and GANAWAY, T.L., 2003. Beyond the rhetoric: Strategies for 
implementing culturally effective practice with children, families, and communities. 
Child Welfare, VXXXII(2), pp. 103-125. 
MCSWEENEY, J., ALLEN, J. and MAYO, K., 1997. Exploring the use of explanatory 
models in nursing research and practice. Image: International Journal of Nursing 
Scholarship, 29(3), pp. 243-248.  
262 
 
MEADOR, K.G., KOENIG, H.G., HUGHES, D.C., BLAZER, D.G., TURNBULL, J. and 
GEORGE, L.K., 1992. Religious affiliation and major depression. Hospital 
Community Psychiatry, 43(1), pp. 1204-1208.  
MEADOWS, J.L., 1991. Multicultural communication. Physical and Occupational 
Therapy in Paediatrics: The Quarterly Journal of Developmental Therapy, 11(4), pp. 
31-42.  
MENEZES, A. Jr and MOREIRA-ALMEIDA, A., 2009. Differential diagnosis between 
spiritual experiences and mental disorders of religious content. Rev Psiq Clin, 36(2), 
pp. 69-76.  
MENEZES, A. Jr and MOREIRA-ALMEDIA, A., 2010. Religion, spirituality and 
psychosis. Current Psychiatry Reports, 12, pp. 174-179.  
MERCER, K., 1986.  Racism and transcultural psychiatry. In: P. MILLER and N. 
ROSE, eds. The power of psychiatry. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986, pp. 111-142.   
MERRIAM, S. and CLARK, M., 1993. Learning from life experience: What makes it 
significant? International Journal of Lifelong Education, 12(2), pp. 129-138. 
METZL, J.M., 2010. The protest psychosis-How schizophrenia became a black 
disease. Boston: Beacon Press. 
MEZZICH, J.E., CARACCI, G., FABREGA, H. and KIRMAYER, L.J., 2009. Cultural 
Formulation Guidelines. Transcultural Psychiatry, 46(3), pp. 385-405.   
MEZZICH, J.E., KLEINMAN, A.M., FABREGA, H. and PARRON, D.L.,1996. 
Introduction. In: J.E. MEZZICH, A.M. KLEINMAN, H. FABREGA and D.L. PARRON, 
eds. Culture and psychiatric diagnosis: A DSM-IV perspective. Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychiatric Press, 1996, pp. xvii-xxiii.  
MIKHAIL, B. and PETRO-NUSTAS, W., 2001. Transcultural adaptation of 
Champion’s health beliefs model scales. Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 33(2), pp. 
159-165.  
MIKKONEN, I., 2005. Clinical learning as experienced by nursing students in their 
critical incidents. PhD thesis, University of Joensuu. 
MILES, M.B. and HUBERMAN, A.M., 1994. Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.    
MILLER, R., 1990. Managing difficult patients. London: Mosby. 
MINAS, I.H., 1990. Mental health in a culturally diverse society. In: J. REID and P. 
TROMPF, eds. The health of immigrant Australia: A social perspective. Sydney, 
Australia: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1990, pp. 250-288. 
263 
 
MINAS, I.H., 1991. Psychiatric services research in a multicultural society. In: I.H. 
MINAS, ed. Cultural diversity and mental health. Melbourne: Royal Australian and 
New Zealand College of Psychiatrists and Victorian Transcultural Psychiatry Unit, 
1991, pp. 35-51.  
MINAS, I.H., STUART, G.W. and KLIMIDIS, S., 1994. Language, culture and 
psychiatric services: A survey of Victorian clinical staff. Australian and New Zealand 
Journal of Psychiatry, 28, pp. 250-258.   
MINICHIELLO, V., ARONI, R., TIMEWELL, E. and ALEXANDER, L., 1990. In-depth 
Interviewing: Researching People. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.   
MINTZ, A.R., DOBSON, A.S. and ROMNEY, D.M., 2003. Insight in schizophrenia: A 
meta- analysis. Schizophrenia Research, 61, pp. 75-88.  
MIR, G., 2007. Effective communication with service users. London: Race Equality 
Foundation. 
MIR, G. and DIN, I., 2003. Communication, knowledge and chronic illness in the 
Pakistani community. Leeds: Centre for Research in Primary Care, University of 
Leeds.   
MISHLER, E.G., 1981. Viewpoint: Critical perspectives on the biomedical model. In: 
E.G. MISHLER, L.A. SINGHAM, S.T. HAUSER, R. LIEM, S.D. OSHERSON and 
N.E. WAXLER, eds. Social contexts of health, illness and patient care. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 1981, pp. 1-23.   
MITCHELL, S. and ROBERTS, G., 2009. Psychosis. In: C. COOK, A. POWELL and 
A. SIMS, eds. Spirituality and psychiatry. London: The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2009, pp. 39-61.  
MOHR, S. and PFEIFER, S., 2009. Delusions and hallucinations with religious 
content. In: P. HUGUELET and H.G. KOENIG, eds. Religion and spirituality in 
psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 81-97.     
MOREIRA-ALMEIDA, A. and CARDENA, E., 2011. Differential diagnosis between 
non-pathological psychotic and spiritual experiences and mental disorders: A 
contribution from Latin American studies to the ICD-11. Revista Brasileira de 
Psiquiatria, 33(1), pp. 29-36.   
MORENO, M.R., OTERO-SABOGAL, R. and NEWMAN, J., 2007. Assessing dual-
role staff-interpreter linguistic competency in an integrated healthcare system. 
Journal of General Internal Medicine, 22(2), pp. 331-335.      
MORGAN, D.L., 1997. Focus groups as qualitative research. 2nd ed., Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.  
264 
 
MORGAN, D.L. and KRUEGER, R.A., 1993. When to use focus groups and why. In: 
D.L. MORGAN, ed. Successful focus groups: Advancing the state of the art. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1993, pp. 3-19.   
MORSE, J.M., 1998. Validity by committee. Qualitative Health Research, 8(4), pp. 
443-445. 
MORSE, J.M. and FIELD, P.A., 1995. Qualitative research methods for health 
professionals. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.  
MOSS-MORRIS, R. and PETRIE, K., 1994. Illness perceptions: Implications for 
occupational therapy. Australian Occupational Therapy Journal, 41, pp. 73-82.  
MOUSTAKAS, C., 1990. Heuristic research. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications. 
MUCCI, M.G. and DALGALARRONDO, P., 2000. Self-mutilation: Reports of six 
cases of enucleation. Rev Bras Psiquiatr, 22(2), pp. 80-86. 
MUECKE, M.A., 1994. On the evaluation of ethnographies. In: J.M. MORSE, ed. 
Critical issues in qualitative research methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 1994, pp. 187-209.  
MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1994a. Intercultural communication for healthcare 
professionals. In: R.W. BRISLIN and T. YOSHIDA, eds. Improving intercultural 
interactions: Modules for cross-cultural training programs. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, 1994, pp. 171-197. 
MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1994b. Intercultural interactions in welfare work. In: R.W. 
BRISLIN and T. YOSHIDA, eds. Improving intercultural interactions: Modules for 
cross-cultural training programs. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1994, pp. 
197-220. 
MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1999. Issues in intercultural and international learning in 
health science curricula. In: J. HIGGS and H. EDWARDS, eds. Educating beginning 
practitioners: Challenges for health professional education. Oxford: Butterworth 
Heinemann, 1999, pp. 143-150.  
MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C. and FITZGERALD, M.H., 1995, 12th-15th July. 
Disconfirmed expectancies in intercultural interactions. Australian Association of 
Occupational Therapists 18th Federal and Inaugural Pacific Rim Conference. Pp. 
159, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. 
MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C. and WEST, S., 2001. Practising without certainty: 
Providing healthcare in an uncertain world. In: J. HIGGS and A. TITCHEN, eds. 
Professional practice in health, education and the creative arts. Oxford: Blackwell 
Science, 2001, pp. 49-62. 
265 
 
MURPHY, K. and CLARK, J.M., 1993. Nurses’ experiences of caring for ethnic 
minority clients. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 18, pp. 442-450.  
MYERS, H.F., WOHLFORD, P., GUZMAN, L.P. and ECHEMENDIA, R.J., 1991. 
Ethnic minority perspectives on clinical training and services in psychology. 
Washington: American Psychological Association.   
NARAYANASAMY, A., 1999. A review of spirituality as applied to nursing. 
International Journal of Nursing Studies, 36, pp. 117-125. 
NARAYANASAMY, A., 2003. Transcultural nursing: How do nurses respond to 
cultural needs? British Journal of Nursing, 12(3), pp. 185-198. 
NARAYANASAMY, A. and OWENS, J., 2001. A critical incident study of nurses: 
Responses to the spiritual needs of their patients. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 
33(4), pp. 446-455. 
NEELEMAN, J. and KING, M.B., 1993. Psychiatrists’ religious attitudes in relation to 
their clinical practice: A survey of 231 psychiatrists. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 
88(6), pp. 420-424.    
NDEGWA, D. and OLAJIDE, D., 2003. Main issues in mental health and race. Eds., 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
NICHTER, M., 1981. Idioms of distress: Alternatives in the expression of 
psychosocial distress: A case study. Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 5(4), pp.379-
408. 
NORMAN, I.J., REDFERN, S.J., TOMALIN, D.A. and OLIVER, S., 1992. Developing 
Flanagan’s critical incident technique to elicit indicators of high and low quality 
nursing care from patients and their nurses. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 17, pp. 
590-600. 
NORTON P.G., STEWART, M., TUDIVER, F., BASS, M.J. and DUNN, E.V., 1991. 
Primary Care Research: Traditional and Innovative Approaches. New Delhi: SAGE 
Publications.   
NUCCI, L., 1997. Culture, universals, and the personal. In: H.D. SALTZSTEIN, ed. 
Culture as a context for moral development: New perspectives on the particular and 
the universal. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997, pp. 5-22.    
NURSING and MIDWIFERY COUNCIL, 2008. The Code: Standards of conduct, 
performance and ethics for nurses and midwives. London: Nursing and Midwifery 
Council. 
ODAWARA, E., 2005. Cultural competency in occupational therapy: Beyond a cross-
cultural view of practice. American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 59(3), pp. 325-
334. 
266 
 
OFFER, D. and SABSHIN, M., 1966. Normality: Theoretical and clinical concepts of 
mental health. New York: Basic Books. 
OLDNALL, A., 1995. On the absence of spirituality in nursing theories and models. 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 21, pp. 417-418. 
OLDNALL, A., 1996. A critical analysis of nursing: Meeting the spiritual needs of 
patients. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 23(1), pp. 138-144. 
OLTMANNS, T.F., 1988. Approaches to the definition and study of delusions. In: T.F. 
OLTMANNS and B.A. MAHER, eds. Delusional beliefs. New York: Wiley, 1988, pp. 
3-12. 
OQUENDO, M.A., 1996. Psychiatric evaluation and psychotherapy in the patient’s 
second language. Psychiatric Services, 47(6), pp. 614-618. 
OSBORNE, M.E., 1995. Dimensions of understanding in cross-cultural nurse-client 
relationship: A qualitative study. PhD thesis, University of Texas. 
OXMAN, T.E., ROSENBERG, S.D., SCHUNURR, P.P., TUCKER, G.J. and GALA, 
G., 1988. The language of altered states. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 
176, pp. 401-408.  
OZOLINS, L.L. and HJELM, K., 2003. Nurses’ experiences of problematic situations 
with migrants in emergency care in Sweden. Clinical Effectiveness in Nursing, 7(2), 
pp. 84-93.  
PALOUTZIAN, R.F., RICHARDSON, J.T. and RAMBO, L.R., 1999. Religious 
conversion and personality change. Journal of Personality, 67, pp.1047-1079.  
PANIAGUA, F.A., 2000. Culture bound syndromes, cultural variations, and 
psychopathology. In: I. CUELLAR and F.A. PANIAGUA, eds. Handbook of 
multicultural mental health. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2000, pp. 142-167. 
PANIAGUA, F.A., 2001. Diagnosis in a multicultural context: A casebook for mental 
health professionals. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
PANIAGUA, F.A., 2005. Assessing and treating culturally diverse clients: A practical 
guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
PAPADOPOULOS, I., TILKI, M. and LEES, S., 2004. Promoting cultural competence 
in healthcare through a research-based intervention in the UK. Diversity in Health 
and Social Care, 1(2), pp.107-116.  
PARK, C., COHEN, L.C. and HERB, L., 1990. Intrinsic religiousness and religious 
coping as life stress moderators for Catholics versus Protestants. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 59(3), pp. 562-574.  
267 
 
PARKER, D.L., WEBB, J. and D-SOUZA, B., 1994. The value of critical incident 
analysis as an educational tool and its relationship to experiential learning. Nurse 
Education Today, 15, pp. 111-116. 
PARRY, K.K., 1984. Concepts from medical anthropology for clinicians. Physical 
Therapy, 64, pp. 929-933. 
PARSONS, C., 1990. Cross-cultural issues in health care. In: J. REID and P. 
TROMPF, eds. The health of immigrant Australia: A social perspective. Sydney, 
Australia: Harcourt Bruce Jovanaich Publishers, 1990, pp. 108-154. 
PARSONS, T., 1951. The social system. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press. 
PARSONS, T., 1979.  Definitions of health and illness in the light of American values 
and social structure. In: E.G. JACO, ed. Patients, physicians and illness. New York: 
Free Press, 1979, pp. 120-141.   
PATEL, V., GWANZURA, F., SIMUNYU, E., LLOYD, K. and MANN, A., 1995. The 
phenomenology and explanatory models of common mental disorder: A study in 
primary care in Harare, Zimbabwe. Psychological Medicine, 25, pp. 1191-1199. 
 
PATTON, M.Q., 1990. Qualitative evaluation and research methods. Newbury Park, 
CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
PATTON, N., 2004. Self-inflicted eye injuries: A review. Eye, 18, pp. 867-872. 
 
PAUL, S., 1995. Culture and its influence on occupational therapy evaluation. 
Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 62, pp. 154-160.  
PAUWELS, A., 1990. Health professionals’ perceptions of communication difficulties 
in cross-cultural contexts. Australian Review of Applied Linguistics, 7, pp. 93-111.  
PAUWELS, A., 1995. Cross-cultural communication in health sciences. Melbourne: 
MacMillan Education Australia.  
PECKOVER, S. and CHIDLAW, R.G., 2007. The (un)-certainties of district nurses in 
the context of cultural diversity. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 58(4), pp. 377-385. 
PERGERT, P., 2008. Facading in transcultural caring relationships: Healthcare staff 
and foreign-born patients in childhood cancer care. PhD Thesis, Karolinska Institutet. 
PERGERT, P., EKBLAD, S., ENSKAR, K. and BJORK, O., 2007. Obstacles to 
transcultural caring relationships: Experiences of health care staff in paediatric 
oncology. Journal of Paediatric Oncology Nursing, 24(6), pp. 314-328. 
PERKINS, R. and MOODLEY, P., 1993. The arrogance of insight. Psychiatric 
Bulletin, 17, pp. 233-234. 
268 
 
PERRON, N.J. and HUDELSON, P., 2006. Somatisation: Illness perspectives of 
asylum seeker and refugee patients from the former country of Yugoslavia. Family 
Practice, 7(10), pp. 1-7.    
PETERS, E.R., 2010. Are delusions on a continuum? The case of religious and 
delusional beliefs. In: I. CLARKE, ed. Psychoses and spirituality: Consolidating the 
new paradigm. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, pp. 127-139.    
PETERS, E.R., JOSEPH, S.A. and GARETY, P.A., 1999. Measurement of 
delusional ideation in the normal population: Introducing the PDI (Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory). Schizophrenia Bulletin, 25(3), pp. 553-576.   
PETERS, E.R., DAY, S., MCKENNA, J. and ORBACH, G., 1999. The incidence of 
delusional ideation in religious and psychotic populations. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 38, pp. 83-96.  
PHIPPS, D.J., 1995. Occupational therapy practice with clients from non-English 
speaking backgrounds: A survey of clinicians in South-West Sydney. Australian 
Occupational Therapy Journal, 42, pp. 151-160. 
PIEPER, H.O. and MACFARLANE, A., 2011. “I’m worried about what I missed”: GP 
Registrars’ views on learning needs to deliver effective healthcare to ethnically and 
culturally diverse patient populations. Education for Health, 24(1), pp.1-13.  
 
PIERRE, J.M., 2001. Faith or delusion? At the crossroads of religion and psychosis. 
Journal of Psychiatric Practice, 7(3), pp. 163-172. 
PIKE, L.K., 1966. Language in relation to a unified theory of the structure of human 
behaviour. The Hague: Mouton. 
PILOWSKY, I., 1997. Abnormal illness behaviour. New York: John Wiley.  
PINKIHANA, J., HAPPELL, B., TAYLOR, M. and KEKS, N., 2002. Exploring the 
complexity of compliance in schizophrenia. Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 23, pp. 
513-528. 
PITTAWAY, L., 2000. The social construction of entrepreneurial behaviour. PhD 
thesis, University of Newcastle. 
PLANT, J. and STEPHENSON, J., 2008. Beating stress, anxiety and depression. 
London: Piatkus Books. 
PODVOLL, E., 1987. Mania and the risk of power. Journal of Contemplative 
Psychotherapy, 4, pp. 95-122. 
POOL, R. and GEISSLER, W., 2005. Medical anthropology. Maidenhead: Open 
University Press. 
269 
 
PORTER, R.E. and SAMOVAR, L.A., 1994. An introduction to intercultural 
communication. In: L.A. SAMOVAR and R.E. PORTER, eds. Intercultural 
communication: A reader. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994, pp. 5-26.  
POST, S., 1992. DSM-III-R and religion. Social Science and Medicine, 35(1), pp. 81-
90. 
POULTON, R., CASPI, A., MOFFITT, T.E., CANNON, M., MURRAY, R. and 
HARRINGTON, H., 2000. Children’s self-reported psychotic symptoms and adult 
schizophrenia form disorder: A 15 year longitudinal study. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 57(11), pp. 1053-1058.  
PRESS, I., 1997. The quality movement in U.S. healthcare: Implications for 
anthropology. Human Organization, 56(1), pp. 1-8.  
PRIESTER, P.E., KHALILI, S. and LUVATHINGAL, J.E., 2009.Placing the soul back 
into psychology: Religion in the psychotherapy process. In: S. ESHUN and R.A.R. 
GURUNG, eds. Culture and mental health: Sociocultural influences, theory, and 
practice. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009, pp. 91-114.  
PRINCE, R.H., 1979. Religious experience and psychosis. Journal of Altered States 
of Consciousness, 5, pp. 167-181. 
PRINCE, R.H., 1992. Religious experience and psychopathology: Cross-cultural 
perspectives. In: J.F. SCHUMAKER, ed. Religion and mental health. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 81-290.    
PRINCE, R.H., OKPAKU, S.O. and MERKEL, L., 1998. Transcultural psychiatry: A 
note on origins and definitions. In: S.O. OKPAKU, eds. Clinical methods in 
transcultural psychiatry. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1998, pp. 3-
17. 
PURNELL, L. and PAULANKA, B., 1998. Transcultural healthcare: A culturally 
competent approach. Eds., Philadelphia: F.A. Davis.    
PUZAN, E., 2003. The unbearable whiteness of being (in nursing). Nursing Inquiry, 
10(3), pp. 193-200.    
QUIRK, A. and LELLIOTT, P., 2004. Users’ experiences of in-patient services. In: P. 
CAMPLING, S. DAVIES and G. FARQUHARSON, eds. From toxic institutions to 
therapeutic environments: Residential settings in mental health services. London: 
The Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2004, pp. 45-55.  
RACK, P., 1982. Race, culture and mental disorder. London: Tavistock. 
RACK, P., 1990. Psychological/psychiatric disorders. In: B.R. MCAVOY and L.J. 
DONALDSON, eds. Healthcare for Asians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, 
pp. 290-304.   
270 
 
RAHILLY, D.A., 1993. A phenomenological analysis of authentic experience. Journal 
of Humanistic Psychology, 33(2), pp. 49-71. 
RATTRAY, L.H., 2002. Significance of the chaplain within the mental health team. 
The Psychiatrist, 26, pp. 190-191. 
RAVETZ, C., 1998. The family. In: D. JONES, S. E. E. BLAIR, T.HARTERY and R. 
K. JONES, eds. Sociology and occupational therapy: An integrated approach. 
Edinburgh, Scotland: Churchill  Livingstone, 1998, pp. 81-91. 
 
REED, J., 1994. Phenomenology without phenomena: A discussion of the use of 
phenomenology to examine expertise in long-term care of elderly patients. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 19(2), pp. 336-341.  
REEVES, R.R. and LIBERTO, V., 2006. Suicide associated with the Antichrist 
delusion. Journal of Forensic Science, 51(2), pp. 411-422.  
REGO, S.A., 2009. Culture and anxiety disorders. In: S. ESHUN and R.A.R. 
GURUNG, eds. Culture and mental health: Sociocultural influences, theory and 
practice. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2009, pp. 197-211.   
REYNOLDS, W. and CORMACK, D., 1990. Psychiatric and mental health nursing: 
Theory and practice. Chapman & Hall: London.  
 
RICOUER, P., 1985. Time and narrative. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
RIESSMAN, C.K., 1993. Narrative analysis. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.   
RIMON, D., 1979. Nurses’ perception of their psychological role in treating 
rehabilitation patients: A study employing the critical incident technique. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 4, pp. 403-413. 
ROBERTS, C., 2004. Qualitative data analysis. Transcribing spoken discourse.  
Available  
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/education/research/projects’dataqual.html   
(Accessed 28 May 2011).   
ROBINSON, J. and ELKAN, R., 1996. Health needs assessment: Theory and 
practice. London: Churchill Livingstone.    
ROBINSON, L., 1998. Race: Communication and the caring professions. 
Buckingham: Open University Press.   
ROBINSON, M., 2002. Communication and health in a multi-ethnic society. Bristol: 
Policy Press. 
ROBINSON, M. and GILMARTIN, J., 2002. Barriers to communication between 
health practitioners and service users who are not fluent in English. Nurse Education 
Today, 22(6), pp. 457-465.      
271 
 
ROGERS, A. and PILGRIM, D., 2005. Sociology of mental health and illness. 
Buckingham: Open University Press.                                                                                                                                     
ROKEACH, M., 1973. The nature of human values. New York: The Free Press.  
ROKEACH, M., 1979. Understanding human values: Individual and societal. New 
York: Free Press. 
ROMISZOWSKI, A.J., 1984. Producing instructional systems: Lesson planning for 
individualised and group learning activities. London: Kogan Page.   
ROMME, M. and ESCHER, A., 1989. “Hearing Voices". Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
15(2), pp. 209–216. 
 
ROPER, J.M. and SHAPIRA, J., 2000. Ethnography in nursing research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.    
ROSALDO, M.Z., 1984. Toward an anthropology of self and feeling. In: R.A. 
SHWEDER and R.A. LEVINE, eds. Culture theory: Essays on mind, self and 
emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 137-157.    
ROSENAL, L., 1995. Exploring the learners’ world: Critical incident methodology. 
The Journal of Continuing Education in Nursing, 26(3), pp. 115-118. 
ROSENBERG, E., KIRMAYER, L.J., XENOCOSTAS, S., DOMINICE DAO, M. and 
LOIGNON, C., 2007. GPs’ strategies in intercultural clinical encounters. Family 
Practice, 24, pp. 145-151. 
ROSENHAN, D.L., 1973. On being sane in insane places.  Santa Clara Law Review, 
13(3), pp. 379-399. 
RUSSELL, C., FITZGERALD, M.H., WILLIAMSON, P., MANOR, D. and 
WHYBROW, S., 2002. Independence as a practice issue in occupational therapy: 
The safety clause. The American Journal of Occupational Therapy, 56(4), pp. 369-
379.  
RUSSINOVA, Z., WEWIORSKI, N. and CASH, D., 2002. Use of alternative health 
care practices by persons with serious mental illness: Perceived benefits. American 
Journal of Public Health, 92(10), pp.1600–1603. 
 
RYLE, G., 1949. The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson.  
RYRIE, I. and NORMAN, I., 2009. Assessment. In: I. NORMAN and I. RYRIE, eds.  
The art and science of mental health nursing. Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open 
University Press, 2009, pp. 211-230. 
SABIN, J.E., 1975. Translating despair. American Journal of Psychiatry, 132, pp. 
197-199. 
272 
 
SALANDER, P., 2002. Bad news from the patients’ perspective: An analysis of the 
written narratives of newly diagnosed cancer patients. Social Science and Medicine, 
55, pp. 721-732. 
SALDANA, J., 2009. The coding manual for qualitative researchers. London: SAGE 
Publications.   
SANCHEZ, V., 1964. Relevance of cultural values. American Journal of 
Occupational Therapy, 18(10), pp. 1-5.   
SANDELOWSKI, M., 2000. Focus on research methods: Whatever happened to 
qualitative description? Research in Nursing & Health, 23, pp. 334-340.  
SANDERSON, S., VANDENBERG, B. and PAESE, P., 1999. Authentic religious 
experience or insanity? Journal of Clinical Psychology, 55(5), pp. 607-616. 
SANG, D., 1996. Health and illness in the Vietnamese community in Western 
Australia. In: I.H. MINAS, ed. Recent developments in mental health. Proceedings of 
a collaborative workshop between Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand. Melbourne: 
Centre for Cultural Studies in Health, University of Melbourne, 1996, pp. 152-153.  
SANTIAGO-IRIZARRY, V., 1996. Culture as cure. Cultural Anthropology, 11(1), pp. 
3-24. 
SANTIAGO-IRIZARRY, V., 2001.  Medicalizing Ethnicity: The Construction of Latino 
Identity in a Psychiatric Setting. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
 
SARAVANAN, B. and JACOB, K.S., 2006. Beliefs, therapies, health systems and the 
treatment of mental illness in the developing world. British Journal of Psychiatry, 189, 
pp. 284-285. 
SARAVANAN, B., DAVID, A.S., BHUGRA, D., PRINCE, M. and JACOB, K.S., 2005. 
Insight in people with psychosis: The influence of culture. International Review of 
Psychiatry, 17(2), pp. 83-87. 
SARAVANAN, B., JACOB, K.S., JOHNSON, S., PRINCE, M., BHUGRA, D. and 
DAVID, A.S., 2007a. Assessing insight in schizophrenia: East meets West. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 190, pp. 243-7. 
SARAVANAN, B., JACOB, K.S., JOHNSON, S., PRINCE, M., BHUGRA, D., and 
DAVID, A.S., 2007b. Belief models in first episode schizophrenia in South India. 
Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 42, pp. 446-451. 
SARAVANAN, B., JACOB, K.S., PRINCE, M., BHUGRA, D. and DAVID, A.S., 2004. 
Culture and insight revisited. British Journal of Psychiatry, 184, pp. 107-109.  
SASHIDHARAN, S.P., 2003. Inside Outside: Improving mental health services for 
black and minority ethnic communities in England. London: HMSO.  
273 
 
SAVAGE, J., 2000. Ethnography and health care. British Medical Journal, 
321(7273), pp. 193-194.     
SCARNATI, R., MADRY, M. and WISE, A., 1991. Religious beliefs and practices 
among the most-dangerous psychiatric inmates. Forensic Reports, 4, pp. 1-16.   
SCHAEFER, K., 2002. Reflections on caring narratives: Enhancing patterns of 
knowing. Nursing Education Perspectives, 23(6), pp. 286-293. 
 
SCHEPER-HUGHES, N. and LOCK, M., 1987. The mindful body: A prolegomenon 
to future work in medical anthropology. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 1(1), pp. 6-
41. 
SCHON, D., 1987. Educating the reflective practitioner. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
SCHULZE, B. and ANGERMEYER, M.C., 2003. Subjective experiences of stigma. A 
focus group study of schizophrenic patients, their relatives and mental health 
professionals. Social Science and Medicine, 56(2), pp. 299-312.    
SCHWANDT, T.A., 1994. Constructivist, interpretivist approaches to human inquiry. 
In: N. DENZIN and S.Y. LINCOLN, eds. Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1994, pp.118-137.    
SCHWANDT, T.A., 1996. Farewell to criteriology. Qualitative Inquiry, 2(1), pp. 59-73. 
SCHWANDT, T.A., 2000. Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry. In: N. 
DENZIN and Y.S. LINCOLN, eds. Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2000, pp. 189-213.   
SCHWARTZ, M.A. and WIGGINS, O.P., 1987. Typifications: The first step for clinical 
diagnosis in psychiatry. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 175(2), pp. 65-
77.    
SEALE, C., 1999. The Quality of Qualitative Research. London: SAGE Publications.   
SEELEY, K.M., 2004. Short-term intercultural psychotherapy: Ethnographic Inquiry. 
Social Work, 49(1), pp. 121-130. 
SEELEY, K.M., 2005. The listening cure: Listening for culture in intercultural 
psychological treatments. The Psychoanalytic Review, 92, pp. 431-452. 
SEELEY, K.M., 2006. Cultural psychotherapy: Working with culture in the clinical 
encounter. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson.    
SEGALL, A., 1988. Cultural factors in sick-role expectations. In: D.S. GOCHMAN, 
ed. Health behaviour: Emerging research perspectives. New York: Plenum Press, 
1988, pp. 249-259. 
274 
 
SEIDEL, J. and KELLE, U., 1995. Different functions of coding in the analysis of 
textual data. In: U. KELLE, ed. Computer-aided qualitative data. Theory, methods, 
and practice. London: SAGE Publications, 1995, pp. 52-61.  
SEVERINSSON, E., 2008. Intensive care nurses’ encounters with multicultural 
families in Norway: An exploratory study. Intensive and critical care nursing, 24(6), 
pp. 338-348. 
SEWELL, H., 2009. Working with ethnicity, race and culture in mental health: A 
handbook for practitioners. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. 
SHAFRANSKE, E.P. and MALONEY, H.N., 1996. Religion and the clinical practice 
of psychology: A case formulation. In: E.P. SHAFRANSKE, ed. Religion and the 
clinical practice of psychology. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological 
Association, 1996, pp. 561-586.   
SHAHNAVAZ, S. and EKBLAD, S., 2007. Understanding the culturally diverse in 
psychiatry rather than being culturally competent in a preliminary report of Swedish 
psychiatric teams’ views on transcultural competence. International Journal of 
Migration, Health and Social Care, 3(4), pp. 14-30. 
SHAPIRO, J., HOLLINGSHEAD, J. and MORRISON, E.H., 2002. Primary care 
resident, faculty and patient views of barriers to cultural competence, and the skills 
needed to overcome them. Medical Education, 36(8), pp. 749-759. 
SHAW, S.J., 2005. The politics of recognition in culturally appropriate care. Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly, 19(3), pp. 290-309. 
SHWEDER, R.A., 1991. Thinking through cultures. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
SHWEDER, R.A. and BOURNE, E.J., 1982. Does the concept of the person vary 
cross-culturally? In: A.J. MARSELLA and G.M. WHITE, eds. Cultural conceptions of 
mental health and therapy. Boston: Reidel, 1982, pp. 97-137. 
SHWEDER, R.A. and BOURNE, E.J., 1984. Does the concept of the person vary 
cross-culturally? In: R.A. SHWEDER and R.A. LE VINE, eds. Culture theory: Essays 
on mind, self, and emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 158-
199. 
SIDDLE, R., 2000. Religious beliefs in schizophrenia. PhD thesis, University of 
Manchester.  
SIDDLE, R., HADDOCK, G., TARRIER, N. and FARAGHER, E.B., 2002. Religious 
delusions in patients admitted to hospital with schizophrenia. Social Psychiatry and 
Psychiatric Epidemiology, 37(3), pp. 130-138.   
275 
 
SIMS, A.C.P., 1992. Symptoms and beliefs. Journal of the Royal Society of Health, 
112, pp. 42-46. 
SIMS, A.C.P., 1994. “Psyche”-spirit as well as mind? British Journal of Psychiatry, 
165, pp. 441-446.  
SIMS, A.C.P., 1995. Symptoms in the mind. 2nd ed., London: WB Saunders.  
SKULTANS, V. and COX, J., 2000. Introduction. In: V. SKULTANS and J. COX, eds. 
Anthropological approaches to psychological medicine: Crossing bridges. London 
and Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000, pp. 7-41.   
SLADE, P.D., 1976. An investigation of psychological factors involved in the 
predisposition to auditory hallucinations. Psychological Medicine, 6(1), pp. 123-132.  
SMITH, A., 1998. Learning about reflection. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 28(4), pp. 
891-898.  
SMITH, A. and RUSSELL, J., 1993. Critical incident technique. In: J. REED and S. 
PROCTOR, eds. Nurse Education: A reflective approach. London: Edward Arnold, 
1993, pp. 119-131. 
SNELL, R., 1992. Experiential learning at work: Why can’t it be painless? Personnel 
Review, 21 (4), pp.12-15. 
SNOW, L.F., 1983. Traditional health beliefs and practices among lower class Black 
Americans. The Western Journal of Medicine, 139, pp. 820-828.  
SOBO, E.J., 2003. Rapid assessment with qualitative telephone interviews: Lessons 
from an evaluation of California’s Healthy Family’s Program & Medi- Cal for Children. 
American Journal of Evaluation, 24, pp. 399-408.  
SOBO, E.J., 2004. Good communication in paediatric cancer care: A culturally- 
informed research agenda. Journal of Paediatric Oncology Nursing, 21(3), pp. 150-
154. 
SOBO, E.J., 2009. Culture and meaning in health services research: A practical field 
guide. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press. 
SOBO, E.J.  and LOUSTAUNAU, M.O., 2010. The cultural context of health, illness 
and medicine. 2nd ed., Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.  
SOBO, E.J. and SEID, M., 2003. Cultural issues in health service delivery. What kind 
of “competence” is needed, and from whom? Annals of Behavioral Science and 
Medical Education, 9(2), pp. 97-100.    
276 
 
SPARLING, J.W., 1991. The cultural definition of the family. Physical and 
Occupational Therapy in Paediatrics: The Quarterly Journal of Developmental 
Therapy, 11(4), pp. 17–29. 
 
SPECK, P., 1998. Spiritual issues in palliative care. In: D. Doyle, G.W.C., Hanks and 
N. Macdonald, eds. Oxford textbook of palliative medicine. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998, pp. 805-816.  
SPENCE, D., 1999. Prejudice, paradox and possibility: Nursing people from cultures 
other than one’s own. PhD thesis, Massey University.  
SPRADLEY, J.P., 1979. The ethnographic interview. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
SPRADLEY, J.P. and MCCURDY, D.W., 1972. The Cultural Experience: 
Ethnography in complex society. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press. 
STEIN, H.F., 1985. The culture of the patient as a red herring in clinical decision 
making: A case study. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 12(1), pp. 2-5.  
STEIN, H.F., 1990. American medicine as culture. Boulder: Westview Press.  
STEVENSON, A., 2010. Cultural issues in psychology: A student’s handbook. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
STEWART, D. and SHAMDASANI, P., 1990. Focus groups: Theory and practice. 
Applied sociological research method series. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.   
STEWART, M., 2002. Cultural competence in undergraduate healthcare education. 
Physiotherapy, 88(10), pp. 620-629.   
STOLK, Y., 1996. Access to psychiatric services by people of non-English speaking 
background in the western metropolitan region of Melbourne. An analysis of 
psychiatric service use in 1993/94.  Melbourne, Australia: Victorian Transcultural 
Psychiatry Unit.  
STOLK, Y., 2009. A training program in cross-cultural psychiatric assessment: 
Development, delivery and evaluation. Holland: VDM Verlag.  
STONE, L., 1992. Cultural influences in community participation in health. Social 
Science and Medicine, 35(4), pp. 409-417.  
STORER, D., 1985. Ethnic family values in Australia. Sydney: Prentice Hall.  
STRAUSS, J., 1994. The person with schizophrenia as person 2: Approaches to the 
subjective and the complex. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164(23), pp. 103-107. 
STRUTHERS, J., 1999. An investigation into community psychiatric nurses’ use of 
humour during client interactions. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 29(5), pp.197-204.  
277 
 
SUE, D.W. and SUE, D., 1990. Counselling the culturally different: Theory & 
practice. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
SUE, D.W., BERNIER, Y., DURRAN, A., FEINBERG, L., PEDERSEN, P.B., SMITH, 
E.J. AND VASQUEZ-NUTTAL, E., 1982. Position paper: Cross-cultural counselling 
competencies. Counselling Psychologist, 10, pp. 45-52.  
SUH, E.E., 2004. The model of cultural competence through an evolutionary concept 
analysis. Journal of Transcultural Nursing, 15(2), pp. 93-102. 
SULLIVAN, W.P., 1998. Recoiling, regrouping and recovering: First-person accounts 
of the role of spirituality in the course of serious mental illness. In: R.D. FALLOT, ed. 
Spirituality and religion in recovery from mental illness. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass Publishers, 1998, pp. 25-33. 
 
SUOMINEN, T., KOVASIN, M. and KETOLA, O., 1997. Nursing culture-some 
viewpoints. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 25, pp. 186-190. 
SWARTZ, L., 1998. Culture and mental health: A Southern African view. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
SWINTON, J., 2001. Spirituality and mental health care: Rediscovering a ‘forgotten’ 
dimension. London: Kingsley. 
TANYI, R., 2002. Towards clarification of the meaning of spirituality. Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 39(5), pp. 500-509.  
TAUSSIG, M., 1980. Reification and the consciousness of the patient. Social 
Science and Medicine, 14B, pp. 3-13. 
TAYLOR, J.S., 2003a. The story catches you and you fall down: Tragedy, 
ethnography and “cultural competence”. Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 17(2), pp. 
159-181. 
TAYLOR, J.S., 2003b. Confronting ‘culture’ in medicine’s ‘culture of no culture’. 
Academic Medicine, 78(6), pp. 555-559.  
TAYLOR, J.S., 2010. Confronting ‘culture’ in medicine’s ‘culture of no culture’. In: 
P.J. BROWN and R. BARRETT, eds. Understanding and applying medical 
anthropology. Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 2010, pp. 284-290.  
TAYLOR, S.J. and BOGDAN, R., 1998. Introduction to qualitative research methods. 
New York: Willey.  
TEBBUTT, M. and WADE, B., 1985. Frames of reference in the care of migrant 
patients. Australian Occupational Therapy Journal, 32(3), pp. 91-103.  
TEK, C. and ULUG, B., 2001. Religiosity and religious obsessions in obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Psychiatry Research, 104(2), pp. 99-108. 
278 
 
TEPPER, L., ROGERS, S.A., COLEMAN, E.M. and MALONY, H.N., 2001. The 
prevalence of religious coping among persons with persistent mental illness. 
Psychiatric Services, 52(5), pp. 660–665. 
 
TERVALON, M. and MURRAY-GARCIA, J., 1998. Cultural humility versus cultural 
competence: A critical distinction in defining physician training outcomes in 
multicultural education. Journal of Healthcare for the Poor and Underserved, 9(2), 
pp.117-125.   
 
THARA, R. and EATON, W.W., 1996. Outcome of schizophrenia: The Madras 
longitudinal study. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 30, pp. 516-
522.  
 
THOM, N., 2008.Why do nurses refuse to use interpreter services? British Journal of 
Nursing, 17(19), pp. 1206. 
 
THOMAS, A., 1978. Discussion on Arthur Kleinman’s paper. Social Science and 
Medicine, 12, pp. 95. 
THORNE, S., 1993. Health belief systems in perspective. Journal of Advanced 
Nursing, 18, pp. 1931-1941. 
TIEN, A.Y., 1991. Distributions of hallucinations in the population. Social Psychiatry 
and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 26, pp. 287-292. 
TOBERT, N., 2007. In-Sanity: Explanatory models for religious experience. 
University of Wales, Trinity Saint David: Alister Hardy Trust Religious Experience 
Research Centre.  
TOBERT, N., 2010. The polarities of consciousness. In: I. CLARKE, ed. Psychosis 
and spirituality: Consolidating the new paradigm. Chichester, West Sussex: John 
Wiley, 2010, pp. 37-49. 
TRAWEEK, S., 1988. Beantimes and lifetimes: The world of high energy physicists. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
TRIPP, D., 1993. Critical incidents in teaching: Developing professional judgement. 
London: Routledge. 
TRIPP-REIMER, T. and BRINK, P.J., 1985. Cultural brokerage. In: G.M. BULECHEK 
and J.C. MCCLOSKEY, eds. Nursing interventions: Treatments for nursing 
diagnoses. Philadelphia, PA: Saunders, 1985, pp. 352-364. 
TSENG, W.S., 1997. Overview: Culture and psychopathology. In: W.S. TSENG and 
J. STRELTZER, eds. Culture and psychopathology: A guide to clinical assessment. 
New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1997, pp. 1-28.  
TSENG, W.S., 2001. Handbook of cultural psychiatry. San Diego, California: 
Academic Press.  
279 
 
TSENG, W.S., 2003. Clinician’s guide to cultural psychiatry. New York: Academic 
Press.  
TSENG, W.S. and MCDERMOTT, J.F., 1981. Culture, mind and therapy: An 
introduction to cultural psychiatry. New York: Bruner/Mazel.  
TSENG, W.S. and STRELTZER, J., 2008. Cultural competence in health care. New 
York: Springer.  
TUOHY, D., MCCARTHY, J., CASSIDY, I. and GRAHAM, M.M., 2008. Educational 
needs of nurses when nursing people of a different culture in Ireland. International 
Nursing Review, 55(2), pp. 164-170. 
TURK, D.C., RUDY, T.E. and SALOVEY, P., 1986. Implicit models of illness. Journal 
of Behavioral Medicine, 9, pp. 453-474.   
TURNER, L., CALLAGHAN, P., EALES, S. and PARK, A., 2004. Evaluating the 
introduction of a pilot client attachment scheme in mental health nursing education. 
Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 11(4), pp. 414-421.  
TURNER, V., 1974. Dramas, fields, and metaphors: Symbolic action in human 
society. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
TURUNEN, H., 2002. Critical learning incidents and use as a learning method: A 
comparison of Finnish and British nurse teachers. PhD thesis, University of Kuopio.   
TURUNEN, H., TOSSAVAINEN, K. and VERTIO, H., 2004. How can critical 
incidents be used to describe health promotion in the Finnish European Network of 
Health Promoting Schools? Health Promotion International, 19(4), pp. 419-427. 
VANDOVER, L. and BACON, J., 2001. Spiritual care in nursing practice: A close up 
view. Nursing Forum, 36(3), pp. 18-29. 
VAN GEMERT, F., 1998. Ieder voor zich, Kansen, cultuur en criminaliteit van 
Marokkaanse jongens (Each for himself. Opportunities, culture, and criminal 
behaviour in Moroccan youths). Amsterdam: Hen Spinhuis.   
VAN OS, J., HANSEN, M., BIJL, R.V. and RAVELLI, A., 2000. Strauss (1969) 
revisited: A psychosis continuum in the general population? Schizophrenia 
Research, 45(1-2), pp. 11-20. 
VAN OS, J., HANSEN, M., BIJL, R.V. and RAVELLI, A., 2001. Prevalence of 
psychotic disorder and community level of psychotic symptoms. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 58, pp. 663-668. 
VEGA, W.A., SRIBNEY, W.M., MISKIMEN, T.M., ESCOBAR, J.I. and AGUILAR-
GAXIOLA, S., 2006. Putative psychotic symptoms in the Mexican American 
280 
 
Population: Prevalence and co-occurrence with psychiatric disorders. Journal of 
Nervous and Mental Disease, 194, pp. 471-477.    
VERHAEGHE, P., 2004. On being normal and other disorders: A manual for clinical 
psycodiagnostics. New York: Other Press.   
VESPIA, K.M., 2009. Culture and psychotic disorders. In: S. ESHUN and R.R. 
GURUNG, eds. Culture and mental health: Sociocultural influences, theory, and 
practice. Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, pp. 245-273.   
VIVELO, F.R., 1978. A cultural anthropology handbook. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company.   
VYDELINGUM, V., 2000.  South Asian patients’ lived experience of acute care in an 
English hospital: A phenomenological study. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32, pp. 
100-107.  
VYDELINGUM, V., 2006. Nurses’ experiences of caring for South Asian minority 
ethnic patients in a general hospital in England. Nursing Inquiry, 13(1), pp. 23-32.  
WACHTLER C., BRORSSON, A. and TROEIN, M., 2006. Meeting and treating 
cultural difference in primary care: A qualitative interview study. Family Practice, 23, 
pp. 111–115.  
 
WAHLIN, U., WIESLANDER, I. and FRIDLUND, B., 1995. Loving care in the 
ambulance service. Intensive and Critical Care Nursing, 11(6), pp.306-313. 
WATTERS, E., 2011. Crazy like us: The globalization of the western mind. London: 
Robinson Publishing.  
WAUGH, A.C., 1986. Autocastration and Biblical delusions in schizophrenia. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 149, pp. 659-659.  
WAYLAND, C. and CROWDER, J., 2002. Disparate views of community in primary 
health care: Understanding how perceptions influence success. Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly, 16(2), pp. 230-247. 
WEIDMAN, H.H., 1982. Research strategies, structural alterations and clinically 
applied anthropology. In: N.J. CHRISMAN and T.W. MARETZKI, eds. Clinically 
applied anthropology: Anthropologists in health science settings. Dordrecht, Holland: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982, pp. 201-241.   
WEIDMAN, H.H., 1983. Research, service and training aspects of clinical 
anthropology: An institutional review. In: D.B. SHIMKIN and P.G. GOLD, eds. 
Clinical anthropology: A new approach to American health problems. Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1983, pp. 119-153.  
WEINSTEIN, E.A., 1962. Cultural aspects of delusions. London: Collier-MacMillan.   
281 
 
WEISS, M.G., 1997. Explanatory model interview catalogue (EMIC): Framework for 
comparative study of illness. Transcultural Psychiatry, 34, pp. 235-263. 
WEISS, M.G. and SOMMA, D., 2007. Explanatory models in psychiatry. In: D. 
BHUGRA and K. BHUI, eds. Textbook of cultural psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, pp. 127-141.   
WEITZ, R., 1991. Life with AIDS. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.  
WESTERMEYER, J., 1985. Psychiatric diagnosis across cultural boundaries. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 142, pp. 798-805. 
WESTERMEYER, J., 1987. Cultural factors in clinical assessment. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55(4), pp. 471-478.  
WESTERMEYER, J., 1993. Cross-cultural psychiatric assessment. In: A. GAW, ed. 
Culture, ethnicity and mental illness. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 
1993, pp. 125-144.      
WHITE, G.M., 1982a. The role of cultural explanations in “somatisation” and 
psychologization. Social Science and Medicine, 16(16), pp. 1519-1530.    
WHITE, G.M., 1982b. The ethnographic study of cultural knowledge of “mental 
disorder”. In: A.J. MARSELLA and G.M. WHITE, eds. Cultural conceptions of mental 
health and therapy. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982, pp. 69-95. 
WHITE, G.M. and KIRKPATRICK, J., 1985. Person, self, and experience: Exploring 
Pacific ethnopsychologies. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.   
WHITE, G.M. and MARSELLA, A.J., 1982. Introduction: Cultural conceptions in 
mental health research and practice. In: A.J. MARSELLA and G.M. WHITE, eds. 
Cultural conceptions of mental health and therapy. Boston: Reidel Publishing, 1982, 
pp. 3-38. 
WHITEFORD, G.E., 1995. Other worlds and other lives: A study of occupational 
therapy student perceptions of cultural difference. Occupational Therapy 
International, 2, pp. 291-313. 
WHITEFORD, G.E. and MCALLISTER, L., 2006. Politics and complexity in 
intercultural fieldwork: The Vietnam experience. Australian Occupational Therapy 
Journal, 54(S1), pp. S74-83. 
WHITEFORD, G.E. and WILCOCK, A.A., 2000. Cultural relativism: Occupation and 
independence reconsidered. Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 67(5), pp. 
324-336.  
282 
 
WHITEFORD, G.E. and WRIGHT ST-CLAIR, V., 2002. Being prepared for diversity 
in practice: Occupational therapy students’ perceptions of valuable intercultural 
learning experience. British Journal of Occupational Therapy, 65(3), pp. 129-137. 
WHYBROW, S., FITZGERALD, M.H. and MULLAVEY-O’BYRNE, C., 1996, 
September 20th-21st. The culture of independence in occupational therapy. NSW 
Association of Occupational Therapists 9th Annual State Conference. Pp. 74, Ballina, 
NSW, Australia.     
WICKS, A. and WHITEFORD, G.E., 2003. Value of life stories in occupation based 
research. Australian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 50, pp. 86-91.  
WIEBE, P., 2004. Degrees of hallucinatioriness and Christic visions. Archiv fur 
Religions psychologie, 24, pp. 201-222. 
WILLEN, S.S., 2011a. Clinician-patient matching. In: M.J.D. GOOD, S.S. WILLEN, 
S.D. HANNAH, K. VICKERY and L.T. PARK, eds. Shattering culture: American 
medicine responds to cultural diversity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011, 
pp. 112-131.  
WILLEN, S.S., 2011b. Pas de Trois: Medical interpreters, clinical dimensions, and 
the patient-provider-interpreter triad. In: M.J.D. GOOD, S.S. WILLEN, S.D. 
HANNAH, K. VICKERY and L.T. PARK, eds. Shattering culture: American medicine 
responds to cultural diversity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011, pp. 70-94.    
WILLEN, S.S., BULLON, A. and Good, M.J.D., 2010. “Opening up a huge can of 
worms”: Reflections on a ‘cultural sensitivity’ course for psychiatry residents. Harvard 
Review of Psychiatry, 18, pp. 247-253. 
WILLIAMS, R., 1968. The concept of values. In: D.L. SILLS, ed. International 
encyclopaedia of the social sciences. New York: Cromwell, Collier and MacMillian, 
1968, pp. 283-287.  
WILLIAMS, B. and HEALY, D., 2001. Perceptions of illness causation among new 
referrals to a community mental health team: “Explanatory model” or “exploratory 
map”. Social Science and Medicine, 53(4), pp. 465-476. 
WILLIGEN, J.V., 2002. Applied anthropology: An introduction. 3rd ed., Westport, CT: 
Bergin and Garvey.  
WILLIS., J.W., 2007. Foundations of qualitative research: Interpretive and critical 
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.    
WILSON, W.H., BAN, T.A. and GUYS, W., 1986. Flexible system criteria in chronic 
schizophrenia. Comparative Psychiatry, 27, pp. 259-265. 
WING, J.K., COOPER, J.E. and SARTORIUS, N., 1974. The measurement and 
classification of psychiatric syndromes. London: Cambridge University Press.  
283 
 
WINKELMAN, M., 1999. Ethnic sensitivity in social work. Dubuque, Iowa: Eddie 
Bowers. 
WINKELMAN, M., 2005. Cultural awareness, sensitivity and competency. Peosta, 
Iowa: Eddie Bowers. 
WINKELMAN, M., 2009. Culture and health: Applying medical anthropology. San 
Francisco, California: Jossey Bass. 
WOLF, E., 1956. Aspects of group relations in a complex society. American 
Anthropologist, 88(6), pp. 1065-1078.  
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 1973. The International Pilot Study of 
Schizophrenia.  Geneva: WHO. 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 1992. The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and 
Behavioural disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines. Geneva: 
World Health Organization.  
YANG, S., SHEK, M.P., TSUNAKA, M. and LIM, H.B., 2006. Cultural influences on 
occupational therapy practice in Singapore: A pilot study. Occupational Therapy 
International, 13(3), pp.176-192. 
YOSSIFOVA, M. and LOEWENTHAL, K.M., 1999. Religion and the judgement of 
obsessionality. Mental Health, Religion and Culture, 2, pp.145-152.     
YOUNG, A., 1967. Internalizing and externalizing medical belief systems, Social 
Science and Medicine, 10(3-4), pp. 147-156. 
YOUNG, A., 1976. Some implications of medical beliefs and practices for social 
anthropology. American Anthropologist, 78(1), pp. 5-24. 
YOUNG, A., 1982. The anthropologies of illness and sickness. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 11, pp. 257-285. 
YULE, E.W., 2008. Practising across cultures: Perspectives of expatriate 
professionals. PhD thesis, University of Sydney.  
ZALOKAR, J., 1994. Psychological and psychopathological problems of immigrants 
and refugees. Radovljica, Slovenia: Didakta.  
ZANDI, T., 2013. Possible misclassification of psychotic symptoms among Moroccan 
immigrants in the Netherlands. In: S. BARNOW and N. BALKIR, eds. Cultural 
variations in psychopathology: From Research to Practice. MA, Cambridge: Hogrefe 
Publishing, 2013, pp. 219-231. 
ZARROUK, E.T.A., 1975. The frequency of visual hallucinations in schizophrenic 
patients in Saudi Arabia. British Journal of Psychiatry, 127, pp. 553-555. 
284 
 
ZIMMERMAN, N.P., 1991. Insight and other factors in compliance: A study of 
outpatients with schizophrenia who are compliant with medication. Unpublished 
thesis, Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists. 
ZINNBAUER, B.J., PARGAMENT, K.I., COLE, B., RYE, M.S., BUTTER, E.M., 
BELAVICH, T.G., HIPP, K.M., SCOTT, A.B. and KADAR, J.L., 1997. Religion and 
spirituality: Unfuzzying the fuzzy. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 36(4), 
pp. 549-564.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
285 
 
APPENDIX A 
Written Critical Incident Guidance Sheet 
Please can you write about any other specific situation with a patient during 
clinical placement where culture was important to that situation?       
Can you please write about this specific situation using the following criteria? 
 Please describe the situation by writing down when and 
where it happened (i.e., time of day and location).     
 Can you please describe who was involved in the situation? 
 Can you please describe what actually happened (i.e., who said or did what)? 
 Can you please describe what you were thinking and feeling at the time of the 
situation and just after it occurred? 
 Can you describe how you responded to or dealt with the situation? 
 Can you describe what it was about this situation that was significant for you? 
Please note that in accordance with the ethical protocols of this research, all 
data is treated as strictly confidential.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM FOR 
PRE-REGISTERED MENTAL HEALTH STUDENT NURSES                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Title of Research: 
Cultural Issues in Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Nurses’ Clinical 
Placements: An Anthropologically Informed Critical Incident Study  
                                                                                                                                        
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or 
not you would like to take part it is important for you to understand the aims of the 
research and what participation will involve. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully. Please contact me using the details at the bottom of 
this information sheet if there is anything that is not clear to you or if you require 
more information. This research is being conducted by Andrew Bassett as part of his 
PhD in ‘Culture and Communication’ at Nottingham Trent University. The research is 
being supervisied by Doctor David Kidner, a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at 
Nottingham Trent University. The aim of this research is to understand from your 
perspective the kinds of cultural issues that arise for you when working with service 
users during clinical placement and the types of strategies that you use to address 
these issues. Currently little is known about the actual impact of cultural influences 
on mental health student nurses’ clinical practice. It is hoped that the findings from 
the research can help to inform nursing education, theory and clinical practice. 
                                                                                                                                           
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are not obliged to participate and 
if you do decide to take part in the research interview you can withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason or explanation. If you would like to take part you will be 
given a copy of this information sheet to keep and asked to sign a participation 
consent form. You also do not have to answer any specific questions during the 
course of the research interview. With your permission the interview session will be 
287 
 
audio taped and transcribed to provide a full and accurate record of the interview. 
You can ask the interviewer to turn off the tape recorder at any point during the 
interview session. You will be provided with a copy of the interview transcript, which 
you can review and amend. If the interview is tape recorded the tape of the interview 
session will be destroyed immediately after transcription. If you do not wish the 
interview to be tape recorded, the interviewer will ask for your permission to take 
notes during the interview session. You will then be given an opportunity to review 
and amend the interview notes. At the end of the interview session the interviewer 
will ask you if you have any particular questions regarding your participation in the 
research.  
Everything that you say during the interview session will be treated as strictly 
confidential.  All records from the interview session will be stored in locked secure 
files, which can only be accessed by the investigator, Andrew Bassett. You will not 
be identified in any resulting publications or presentations which derive from this 
research. When you have read this information, Andrew Bassett the research 
investigator will discuss it with you at the beginning of the research interview and 
answer any questions you may have. If you have any questions at any time please 
contact Andrew Bassett. Telephone Landline, 0115 922 8684; Mobile, 
07902908630; Email, n0284265@ntu.ac.uk Please keep this participant information 
form.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH STUDY 
I have read and fully understand the information detailed in the Participant 
Information Sheet. I agree to participate in this research study having carefully 
considered all the information provided in the Participant Information Sheet.  
Any questions which I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I 
am fully aware that taking part in this research study is voluntary and that I 
can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. I understand that I will not 
be identified in any resulting publication and that all information provided in 
the interview will be treated as strictly confidential. I have received a copy of 
the Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form. I understand that if I 
require any additional information that I can contact the research investigator 
Andrew Bassett who will answer any additional questions.    
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Participant’s Name.............................................. 
Participant’s Signature........................................ Date............. 
Researcher Obtaining Consent 
I verify that I have given the Participant Information Sheet and Consent form to the 
interviewee. 
Researcher’s Name............................................ 
Researcher’s Signature...................................... Date................   
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of the research 
study can contact the ‘Graduate School Research Department’ at Nottingham 
Trent University, 0115 848 6335, or Andrew Bassett’s research supervisor, Dr 
David Kidner, Landline, 0115 848 3022, or email, david.kidner@ntu.ac.uk    
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APPENDIX C 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING BRANCH EDUCATORS 
Title of Research: 
Cultural Issues in Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Nurses’ Clinical 
Placements: An Anthropologically Informed Critical Incident Study 
                                                                                                                                        
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not 
you would like to take part, it is important for you to understand the aims of the 
research and what participation will involve. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully. Please contact me using the details at the bottom of 
this information sheet if there is anything that is not clear to you or if you require 
more information. This research is being conducted by Andrew Bassett (BA, PGcert, 
MA, and MA) as part of his PhD in ‘Culture and Communication’ at Nottingham Trent 
University. The research is being conducted under the supervision of Doctor David 
Kidner, a senior lecturer in psychology at Nottingham Trent University. 
The aim of this research is to understand from your perspective the kinds of cultural 
issues that arise for mental health nursing students when working with service users 
and the types of strategies that students use to address these issues. Currently little 
is known about the impact of cultural influences on mental health nursing students’ 
clinical practice. It is hoped that this research will help to identify these cultural 
issues and in doing so, inform nursing theory, education and practice.                                                                                                                                           
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are not obliged to participate; 
however, if you do decide to take part in the research, you can withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason or explanation. If you would like to take part, you will be 
given a copy of this information sheet to keep and asked to sign a participation 
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consent form. You also do not have to answer any specific questions during the 
course of the interview.  
With your permission the interview session will be audio taped and transcribed to 
provide a full and accurate record of the interview. You can ask the interviewer to 
turn off the tape recorder at any point during the interview session. You will be 
provided with a copy of the interview transcript, which you can review and amend. If 
the interview is tape recorded the tape of the interview session will be destroyed 
immediately after transcription. If you do not wish the interview to be tape recorded, 
the interviewer will ask for your permission to take notes during the interview 
session. You will then be given an opportunity to review and amend the interview 
notes. At the end of the interview session the interviewer will ask you if you have any 
particular questions or concerns regarding your participation in the research.  
Everything that you say during the interview session will be treated as strictly 
confidential.  All records from the interview session will be stored in locked secured 
files, which can only be accessed by the investigator (Andrew Bassett). You will not 
be identified in any resulting publications or presentations which derive from this 
research. When you have read this information, Andrew Bassett the research 
investigator will discuss it with you and answer any questions you may have. If you 
have any questions at any time, please contact Andrew Bassett. Telephone 
Landline, 0115 922 8684; Mobile, 07902908630; Email, n0284265@ntu.ac.uk 
This participant information form is for you to keep.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH STUDY 
I have read and fully understand the information detailed in the Participant 
Information Sheet. I agree to participate in this research study having 
carefully considered all the information provided in the Participant 
Information Sheet.  Any questions which I have asked have been answered to 
my satisfaction. I am fully aware that taking part in this research study is 
voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. I 
understand that I will not be identified in any resulting publication and that 
all information provided in the interview will be treated as strictly 
confidential. I have received a copy of the Participant Information Sheet and 
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Consent Form. I understand that if I require any additional information that I 
can contact the research investigator Andrew Bassett who will answer any 
additional questions.    
 
Participant’s Name.............................................. 
Participant’s Signature.....  .................... Date............. 
Researcher Obtaining Consent 
I verify that I have given the Participant Information Sheet to the interviewee. 
Researcher’s Name............................................ 
Researcher’s Signature...................................... Date................   
Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of the research 
study can contact the ‘Graduate School Research Department’ at Nottingham 
Trent University: Landline, 0115 848 6335; Andrew Bassett’s research 
supervisor, Dr David Kidner: Landline, 0115 848 3022 or email, 
david.kidner@ntu.ac.uk    
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APPENDIX D 
 
FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND 
CONSENT FORM 
 
You are invited to take part in a focus group discussion. The focus of this discussion 
will be based on the preliminary findings report from my PhD research: “Cultural 
Issues in Pre-Registered Mental Health Student Nurses’ Clinical Placements: An 
Anthropologically Informed Critical Incident Study”. Before you decide whether or not 
you would like to take part in the discussion, it is important for you to understand 
what participation will involve. Please take the time to read the following information 
carefully. If there is anything that is not clear to you regarding any aspect of this 
research or if you require more information, please contact me (Andrew Bassett) 
using the details at the bottom of this information sheet. This research is being 
conducted by Andrew Bassett, who is a PhD student at Nottingham Trent University.                                                                                                                                                
Participation in this focus group discussion is entirely voluntary. If you would like to 
take part, you will be given a copy of this information sheet to keep and asked to sign 
a consent form. If you do decide to participate you are still free to withdraw from the 
focus group discussion at any time. In addition, you can withdraw any information 
you have given during the discussion without stating a reason for doing so. You do 
not have to answer any of the questions during the discussion. With your permission 
the discussion will be audio-taped. This is to provide an accurate record of what was 
said at the focus group discussion. If at any time you wish to turn off the tape 
recorder, this will immediately be done. You also will be asked if you would like a 
copy of the transcript of the tape recorded discussion. You will be given the 
opportunity to review and amend any part of your contribution to the discussion.  
Everything that you say during the discussion will be treated as strictly confidential. 
All records from the discussion will be stored in locked and secured files, accessible 
only to the investigator (Andrew Bassett). You will not be identified in any resulting 
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publications or presentations that derive from this research. In addition, you will be 
fully debriefed following the focus group discussion. During the debriefing you can 
convey any questions or concerns that you may have regarding any aspect of the 
research to the investigator (Andrew Bassett). It is expected that the discussion will 
last up to 2 hours.                                                                                                                                             
When you have read this information, the researcher (Andrew Bassett) will discuss it 
with you and answer any questions that you may have. If you have any questions at 
any time, please feel free to contact Andrew Bassett. Mobile no, 07902908630; 
Landline no, 01323 488382; Email, n0284265@ntu.ac.uk This participant 
information form is for you to keep.  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH STUDY 
I have read and fully understand the information outlined in the participant 
information sheet. I agree to participate in this focus group discussion having 
carefully considered all the information provided in the participant information 
sheet. Any questions which I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I am fully aware that taking part in this focus group discussion is 
voluntary and that I can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. In 
addition, I am fully aware that during or after the discussion, I can withdraw 
any information pertaining to me. I understand that I will not be identified in 
any resulting publication and that all information provided in the group 
discussion will be treated as strictly confidential. I have received a copy of the 
participant information sheet and consent form. I understand that if I have any 
concerns or require any additional information that I can contact the 
researcher (Andrew Bassett).    
 
Participants' Name.............................................. 
Participants’ Signature........................................ Date............. 
Researcher Obtaining Consent 
I verify that I have given the participant information and consent sheet to the 
research participant. 
Researcher’s Name............................................ 
Researcher’s Signature...................................... Date................   
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Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of the research 
study can contact the ‘Graduate School Research Department’ at Nottingham 
Trent University: Landline, 0115 848 6335; Andrew Bassett’s research 
supervisor, Dr David Kidner: Landline, 0115 848 3022, or email, 
david.kidner@ntu.ac.uk.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
       
   
 
